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ABSTRACT 
 
This empirical study identifies and measures ways in which legal specialists with 
different levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think differently 
when assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-constrained contexts. 
The 20 participants in this study are all specialists in competition law.  They are a 
mixture of lawyers and economists from eight leading Australian law and economics 
firms, and from two regulatory bodies responsible for administering national 
competition laws.   This sample of individuals, whose years of experience as 
competition law specialists range from five to 35 years, is assumed to include 
apprentices, journeymen, experts and masters according to the proficiency scale used in 
Middle Ages craft guilds and still used today in studies of expertise and expert 
performance.   
Following an initial selection and ranking process, participants are categorised 
according to these four levels of proficiency.  Their cognitive skills are then tested and 
compared to identify expertise-related differences.  The principal data analysed are the 
think-aloud, concurrent verbalisations of study participants recorded as they seek to 
assess legal risk in test cases that require the use of competition law expertise.   These 
data reveal a number of readily identifiable and measurable differences between how 
more and less expert participants assess legal risk in their common area of legal 
specialisation.   
Master-level legal specialists are identified by their correct substantive analysis of legal 
issues, the ease and speed with which they identify key issues, and their heavy and 
effective reliance on intuition in assessing legal risk.  Experts are identified by their 
refusals to provide concluded views when information and time are limited, their ability 
to identify key issues quickly, and their effective integration of intuition and analytical 
reasoning. 
In terms of lower-level legal specialists, journeymen are identified by their reliance on 
superficial reasoning to assess legal risk, their laboured identification of issues, and 
their tendency to rely on guessing rather than intuition and to ‘blurt out’ their responses 
prematurely.  Apprentices are identified by their laboured reasoning and extensive 
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searching for relevant issues and analogies, their heavy reliance on analytical 
reasoning, and the influence of self-doubt on their deliberations. 
These and related findings, which are generalizable across other areas of legal 
specialisation, confirm the results of previous studies, raise questions about others, and 
offer new insights into the ways in which lawyers at different points along the legal-
expertise continuum think differently from each other.  These insights have the 
potential to improve the assessment methodologies used in lawyer accreditation 
schemes, change how users of legal services assess the expertise of legal specialists, 
increase the effectiveness of in-house training programs developed within law firms 
and by other legal service providers, and lead to new pedagogical approaches to the 
design and delivery of post-graduate, mid-career courses offered by law schools.  They 
also provide a new foundation for scholarly research into the cognitive development of 
specialist legal expertise, which to date has not distinguished between the four levels of 
proficiency identified in this thesis. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In its broadest setting, this thesis forms part of the scholarly literature devoted to 
understanding human wisdom and the nature of expertise.  It investigates specific 
aspects of how lawyers think, which has for decades been a topic of keen interest 
amongst legal scholars yet also one that has been rarely subjected to empirical 
investigation.  Previous studies in this area have overwhelmingly focused on the 
generic and knowledge-based aspects of legal thinking skills.  They have also mainly 
been restricted to comparisons between novices and presumed legal experts.  This study 
is the first to identify cognitive differences between legal specialists with different 
levels of expertise within the same area of law.   
Using investigative methodologies from the field of cognitive psychology, this thesis is 
grounded in the traditional framework of progressive or relative expertise.  This is a 
departure from previous studies that have relied on knowledge-based distinctions and 
presumptions of expertise based solely or principally on years of professional 
experience.  The findings of this thesis open up new areas of research where the 
identification and ranking of legal experts based on readily identifiable and measurable 
cognitive differences may now be approached with greater confidence and specificity. 
A  The Research Question 
The research question addressed in this thesis is: 
In what readily identifiable and measurable ways do legal specialists with different 
levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think differently when 
assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-constrained contexts? 
The significance of this question and the issues it raises lies in the centrality of 
cognitive skills to a lawyer’s training and professional work.  The idea that lawyers 
think differently from other people is ingrained in modern culture.  The dimensions of 
these differences, however, have not been fully investigated in a scientific sense.  Even 
less understood and less researched are the cognitive differences that exist between 
lawyers with different levels of legal expertise.  This is the context in which the above 
research question fits, and where the findings of this thesis have their greatest theortical 
and pedagogical significance. 
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Not only does this thesis open up new areas for investigation, its findings have 
immediate and direct applicability in a range of situations.  These include accreditation 
schemes within the legal industry, lawyer-selection choices by clients, legal training 
programs and law-school education initiatives.  Moreover, the methodology used in this 
research project offers guidance to future researchers seeking both to reproduce the 
findings reported here and to extend the qualitative and quantitative framework 
developed for this study.  No previous studies have provided an equivalent foundation 
based on an ability to distinguish between different levels of expertise within a single 
field of legal specialisation. 
As to the form of the research question chosen for this thesis, the focus on readily 
identifiable and measurable differences ensured that the findings of this study would be 
of practical use to future researchers as well as to others with an interest in lawyer 
accreditation schemes, the development of legal talent within law firms, enhancing 
information available to consumers of legal services, and legal education particularly at 
intermediate and advanced levels.  While theoretical insights about cognitive processes 
were important, the ultimate aim was to generate a list of identifiers, traits and 
indicators that could be easily and reliably used by a variety of interested parties to 
distinguish between different levels of legal experts within a single field of legal 
specialisation. 
Restricting the research question to information-limited and time-constrained contexts 
reflected the empirical basis of the study which was informed, in part, by the need to 
establish a benchmark for future testing that would likely take place in similar contexts, 
for example, by way of written or oral examinations.  Assessing legal expertise in a 
purely naturalistic setting was not considered feasible given the methodological tools 
available.  Nor would it have been as useful for future researchers and other interested 
parties given their likely reliance on carefully selected case studies and examination-
like test environments.     
The chosen area of legal specialisation in this study was competition law.  More 
specifically, it was Australian and New Zealand competition law with a specific focus 
on the merger clearance procedures that exist under the legislated regimes of both 
countries as well as in most other competition law jurisdictions around the world.  The 
advantage of choosing competition law for this thesis was twofold.  First, it is a distinct 
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and recognised field of legal specialisation such that practitioners can be easily 
identified.  Second, the researcher has been both a legal and economic specialist in this 
area of law for over 20 years.  This facilitated the efficient identification of technical 
legal issues and comports with previous studies along similar lines which have been 
conducted by researchers with extensive experience in immigration law, social security 
disability law and family law. 
This choice of legal specialisation required a detailed analysis of competition law 
issues during the testing process.  However, the findings of the thesis are general in 
nature and can be applied to a variety of other specialist fields of law.  Since all 
participants had essentially the same technical legal knowledge, such knowledge was 
not in or of itself a distinguishing factor when comparing their test performances.  The 
results from these tests can therefore be compared directly to the higher-level reasoning 
strategies of legal practitioners in other specialist areas of law. 
In terms of methodology, this thesis adopts the well-established techniques of think-
aloud problem solving and verbal protocol analysis.  These investigatory techniques 
have been used successfully in previous studies of legal thinking skills.  Based on the 
theoretical work of cognitive psychologists, this approach to eliciting and analysing 
ecologically valid verbal data was considered ideally suited to this research project 
which aims to collect empirical data on how lawyers actually think.  Moreover, by 
maximising the number of study participants and the assessment tasks they undertook, 
this study identifies statistically-significant differences between the cognitive skills of 
participants with different levels of specialist expertise.   
Lastly, this thesis’ response to the research question was aligned with the traditional 
categories of expertise development, namely, the progression from apprentice to 
journeymen and from expert to master.  By design, no participant in this study had less 
than five years specialist experience in competition law.  Accordingly, it was not 
necessary to consider the lower levels of novice, initiate or layman.  Further 
background to these traditional categories of expertise development is provided in the 
next chapter. 
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B  Summary of Findings 
The findings of this thesis are based on an analysis of 73 case assessments undertaken 
by 20 legal specialists, all of whom were required to think-aloud as they analysed and 
assessed legal risk in each case.  These findings can be broken down into qualitative 
identifiers, performance traits and uses of intuition which together can be used to 
distinguish legal specialists with different levels of expertise.  The following table 
summarises a number of these expertise-related identifiers and cognitive attributes. 
TABLE 1.1 – Summary of Expertise-Related Identifiers, Performance Traits and 
Intuitive Responses of Study Participants 
 1. IDENTIFIERS 2. PERFORMANCE TRAITS 3. INTUITIVE RESPONSES 
M
A
ST
ER
 
 Correct legal-risk 
assessments based on 
substantive analyses 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 
 Identifies key issues easily, and very quickly 
 Avoids irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Uses appropriate and specific analogies 
 Ignores/glosses-over short-cuts that minimise 
synthesis 
 Synthesises issues efficiently and effectively 
 Heavy and effective reliance 
on intuition 
 Extensive and effective self-
monitoring 
 Avoids deliberative doubt 
EX
P
ER
T 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Refusals to give an 
assessment when 
insufficient information 
available 
 
 Identifies key issues easily 
 Avoids irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Uses appropriate and specific analogies 
 Ignores/glosses-over short-cuts that minimise 
synthesis 
 Synthesises issues efficiently and effectively 
 Integrated intuition and 
reasoning 
 Extensive and effective self-
monitoring 
 Limits deliberative doubt 
JO
U
R
N
EY
M
A
N
 
 Correct legal-risk 
assessments based on 
superficial analyses 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Incorrect legal-risk 
assessments 
 Issue identification is laboured. 
 Identifies short-cuts that minimise synthesis 
 Identifies irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Synthesis is inefficient and limited/superficial 
 Substitutes guessing for 
intuition 
 Limited and ineffective self-
monitoring 
 Tendency to ‘blurt out’ 
premature responses 
A
P
P
R
EN
TI
C
E 
 Laboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Incorrect legal-risk 
assessments 
 
 Issue identification is laboured, and extensive 
 Uses vague and inappropriate analogies 
 Identifies irrelevant and low-quality issues  
 Synthesis is inefficient and limited/superficial 
 Heavy reliance on analytical 
reasoning 
 Limited self-monitoring 
 Overwhelmed by 
deliberative doubt 
 
These findings indicate that under test conditions such as those utilised in this study, 
master-level legal specialists can be identified by their correct substantive analysis of 
legal issues, the ease and speed with which they identify key issues, and their heavy 
reliance on intuition in assessing legal risk.  Experts can similarly be identified by their 
refusals to provide concluded views when information and time are limited, their ability 
to identify key issues quickly, and their effective integration of intuition and analytical 
reasoning. 
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In terms of lower-level legal specialists, journeymen are identifiable by their reliance 
on superficial reasoning to assess legal risk, their laboured identification of issues, and 
their tendency to rely on guessing rather than their intuition and to ‘blurt out’ their 
responses prematurely.  Apprentices are identifiable by their laboured reasoning and 
extensive search for relevant issues and analogies, their heavy reliance on analytical 
reasoning, and the significant influence of self-doubt on their deliberations. 
A more detailed discussion of these and other expertise-related identifiers, performance 
traits and intuitive responses is provided in Chapter 6. 
1  Quantitative Differences 
The findings summarised in Table 1.1 are based, in large part, on statistically-
significant quantitative differences between the legal-risk assessment performances of 
study participants.  Some of these differences can be expressed as numeric ratios and 
charted to illustrate relationships and associations between particular cognitive 
performance characteristics and different levels of specialist legal expertise.  The 
following chart, which depicts time spent retrieving information from long-term 
memory (denoted here as identifying issues) as a proportion of total assessment time, 
provides an example of a relevant expertise-based association. 
CHART 1.1 – Average Proportion of Total Time Spent Identifying Issues 
 
This chart indicates that as expertise increases, legal specialists spend less time 
retrieving information from their long-term memories.  This is ostensibly because they 
10%
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have a better sense of which issues are most important compared to less expert legal 
specialists who have a less developed sense of issue priorities and relevance, as well as 
less efficiently organised mental schema.  As between journeymen and experts, 
however, no statistically significant difference was identified on this measure.  The fact 
that master-level participants spent less time than experts on this task suggests that 
cognitive performance in this area continues to improve even amongst highly-
experienced lawyers. 
A similar chart can be generated from data relating to the proportion of total assessment 
time participants spent drawing inferences when assessing legal risk in the test-cases.  
The chart below shows that higher-level (more expert) participants in this study spent 
substantially more time drawing inferences (denoted as synthesis) compared to lower-
level participants.  However, amongst experts and masters no further distinction was 
evident.  There was also no statistically significant difference between apprentices and 
journeymen on this measure. 
CHART 1.2 – Average Proportion of Total Time Spent Engaging in Synthesis 
 
Cognitive load statistics were also recorded during the legal risk-assessment process by 
measuring participants’ rates of verbalisation as they engaged in different cognitive 
tasks.  These data indicate that apprentices and journeymen exert greater effort than 
experts and masters while retrieving information from their long term memories and 
when drawing inferences.  In addition, whereas experts and masters exert the same 
cognitive effort whether identifying or synthesising issues, apprentices and journeymen 
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tend to experience greater cognitive load when identifying issues and appear to find 
synthesis significantly easier in relative terms, ostensibly because the inferences they 
draw are more superficial. 
2  Previous Studies 
This thesis relied on a variety of previous studies to guide its methodological design.  It 
also confirmed the findings of researchers who have investigated the cognitive 
behaviours and abilities of experts in general and lawyers in particular.  These 
confirmations were, however, largely incidental to the primary objective of developing 
a response to the thesis’ research question regarding readily identifiable and measurable 
expertise-related cognitive differences.  In terms of cognitive traits previously 
identified by researchers of general expertise, the following confirmatory results were 
recorded: 
 Higher-level (ie more expert) legal specialists in this study used more effective 
and more efficient risk assessment strategies, with masters being able to 
correctly evaluate risk based on substantive analysis notwithstanding the 
information and time-constraints that existed.  They were also the only 
participants able to recall ‘instant’ solutions (that is, solutions that appeared to 
avoid intermediate steps) on this basis.  
 
 There was some evidence that the higher-level specialists in this study were less 
flexible in their methods and more dependent on contextual information, which 
may explain the refusals by two expert/master-level participants to provide any 
assessment because of insufficient background information. 
 
 The atypical case used in this study revealed differences between higher-level 
participants who either provided an instant solution based on their expert 
knowledge or successfully undertook a substantive and conceptually difficult 
assessment, and lower-level participants who were either attracted to analytical 
short cuts (which resulted in superficial analyses) or struggled to complete their 
assessments. 
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 The responses of some higher-level participants suggested that they had 
glossed-over unimportant details in the test-case documents, while their more 
effective self-monitoring skills could explain why they verbalised fewer 
comprehension and analytical errors than lower-level participants. 
 
Regarding those researchers who previously focused on the cognitive analysis of legal 
expertise, further confirmations were apparent from the data collected during this study.  
These confirmations include: 
 Higher-level participants in this study were faster at diagnosing relevant legal 
issues, at least in the sense of more quickly identifying the key factual 
information in the test-case documents.  (The area of law itself was known at 
the start of the tests, so there was no testing of whether or not participants could 
identify the applicable legal rules.) 
 
 The better performance of higher-level participants was likely to have been 
explained by their having more effective mental schemas for assessing legal risk 
in the context of the test-cases used in this study.  
 
 Higher-level participants also had a clearer and more specific idea of what 
further information they required – and they had more effective strategies for 
how to get that information.  Lower-level experts tended to be more vague in 
these areas. 
 
 Lower-level participants generally exhibited less precise and more generalised 
use and recall of information.  This was particularly evident in instances of 
laboured reasoning and in lower-level participants’ greater focus on retrieving 
information which was generally of a lower quality than that relied upon by 
higher-level participants. 
 
Lastly, the results of this study suggest that some previous researchers have relied on 
questionable assumptions regarding the expertise levels of their study participants.  In 
studies concerning generic legal skills such as reading court cases, this is unlikely to 
have been a significant issue.  However, for those studies which sought to compare the 
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cognitive performances of legal experts and novices on more substantive tasks, there 
may have been material – yet unacknowledged – variation in the cognitive abilities of 
the presumed experts.  Whether or not this warrants a reassessment of those studies, 
future studies are likely to benefit from the findings of this thesis, which provides a list 
of readily identifiable and measurable differences in the cognitive performances of 
legal specialists from five years through to more than 30 years of specialist experience. 
C  Chapter Outline 
This thesis is divided into six further chapters. 
Chapter 2 identifies a lack of scholarly literature concerned with the cognitive skills of 
legal specialists and describes how the few empirical studies that have taken place in 
this area have been restricted to expert-novice comparisons rather than the higher-level 
comparisons of interest to this thesis.  This review summarises the nature of this gap in 
the literature while at the same time identifying the methodologies likely to be most 
useful for further research in the area.  This includes a discussion of the conceptual 
framework of progressive expertise, which has to date largely been overlooked in 
favour of knowledge-based expertise frameworks as used by cognitive psychologists 
investigating expert thinking in medicine, amongst other professions. 
Chapter 3 describes the process by which the methodology used in this study was 
developed having regard to previous research amongst legal scholars and researchers in 
other fields who have used think-aloud verbal protocol analysis to investigate cognitive 
traits associated with expert performance.  It describes the five measures used to rank 
participants in this study according to their levels of apparent or likely expertise.  It also 
explains the procedures used to elicit and record the concurrent verbalisations of 
participants as they assessed legal risk in the provided test-cases.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the exploratory nature of the analytical approach 
adopted in this thesis to describe readily identifiable and measurable differences in the 
cognitive performances of study participants with different levels of specialist legal 
expertise.   
Chapter 4 explains how 20 competition law specialists spread across the major business 
centres of Australia were selected and then ranked according to their levels of likely 
expertise using the methodological framework developed in Chapter 3.  This 
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explanation includes detailed accounts of the processes by which individual lawyers 
were assessed having regard to their work experience and their performance in 
assessing the test cases.  The chapter includes a comparative review of rankings from 
independent research publications that purport to identify leading lawyers in various 
specialist fields in different jurisdictions.   
Chapter 5 describes how the results of participants’ test performances were assessed 
and categorised according to an analytical framework that sought to highlight readily 
identifiable and measurable differences between higher and lower-ranked participants.  
This includes an overview of the data collected and the application of the 
methodologies described in Chapter 3.  The substantive discussion in this chapter 
centres on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of participants’ verbal transcripts 
and the differences that became evident during the comparative process.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of observed behavioural and quantitative differences. 
Chapter 6 records a deeper analysis of the results observed in the Chapter 5.  It begins 
by focusing on associations between levels of expertise and time spent identifying 
issues and drawing inferences.  It then analyses verbalisation rates for each category of 
participant and for specific cognitive tasks.  After this, a further analytical approach is 
considered to investigate possible reasons why participants behaved in the ways that 
were observed.  This is followed by a discussion of several factors that may have 
influenced the results of the study.   The final section of the chapter summarises the 
findings of the study for the purpose of providing a direct response to the research 
question in both tabular and written forms.  These findings include a list of the 
behavioural identifiers, performance traits and cognitive indicators that distinguished 
the different thinking approaches and abilities of the apprentice, journeyman, expert 
and master-level legal specialists in this study.   
Chapter 7 reviews the previous research on which this study was based and identifies 
areas where this thesis either confirms or raises questions about the methodology and 
findings of previous studies that have investigated the cognitive aspects of legal 
expertise.  It also discusses the limitations of the present study in terms of design and 
execution.  It then considers the areas of future research facilitated by or likely to 
benefit from the methodological approach adopted here and the responses provided to 
the original research question.  These areas of future research extend across the 
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disciplines of cognitive psychology, lawyer accreditation schemes, assessments by 
consumers of legal services, talent management within law firms, and legal education.   
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II  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter begins with a review of the scholarly literature concerned with legal 
thinking.  It then considers various methodologies and conceptual frameworks that 
have been used to investigate and analyse the cognitive characteristics of legal 
expertise.  The discussion concludes by confirming the need for further research to 
provide a response to this thesis’ research question insofar as there does not presently 
exist a list of identifiers, traits and indicators that can be used to measure specialist 
legal expertise beyond the knowledge-based, novice-expert dichotomy. 
Part A of this chapter explores both scholarly and popular interest in the phrase ‘to 
think like a lawyer.’  This includes a review of existing research involving legal experts 
which to date has been limited to the comparison of novice and expert differences, but 
not the cognitive abilities of higher-level legal specialists within the same field of law.  
Given the focus of the present study on how specialist lawyers with different levels of 
expertise think, scholarly contributions to the debate over what it means to think like a 
lawyer are identified as lacking sufficient empirical data to ground a compelling 
response to this study’s research question.   
Part B considers previous empirical research into the cognitive traits of lawyers.  
Researchers in this area have combined theoretical research on legal thinking skills 
with methodologies developed by cognitive psychologists to trace the mental processes 
that distinguish the mental abilities of experienced lawyers.  However, these studies 
have predominantly been undertaken by scholars outside the legal academy and have 
been restricted to generic legal skills, such as the effective reading of court cases.  
While suggestive of a methodological path towards answering this study’s research 
question, no studies in this area offer an adequate response.     
Part C examines a different methodological approach adopted by cognitive 
psychologists who have studied expertise amongst medical practitioners.  This 
approach acknowledges the discrete nature of medical specialisation.  Scholars in this 
field have developed analytical schemes and frameworks to distinguish between 
different levels of expertise within and amongst medical specialists.  However, the 
work of these researchers has been confined to studying knowledge-based differences, 
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where higher-level experts are distinguished by their possession of specialist medical 
knowledge.  This is a different conceptual approach from that required to measure 
cognitive differences between legal specialists with the same technical legal 
knowledge, but different levels of expertise. 
Part D draws together the work of legal scholars who have undertaken or foreseen the 
potential for empirical research into the cognitive traits of legal specialists with 
different levels of expertise.  It identifies the influence of previous research from the 
area of medicine which has resulted in a refocusing of scholarly attention on how legal 
specialists actually think, even though this refocusing has largely been limited to 
knowledge-based inquiries.  This discussion confirms that the cognitive differences 
noted in this context are those attributable to differences in specialist legal knowledge 
rather than differences in levels of expertise within the same specialist field of law. 
Part E discusses an alternative conceptual framework better suited to identifying 
cognitive differences between legal specialists with different levels of expertise within 
the same field of legal specialisation.  This framework draws on the traditional 
progressive categorisation of expertise, which both presumes a basic common 
knowledge across all levels along the specialist expertise continuum and provides 
descriptions of an individual’s level of expertise as they move through different stages 
of development.   
Part F describes an intra-specialist conceptual framework within which lawyers with 
the same specialist legal knowledge may be compared according to different cognitive 
skills associated with their different levels of specialist legal expertise.   This discussion 
confirms the efficacy of progressive expertise frameworks in general, and highlights 
the relevance of the traditional model as both a workable and appropriate 
methodological construct for the current proposed research into the identification and 
measurement of the expertise-related cognitive traits of legal specialists. 
The chapter concludes that the research question for this study cannot be answered by 
previous research into how lawyers think.  This is not because the methodologies or 
techniques that have been developed are not appropriate or are unlikely to be effective 
in an intra-specialist comparative context.  Rather, it is because no previous studies 
have sought to identify and analyse the cognitive differences that are of interest here.  
Those studies have been predominantly concerned with knowledge-based comparisons 
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rather than with the progressive conceptualisation of specialist legal expertise.  Given 
this gap in the existing scholarly literature, the latter approach was adopted to answer 
this thesis’ research question. 
A  To Think Like a Lawyer 
The ways in which lawyers solve legal problems have long been of interest to 
researchers of expertise and expert performance, perhaps in part because of the 
perceived uniqueness of what it means ‘to think like a lawyer.’  Yet empirical studies 
have not been as numerous nor as extensive as those involving chess players and 
medical doctors, to name just two of the hundreds of fields of human endeavour in 
which experts have been identified and their cognitive abilities subjected to 
investigation.   As a consequence, the empirical study of lawyering expertise remains a 
promising though largely untapped area of research, especially at the higher levels of 
legal specialists.   
One of the most important contributions to the study of legal expertise from scholars 
involved in wisdom and expertise research is the application of methodologies that 
enable the tracing of cognitive processes.  Amongst these methodologies, one of the 
most popular and best understood is think-aloud verbal protocol analysis.
1
  This 
methodology, which involves participants engaging in ‘think-aloud’ problem-solving 
tasks, has significant advantages over interviews, surveys and other data gathering 
techniques because it permits direct investigation of how individuals actually think. 
                                                          
1
 The popularity of this methodology, particularly amongst the leading researchers in wisdom studies, is 
well documented.  See Monika Ardelt, ‘Wisdom as Expert Knowledge System:  A Critical Review of a 
Contemporary Operationalization of an Ancient Concept’ (2004) 47 Human Development 257.  The so-
called Berlin group of wisdom researchers, whom Ardelt describes as having undertaken ‘the most 
extensive and systematic empirical work on wisdom in the field to date’ (Ibid 258) and whom Robert 
Sternberg calls ‘world leaders in the study of wisdom’ (Robert J Sternberg, ‘Words to the Wise About 
Wisdom:  A Commentary of Ardelt’s Critique of Baltes’ (2004) 47 Human Development 286, 286), have 
consistently embraced think-aloud verbal protocol analysis.  See, as examples: PB Baltes and UM 
Staudinger, ‘Wisdom:  A Metaheuristic (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mind and Virtue Toward Excellence’ 
(2000) 55 American Psychologist 122; PB Baltes, UM Staudinger, A Maercker and J Smith, ‘People 
Nominated as Wise:  A Comparative Study of Wisdom-Related Knowledge’ (1995) 10 Psychology and 
Aging 155;  J Smith and PB Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge:  Age/Cohort Differences in Response 
to Life-Planning Problems,’ (1990) 26 Developmental Psychology 494; Staudinger, UM, J Smith and PB 
Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge in a Life Review Task:  Age Differences and the Role of 
Professional Specialization’ (1992) 7 Psychology and Aging 271.  For a summary of hundreds of studies 
that have used this methodology in the contexts of various professions see K Anders Ericsson, Neil 
Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006).    See also the recent review of almost 2,000 think-
aloud studies in Mark C Fox, K Anders Ericsson and Ryan Best, ‘Do Procedures for Verbal Reporting of 
Thinking Have to Be Reactive? A Meta-Analysis and Recommendations for Best Reporting Methods,’ 
(2011) 137(2) Psychological Bulletin 316. 
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Accordingly, while there is a relative lack of empirical research on how lawyers 
actually think, the tools for undertaking such investigations are both readily available 
and well understood.  Moreover, the few cognitive studies that have involved lawyers 
have consistently demonstrated the feasibility of scholarly inquiry of this kind.
2
  These 
studies have not, however, significantly advanced our understanding of how legal 
practitioners at the highest levels in specialist fields of law think.  This is largely 
because previous researchers have typically compared novices with presumed experts 
in tasks involving generic or general legal skills.  Only a few have compared intra-
specialist cognitive differences within the same field of law. 
The application of think-aloud verbal protocol analysis to lawyers can be traced back to 
the mid-1970s,
3
 although use of this methodology in other knowledge domains began 
as early as the 1920s.
4
  One reason why cognitive researchers began to focus their 
attention on lawyers was because of a long held belief that ‘to think like a lawyer’ 
involved thinking differently from other people.
5
  This view has persisted within 
                                                          
2
 See, as examples, Mary A Lundeberg, ‘Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension:  Studying 
Understanding in Legal Case Analysis’ (1987) 22(4) Reading Research Quarterly 407; Dorothy H 
Deegan, ‘Exploring Individual Differences Among Novices Reading in a Specific Domain:  The Case of 
Law’ (1995) 30(2) Reading Research Quarterly 154; Fernando Colon-Navarro, ‘Thinking Like a 
Lawyer:  Expert-Novice Differences in Simulated Client Interviews’ (1997) 21 The Journal of the Legal 
Profession 107; Ian Weinstein, ‘Lawyering in the State of Nature:  Instinct and Automaticity in Legal 
Problem Solving’ (1998-1999) 23 Vermont Law Review 1; James F Stratman, ‘When Law Students Read 
Cases: Exploring Relations Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection’ (2002) 
34(1) Discourse Processses 57; James F Stratman, ‘How Legal Analysts Negotiate Indeterminacy of 
Meaning in Common Law Rules:  Toward a Synthesis of Linguistic and Cognitive Approaches to 
Investigation’ (2004) 24 Language & Communication 23; Laurel Currie Oates, ‘Leveling the Playing 
Field:  Helping Students Succeed by Helping Them Learn to Read as Expert Lawyers’ (2006) 80 St 
John’s Law Review 227; Leah M Christensen, ‘Legal Reading and Success in Law School:  An Empirical 
Study’ (2006-2007) 30 Seattle University Law Review 603; Leah M Christensen, ‘The Paradox of Legal 
Expertise:  A Study of Experts and Novices Reading the Law’ (2008) Brigham Young University 
Education and Law Journal 53; Fleurie Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, Henny P A Boshuizen and Frans J 
Prins, ‘Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological Knowledge in the Legal Domain’ 
(2008) 20(6) European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 1043; Fleurie Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, 
Henny P A Boshuizen and Frans J Prins, ‘Effects of Conceptual Knowledge and Availability of 
Information Sources on Law Student’s Legal Reasoning’ (2010) 38 Instructional Science 23; Fleurie 
Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, Gijs van Dijk and Henny P A Boshuizen, ‘Instructional Support for 
Novice Law Students:  Reducing Search Processes and Explaining Concepts in Cases’ (2011) 25 Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 408. 
3
 H F M Crombag, J L De Wijkerslooth and E H Van Tuyl Van Serooskerken, ‘On Solving Legal 
Problems’ (1975-1976) 27 Journal of Legal Education 168. 
4
 See, for example, J B Watson, ‘Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?’ (1920) 11 
British Journal of Psychology 87; and, K Duncker, ‘A Qualitative (Experimental and Theoretical) Study 
of Productive Thinking (Solving Comprehensible Problems)’ (1926) 33 Pedagogical Seminary 642. 
5
 One of the earliest recorded instances of the phrase 'to think like a lawyer' (written within quotation 
marks) was in the first edition of the Journal of Legal Education in 1948, in a report on the proceedings 
of the first National Law Student Conference in the United States.  John De J Pemberton, ‘National Law 
Student Conference: The Conference Report’ (1948-49) 1 Journal of Legal Education 73, 90.  See also 
Clarence Morris, How Lawyers Think (Harvard University Press, 1937). 
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popular culture and within the legal academy, and ostensibly explains at least in part 
the marketing of self-help books based on this premise,
6
 as well as the numerous 
scholarly references to the 1973 Hollywood movie The Paper Chase, in which 
Professor Charles Kingsford famously pronounced to his class of first year law 
students, ‘You teach yourselves the law.  I train your minds.  You come in here with a 
skull full of mush, and if you survive, you'll leave thinking like a lawyer.’7   
For a significant number of legal academics, Professor Kingsford’s speech has become 
something of an intellectual touchstone, arguably because of the paucity of empirical 
studies on legal thinking skills.
8
  For some scholars, just as it was for the fictitious 
Professor, the existence of a specific legal way of thinking is beyond question.  This 
view permeates the myriad formalised methods of legal reasoning taught to law 
students during the early years of law school.  Such methods typically have their own 
acronyms, such as IRAC, HIRAC, IREAC, MIRAT and CREAC,
9
 and their central 
                                                          
6
 What it might mean ‘to think like a lawyer’ has today become a key theme in a number of books aimed 
at a general readership promising to impart the ‘secrets’ of legal thinking skills to lay people – as if the 
ability to think like a lawyer is a special attribute and an advantage only experienced by those people 
who have attended law schools.  See as examples, Robert J Dudley, Think Like a Lawyer:  How to Get 
What You Want by Using Advocacy Skills (Nelson-Hall, 1980);  Kenneth J Vandevelde, Thinking Like a 
Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Westview Press, 1996) – The marketing spiel on this book 
states: ‘This is not a book about the content of the law; it is about a well-developed and valuable way of 
thinking that can be applied to many fields’; Ruth Ann McKinney, Reading Like  A Lawyer: Time-Saving 
Strategies for Reading Like an Expert (Carolina Academic Press, 2
nd 
ed, 2012); Larry Kahn, Think Like a 
Lawyer:  Negotiating a New Car Purchase (Amazon Digital Services, 2012).  The opportunity should 
not be missed to note also that blogs and other easily accessible sources of information that inform 
popular opinion are not just a repository of hilarious lawyer jokes, but also of observations like this:  ‘In 
case you were wondering, here is a formal definition of to think like a lawyer:  verb, 1) to display a 
neurotic tendency to hostile, oppositional behavior; and/or 2) to obsess over unnecessary, pointless 
detail.’ The People’s Therapist, ‘Oversold’ (25 April 2012) 
<http://thepeoplestherapist.com/2012/04/25/oversold/ >. 
7 
The Paper Chase (Directed by James Bridges, Twentieth Century Fox, 1973).  John Jay Osborne’s 
book on which the movie was based, also titled The Paper Chase, was written while the author attended 
Harvard Law School.  During a visit to his alma mater in October 2012, Osborne said he was motivated 
to write the book after sensing that the law school ‘glorified their teachers over their students.’  ‘“The 
Paper Chase” at 40: Law School audience reflects on iconic film about earning degree,’ (Harvard 
Gazette, 2 October 2012) <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/10/the-paper-chase-at-40/>. 
8
 As many as half of all the articles reviewed by the researcher in which a legal scholar discussed 
teaching students how to think like lawyers, cited – and often quoted from – Professor Kingsfield’s 
fictional speech. 
9 
 For an introduction to what these acronyms mean and where more information about them can be 
found see
 Nick James, ‘Logical, Critical and Creative: Teaching ‘Thinking Skills’ to Law Students’ 
(2012) 12(1) QUT Law & Justice 66.
  
As to the above acronyms: 
 
IRAC = Issue, Rule/Law, Application, 
Conclusion; HIRAC = Heading, Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion; IREAC = Issue, Rule, Explanation 
of rule, Application, Conclusion; MIRAT = Material facts, Issues, Rules, Arguments, Tentative 
conclusion; and, CREAC = Conclusion, Rule, Explanation of rule, Application of rule, Conclusion.  See 
further:  Jeffery Metzler, ‘The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing’ (2002-2003) 60 University of 
Detroit Mercy Law Review 501; Soma Kedia,‘Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: 
Towards a New Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing’ (2009-2010) 87 University of Detroit Mercy Law 
Review 147; Michelle Sanson, Thalia Anthony and David Worswick, Connecting with Law (Oxford 
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purpose is to assist law students identify legal issues and present their solutions to legal 
problems in a lawyerly manner.
10
  In other words, they replicate or mechanize what it 
means to think like a lawyer.  In this regard, they reflect how law professors believe 
lawyers think or – cast in a normative pedagogical sense – should think.11 
The continuing refinement of such methods has been accompanied by a growing 
number of reports and studies commissioned globally to clarify what law schools 
should be teaching their students, and more specifically what kinds of pedagogical 
outcomes they should be aiming to achieve.  For instance, the Australian Learning and 
Teaching Council’s Threshold Learning Outcome 3 (‘TLO3’) for the Bachelor of Laws 
degree titled ‘Thinking Skills’ was formulated to align with studies, reports and 
recommendations published in a range of other jurisdictions, including Britain, the 
United States, Canada and Scotland.
12
  Its accompanying Good Practice Guide to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2010); ANU Academic Skills and Learning Centre, ‘Legal Reasoning and 
HIRAC’ (2010); Mark E Wojcik, ‘Add an E to Your IRAC’ (2006-2007) 35 Student Lawyer 26; John 
Wade,‘Meet MIRAT: Legal Reasoning Fragmented into Learnable Chunks’ (1990-1991) 2 Legal 
Education Review 283; David S Romantz and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental 
Skill (Carolina Academic Press, 2nd Ed, 2009).
 
10
 With reference to the above acronyms, James wrote that ‘Students are taught how, when presented 
with a set of facts in the form of a tutorial problem or an exam question, they should identify the legal 
issues and, considering each issue carefully and logically, apply the relevant legal rules to the facts in 
order to reach a rational and convincing conclusion about the legal consequences of the particular 
situation.’  James, above n 9, 76.  
11
 Although it should also be noted that some academics argue against the use of these formalistic 
approaches in legal practice claiming they are unlikely to facilitate the flexible, tailored analyses required 
in real world settings.  See, for instance, Bryan A Garner, ‘Although IRAC Works for Exams, Avoid it in 
Practice’ (2004-2005) 33 Student Lawyer 10.  James further states that ‘The prevailing view in Australia 
appears to be that formalistic techniques such as IRAC are useful for students new to the study of law, 
but as they progress through their legal studies the “scaffolding” offered by the step by step techniques 
should recede into the background in favour of a greater emphasis upon “flow” in the student’s reasoning 
and consequent improvements in subtlety and persuasiveness.’  Ibid. 
12
 The authors of these TLOs summarized the various – and consistently general – ways in which 
researchers and advisory bodies in other jurisdictions have described what they consider the legal 
thinking skills that law school graduates should be expected to have developed:   
The United Kingdom QAA Subject Benchmark Statement for Law stresses the need for 
graduates to be able to ‘make a critical judgment of the merits of particular arguments,’ ‘critical 
analysis’ being ‘recognised as a key attribute of graduates.’  Also, the QAA identified that 
graduates should have an ability to ‘present and make a reasoned choice between alternative 
solutions.’  This is similar to the United Kingdom Joint Statement of the Law Society and the 
General Council of the Bar’s requirement that graduates should be able to ‘recognise potential 
alternative conclusions for particular situations, and provide supporting reasons for them.’  The 
MacCrate Report in the United States recognised that graduates should ‘be familiar with the 
skills and concepts involved in identifying and formulating legal issues.’  The Task Force on the 
Canadian Common Law Degree recommended that entrants to a Canadian bar admission 
program be required to have demonstrated skills in solving legal problems that included the 
ability to ‘a. identify relevant facts; b. identify legal, practical, and policy issues and conduct the 
necessary research arising from those issues; c. analyse the results of research; d. apply the law 
to the facts; and e. identify and evaluate the appropriateness of alternatives for resolution of the 
issue or dispute.’  The Scottish Accreditation Guidelines require that graduates have a basic 
competence in ‘apply[ing] knowledge and analysis... creatively to complex situations in order to 
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teaching TLO3 includes a review of relevant literature such as text books and articles 
dedicated to explaining various reasoning strategies using the above reasoning methods 
and related strategies.
13
   As to the elements of TLO3 itself, which is one of six TLOs 
developed under the Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Project, these 
recommend that law graduates should be able to ‘(a) identify and articulate legal issues, 
(b) apply legal reasoning and research to generate appropriate responses to legal issues, 
(c) engage in critical analysis and make a reasoned choice amongst alternatives, and (d) 
think creatively in approaching legal issues and generating appropriate responses.’14 
Kift, Israel and Field describe how they identified these four essential elements of legal 
thinking after undertaking national consultations with industry and academic 
representatives, and following an investigation of international trends amongst legal 
educators.
15
  They note the universal emphasis on graduates being capable of thinking 
‘analytically and creatively in approaching and generating solutions to legal issues,’ 
independent of any specific legal knowledge in a substantive sense.
16
  This approach 
comports with the authors’ characterization of legal education as a continuum, just as 
their Canadian counterparts had focused on ‘foundational competencies necessary for 
the practice of law’ while acknowledging the important role of the legal profession in 
providing additional inputs along the path towards formal licensing.
17
  
The key challenge for theoreticians has been how to define (and not merely describe) 
what constitutes lawyerly thinking, a concept which is viewed by many scholars as 
critical to the mission of law schools.
18
  Some authors have written about what they 
                                                                                                                                                                         
provide arguable solutions to concrete problems by presenting a range of viable options from a 
set of facts and law’ and also that they ‘[t]hink critically and make critical judgments on the 
relative and absolute merits of particular arguments and solutions.’  
Sally Kift, Mark Israel and Rachael Field, Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Project:  
Bachelor of Laws Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Statement, December 2010 (Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council, 2010) 17 (references omitted).  Also see James, above n 9. 
13
 Nick James, Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of Laws): Thinking Skills (Threshold Learning Outcome 
3) (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2011). 
14
 Ibid 1. 
15
 Kift, Israel and Field, above n 12. 
16
 Ibid 8. 
17
 Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Final Report (2009) 23. 
18
 ‘[T]he critical first step to understanding the purpose of law school is to define what it means to “think 
like a lawyer.”  Although this is an oft-stated justification for law school, no consensus exists about what 
“thinking like a lawyer” means.  Furthermore, the concept of thinking like a lawyer is loaded with 
notions, accumulated over time, about what a lawyer does.  We need to re-examine and clearly define 
what it means to “think like a lawyer” before we can begin to assess lawyers’ practices.’ Bethany Rubin 
Henderson, ‘Asking the Lost Question:  What is the Purpose of Law School?’ (2003) 53(1) Journal of 
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perceive to be a lack of agreement on ‘a detailed conception of what “thinking like a 
lawyer” means,’19 while others have called it ‘the hoary old saw’ of legal education.20  
These scholars claim that notwithstanding the popularity of this phrase and numerous 
articles and books on the subject, the definitions that have been offered are 
‘unfulfilling’ and clearly show the need for a greater focus on the ‘cognitive 
components of the skill that has become a central theme of legal education.’21   
According to Schauer, the author of a recently reprinted text-book on thinking like a 
lawyer,
22
 the manner in which law school professors typically escape confronting this 
definitional void is particularly revealing.  He has observed how his fellow law-school 
deans, when asked by first year law students about the value of a legal education, begin 
to realise that ‘we claim that we are teaching students how to think like lawyers, but we 
never really tell them what it is to think like lawyers; we assume that they will absorb 
this by osmosis, and we assume it the same way that people have assumed it for 
decades or generations.’23  Which is, as Schauer also notes, essentially the same 
approach adopted by Professor Kingsfield who similarly avoided providing any 
definition.
24
 
Other legal academics have argued that not only is there such a thing as ‘thinking like a 
lawyer,’ but that depending on what kind of law is involved different types of legal 
thinking are required.  Okamoto, for instance, has argued that by exposing law students 
to the mathematics of business and finance, their ability as transactional lawyers can be 
greatly improved such that ‘we will have taught them how to begin to think like a “deal 
lawyer” – something very different from what we have traditionally meant by “thinking 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Legal Education 48, 57.  See also Larry O Gantt, ‘Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer:  Analyzing 
the Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind’ (2006-2007) 29 Campbell Law Review 413. 
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 Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard 
University Press, 2009, reprint 2012). 
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 Frederick Schauer, ‘Do Lawyers Think, and If So, How?’ presentation at an alumni luncheon on 30 
April 2010 uploaded to Youtube.com by the University of Virginia School of Law on 4 May 2010 at 
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expressed by James (whose opinion may well be shared by a large majority of law professors) that ‘Legal 
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they are called upon to engage in legal problem solving in almost all their law subjects.’  James, above n 
13, 11. 
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like a lawyer”.’25  This is notwithstanding that, as noted, there is no clear consensus as 
to what that traditional meaning might be.  
Okamato’s contention conflicts with the claimed ability of law professors to teach ‘the 
specialized type of thinking and problem solving common to the legal profession.’26  
His ‘deal lawyer’ thesis postulates that the yet-to-be defined concept of legal thinking 
does not exist in a singular form, but rather has a plurality of forms.  For every 
specialist field of law, it may be argued, different legal thinking is required.  
Alternatively, whereas the pluralistic view is concerned with specialist legal practice 
post law-school, the standard view has more generic – even populist – aims.  Whether 
the idea of specialist legal thinking therefore represents a progressive transformation of 
thinking skills, or merely a different perspective on the same theme, is unclear. 
Still other scholars have questioned whether lawyers actually do think differently from 
other people.  Stratman, for instance, queries ‘whether legal thinking, legal reasoning, 
and legal argument comprise a unique kind of thinking, reasoning, and argument, that 
is, distinct from ordinary critical thinking, reasoning, and argument.’27  But such views 
have not, on the whole, been expressed by legal academics.  Rather they have been 
contributed by scholars from outside the legal academy, perhaps by researchers who 
may not appreciate the popularity of the belief amongst law professors in a distinct 
method of legal thinking that law schools are uniquely destined to teach.
28
 
That said, a review of the above-listed elements of the TLO3 developed as the 
Australian benchmark for law graduate thinking skills reveal generalities both in terms 
of law (inasmuch as the listed attributes are non-specific and can relate to any area of 
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law) and in terms of describing standard forms of ordinary human reasoning.  Being 
able to identify and articulate legal issues, for instance, may require special training to 
teach relevant legal knowledge.  But the ability to engage in critical analysis and make 
reasoned choices amongst alternatives, or demonstrating the skills associated with 
creative thought, are those routinely taught to and possessed by professionals in many 
fields.  The fact that TLO3 was developed by law professors could therefore suggest 
that at least some scholars within the legal academy also subscribe to the view that law 
schools essentially teach general thinking skills, albeit tailored or adapted to the 
practice of law. 
A recent survey of legal practitioners revealed that they, too, are divided over what it 
means to think like a lawyer – which may be of even greater concern given that 
thinking like a lawyer is, at least on one view, their stock in trade.  The definitions 
offered by survey respondents included statements that to think like a lawyer means:  to 
think ‘with both sides of the brain; precisely, rigidly, logically in relation to known 
rules;’ ‘Analyse things.  Argue the alternative. Ask why;’ ‘having a jaundiced view of 
human nature;’ ‘find legal topics interesting.  See the world in time limits and with 
reference to “what a judge might do”;’ engage in ‘a lot of “worst case scenario” 
thinking;’ ‘be a good listener, lateral thinker, empathetic, analytical and persistent;’ 
have a ‘good ability to organise large amounts of information;’ and ask, ‘Is the client 
telling me everything?’29 
It should be noted that the question put to survey respondents presumed a general or 
generic conception of legal thinking skills.  Which is to say, no respondent was asked 
how a lawyer in a specialist field of law might think.
30
  This, and a lack of guidance on 
what ‘legal thinking’ might mean (either from those conducting the survey or from the 
respondents’ earlier law school experience), may explain the variety and disparity of 
responses recorded by the survey team. 
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One of the researchers on this survey team had six years earlier reviewed the literature 
on what thinking like a lawyer entails.
31
  In summing up the findings of her review, she 
admitted to not being a cognitive scientist herself, but merely a lawyer whose own 
views on this topic had ‘been formed purely by an examination of “how” I think.’32   
Her article concluded that, ‘it would be ideal if this topic were made the subject of 
proper scientific research as this could provide us as legal educators with great 
insights.’33    
B  Cognitive Psychology and Lawyers 
Legal scholars began showing an interest in using methodologies from cognitive 
psychology, with a specific focus on think-aloud verbal protocol analysis, from the 
mid-1990s.
34
  Their stated aim was to generate empirical data to inform their 
understanding of what it means to think like a lawyer.
35
  But their contributions were 
pre-empted by researchers from outside the legal academy who were the first to use 
these methodologies to study the thinking processes of lawyers starting from the mid-
1980s
36
 although there was one earlier recorded but unpublished study undertaken in 
the mid-1970s.
37
  It was not until the late 1990s that legal academicians began to 
undertake their own think-aloud verbal protocol studies on the subject of how lawyers 
think. 
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While not explicitly referencing the work of Polanyi whose treatises on tacit knowledge 
have been acknowledged as foundational to this field of research,
 38 
early non-law 
researchers understood both the importance and difficulties of attempting to analyse the 
use of tacit knowledge by legal experts.  Their studies were an explicit 
acknowledgement of Polanyi’s observation that ‘we can know more than we can tell’39 
inasmuch as the attraction of think-aloud verbal protocol analysis was a direct response 
the so-called ‘paradox of expertise’ which denotes how experts commonly have 
difficulty explaining what it is they do and why – precisely because they are experts.40  
While traditional interviews and introspection techniques offered indirect access to 
cognitive processes, this alternative knowledge-elicitation and analysis methodology 
became popular amongst a wide range of researchers seeking to investigate directly the 
cognitive dimension of legal expertise and expert performance by lawyers.    
The first published contribution to this field of research was a 1987 journal article by 
Lundeberg, a non-law academic with an interest in how law students read court cases.
41
  
She described in detail how the verbal protocols of experienced lawyers reading court 
cases differed from those of the least successful law school students.
42
  Her findings 
informed the design of reading guidelines that were subsequently demonstrated to 
improve the performance of first year law students in not just reading cases, but also in 
terms of their overall grades.  Lundeberg’s research focused on the general or generic 
thinking skills associated with reading, not on the specialist skills required for legal 
practice in a specific area of law. 
A number of subsequent researchers from outside the legal academy followed 
Lundberg’s example by using think-aloud verbal protocol analysis to examine and 
improve the cognitive performance of law students.  Their empirical research typically 
involved comparing and contrasting how experts and novices solved law-related 
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problems and performed generic legal tasks.  Such studies have focused on legal 
reading skills,
43
 how law students can better develop their essay-writing abilities,
44
 
strategies law students use to pass bar examinations following graduation,
45
 students’ 
abilities to conceptualise legal principles,
46
 and how students search for, access and rely 
on information sources to solve legal problems.
47
  
The few legal scholars who embraced these methodologies in their own empirical 
studies around the time that Lundeberg’s study was published, such as Senger’s 
unpublished doctoral research which analysed the extent to which law students 
increased their use of reasoning by analogy as they progressed through their law school 
studies,
48
 also focused on general thinking skills.
49
  The implicit assumption underlying 
this research was that all lawyers think the same way – or at least do so in a broad sense 
and insofar as matters when teaching first-year students how to pass law-school 
examinations.     
As discussed in Part D of this chapter, some legal scholars have more recently 
identified thinking skills that are shared amongst legal experts, but not amongst legal 
novices.  This is notwithstanding that all the individuals studied possessed essentially 
the same generic skills required to read cases and frame their arguments in an 
appropriate lawyerly manner.  Accordingly, while generic cognitive skills have been 
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observed amongst a variety of legally trained individuals as discussed above, some 
skills have been linked to an individual’s level of legal expertise. 
C  Knowledge-based Differences 
The generic conceptualisation of legal thinking skills contrasts with the ways in which 
cognitive studies in the field of medicine have acknowledged the specific nature of 
thinking skills in specialist fields of medical practice.  Below is a brief review of these 
studies reflecting the emergence of a knowledge-based framework for comparing 
different levels of expertise, which has also been used in the study of lawyers.  This 
review provides necessary background to the argument presented later that such a 
framework is inconsistent with the analysis of intra-specialist legal expertise, which is 
the focus of this thesis. 
In the 1960s, Butterworth and Reppert found that experts in cardiovascular disease 
were consistently more skilful in identifying unhealthy heartbeats than were general 
practitioners, medical residents and third and fourth-year medical students.
50
  Norman 
et al discussed similar findings in the development of dermatological expertise.
51
  
These latter researchers identified five levels of experts and found that specialised 
medical thinking skills accounted for the greater success of their higher-level experts.
52
    
Another team of researchers found that knowing how to read mammographic images 
was a skill demonstrably different from those skills developed by experienced 
mammographers with little image reading experience.
53
   
In each of these studies ‘thinking like a doctor’ was of no practical or theoretical 
interest to researchers.  Nor was it in subsequent studies concerned with specialist 
expertise in medicine.  This contrasts with the way in which law professors have 
continued to characterize legal thinking skills in general terms.
54
  It also contrasts with 
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the critical-thinking literature produced by legal scholars
55
 and, as has been noted, with 
surveys of legal practitioners which perpetuate the view that 'to think like a lawyer' 
means having been taught generic cognitive skills at law school on the implicit 
understanding that these skills will be foundational to future success in legal practice.  
In the early 1990's, two leading cognitive psychologists working in the field of medical 
expertise moved beyond the expert-novice dichotomy of cognitive analysis to develop a 
knowledge-based hierarchy of expertise.
56
  Patel and Groen described a conceptual 
framework within which it was ‘possible to consider much finer gradations of expertise 
… between specific expertise (e.g., cardiology) and generic expertise (e.g., medicine)’ 
on the basis that ‘an individual may possess both, or only generic expertise.’57  The 
authors further explained by way of an example from an unrelated field that ‘in 
computer programming, systems programmers are a different breed from applications 
programmers,’ even if they might both be regarded somewhat simplistically as just 
‘computer programming experts’ by general observers. 58  They also noted that 
expertise based on specialization ‘is apparent in every academic discipline,’ and that ‘in 
chess, masters specialize in different opening variations.’59 
Patel and Groen’s knowledge-based hierarchy of expertise is reproduced in Table 2.1.  
In this table, there is a conceptualized progression from layperson to expert.  But it is 
not a progression within the same specialist knowledge domain.  Rather, it is the 
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possession of specialized knowledge that distinguishes experts from less able problem-
solvers.  This results in a hierarchy which is purely knowledge-based and conforms to a 
binary ‘jump’ analogy rather than to a graduated progression in proficiency.  This is 
most clearly seen in the distinction between subexperts and experts, where the only 
difference is that the latter possesses the relevant specialist knowledge, but the former 
does not. 
TABLE 2.1 – Patel and Groen’s Knowledge-Based Hierarchy of Expertise60 
Terminology Definition 
Layperson 
 
Beginner 
 
Novice 
 
Intermediate 
 
Subexpert 
 
Expert 
An individual who has only common-sense or everyday knowledge of the domain. 
 
An individual who has the pre-requisite knowledge assumed by the domain.  
 
A layperson or a beginner. 
 
By default, we define this as anyone who is above the beginner level but below the subexpert level.  
 
An individual with generic knowledge, but inadequate specialized knowledge, of the domain.  
 
An individual with specialized knowledge of the domain. 
 
A small group of legal scholars have undertaken cognitive research consistent with – 
and in some instances explicitly based on – this view of how experts think differently 
from non-experts.  Mitchell was the earliest to record his findings in this area,
61
 
although his research was not presented as a scientific study.
62
  Having been influenced 
by research from the social sciences in which think-aloud verbal protocol analysis had 
revealed how experts in Soviet Union Government policies solved a hypothetical 
Soviet grain supply problem more effectively than experts from other fields, such as 
chemistry,
 63
 he observed how his law-school colleagues with specialist expertise in 
criminal law were far more effective in solving a criminal law problem than law 
professors who specialised in other areas of law.   
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Mitchell noted that although his ‘criminal law or “expert” group approached such a 
problem in a number of different ways, each approach had common characteristics.’64  
Because each group member had appropriate knowledge-based schema and methods 
for dealing with problems of this kind, they were able to apply themselves to the task 
quicker than their colleagues.   Mitchell stated, ‘In short, the experts “saw” – or could 
construct – a coherent whole that was triggered by and transcended the facts, into 
which the facts could be fit[ted] to arrive quickly at an overall solution.’65  He also 
recorded how his group of criminal law professors ‘worked with apparent ease and 
enjoyment.’66  
These findings contrasted with the performance of Mitchell’s non-experts.  These 
individuals were frustrated insofar as they knew what was expected of them and what 
the end result of their deliberations should have been.  But they lacked the key 
ingredients to complete the task because they did not have adequate doctrinal and 
policy knowledge.  They were therefore unable to develop a reasoned and satisfactory 
answer, or at least not do so as easily as their criminal law colleagues could.  Mitchell 
concluded that these non-experts, while not lacking in analytic ability, ‘simply did not 
know enough.’67  This is notwithstanding that these non-experts actually were experts, 
but in other areas of law. 
Marchant and his fellow business-school colleagues sought to compare the analogical 
reasoning abilities of tax accountants with those of undergraduate tax students in an 
experiment involving a tax law problem.
68
  While the authors had inadvertently 
confounded their original experiment by introducing a hypothetical legal rule that 
conflicted with the tax deduction rules with which their experts were familiar,
69
 the fact 
that they had recognised taxation law as involving specific cognitive skills was novel in 
the context of then existing literature on legal thinking skills.   
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However, while Marchant et al had created a protocol coding system to trace the 
reasoning processes of their experiment subjects, they did not apply this system to the 
transcripts of think-aloud concurrent verbalisations.  Instead they relied on written 
answers to a test problem, which did not permit the kinds of insights into actual 
thinking skills that are possible with think-aloud verbal protocol analysis.  
Nevertheless, their conception of an intra-specialist test of reasoning strategies in a 
legal setting was novel, even if their comparison of novices and domain experts was 
not.  
D  Specialist Legal Expertise 
The earliest published statement of interest by a legal scholar in the use of think-aloud 
verbal protocol analysis to study the thinking skills of experts in specialist fields of 
legal practice, appeared in a 1995 journal article by law professor Gary Blasi.
70
  He was 
the first legal academic to state explicitly that cognitive science provided the 
‘theoretical framework and empirical methods that make it possible to study directly a 
topic about which law professors have long only asserted knowledge: how lawyers 
think.’71  With references to the work of leading cognitive scientists such as Ericsson 
and Simon, authors of the seminal text Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data 
(‘Protocol Analysis’),72 Blasi claimed that law professors could at last investigate, 
‘topics until now considered either simply unknowable or suitable only for speculation 
or mere assertion: judgment, wisdom, expertise and the relation of theory to lawyering 
practice.’73   
Like Mitchell, Blasi’s optimism was primarily based on the results of the Soviet Union 
grain supply study published in 1983 as well as on the work of cognitive psychologists 
in the medical field.  He also referenced other studies including one published in 1993 
by Schraagen, whose expertise as a psychologist with an interest in experimental design 
resulted in a textbook study of specialist expertise in gustatory research.
74
  Blasi did 
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not, however, report on any of his own studies involving think-aloud verbal protocol 
analysis of legal expertise, although he did indicate that he was undertaking such 
research.
75
  Instead, he offered an extended discussion on the need for such empirical 
research amongst his law school colleagues, noting in the process that he was making a 
contribution ‘to an academic discourse that does not yet exist.’76   
Blasi claimed that, ‘despite an enormous amount of theoretical and empirical work on 
expertise in problem-solving in dozens of different domains, none of that work to date 
has examined expert problem-solving by lawyers.’77  He then offered a tentative 
definition of legal expertise as ‘extraordinary competence in the instrumental solving of 
the problems of clients.’78  Subsequent researchers have cited Blasi as providing ‘[a]n 
excellent discussion of the implications of cognitive psychology research for legal 
education and legal problem-solving’79 and that his ‘rich and insightful article [set] 
clinical scholarship in the cognitive science framework.’80 
Two legal scholars directly influenced by Blasi's article were Colon-Navarro and 
Weinstein.  These scholars published empirical studies of a kind broadly comparable to 
the approach envisaged by the present research project.
81
  Krieger, another legal 
academic who explicitly embraced Blasi’s perspective on the value of cognitive 
research into how lawyers think and who was heavily influenced by the work of 
researchers such as Patel and Groen in the medical field, also undertook think-aloud 
studies but focused on law students rather than specialist legal practitioners.
82
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Colon-Navarro described research he had undertaken involving immigration law 
experts solving an immigration law problem.
83
  His study focused on differences 
between how his selected experts interviewed a client with an immigration law issue 
compared with how two sets of novices approached the same task.
84
  One of these sets 
of novices consisted of law students who had both theoretical and clinical training in 
immigration law.  The other was a lone law student with only theoretical training in this 
area of specialist legal knowledge.
85
 
Modelling his methods after those ‘used by cognitive psychologists studying the 
development of expertise in the medical field as well as in chess and physics,’ Colon-
Navarro devised a legal problem using an actor to play the role of a man from El 
Salvador seeking to live in the United States.
86
  His expert subjects were better at 
sorting between the relevant and irrelevant facts embedded in the problem, they also 
developed workable plans by the ends of their interviews (as well as alternative plans), 
they acted more confidently and reassuringly towards their client, and they prioritised 
the available remedies in a similar way to each other.  The novices in the study, on the 
other hand, had a different ordering approach (though the study’s experienced novices 
were more like the experts in this regard)
 87
 and were much slower at ‘diagnosing’ the 
problem and coming up with solutions.
88
   
Colon-Navarro’s concluding remarks echoed the informal findings of Mitchell.  He 
noted how his immigration law experts used their better organized substantive and 
procedural knowledge to identify a range of possible solutions, as well as how they 
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‘looked at the facts (analogous to the ‘x-rays’ in the study of radiologists) and quickly 
extracted only relevant aspects, leading to the correct diagnosis.’89 
Weinstein began his 1998 journal article by claiming that ‘the doctrine-centric 
conception of what it means to “think like a lawyer”’ had blinded legal academics to 
the ‘important differences in the ways lawyers approach different kinds of problems’ 
and that it is a mistake to ‘confuse appellate lawyering for all of lawyering.’90   He then 
explained how his own studies had provided ‘a model of how legal and factual 
command over a specific area of law allows lawyers to quickly, and largely 
unreflectively, analyze both facts and law together.’91 He further claimed that ‘the 
degree of specialized knowledge required may surprise those who view “good 
lawyering” as a generic ability, applicable to any legal question.’92 
Weinstein, like Colon-Navarro, drew directly on the research of cognitive 
psychologists working in the medical field.  In relation to his contention that area-
specific knowledge in law is as critical to problem solving expertise in law as it is in 
other areas,
93
 he confirmed his view that: ‘The relevant area of knowledge is usually 
narrow, often a professional subspecialty.  For doctors it would be a particular area of 
medicine such as cardiac surgery or radiology, not medicine generally.’94 
Weinstein contended that his study constituted ‘the first application of the human 
problem solving model to representational lawyering.’95  He also claimed that it was 
conceived as a direct response to Blasi’s challenge to apply ‘the human problem 
solving model to lawyering.’96  
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Weinstein’s think-aloud verbal protocol analysis centred on the case assessment of a 
fictitious SSD claimant called Mr Sims.
97
  ‘SSD’ refers to Social Security Disability, 
and the experimental task required participants to help Mr Sims solve the problem of 
his initial claim having been rejected by the Social Security Agency.  Mr Sims’ case, 
participants were told, had been prepared by legal services officers who had arranged 
for him to appear before an Administrative Law Judge.  According to comments made 
by one of the expert lawyers in the experiment, this was typical of case files he handled 
at his office.
98
   
There were 10 participants in Weinstein’s study.  Three were described as ‘outstanding 
practitioners’ by the author, although their experience and credentials were not 
detailed.
99
  They were designated experts by virtue of their experience in dealing with 
SSD claims.  There was one subexpert, whom the author described as a legal academic 
‘experienced in appellate and trial level criminal law,’ but who had little experience 
with SSD claims.
100
  The remaining six participants were law students who had some 
familiarity with SSD cases, including in some instances representing ‘an SSD claimant 
in a live client clinic.’101 
The lone legal academic’s status as a subexpert was based on his being an expert in a 
related field of law, but lacking ‘specific knowledge in the domain under 
examination.’102  This was an explicit reference to the work of Patel and Groen,103 
developers of the knowledge-based hierarchy of expertise in Table 2.1 above, in their 
research on the problem-solving abilities of specialist medical professionals.
104
  As 
noted, these researchers had defined a subexpert as: ‘An individual with generic 
knowledge, but inadequate specialized knowledge, of the domain.’105 
In summing up his assessment of the subexpert’s performance, based on an analysis of 
this participant’s think-aloud verbal protocols, Weinstein observed that while the 
appellate attorney was very capable at doctrinal analysis, he lacked ‘both substantive 
                                                          
97
 A detailed summary of the factual and legal background to the case is provided in ibid 20-23. 
98
 Ibid 19, footnote 89. 
99
 Ibid 18. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid 19. 
102
 Ibid 18, footnote 88.
 
103
 Ibid 24, footnote 119. 
104
 Patel and Groen, above n 56. 
105 
Ibid 96. 
34 
 
knowledge and domain-specific models for dealing with the much more ill-structured 
problem presented by initial case planning [of SSD claims].’106  Nevertheless, this 
experienced lawyer was able to develop a compelling solution to the set task.  The only 
problem was, according to Weinstein, his conclusion ‘just happened to be wrong.’107 
E  Comparing Comparative Studies 
A critical dimension to the above literature is the comparative nature of previous 
expertise studies.   Common to virtually all the studies noted has been a focus on how 
experts think differently from novices.  Studies of this kind have been by far the most 
common amongst researchers in this area, ostensibly reflecting a motivation to improve 
the performances of novices (particularly undergraduate law students) by better 
understanding how their cognitive skills differ from (and may be improved through 
pedagogical intervention to be more like) those of presumed experts. 
Expert-subexpert studies have been less common, at least in relation to legal thinking 
skills.  Whereas expert-novice research has mostly compared students with 
professionals, expert-subexpert tests have tended to compare professionals at the same 
general level of expertise and experience – but with differing amounts of the specific 
knowledge critical to performing the required problem-solving tasks.    
What have not been studied in the legal context are cognitive differences associated 
with different levels of expertise within the same area of domain specialisation.  The 
conceptual distinction between this approach and the more commonly followed 
approaches described above can be explained with reference to the following 
comparison of two alternative schemes for categorizing specialist expertise.  The first 
scheme is the knowledge-based hierarchy used by Patel and Groen described in Table 
2.1.  The second is the traditional, progressive categorization of expertise described by 
Hoffman. 108  Table 2.2 below sets out both the Patel and Groen’s framework and what 
will be termed Hoffman’s Scheme109 in a side-by-side comparison. 
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TABLE 2.2 – Comparison of Alternative Expertise Categorisation Schemes 
Patel & Groen’s Knowledge-
based Hierarchy 
110
 
Hoffman’s Scheme – A Traditional Progressive 
Categorisation of Expertise
 
 
Layperson:  An individual who has 
only commonsense or everyday 
knowledge of the domain.  
 
Beginner:  An individual who has 
the pre-requisite knowledge 
assumed by the domain.  
 
Novice:  A layperson or a beginner.  
 
Intermediate:  By default … anyone 
who is above the beginner level but 
below the subexpert level.  
 
Subexpert:  An individual with 
generic knowledge, but inadequate 
specialized knowledge, of the 
domain.  
 
Expert:  An individual with 
specialized knowledge of the 
domain. 
 
 
Naivette:  One who is totally ignorant of a domain.  
 
Novice:  Literally, someone who is new – a probationary member.  There has been 
some (‘minimal’) exposure to the domain.  
 
Initiate:  Literally, someone who has been through an initiation ceremony – a 
novice who has begun introductory instruction.  
 
Apprentice:  Literally, one who is learning – a student undergoing a programme of 
instruction beyond the introductory level.  Traditionally, the apprentice is 
immersed in the domain by living with and assisting someone at a higher level.  
The length of an apprenticeship depends on the domain, ranging from about one 
to 12 years in the craft guilds.  
 
Journeyman:  Literally, a person who can perform a day’s labour unsupervised, 
although working under orders.  An experienced and reliable worker, or one who 
has achieved a level of competence.  It is possible to remain at this level for life.  
 
Expert:  The distinguished or brilliant journeyman, highly regarded by peers, 
whose judgments are uncommonly accurate and reliable, whose performance 
shows consummate skill and economy of effort, and who can deal effectively with 
certain types of rare or ‘tough’ cases.  Also, an expert is one who has special skills 
or knowledge derived from extensive experience with sub-domains.  
 
Master:  Traditionally, a master is any journeyman or expert who is also qualified 
to teach those at a lower level.  Traditionally, a master is one of an elite group of 
experts whose judgments set the regulations, standards, or ideals.  Also, a master 
can be that expert who is regarded by other experts as being ‘the’ expert, or the 
‘real’ expert, especially with regard to sub-domain knowledge. 
 
As noted, Patel and Groen’s framework was used by Weinstein to assess cognitive 
differences between the experts and subexpert in his experiment involving SSD claims.  
The fact that the subexpert in Weinstein’s study differed from the designated experts 
only inasmuch as he lacked direct specialist knowledge of immigration law cases of a 
particular kind, fits squarely within the Patel and Groen knowledge-based hierarchy.  It 
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does not, however, comport with Hoffman’s traditional progressive categorization 
scheme, which is described by Chi as a ‘proficiency scale.’111  This is because the only 
difference between Weinstein’s experts and subexpert was that the former had the 
required specialist domain knowledge while the latter did not.   
It is not feasible under Patel and Groen’s framework to compare an expert and a lesser 
expert who both possess essentially the same domain-specific knowledge.  This is 
because knowledge is the differentiating variable that separates the two categories of 
experts.  It may be contended that an expert has more specific knowledge in the given 
domain.  But this is inconsistent with a scheme where one must either have knowledge 
or not have knowledge rather than varying amounts of it – at least not in relation to the 
specialist knowledge of the relevant expertise domain.  This is the binary essence of 
Patel and Groen’s conceptual framework. 
Hoffman’s Scheme, on the other hand, presumes a progression of knowledge and 
capabilities associated with different amounts of instruction and domain-specific 
experience.  It describes relative levels of expertise or proficiency within a single 
knowledge domain.  In doing so, it fulfils its traditional function as a means of 
describing the progression of increasing knowledge and skills as one moves, over many 
years, from the status of novice to a master in a specific field. 
Consider for instance a team or department of specialist competition law lawyers as 
exists in most large commercial law firms, with, say, three partners, two special counsel 
and five senior associates,
112
 or alternatively seven partners and 30 other lawyers.
113
   
Each lawyer in these teams specialises in competition law exclusively or to a 
significant degree, yet they are recognised as having different levels of skill or 
problem-solving ability.  This is the case even though, at least in a technical or an 
academic sense, they might all possess essentially the same amount of technical 
knowledge about this specialist area of law.  Such a team will often include esteemed 
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experts working alongside more junior solicitors, as well as senior lawyers on the cusp 
of making partnership.
114
  
From a dollar-per-hour fee perspective (where the most senior lawyers in such a 
specialist legal team may charge hourly fees more than double those of their junior 
colleagues
115
) and in terms of the allocation of formal responsibilities within the group 
(partners having sign-off authority,
116
 while non-partners typically not), it is much 
easier to explain these differences under Hoffman’s Scheme than by attempting to rely 
on Patel and Groen’s framework.  In practical terms, one would ostensibly be hard-
pressed to establish the necessary differences in knowledge to justify calling any of 
these lawyers ‘subexperts’ or, to use Patel and Groen’s description of the term, 
individuals ‘with generic knowledge, but inadequate specialized knowledge, of the 
domain.’117   
F  Intra-Specialist Expertise Comparisons 
The preceding discussion considered the few empirical studies that have investigated 
the cognitive differences between how expert and less expert practitioners in the same 
specialist field of law solve domain-specific problems.  The farthest any researcher has 
come in answering this thesis’ research question is Weinstein.  However, his 
conception of subexpertise was not of a progressive or staged proficiency, but a 
knowledge-based one within Patel and Groen’s framework.  The alternative framework 
of Hoffman’s Scheme, which as noted in the previous section traces the advancement 
of apprentices to journeymen and experts to masters, envisages an intra-domain 
progression where comparisons are made not between individuals with and without 
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domain knowledge, but between individuals with different levels of domain ability 
which may or may not be attributable to differences in domain-specific knowledge.  
However, Hoffman’s use of traditional definitions of expertise based on Middle Ages’ 
craft guilds in Europe
118
 may be criticised for its apparent lack of scientific rigour and 
motivate a search for more modern conceptual frameworks.  It is therefore useful to 
examine the practical utility of this terminology more closely, as well as to consider 
alternatives and their suitability for use in this thesis. 
Considering journeymen first, the essential character of such an individual is that he or 
she must be capable of working unsupervised in a specialist type of work.  This 
requires that they possess both considerable technical competency and an appropriate 
level of trustworthiness.  Moreover, the fact that one may remain a journeyman for life 
as Hoffman notes, suggests that (i) it is a vocation which has traditionally been 
sufficiently compensated so as to provide a living wage (in other words, it is not a part-
time or hobby activity demanding only a casual interest), and (ii) the status of a 
journeyman is not necessarily associated with youth.  Indeed, a degree of maturity 
would seem essential to fulfil the role as defined. 
Critically, however, a journeyman is also an individual who works under orders.  In 
other words, he or she requires direction of some kind, presumably a higher-level of 
direction than that associated with mere supervision.  This also suggests that a 
journeyman would not be held ultimately responsible for whether their finished product 
is necessary or appropriate – just that they complete their work as instructed.  In this 
sense, they could be viewed as part of middle-management in a contemporary setting. 
Experts, on the other hand, have their status determined by being ‘highly regarded by 
their peers,’ having ‘uncommonly accurate and reliable’ judgment, demonstrating 
‘consummate skill and economy of effort,’ and being able to ‘deal effectively with 
certain types of rare or “tough” cases.’119  They may also demonstrate ‘special skills or 
knowledge derived from extensive experience with sub-domains.’120  Experts, it may 
therefore be assumed, would be capable of giving orders to journeymen and to lower 
level workers.  In this capacity they would not only make decisions as to what needs to 
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be done and how, but would take responsibility for those decisions in ways that a 
journeyman would not. 
The issue of rare or tough cases is of particular interest inasmuch as such cases may 
occur only infrequently, making it possible for a legal specialist to work for several 
years in their area of law without ever encountering such cases.  As noted by Hoffman 
in his account of operators of large industrial looms in the mid-1900s,
121
 an expert 
operator was generally required to have at least seven years’ experience in this field 
since some atypical events – notably certain loom-breakdown scenarios – occurred, on 
average, only once every seven years.
122
  This led trainers to develop a loom that was 
designed to breakdown more frequently, thereby speeding up the development of 
operator expertise.
123
   
An expert is therefore likely to have more experience, as measured in time, as this is 
necessary to give them exposure to unusual tests of their cognitive skills – unless of 
course special training is provided as in the case of the loom operators.  It is also noted 
how Norman et al’s research in the medical field found that specialists in dermatology 
were better than less experienced colleagues – who were still thoroughly competent 
dermatologists in their own rights – in relation to atypical cases.124  In that study, this 
was found to be the only way of distinguishing between the participating experts and 
lesser experts in terms of their cognitive performances.   
Regarding the definition of a master under the above framework, attention is drawn to 
whether a legal specialist performs a formal or informal teaching role (perhaps at the 
post-graduate level where specialised, craft-like training is most likely in a modern 
university context), whether they are viewed as part of an elite group of standard 
setters, and how other experts in the field assess their abilities.  Where the activities of 
an individual satisfy the requirements of being an expert and these additional indicators 
are evident, a relatively confident assessment of mastery under Hoffman’s Scheme 
would seem feasible. 
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The remaining categories of naivette, novice, initiate and apprentice are also capable of 
objective assessment in a general sense.  By defining the relevant knowledge domain as 
a specialist field of law, for instance competition law as above, whether someone is 
totally ignorant of the laws in this area, has had minimal exposure to it, has been given 
introductory instruction, or is ‘undergoing a program of instruction beyond the 
introductory level’ and may be considered ‘immersed in the domain’ insofar as they are 
working in a team where they provide assistance to higher level specialists, are all 
questions that could be answered objectively with only limited investigation.   The 
appeal of such descriptors is clear in an empirical setting where distinctions between 
higher levels of specialist expertise are important. 
Hoffman’s endorsement of this analytical framework in the absence of better 
alternatives
125
 is further confirmation of its utility for this thesis.  Using Taleb’s 
arguments regarding time and fragility, the fact that a framework of this kind has been 
in continuous use for several centuries (largely in practical and therefore empirically 
rigorous contexts) is itself testament both to its theoretical robustness and its relevance 
for centuries to come.
126
  It is also noteworthy how the legal profession today maintains 
remnants of the traditional craft guild framework insofar as clerkship and pupillage are 
still undertaken under the instruction and supervision of a ‘master’ lawyer, and as has 
been discussed, specialist teams of lawyers in law firms typically include members who 
may be placed conceptually with little difficulty in their appropriate categories within 
Hoffman’s Scheme.  
In addition to Hoffman’s Scheme and Patel and Groen’s knowledge-based distinction 
between experts and subexperts (which Weinstein adapted for his research but which is 
ill-suited to the present study), Chay has identified three further conceptual frameworks 
for assessing and categorising different levels of expertise on a progressive basis.
127
  
However, none of these appears to add much to Hoffman’s Scheme – and could involve 
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serious feasibility issues in the present context while at the same time being viewed as 
less well established frameworks of progressive expertise categorisation. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus,
128
 who developed their framework while researching activities as 
varied as learning languages, playing chess and piloting aircraft, identified five stages 
or phases of expertise development:  (i) Novice (able to correctly pair problems and 
problem-solving rules); (ii) Advanced beginner (able to successfully undertake the 
same pairing exercise as at the novice level, but in a wider range of contexts); (iii) 
Competence (able to consider an even wider range of problems in real-world settings, 
but lacking ‘a sense of what is important’129); (iv) Proficiency (able to reflect on 
alternative courses of action while starting to act intuitively based on previous 
experiences); and, (v) Expertise (being able to rely more on intuition without needing 
to make conscious decisions, but simply doing ‘what normally works’130).  
The other two frameworks for categorising expertise development identified by Chay 
were those of Schmidt, Norman and Boshuizen, whose concepts were derived from 
their work with medical practitioners,
131
 and Scandura, who was concerned primarily 
with the efficacy of general school education.
132
  The former researchers’ framework 
took the form of a four-stage model in which experts were distinguishable from lower-
level practitioners by their development of illness scripts.  These scripts were defined 
as ‘memories of previous patients [that] are retained in memory as individual entities 
and are not merged into some prototypical form.’133  The latter researcher favoured a 
three-stage analytical framework consisting of naïve, neophyte and master, with 
mastery being reflected in greater efficiency and the use of more complex cognitive 
structures.   
Chay dismissed each of these frameworks for his study because they required an 
assessment of cognitive development, which depended on investigations of individual’s 
cognitive abilities in a manner more extensive than he was prepared to undertake.
134
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In any event, he concluded that his study was not dependent on establishing stages of 
development, but rather on what he termed ‘transformations of knowledge.’135  The 
objective criteria of Hoffman’s Scheme may have been a more practical approach for 
him to have adapted, to the extent that a degree of staged categorisation was required to 
address his stated research questions.  In this respect, Chay’s ultimate reliance on years 
of experience and peer recognition to identify his experts was broadly consistent with – 
even if not based on – the traditional framework described by Hoffman. 
G  Conclusion 
The above discussion confirms that no previous empirical studies provide a complete 
response to this study’s research question which is concerned with how legal specialists 
with different levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think 
differently from one another.  This is notwithstanding the extensive research and 
numerous studies that have been undertaken by scholars both within and outside the 
legal academy which constitute both a rigorous and generous base on which to 
construct an appropriate methodology for the present research.  This includes: the 
think-aloud problem solving and verbal protocol analysis methodologies that have been 
developed and refined by cognitive psychologists, and which have been used in the 
study of legal thinking skills; and Hoffman’s Scheme, which relies on a well-
established conceptualisation of progressive expertise and is analytically aligned with 
the objectives of this thesis.  
The research undertaken by Colon-Navarro and Weinstein offers useful technical 
guidance, and the expertise traits observed in the expert lawyers who participated in 
their studies are likely to be relevant to interpreting the findings of this thesis.  
However, their findings are necessarily limited as far as providing a more complete 
picture of present prospects.  While it is anticipated, based on their work and similar 
studies, that legal experts will indeed be shown to possess different cognitive traits 
from their less expert colleagues practising in the same specialist field of law, how 
readily they can be identified and measured remain open questions. 
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The next chapter examines in detail the methodological elements that underlie this 
thesis.   These include references to many of the above-noted theories and research, 
which this study seeks to extend within a single specialist legal-knowledge domain.   
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III  METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used in this thesis relies primarily on the approaches and techniques 
used in the studies reviewed in the previous chapter.  That review began with an 
investigation into how lawyers think and ended with an analysis of studies that have 
looked specifically at the cognitive aspects of legal expertise.  The conclusion of this 
review was that previous researchers in this area have predominantly focused on 
generic legal thinking skills and novice-expert comparisons, and as a consequence there 
currently exists no adequate response to this thesis’ research question:   
In what readily identifiable and measurable ways do legal specialists with different 
levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think differently when 
assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-constrained contexts? 
To answer this question, the methodology developed for the present study involved the 
following five stages or steps: 1. Establishing a theoretical framework for analysing 
cognitive differences between participants as they engage in representative tasks within 
their domain of specialist legal expertise; 2. Securing the co-operation of a sufficient 
number of suitably-qualified legal specialists from law firms, economics consultancies 
and government agencies across the major business centres of Australia; 3. Ranking 
these specialists according to their levels of likely expertise in competition law; 4. 
Identifying performance and behavioural differences between these participants 
reflecting or associated with their different  levels of likely expertise; and, 5. Inferring 
from those differences underlying cognitive processes that distinguish legal specialists 
according to their levels of domain expertise, rather than their levels of technical legal 
knowledge. 
Part A of this chapter describes the theoretical underpinnings of the think-aloud verbal-
protocol analysis methodology developed for this study.  First, the advantages and 
concerns with think-aloud problem solving as a method of knowledge elicitation and 
the assumptions that underlie the analysis of resultant concurrent vocalizations are 
discussed.   This is followed by a discussion of the choice of representative task and 
why merger review cases were used to facilitate participants’ engagement in legal risk 
assessments requiring their specialist competition law skills.    
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Part B describes the process for selecting participants for this study.  This includes a 
discussion of the threshold requirements chosen to ensure that all participants would be 
above the level of novice in the same specialist field of law while also allowing for a 
range of expertise levels extending from apprentices to masters within the meanings of 
these terms under Hoffman’s Scheme of progressive expertise.136  The details of how 
prospective participants were identified are also explained, as is the method used to 
solicit their involvement on a voluntary basis. 
Part C describes the theoretical basis for ranking participants according to their levels 
of likely expertise.  This includes a review of previous studies involving lawyers and 
more generally.  These studies provide guidance on the elements of an effective and 
practicable ranking methodology.   This part also includes a discussion of the five 
measures of likely expertise that were ultimately chosen, namely, promotion to 
partnership or a position with similar sign-off responsibility, the possession of over 
10,000 hours or 10 years’ experience in the field of competition law, evidence of 
conceptual ability, engagement in exceptional reasoning strategies, and examples of 
material comprehension errors.   
Part D outlines the procedures followed during the testing process used in this study.  
This includes an overview of the think-aloud problem solving instructions given to 
participants prior to their analysing the test cases and an explanation of the method by 
which the test cases themselves were selected and presented to participants via a 
standardized on-line testing platform.   Other technical issues relating to how the 
interviews were conducted by long-distance telephone calls and how transcripts were 
created and analysed using dedicated software solutions are also described. 
Part E begins with an explanation of how the verbal protocols of participants were 
assessed and compared on an inter-group basis to identify cognitive differences 
associated with different levels of likely expertise.   It then discusses the broad, 
exploratory approach adopted for the analysis of verbal data generated during this 
study.  This is followed by an introduction to the three-stage problem solving 
framework used to categorise and track the cognitive tasks on which participants 
focused when assessing legal risk, and the choice to subsequently investigate aspects of 
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participants’ intuitive and analytical reasoning.  General and specific expertise traits 
previously identified in past studies are also listed as analytical references.    
Part F summarises the key methodological choices made in this study in service of 
generating an empirically-based response to the research question.   
A  Think-Aloud Verbal Protocol Analysis 
Think-aloud verbal protocols have been used to investigate the cognitive processes of 
experts across a wide range of human activities.
137
  Studies using this methodology 
were undertaken as early as the 1920s.
138
  But it was Ericsson and Simon’s 1984 book, 
Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (‘Protocol Analysis’), which has to date 
provided the most authoritative discussion of this analytical approach.
139
  That text, 
which was republished in 1993, is still routinely cited as a foundational source of 
methodological theory in think-aloud studies (including in each of the previous think-
aloud verbal protocol studies involving lawyers discussed in the previous chapter), and 
this thesis adopts the same approach. 
Crandall, Klein and Hoffman describe think-aloud problem solving as a simple 
methodology with application to almost any task.
140
  It involves participants being 
instructed ‘to speak their thoughts as they work on specially chosen problems, and do 
so as if they are “speaking to themselves”.’141  It is important that participants do not 
try to explain what they are doing explicitly, but rather focus on solving the problem at 
hand.  Explanations risk altering a participant’s normal cognitive processes insofar as 
they must reflect on and reconfigure their thinking in order to verbalise an explanation.   
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Think-aloud problem solving overcomes a fundamental difficulty in the study of expert 
problem-solving, namely, that experts can find it difficult if not impossible to explain 
their thought processes to researchers in such a way that facilitates direct cognitive 
analysis.  Lundeberg, for instance, in her study on legal reading skills explicitly 
acknowledged that direct questioning of experts was unlikely to give her the 
information she needed because experts accustomed to performing tasks within their 
areas of expertise are often unaware of the specifics of what they do, let alone how they 
do them.
142
    
This so-called ‘paradox of expertise’143 connotes both the existence of tacit 
knowledge
144
 and a lack of self-awareness on the part of the expert, who may never 
have thought to explain the details of their actions, either because the mental steps they 
perform happen automatically (and therefore defy introspection) or because the 
information seemed to the expert to be obvious and therefore did not warrant 
explication.  In this context Ericsson and Simon contend that the use of their 
methodology in expertise studies ‘is the most effective way to elicit knowledge about 
[cognitive] methods.’145 
The basic assumptions underlying think-aloud problem-solving are not controversial, 
although some theoretical concerns have been expressed.  One concern is that the act of 
vocalisation may change the way that a participant naturally thinks, which is known as 
reactivity.
146
  This issue has been addressed directly in a number of studies, one of the 
most recent being Fox, Ericsson and Best’s 2011 meta-study of almost 2,000 studies in 
which reactivity was shown not to have been a confounding issue.
147
  As long as the 
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established procedures for conducting this method of verbal data elicitation are strictly 
followed, there should be no material concerns of this kind. 
Ericsson asserts that, ‘the closest connection between actual thoughts and verbal reports 
is found when people verbalize their thoughts that are spontaneously attended during 
task completion.’148 He also reiterates, based on data analysed from a large number of 
empirical studies, think-aloud problem solving can reveal a study participant’s 
‘thoughts in a manner that does not alter the sequence and content of the thoughts 
mediating the completion of a task and therefore should reflect immediately available 
information during thinking.’149 
The think-aloud problem solving procedures described in Protocol Analysis and 
followed in this study as described in Part D below, are designed to ensure that the 
verbalization of a participant’s thoughts is either Level 1 or Level 2 verbalization, to 
use Ericsson and Simon’s terminology.150  Level 1 describes verbalization that is 
‘simply the vocalization of covert articulatory or oral encodings,’ without any 
intermediate processing such as happens when effort is expended for the purpose of 
communicating with other people.
151
  Level 2 verbalization involves the explication of 
what a participant is thinking about.  This requires additional processing (and therefore 
can slow down the participant’s response time), but does not involve the participant 
explaining what they are thinking (which is Level 3 verbalization).
152
  This is why the 
instructions and prompts given to participants in this study made clear that they were 
not to explain what they were doing, but simply to ‘speak to themselves.’153     
Levels 1 and 2 are the types of verbalizations that studies such as the present one seek 
to elicit and analyse.  The ‘stream of consciousness’ aspect of these levels distinguishes 
them from Level 3’s introspective dimension, in which an individual reflects on and 
reorganises their thoughts, often in ways that are considered more socially or 
professionally acceptable.  The elicitation techniques used in think-aloud problem 
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solving tests are intended to prevent participants entering into this third level of 
verbalization, which is least likely to be reflective of spontaneous, mediating thoughts. 
There remain two further concerns regarding the completeness of think-aloud 
verbalisations postulated by Ericsson and Simon.  The first reflects Duncker’s 
observation that while the knowledge elicited by this means may be reliable, it may be 
that what it does not (and cannot) contain is just as important.
154
  Such omissions could 
lead to an incomplete and possibly erroneous understating of cognitive activity since 
only those verbalizations that are recorded can be counted.  However, this problem is 
likely to be less acute when reliance on the comprehensiveness of protocols is reduced, 
such as in this study where patterns of thinking behaviour are analysed rather than 
measures that assume all cognitive processes have been revealed.
155
 
The other concern is that some automated responses may occur without the participant 
being aware of them, let alone verbalizing these cognitive events.  As Ericsson and 
Simon have acknowledged, ‘many highly overlearned processes operate automatically 
without leaving any more trace than their final result in [short term memory].’156  To 
safeguard against such events diminishing the value of transcribed verbalisations in 
think-aloud studies, Middleton recommends using novel and challenging problem-
solving scenarios.
157
  This approach has its basis in Chi et al’s contention that in such 
situations there will necessarily be reduced reliance on automatic responses.
158
  The 
present study, like that undertaken by Chay who also followed Middleton’s 
suggestions, sought to use ‘authentic’ and ecologically valid scenarios that were 
familiar to participants in terms of task procedure and required outcome, but which 
were novel in a substantive sense given that none of the test cases had been previously 
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considered by any participant and all contained unique facts requiring individualised 
analysis.
159
 
The remainder this part is divided into three sections.  The first describes the central 
importance of designing a representative task to test the essence of expertise within the 
relevant knowledge domain.  The second explains why legal-risk assessments in the 
context of merger review cases were considered to be appropriately unique to the 
practice of competition law, which was the relevant knowledge domain chosen for this 
study.  The third section argues that such assessments involve cognitive tasks that only 
competition law specialists are trained to undertake, thereby ensuring that the observed 
cognitive differences between participants with different levels of specialist expertise 
would relate to these specialist skills and not to generic legal skills that lawyers in other 
areas of law may possess.
160
  
The overriding objective in each of these contexts – and in the overall design of this 
study – was to ensure that only differences in participants’ levels of specialist legal 
expertise would be subjected to cognitive analysis, and not simply the amount of 
technical legal knowledge they possessed or how well-developed their generic legal 
skills were, which would be unavoidable if the choice of a representative task merely 
tested participants’ reading skills or their ability to interpret court cases outside their 
field of legal expertise.  At the same time, the selected representative task needed to be 
capable of being performed by all participants possessing the relevant specialist legal 
knowledge.  Accordingly, the problem-solving task had to be representative of a 
standard area of practice even amongst relatively junior competition law specialists. 
1  Representative Task 
The choice of an appropriate representative task is critical when developing a study 
based on think-aloud verbal protocol analysis.  Ericsson describes the process as 
beginning with the identification of ‘those naturally occurring activities that correspond 
to the essence of expertise in a domain’ and the rejection of those tasks that would 
merely reveal the cognitive differences between novices and experts in a specialist 
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knowledge domain.
161  
It is also important to ensure that the conditions in which experts 
are tested are carefully planned and executed to ensure the preservation of the highest 
possible methodological reliability.  Where this is achieved and conditions of 
reproducibility are met, researchers can begin ‘to examine the specific mediating 
mechanisms with experiments and process-tracing techniques … [and] measure and 
compare the performance of less-skilled individuals on the same tasks.’162 
This study focused on how specialist competition lawyers and economists think (in 
terms of assessing legal risk), which was assumed to be different from how other 
lawyers in other specialist fields think – and from how lawyers displaying merely 
generic legal skills would approach the same competition law risk-assessment task.
163
  
Because only competition law specialists possess the necessary sub-domain knowledge 
required to competently undertake such a task, they necessarily think differently from 
other lawyers and economists who do not possess this knowledge. 
Competition law specialists may still use the same generic cognitive processes as other 
legal specialists in terms of the basic building blocks of their analytical reasoning.  
However, knowledge and thought are intertwined at the applied level where the most 
capable intellectual property lawyer, for instance, would likely struggle with even a 
straightforward legal-risk assessment task in competition law.  As Mitchell and 
Weinstein have demonstrated empirically,
164
 a lack of domain knowledge can turn legal 
experts into virtual novices when it comes to applied legal reasoning in an unfamiliar 
field of law. 
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A defining feature of competition law practice is the routine application of economic 
analysis.
165
  In this regard, the International Competition Network (‘ICN’) states in its 
investigative handbook, ‘The practice of Antitrust [competition law] is in essence both 
a legal and an economic exercise. This truism is widely recognized, and, indeed, in 
most countries, legal and economic experts combine to analyze antitrust issues.’166  
Senior competition law practitioners have similarly been quoted as stating that 
competition law ‘is all about economic analysis.’167   
This is not to confuse the present research with being concerned with the economic 
analysis of law, which has developed as its own area of scholarship.
168
  Rather, 
competition law is a form of ‘economic law’ that derives from statutory rules intended 
to enhance community welfare through the promotion of competition and economic 
efficiency, as well as related industrial policies.
169
   
Alternative names for this area of legal practice are antitrust and restrictive trade 
practices law.  These names are favoured in different jurisdictions, but refer to 
essentially the same thing.  In this study, the competition law descriptor is used. 
The practice of competition law also involves issues of statutory interpretation, keeping 
up with the latest case-law developments and a range of other generic legal and 
administrative tasks familiar to practitioners in this field.  However, these aspects of 
what competition law specialists do are not of direct interest in the present context, 
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although they could legitimately be – and, as was shown in the previous chapter, have 
been – the focus of empirical studies of how lawyers think in more general terms.   
The essence of a competition law specialist’s expertise for present purposes is in their 
performance of applied legal and economic analysis within a specific regulatory and 
policy setting.  This combined analysis has, to the researcher’s knowledge, no analogue 
in other areas of law and for this reason constitutes an appropriate focus for the study of 
competition-law expertise.   
2  Merger Review Cases 
Merger review cases are a common feature of many, and ostensibly most, competition 
law specialists’ practices.170  A review of the practice profiles of those Australian, New 
Zealand, UK and US law firms which maintain specialist competition law departments 
and are recognised as leaders in this field in legal directories published by Chambers 
and Partners,
171
 Who’s Who Legal172 and The Legal 500,173 all promote on their 
websites their expertise in handling merger review cases as a core – and often as their 
lead – service offering.174   In this regard, all participants in this study confirmed that 
they had had direct involvement in a number of merger review cases during their 
careers, including the least experienced.  Moreover, 85% of them volunteered that 
merger review cases were a focus of their professional practice.
175
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Merger review cases are concerned with future reductions in competitive tensions 
within specific markets as a direct result of, for instance, two vigorous competitors 
combining their businesses or a dominant business taking over a smaller, maverick-
type business which was previously the instigator of price-wars in a particular industry.  
The concern in these situations is that reductions in competitive rivalry as a result of a 
proposed merger could lead to less efficient market structures, higher prices and 
reduced choice for consumers.
176
 
Procedurally, the merger review process centres on the role of a competition authority, 
commonly an independent statutory or government body, which assesses whether or 
not a merger is likely to violate a statutory prohibition against anti-competitive mergers 
as found in most competition laws.  According to the ICN – which is an association of 
national and multinational competition authorities representing the world’s largest 
competition law jurisdictions
177
 – merger review cases involve competition authority 
staff attempting ‘to predict a merger’s competitive impact to prevent any competitive 
problems before they materialize,’ while at the same time seeking to ensure procedural 
consistency, predictability and transparency.
178
 
Based on a multi-year study by the ICN, such prohibitions exist in almost every 
competition law statute in every competition law jurisdiction,
179
 and Clarke has 
recorded that an estimated 110 countries have statutory regimes of this kind.
180
   
                                                                                                                                                                         
lawyers and competition economists owing to their highly specialist substantive and procedural natures, 
but are also a central feature of a competition law specialist’s practice. 
176
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In some countries, merger proponents (usually when involved in transactions exceeding 
certain combined-turnover amount or other thresholds) may be required to notify their 
merger proposals to the relevant competition officials.
181
  In other jurisdictions, 
notification is voluntary, but informal procedures exist whereby officials can review 
proposed transactions either confidentially or publicly, and then provide their views as 
to any legal compliance issues.
182
  In cases where there are no such issues, a 
competition authority may provide a qualified letter of comfort to merger proponents 
on a pre-assessment basis without undertaking a public review.   
In Australia, as one of the two relevant jurisdictions in this study, most publicly 
reviewed merger transactions are cleared without official comment, while a small 
percentage are cleared with conditions attached.  An even smaller number are opposed 
by the competition authority on grounds of likely anti-competitive detriment.
183
  
A voluntary notification framework and an informal, public review process were the 
general background conditions with which the participants in this study – who were 
specialists in either Australian or New Zealand competition law – were most familiar.  
Accordingly, this was the regulatory framework of interest in this study.    
3  ‘The Essence’ of Competition Law Expertise 
The representative task in this study required participants to provide legal-risk 
assessments relating to merger transactions under review by the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) or the New Zealand Commerce Commission 
(‘CC’).  Rather than provide a definitive view (which was impracticable given the 
limited information provided in the test-case documentation), the objective was for 
each participant to provide the kind of advice merger proponents typically seek when 
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assessing the ease or difficulty of securing the necessary approvals from a responsible 
competition authority.
184
   
Regarding the methodological efficacy of using merger cases to test the essence of 
competition law expertise, most of a competition law specialist’s time in a merger 
review case is spent, in a substantive sense, undertaking an applied legal and economic 
analysis.  They must also deal with procedural and tactical issues.  But their ability to 
understand and master the economic implications of a proposed transaction within the 
parameters of the relevant merger laws, arguably dictates to a significant extent all 
other aspects of their brief.   
The amount of black letter law that needs to be navigated in most merger cases in 
virtually any competition law jurisdiction can be reduced to one simple question:  Is 
this merger transaction likely to materially harm future competition?
185
  There is 
seldom if ever a need to inquire into issues such as intent or who-said-what-to-whom as 
happens in price fixing, monopolization and many other restrictive trade practices cases 
typically handled by competition law specialists.
186
  Statutory interpretation and forms 
of generic legal analysis are therefore less important, in relative terms, in merger 
review cases as compared to cases involving other competition law prohibitions.   
In most merger matters, the necessary economic analysis begins with the market 
definition process, which Beaton-Wells – quoting from the landmark Australian case 
Re QCMA
187
 – describes as ‘the “essential first step” in the assessment of present 
competition and likely competitive effects.’188  According to Round, market definition 
is a well-established analytical exercise which is governed by principles that are 
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57 
 
generally settled.
189
 Also relevant to the present study, which involves both Australian 
and New Zealand competition law specialists, are the authoritative statements of Smith 
and Walker,
190
 and Brunt,
191
 who as practitioners and adjudicators in both jurisdictions 
claim that the same basic approach to market definition is followed in both Australia 
and New Zealand.   
Importantly, however, the market definition process is not limited only to merger cases.  
It is also an essential element in the application of every competition law prohibition 
concerned with market power issues, such as unilateral abuses of market dominance 
and forms of exclusionary conduct.  Moreover, it is integral to the analysis of barriers 
to entry and other issues relevant to the contestability and competitiveness of markets.  
Insofar as it is central both to the work of a competition law specialist and to the 
analysis of merger review cases, it is an ideal focus for a representative task of the kind 
required for a study such as this. 
In the context of competition law in general, Beaton-Wells characterises market 
definition as ‘an evaluative exercise involving mental processes akin to those involved 
in dealing with standards derived from the common law or equity such as 
reasonableness, fairness, just cause or hardship.’192  This view, which is supported by 
Gault’s contention that issues of substitution in market analysis require ‘informed 
assessment’ in a manner akin to judicial assessments of negligence, reasonableness and 
fairness,
193
 highlights the importance of judgment, wisdom – and hence expertise – in 
the assessment of merger review cases where market definition is a central task.   
These comments by Beaton-Wells and Gault also underline the deeper significance of 
choosing a representative task that is solely limited to the domain of competition law 
but which by virtue of this very focus facilitates the discovery and analysis of cognitive 
skills associated with expertise across a much wider range of specialist areas of legal 
practice.  Because only competition law specialists would be selected to undertake a 
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representative task unique to their particular area of legal specialisation, their specialist 
knowledge becomes irrelevant in the sense that observed cognitive differences would 
exist only in terms of their levels of expertise.  Issues of judgment, wisdom, insight and 
other expertise-related considerations could therefore be addressed without worrying 
about whether such differences arose merely because some participants knew more law 
or were more familiar with the relevant regulatory procedures than others. 
As regards ancillary legal issues in merger review cases, these are for the most part 
issues that other lawyers might be expected to manage competently in both substantive 
and procedural senses insofar as they have their analogues in other areas of law.  This is 
not the case for applied economic analysis and not for the definition of markets as 
described.  As Elhauge notes in the context of teaching competition law skills, it is 
important to focus on the most distinctive elements of substantive competition law 
analysis, on the basis that ‘procedural issues are common to many courses and can be 
picked up much more easily in practice.  The substance of competition law [which is 
economic analysis] is unique …’194 
These were important considerations from a study design perspective.  Without a 
substantial outer-wall of legalese to penetrate in merger review cases, the need for 
general legal skills was significantly reduced, while at the same time key economic 
issues would present themselves for analysis almost immediately the task was 
revealed.
195
  This would enable study participants with less developed legal skills – 
such as economists – to engage with the central problems of the task faster and more 
directly, while presentation of the task itself could be reduced to a few key facts 
without sacrificing realism or the ability of the researcher to regulate degrees of 
difficulty.   This was considered likely to improve experimental efficiency and open the 
possibility of each participant completing multiple test-cases per interview session. 
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Further below in Part D is a discussion of the actual merger test cases used in this study 
and the decision to use a limited-information approach for testing purposes.   
B  Participant Selection 
The next step was to develop a means of identifying prospective candidates who would 
constitute a sufficiently large and varied, yet focused, group of specialists all with 
substantial technical legal knowledge of competition law.  It was critical to ensure as 
far as practicable that there would be participants who possessed differing levels of 
expertise within this specialist knowledge domain, but that none of them would be 
considered mere novices or initiates as defined under Hoffman’s Scheme.  A total of 
between 15 to 20 participants was viewed as being both sufficient for the purposes of 
analysis and feasible for a single researcher to manage.
196
   
It was decided that each participant should have at least five years specialist 
competition law experience.  This baseline requirement avoided the involvement of 
novices or initiates, whom it was assumed would necessarily have less than 5 years 
specialist experience.
197
   Competition law also needed to be the focus of their 
professional work, and not just one of a broad portfolio of areas in which they 
practised.
198
  This restricted the pool of potential candidates to lawyers and economists 
working for major Australian law firms, specialist economics consultancies, or 
competition authorities.  It also meant a focus on the main national business centres in 
Australia, namely, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth.  This was because it was 
assumed that the work environments in smaller cities would not permit the degree of 
specialisation required for participants in this study.
199
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The targeting of market-leading law and economics firms was also important insofar as 
they screen-out those individuals whose technical skills or personalities do not meet the 
requirements of these organisations.  This screening function, which was formally 
recognised in Spence’s job-signaling model where higher education provides a sorting 
function for would-be employers,
200
 has been explicility considered by Ippolito in the 
context of the legal profession
201
 and was also noted by Blasi.
202
  In essence, those 
individuals with the IQ, tenacity (or, to use Duckworth et al’s terminology, ‘grit’203), 
social skills and technical capabilities (as well as high levels of ambition or 
‘passion’204), ultimately overtake their less-capable and less-motivated peers in the job 
market.  These individuals become employees at the best law and economics firms 
which are, in turn, attuned to identifying those individuals who best match their 
demanding talent-requirements.
205
   
It was assumed that factors such as IQ, grit and technical abilities would be consistently 
high across the sample of individuals in this study because they worked for these kinds 
of firms.  This would have the effect of controlling, at least to some degree, for factors 
not directly associated with this study’s conceptualisation of specialist competition law 
expertise, but which nevertheless could be important in explaining how these 
individuals came to be in their current positions.  Competition authority employees 
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were targeted on the same basis inasmuch as demand for opportunities to work in such 
organisations is high owing to the quantity and quality of competition work undertaken 
by these ‘monopolies’ of competition law enforcement, and because experience with a 
competition authority is a well-trodden path to private-sector employment with leading 
law and economics firms.
206
 
A balance between senior and junior participants was to be achieved by adopting a 
staggered selection process whereby once a number of, say, senior participants had 
volunteered, solicitations to more junior participants would be increased. To this end, it 
was assumed that those participants who were partners or at an equivalent level of 
seniority within their organisations (where they had sign-off responsibility) would have 
greater expertise than those participants who did not meet these conditions, but who 
were nevertheless domain specialists with at least 5 years’ experience in this field.  But 
this constituted a rough approximation only.  The aim at the participant-selection stage 
would not be to rank participants as such, but rather to ensure a broad representative 
sample of participants whose cognitive skills would extend the full range of expertise 
possibilities. 
As to making initial contact with prospective participants, it was decided to send 
invitational e-mails either directly and unsolicited to lawyers and economists whose 
profiles were listed on their organisations’ websites (where their specialisation and 
seniority were clearly displayed), or to do so on the recommendations of other 
participants who permitted the researcher to use their name to solicit further prospects.   
No participant would be offered payment of any kind or any other financial or non-
financial incentive to participate.      
An overview of the individuals who volunteered for this study is provided in the next 
chapter.  This includes details concerning each participant’s employing organisations, 
years of professional experience, years of specialist experience in competition law, and 
the number of merger matters in which they had been involved during their careers.  
 
                                                          
206
 This point was confirmed inasmuch as almost half the lawyers and economists in private practice who 
participated in this study had previously worked for a competition authority.  In terms of Spence’s Job-
Signaling Model, such individuals’ experience is an indicator to law and economics firms that these 
professionals have valuable – and rare – knowledge, skills and abilities. 
62 
 
C  Participant Ranking 
The third step in the methodology developed for this study was to determine a means 
by which participants could be ranked according to their levels of likely expertise.  As 
no previous studies had developed such a process, at least not in a form that fitted the 
analytical objectives of this thesis, it was necessary to establish a reasoned and 
practicable basis for creating an appropriate hierarchy of legal specialists amongst and 
between whom cognitive performances could be compared.   This meant devising a 
scale to measure expertise levels and a weighting system that would ensure a 
meaningful balance between these measures of specialist legal ability.  This would be a 
further, and more refined, sorting of participants beyond the approximate 
categorisations of partners and non-partners used when soliciting volunteers.  That 
distinction was relevant only for sampling purposes.  A more detailed and systematic 
ranking procedure was needed to permit more fine-grained – and theoretically explicit 
– comparisons along the expertise continuum. 
Chess players have long been popular subjects for expertise researchers in much the 
same way that the fruit fly has been a model organism for geneticists.
207
   This is 
primarily because of the existence of the ELO rating scale, which has been used to rank 
chess players since the 1960s.
208
  Gobet and Charness describe this rating scale as ‘a 
sophisticated measurement scale for evaluating chess skill based on performance in 
chess tournaments.’209  This scale has enabled expertise researchers to undertake fine-
grained comparisons between the cognitive abilities of different levels of chess experts, 
such as those in De Groot’s seminal studies comparing expert and grandmaster-level 
chess players
210
 and in follow-up research by Chase and Simon,
211
 as well as in more 
                                                          
207
 Fernand Gobet and Neil Charness, ‘Expertise in Chess,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J 
Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 523.  See also, N Charness, ‘The Impact of Chess Research on 
Cognitive Science’ (1992) 54 Psychological Research 4.   
208
 A E Elo, ‘Age Changes in Master Chess Performance’ (1965) 20 Journal of Gerontology 289 and A E 
Elo, The Rating of Chessplayers, Past and Present (Arco Chess, 2
nd
 Edition 1986). 
209
 Gobet and Charness, above n 207, 524. 
210
 A D de Groot, Thought and Choice in Chess (Mouton, 1965). 
211
 WG Chase and HA Simon, ‘Perception in Chess’ (1973) 4 Cognitive Psychology 55 and WG Chase 
and HA Simon, ‘The Mind’s Eye in Chess,’ in WG Chase (ed), Visual Information Processing 
(Academic Press, 1973) 215. 
63 
 
general studies involving chess players by Bachmann and Oit,
212
 Charness et al,
213
 and 
Van der Mass and Wagenmakers.
214
   
In other domains, the lack of a similar scale against which to rank individuals with 
different levels of expertise has remained a problem for expertise researchers,
215
 
including those involved in the cognitive analysis of legal expertise.  Previous studies 
of cognitive differences between expert and novice lawyers (often law students), have 
relied on broad assumptions regarding the superior abilities and performance of the 
putative experts concerned.
216
   
Most relevant to the present study of specialist legal expertise were the participant 
selection choices of Colon-Navarro and Weinstein in their think-aloud verbal protocol 
analyses of immigration law experts and social security disability (‘SSD’) claims 
experts, respectively.  Colon-Navarro chose as his highest level of experts four 
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experienced lawyers from Boston.
217
  His assumption was that lawyers who had 
specialized in immigration law for between three and 14 years and who had handled 
between 500 to 1,500 immigration problems
218
 could be considered experts vis a vis 
two ‘experienced novices’ who were law students with both theoretical training and 
some clinical experience, and vis a vis one inexperienced novice with only theoretical 
training in immigration law.
219
   
In Weinstein’s study, three of his 10 participants were designated experts on the basis 
of their being ‘outstanding practitioners,’ but their credentials were not stated.220  The 
author simply indicated that their expertise arose from their experience dealing with 
SSD claims of the general type chosen for the think-aloud problem solving task in the 
study. 
Chay’s more recent doctoral research, which also involved verbal protocol analysis 
involving legal specialists, used two experienced family law specialists and two law 
students.
221
  His first designated expert was a lawyer who specialized exclusively in 
family law matters, but who had practiced in the area for only 6 years.  The second was 
a lawyer with 22 years of experience in family law matters, but who also practiced 
concurrently in the fields of criminal and business law.   The two law students in 
Chay’s study were law school graduates who had yet to complete their practical legal 
training qualifications. 
In the absence of a formal scoring system like that used to rank chess players, and 
recognizing the methodological shortcomings of previous researchers’ assumptions 
concerning their choice of legal experts, the approach adopted in this study utilized 
multiple measures of expertise to create a ranking of participants according to their 
likely levels of specialist legal expertise.  Which is to say, no attempt was made to 
determine levels of expertise in an absolute sense, but rather to identify which 
participants were more likely (and which were less likely) to be experts according to a 
set of five measures of expertise informed, for the most part, by previous research.   
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This approach comports with Chi’s review of the so-called ‘relative expertise’ approach 
to expertise research, which obviates the need to define expertise in absolute terms.
222
  
The theoretical construct underlying this approach was that of a continuum of expertise, 
which Chi argues is better for identifying the specific skills and knowledge that less 
expert individuals need to progress to higher levels within a particular knowledge 
domain.
223
   
Given the focus in this study on higher-levels of specialist expertise rather than on 
simply experts versus novices, an overlay of probabilities acknowledged that it was not 
possible to discover all relevant facts about individual participants such that a definitive 
view of their position on the continuum of expertise might be determined.  For 
instance, certain expert behaviours may not manifest in ways that that would be 
recognized or recorded within the chosen analytical framework.  This acknowledges 
Duncker’s concern that the analysis of verbal protocols is necessarily limited to only 
that information which is verbalized.
224
   
It was therefore decided to conceptualise the rankings process in terms of ‘more likely 
to be an expert’ and ‘less likely to be an expert.’  This was to make clear that higher-
ranked participants were simply those who had had their positive performances against 
the chosen measures recorded and assessed.  Very good performance against all these 
measures was therefore assumed to reflect a greater likelihood that an individual 
participant was a higher-level expert.   
Poor performance against one or more measures, however, could not be so easily 
associated with lesser expertise.  Allowing for the limited number of measures used 
(and hence the unavoidably incomplete capturing of expert performance) as well as a 
participant’s possible reliance on non-vocalized mediating protocols, the absence of 
good performances against the chosen measures could not be said to necessarily reflect 
lesser expertise.  Instead, it indicated only the probability or likelihood that an 
individual had less expertise than another participant who was observed performing 
better against the same measures. 
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In other words, it was important to ensure when implementing these measures that the 
‘absence of evidence’ of such abilities was not conflated with ‘evidence of absence’ of 
those abilities, a problem associated with the so-called black swan phenomenon 
discussed by Taleb.
225
  The chosen probabilistic approach therefore acknowledged the 
possibility that some participants would perform poorly against these measures in the 
context of this study, but may nonetheless possess high levels of relevant expertise.   
Five measures of probable expertise were chosen for this aspect of the study.  These 
were: a) Whether or not a participant had been promoted to a partnership position as a 
competition law specialist (which status was equated with having sign-off 
responsibility); b) Whether or not they had 10,000 hours (approximately 10 years) 
specialist experience in competition law; c) The depth of their analysis, in conceptual 
terms, when assessing two designated test cases; d) Their ability to generate 
exceptional reasoning strategies during the problem-solving tasks, indicating either 
high or low levels of expertise; and, e) How prone they were to making comprehension 
errors. 
There was no assessment undertaken at this point as to whether participants offered 
correct or accurate legal risk assessments against the test cases.  This was principally 
because without a complete analysis of their verbal protocols (which was considered 
more appropriately left until the post-test assessment), it was not possible to determine 
whether a seemingly accurate assessment might be the result of mere guessing or 
flawed reasoning.  Accordingly, this measure was viewed as problematic and likely to 
lead to circularity problems (discussed further below) when it came to correlating 
assessed levels of expertise with the substantive results of the testing phase. 
Moreover, correct or accurate responses to a task cannot always be associated with 
greater levels of expertise, and in some instances incorrect responses can be explained 
on the basis that the relevant individual was an expert.
226
  This was observed in 
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Marchant et al’s study in which their assumed experts were incapable of dismissing 
from their minds a tax deduction rule that conflicted with the researchers’ expected 
resolution of the test-cases.
227
  Feltovich and Barrows also note how the limiting effects 
of contextual dependence can lead expert medical practitioners into error or at least 
prevent them from offering an opinion while less capable doctors freely express their 
views.
228
  In this latter respect, it was entirely possible that some participants in the 
present study would refuse to give any opinion – or offer only a highly qualified 
response – because of insufficient information and too little time.  It would have been 
difficult to categorise such responses as correct or accurate (or incorrect or inaccurate) 
in the standard sense. 
With respect to the last three measures noted above, which depended on the assessment 
of participants’ performances during their consideration of the tests cases in this study, 
a further concern was the circularity of ranking participants according to their levels of 
expertise by utilising the same test cases used to test their expertise.  To the extent that 
such circularity might exist and influence the results of the study, it was decided that 
the areas of comparison subsequently chosen for protocol analysis would be unrelated 
(or only indirectly related) to the above three measures of cognitive development.   
The chosen measures were otherwise considered consistent with the substantive tests of 
expertise derived from previous studies as discussed below.  They also comported with 
Chay’s contention that performance measures of cognitive development are analytically 
valid in a ranking context, although they can be logistically cumbersome to implement 
when test participants are busy professionals.
229
    
Below is a more detailed discussion of the nature and relevance of all five of the above 
measures of likely expertise.  This is followed by an explanation of the measurement 
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and weighting approaches adopted for the purpose of scoring participants according to 
their assessed likely levels of expertise, both against each individual measure, as well 
as cumulatively.  These measures define the ranking methodology on which this study 
relied for identifying associations between participants’ cognitive performances and 
their respective levels of specialist legal expertise.  
1  Promotion to Partnership as a Competition Law Specialist 
The first measure of likely expertise was whether or not a participant possessed sign-off 
responsibility and, more particularly, whether their promotion to partnership or its non-
law firm equivalent was based on their demonstrated expertise in competition law. 
This difference, which was the basis for the partner and non-partner distinction relied 
on during the participant-selection process, mirrors the difference between journeymen 
and experts under Hoffman’s Scheme where journeymen work under orders from their 
superiors, but experts are self-directed and can therefore be held responsible for their 
work in ways that journeyman are not.  Accordingly, this first measure of likely 
expertise assumed a positive correlation between a participant’s level of expertise and 
their ability to sign-off on their work as an authorised representative of their 
organisation.   
This level of responsibility is typically only given to the partners of law firms (or their 
economist equivalents), such that only their signatures on official firm documents, in 
the form of letters of advice for example, are binding on their partnership or firm.  
Securing such responsibility generally requires the agreement of existing partners or of 
senior management in the case of incorporated organisations and economics firms 
which do not have a partnership structure.  In this sense, sign-off responsibility is 
ostensibly a proxy for the requirement noted by Hoffman that experts must be 
individuals who are ‘highly regarded by their peers’ inasmuch as their ‘judgments are 
uncommonly accurate and reliable.’230   Existing partners or senior management are 
unlikely to bestow an ability to legally bind them and their firm on an individual who 
has not demonstrated these attributes.   
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However, the choice of sign-off responsibility may not always be an appropriate point 
of distinction.  Domain experts do not only exist amongst those professionals with such 
authority.  It is plausible and to an extent inevitable that there are non-partners who 
perform equally as well as – and in some instances even better than – professionals who 
possess sign-off responsibility.  There are, for instance, non-partners who may today be 
on the brink of promotion to partnership, save for the finalisation of promotion 
formalities.  There are also non-partners who may be experts in a technical sense, but 
who lack the interpersonal skills needed to attract new clients to their organisation and 
expand their practices, and on this ground they fail to secure promotion.   
It is also possible that some partners will not be experts in a specialist legal sense, but 
will have obtained sign-off responsibility on the strength of other personal attributes or 
professional abilities.  This situation could occur either as a conscious act of the 
partnership promotion committee, or because of a phenomenon noted by Ericsson – 
with specific references to research by Ericsson and Lehmann on stock market advice,  
psychotherapy counselling and weather forecasting
231
 – that ‘people recognized by 
their peers as experts do not always display superior performance on domain-related 
tasks.’232  In other words, peer confirmation may be expressly or impliedly based on 
traits other than subject-matter expertise – or be mistakenly bestowed on merely 
presumed domain experts. 
Further, simply being a partner in a law firm or a senior manager in an economics firm 
or a competition authority, should not be a sufficient condition for scoring a participant 
positively under this measure.  What is necessary is that their appointment to 
partnership or its equivalent level of authority be a reflection at that time of their 
specialist expertise in competition law.  Only in this way can the argument be made 
that the relevant individual’s specialist legal skills were attested to by their peers.   
2  10,000 Hours 
The second measure of likely expertise used to rank participants in this study was 
whether or not an individual had 10,000 hours of experience in competition law. 
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According to the so-called 10,000-hour rule as defined in a 1993 journal article by 
Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Romer
233
 and subsequently popularized in Malcolm 
Gladwell’s 2008 book, Outliers,234 an individual who has engaged in 10,000 hours (or 
approximately 10 years) of deliberate practice in a specific area of endeavour can be 
considered an expert in that area.  There have since been other scholarly articles written 
by a range of researchers, notably Kaufman
235
 and Freeman,
236
 who have relied on, 
defended or sought to confirm the validity and predictive power of this rule or a 
variation of it.
237
   The origins of the rule itself can be traced back to the work of 
Watson in the 1920s, who contended that expertise – and even genius – can be 
developed in almost anyone
238
 and is not dependent on an individual’s innate ability as 
had been claimed by Galton in the 1860s.
239
 
In addition to Gladwell’s book, at least eight other bestsellers240 have been written 
during the last decade expounding Ericsson et al’s findings that ‘high levels of 
deliberate practice are necessary to attain expert level of performance’ and that 
‘dramatic differences in performance between experts and amateurs-novices’ are in 
most cases (allowing for activities such as sports where the genetics of body size are 
important) due ‘to similarly large differences in the recorded amounts of deliberate 
practice.’241  
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Yet not all scholars agree with the significance of this rule.  For example, Hambrick et 
al have recorded how ‘Ericsson and colleagues’ view has been roundly criticized on 
conceptual and methodological grounds,’242 and that ‘there is widespread skepticism … 
over Ericsson and colleagues’ strong claims regarding the importance of deliberate 
practice for acquiring expert performance.’243  Ackerman, one such critic, recently 
questioned the strong view of Ericsson et al’s position stating that elite performance is 
not attainable by everyone, such that: 
some individuals may have accumulated 15,000h, 20,000h or more of deliberate 
practice, yet remain also-rans on the leader board, or never achieve medal status in 
national or international competitions.
244
 
In their own research, Hambrick et al found that based on a review of six previous 
studies on the correlation between deliberate practice and chess-playing ability, ‘on 
average, deliberate practice explained 34% of the variance in performance after 
correcting for measurement error … leaving 66% of the variance unexplained and 
potentially explainable by other factors.’245  The authors go on to claim that not only do 
some people never become experts, regardless of how many hours or years they devote 
to practicing deliberately in a single area, there is clear evidence that ‘people do reach 
an elite level of performance without copious practice.’246  These findings accord with 
Gardner’s contention that Ericsson et al’s view on the sufficiency of deliberate practice 
‘requires blindness to ordinary experience.’247  
Such findings and related practical issues raise questions about the applicability of the 
10,000-hour rule as a definitive measure of specialist legal expertise.  First, there is the 
difficulty of assessing the quality of work a competition law specialist has engaged in 
during their years of experience in the field.  Deliberate practice is defined by Ericsson 
et al as ‘engagement in highly structured activities that are created specifically to 
improve performance in a domain through immediate feedback, that require a high 
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level of concentration, and that are not inherently enjoyable.’248  To what extent a 
lawyer or economist dealing with competition law matters may have experienced all or 
even some of these things during their specialisation is difficult to determine, even if 
relying on personal responses to a detailed questionnaire. 
There is also the possibility, as foreshadowed by Hambrick et al,
249
 that some of the 
participants in this study with less than 10,000 hours of deliberate practice as a 
competition law specialist may nevertheless be experts under Hoffman’s Scheme.  To 
apply the 10,000-hour rule as a necessary precondition to being assessed as such would 
therefore seem arbitrary, and in some instances misleading.  Nevertheless, it is not 
unreasonable to accept that this rule has some determinative significance, at least as 
one of five measures of likely expertise within the ranking-framework for this thesis. 
The most acute issues were anticipated to arise when assessing those participants who 
had more than 8 years but less than 12 years specialist competition law experience.  At 
the lower end of this range it was possible that each year qualified as deliberate practice 
according to Ericsson’s formulation, and that this may have been sufficient for some 
individuals to rise to expert status in as few as, say, eight and a half years.  At the 
higher end, a participant with eleven and a half years’ experience may appear to have 
satisfied the 10,000-hour rule, yet might not have developed their cognitive skills as 
much as their less experienced colleagues.  As Blasi noted with reference to the work 
of Avram Sherr,
250
 it has been not uncommonly observed ‘that some people have 
twenty years’ experience while others seem to have but one year of experience twenty 
times.’251 
3  Conceptual Depth 
The third measure of likely expertise was the extent to which a participant 
demonstrated an ability to engage in deep conceptualisation while considering 
competition issues in a legal-risk assessment context.  
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Chi, Feltovich and Glaser’s landmark study of novice and expert physicists 
demonstrated how greater expertise can be reflected in an increased focus on ‘second-
order, derived cues.’252  In a more recent review of the relevant literature, Chi reiterates 
that experts can be distinguished from novices insofar as they ‘perceive the “deep 
structure” of a problem or situation.’253   This assessment comports with Lesgold et al’s 
findings that experts are able to identify patterns, arrangements and cues that less 
expert practitioners do not perceive.
254
  It is also consistent with the findings of 
Nievelstein et al who concluded in a study of law students and academics that their 
expert participants ‘mentioned significantly more central concepts’ when, like Chi et 
al’s physics experts, they were given the think-aloud problem-solving task of grouping 
concept cards based on text-book problems.
255
  Weinstein, who compared lawyers and 
law students in the area of social security disability law, similarly found that his expert 
subjects saw ‘deeper patterns’ while the novice participants ‘tended to focus on surface 
features.’256  
Guided by these studies, conceptual depth was chosen as the third measure for 
distinguishing between different levels of expertise amongst the participants in this 
study.  More particularly, it seemed reasonable to expect that the more expert a 
participant in this study, the more likely they would be ‘to use “abstract” 
representations that rely on “deep knowledge”; that is, imaginal and conceptual 
understanding of functional relations and physical principles that relate concepts.’257  It 
was also assumed that they would be less likely to display the novice’s tendency ‘to use 
hastily formed “concrete” (that is, superficial) problem representations’258 which lack 
the ‘conceptually richer and more organized’259 representations associated with greater 
expertise. 
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Two test cases in this study (Case A and Case B) provided the best opportunity to 
identify those participants who considered issues at a conceptually deep level and those 
whose assessments involved more superficial analyses.  While neither of these cases 
was selected for this specific purpose, they were viewed as better suited to this task 
than the other cases because they permitted a clearer conceptualization of different 
levels of analytical abstraction.  The other cases were problematic because for Case C 
there was an option for participants to bypass substantive analysis altogether using 
various inference strategies, and for Case D the range of agriculture-related products 
and services in that case resulted in a complex and potentially unwieldy factual matrix 
not easily framed in terms of conceptual depth. 
Given that conceptual depth would be only one of five different measures used to 
distinguish between different levels of likely expertise in this study, the potential 
detriment of using just two rather than four test cases for this measure was reduced.  
Moreover, the ultimate aim was not so much to rank individual participants 
conclusively, but to identify, in broad terms, the degree to which they were likely to be 
experts.  This invocation of a second-order analysis further reduced concerns about 
unobserved performance against this one measure. 
As to the analysis of the relevant test cases themselves (which are more fully described 
in Part D below and in Attachment B), Case A concerned the supply of large precast 
concrete products used in road works and other infrastructure projects.  Both the 
acquirer and the target company manufactured reinforced concrete box culverts and 
drainage pits, which were the key overlapping product-lines offered by both merger 
parties and were the focus of the ACCC’s inquiries.  These were the basic facts of the 
case.  As with all the test cases, the market definition task then required participants to 
identify what they considered to be the relevant product (or service) and geographic 
dimensions of the relevant market.   
In this particular test case, participants’ analytical approaches to defining a relevant 
market were considered likely to be determined in large part by whether or not they 
viewed the relevant concrete products primarily in terms of their superficial 
characteristics (that is, the substantial weight of large, reinforced concrete pipes and 
arches) or their functionality (that is, the utility and use of the relevant products in 
various contexts).  Where the weight of the concrete products proved to be the focus, 
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participants would be more likely to devote their time to assessing how far such heavy 
cargo might be transported. However, where functionality – the second-order feature of 
the relevant products – was their focus, participants would be more likely to spend their 
time analysing product substitutability.   
Functional substitution is a key issue in merger cases, as alternative products or 
services need to be identified before geographic issues are considered.  Without 
knowing which other types of products or services are likely to constrain the pricing 
and supply decisions concerning the products or services supplied by the merging 
parties, it is impossible to identify the locations and availability of those sources of 
constraint, and hence the geographic extent of the market.   
Experienced practitioners typically seek first to understand as much as they can about 
other products or services that could perform the same functions as those supplied by 
the merger parties.  Lay people and less expert competition law specialists, on the other 
hand, are more likely to rely on the obvious (but superficial) fact that concrete products 
are heavy with a low value-to-weight ratio.  Accordingly, such individuals can be 
expected to devote more time and effort to analysing issues relating to the feasibility of 
transporting these products by various means and across various distances.  They are 
less likely to perceive that lighter, corrugated steel substitute products, for instance, 
might be sourced from a wide variety of suppliers and be viably transported over far 
greater distances, thereby concluding that a widened geographic market would be more 
appropriate.  Such an assessment could materially affect competition-law risk. 
On this basis, those participants choosing to spend relatively more time – and rely more 
– on geographic considerations in their assessment of Case A, were viewed as adopting 
a more superficial analytical approach than those who emphasised product substitution 
analysis.  Participants relying on arguments that there may be no geographic overlap 
between the merger parties – and hence no competition concern at all – would therefore 
be considered less likely to be experts on this measure than those who focused more on 
supply and production-substitution possibilities, which in conceptual terms were more 
abstract and more directly associated with greater analytical depth. 
Case B concerned the merger of two freight-forwarding businesses.  The acquiring 
business (but not the target business) operated as a vertically integrated freight-
forwarding and shipping service provider though a joint venture arrangement it had 
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with a shipping company.  Shipping services were central to this case because the main 
transportation routes at issue included a 240 kilometre sea-crossing between the 
Australian mainland and the island state of Tasmania.   
It was anticipated that some participants would fail to detect a potentially problematic 
vertical-integration issue because they viewed both merger parties as logistics 
companies of roughly equivalent structure.  Others might identify freight-forwarding 
services as the relevant service dimension, and on that basis view the merger as 
essentially a horizontal merger without a vertical dimension.  Their analysis would 
therefore be ‘deeper’ than those who either did not identify the significance of this 
distinction between freight-forwarding and integrated logistics operators.  However, 
this second group of participants would still not have undertaken the deepest level of 
possible conceptualisation. 
Participants would engage in deeper conceptualisation if they recognised that freight-
forwarding was the relevant focus for identifying the potential anti-competitive effects 
of the proposed merger, but that foreclosure to this market could arise from the acquirer 
being vertically integrated and potentially motivated to restrict the supply of its 
shipping services to third-party freight forwarders post-merger.  These participants’ 
ability to discern this so-called ‘vertical risk’ while other participants might either 
overlook or not fully grasp the significance of the asymmetrical economic structures of 
the merger parties, was considered an indicator of the former’s greater expertise 
inasmuch as their analysis required a deeper conceptualisation of the facts of the case.  
Not only would these participants identify the relevant structural differences between 
the parties, they would also identify the behavioural implications of this distinction.  
To summarise with reference again to Chi, Feltovich and Glaser’s study of physics 
expertise, those participants who viewed the concrete products in Case A primarily in 
terms of their physical characteristics would be like the authors’ novice physicists who 
grouped physics problems according to their descriptive characteristics, rather than 
according to underlying physics principles as the experts did.   Whereas the less expert 
competition law specialists in this study would ‘basically use the features explicitly 
stated in the problem’260 and be more likely to identify problem distinctions ‘on the 
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spot,’261 the more expert participants could be expected to focus more on issues of 
functionality.  In doing so, they would be guided by the economic principles of product 
substitution while relying less on the more obvious physical characteristics of large 
reinforced, concrete products.  Their focus – and hence their verbal protocols – would 
therefore dwell proportionally more on evidence of equivalent functionality in the form 
of steel products and products made from other materials.   
Those participants considering Case B would have the option of relying on the literal 
descriptions of the parties in the ACCC’s letter, which, as it happened, had poorly 
explained the differences between the merger parties (the letter read as if the acquirer 
and target companies serviced different customers, when in fact they did not).  
Alternatively, they could focus more on the nature of the commercial activities implied 
in the letter and develop a richer representation of the relevant services.  Those 
participants who took this latter route would be more likely to avoid errors arising from 
the ACCC’s mismatched comparisons and recognise vertical integration issues as 
central to a correct assessment.  In doing so, they would demonstrate a deeper 
conceptualization of the case. 
4  Exceptional Reasoning  
The fourth measure of likely expertise was the extent to which a participant engaged in 
exceptional reasoning when considering competition issues in a legal-risk assessment 
context.  
Given the range of specialists participating in this study, not only was it assumed that 
some participants would perform better, and others worse, but that certain individuals 
would perform very differently from all other participants, either in a positive or a 
negative sense.  While the test cases themselves contained limited information thereby 
precluding a direct comparison of ultimate opinions since many participants may 
simply be unable to provide a conclusive view, unique reasoning strategies would be 
readily identifiable.  Accordingly, those participants whose reasoning strategies were 
significantly and materially different from those of every other participant would be 
identified as having engaged in exceptional reasoning.   
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This measure of likely expertise was foreshadowed by Weinstein, who expressly 
limited his terminology to ‘experienced’ and ‘inexperienced’ solvers.262  He chose not 
to use the ‘expert’ designation because it connoted ‘exceptional performance’ amongst 
experienced legal specialists, whereas his focus was on differences attributable to 
participants being either a novice or an ‘outstanding practitioner’ without further 
dividing the latter category in terms of degree of expertise.
263
  At the same time, 
however, he observed that exceptional answers arrived at by some experts, but not by 
others, could be a distinguishing feature of greater expertise and be worthy of future 
research.
264
 
To determine whether or not these unique reasoning strategies could be considered 
positive or negative outliers, an ideal strategy or response was formulated for use as a 
conceptual template against which the quality of a reasoning strategy could be assessed.  
Those exceptional performances that conformed closely to the ideal would be ascribed 
a positive rating, while those that bore little resemblance would be rated negatively.  
An ideal response according to this measure of likely expertise was considered a unique 
reasoning strategy which: 
i. The participant relied on to a material extent when assessing the case (trivial 
reasoning differences were therefore excluded); 
 
ii. Was grounded in known facts, experience and inferential insight, rather than 
superficial distinctions and dubious assumptions;  
 
iii. Reflected extensive specialist knowledge in competition law analysis; and 
 
iv. Was novel, creative and compelling. 
 
Comparisons against an ideal response are not new in studies like the present one.  
They have been used extensively in the wisdom studies conducted by the Berlin Group, 
amongst other researchers.
265
 Some of the most recent endorsees of this approach 
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(which, like this study, relied directly on the Berlin Group’s Manual for the Assessment 
of Wisdom-Related Knowledge
266
), were Greaves et al in their 2014 study of 
transformational leadership styles.
267
  That study, and several of the earlier studies cited 
by the authors, were similar to the present study insofar as it combined measurements 
against an ideal response and think-aloud problem solving and verbal protocol analysis. 
This study applied principles from the Berlin Group’s Manual when formulating the 
above ideal response to assess reasoning quality in the competition law problem-
solving tests used here.  That document also informed the approach to scoring and 
weighting responses against this ideal, as discussed below in Section 6.  
5  Comprehension Errors 
The fifth and final measure of likely expertise was the extent to which a participant 
made comprehension errors when considering competition issues in a legal-risk 
assessment context.  
Comprehension errors included misreading the test-case documentation or recalling 
irrelevant or inaccurate information in an attempt to augment that incomplete 
information.  Those participants who made more non-trivial errors, especially where 
these were material or determinative in a problem-solving sense, would be assumed 
less likely to be experts.  This was considered a non-controversial assumption 
supported by Chi’s observation that it can be generally expected that experts will solve-
problems with fewer errors than lesser experts within the expert’s specialist knowledge 
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domain.
268
  In the present study, material errors were therefore assumed to be 
associated with lower levels of expertise. 
The documentation used in this study was in a form that was unfamiliar to most 
participants.  It was also purposely insufficient to support a fully-reasoned response to 
the legal-risk assessment task.  Further, as a result of the procedural rules applied in this 
study, no participant would have prior familiarity with any of the test-case 
transactions.
269
  Assessing the difficulty of securing clearance for a specific merger 
transaction based on these documents alone would therefore be a novel experience.     
Given these factors, it was considered inevitable that errors of various kinds would 
occur, but that the more expert participants would be less prone to serious errors.  As 
Colon-Navarro had found, the experts in his study were not misled by what he termed 
‘deliberate red herrings implanted in the hypothetical’ backstory he had prepared for 
his interviewee.
270
  This, he argued, attested to their ability to distinguish between 
relevant and irrelevant information, and to self-correct when possible ambiguities were 
discovered.   
6  Scoring and Weighting 
A scoring and weighting scheme was developed to facilitate the ranking of participants 
based on the above five measures of likely expertise.  Ranking required the summation 
of scores across each of the five measures.  These final scores would form the basis for 
rankings according to participants’ levels of likely expertise. 
The following sections (a) to (c) describe the methodological choices made to establish 
a theoretically coherent and consistent approach to quantifying the relative levels of 
likely expertise amongst those individuals volunteering to participate in this study.  
This quantification process focused first on participants’ possession of sign-off 
responsibility and 10,000 hours of experience as legal specialists.  It then shifted to the 
scoring and weighting of participants’ performances according to their observed 
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conceptualization ability, their exceptional reasoning ability, and their avoidance of 
comprehension errors in an information-constrained and time-limited context. 
(a)  Sign-off Responsibility and The 10,000 Hour Rule 
The two experience-based measures of expertise (appointment to partnership and 
10,000 hours of specialist experience) were viewed as essentially binary in nature.  A 
participant either had the experience (or status) or they did not.  The only complication, 
as noted previously, was when it could not be ascertained conclusively whether or not 
either scenario was satisfied.  For instance, a participant may have been a partner with 
full sign-off responsibility for several years, yet may not have been appointed to the 
partnership on the basis of his or her specialist experience in competition law.  
Accordingly, a participant’s partnership status could not be ignored, but their 
promotion to partnership also needed to be a reflection of their then competition law 
expertise.  Partnership promotion per se could not be presumed to be a peer-based 
attestation of their expertise in a specialist knowledge domain unless this condition was 
satisfied.  
Similarly, some participants may have had 10 years’ experience as a competition law 
specialist, yet during their first few years (or in more recent times) they might not have 
devoted all their time to competition law matters.  Alternatively, they might not have 
engaged in increasingly demanding competition law work that would enable them to 
grow their knowledge and abilities in a deliberate-practice sense.  It was therefore 
considered preferable to avoid blindly equating their 10,000 hours of experience with 
the 20,000 hours of experience of another participant whose position at the most senior 
levels of their profession largely validated the quality of their experience in building 
expertise. 
In addition, there existed no previous research confirming partnership and sign-off 
responsibility to be unambiguous indicators of legal expertise.  The so-called 10,000 
hour rule, as previously discussed, also remains controversial inasmuch as expertise 
may develop in substantially less time for some individuals, but take much longer (or 
may never develop) for others.    
For these two measures of likely expertise, three possible grades were chosen.  First, a 
+1 score depicted clear possession of the required experience.  For partnership this 
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equated to promotion to partnership after having been a specialist competition lawyer 
or economist for more than eight years prior to that promotion.  For the 10,000 hour 
rule, it equated to a participant having developed their expertise as a competition law 
specialist over a period of at least 12 years.   
At the other end of the scale, not being a partner with sign-off responsibility was scored 
as an automatic -1, even when the participant in question could have been on the brink 
of partnership promotion (which was not something that could have been realistically 
determined during pre-test interviews
271
).  Similarly, specialist experience of eight 
years or less scored -1 for the reason that this represented a substantial discount to the 
10,000 hours rule, even assuming this rule to be overstated in some instances.   
For those participants where neither a +1 nor a -1 could be confidently given, a ‘0’ 
score was assigned to reflect an unobserved or inconclusive assessment.  This was 
considered an appropriate compromise where a participant had been promoted to 
partnership but had had eight or fewer years of prior experience as a competition law 
specialist, or had only gained specialist status after becoming partner.  A score of ‘0’ 
was also given when a participant had more than 8 but fewer than 12 years’ experience 
as a competition law specialist.  This range was intended to accommodate borderline 
cases, with a not insubstantial margin of error on both the high and low sides of the 
conventional 10-years cut-off period.  It also allowed for participants having only 
loosely approximated their responses to the pre-test questionnaire.  
The choice to restrict these partnership and experience measures to a range from -1 to 
+1 reflected the view that the correlation between partnership promotion and level of 
expertise has not been conclusively established, and that based on available scholarly 
research the 10,000-hour rule remains controversial.  It was therefore considered 
necessary to avoid placing excessive weighting on either of these measures, particularly 
given that other performance-based measures would also be used and an appropriate 
calibration across all measures could become over-complicated if a wider range of 
scores had been chosen.     
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(b)  Performance-Based Measures 
The performance-based measures of conceptual depth, exceptional reasoning and 
comprehension errors, were not considered binary, but rather measures of degree.  The 
deeper a participant conceptualized the core issues in a case, for example, the greater 
their apparent level of likely expertise.  It was therefore decided to give greater range to 
this measure than was chosen for assessing partnership status or 10,000-hours of 
experience.  It was also decided that greater weighting could be given to these tests of 
performance because they were blind to any preconceptions based on the participant’s 
status or seniority, and therefore were not prejudiced by the assumptions associated 
with those experience-based measures.   
The better an exceptional reasoning strategy was assessed to be, the higher (and 
weightier) a participant’s likely expertise rating.  Similarly, an exceptionally poor 
reasoning strategy required a correspondingly substantial lacking-in-likely-expertise 
rating.  As to comprehension errors, it was important to distinguish between errors that 
were trivial and errors that were substantial (either in seriousness or number, or both).  
There was therefore a need to reflect these differences in more nuanced terms. 
At the same time, it was necessary to maintain uniformity between all the measures 
used to rank participants.  If partnership status and more than 12,000 hours’ specialist 
experience were both to be scored at +1, then significant conceptual ability should not 
be scored +10, or at least not if the ultimate aim was to arrive at a compelling 
summation of likely expertise scores across all five measures.  The imperative of intra-
measure meaningfulness therefore needed to be balanced against the need for inter-
measure consistency.   
Moreover, while a -1 to +1 score (for partnership and ‘10,000 hours’ experience) and a 
-5 to +5 score (for each of deep conceptualization, exceptionally good reasoning and no 
comprehension errors) may appear a significant improvement over the much wider -10 
to +10 range, there would still exist a range of only three points in the former measures 
(-1, 0, +1) compared to a substantially more extended (and more difficult to justify in a 
proportional sense) range of eleven points across each of the latter measures (-5, -4, -3, 
-2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4, +5). 
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A conservative weighting of the performance-based measures from -2 to +2 was 
therefore considered appropriate insofar as it permitted 5 degrees of total range (-2, -1, 
0, +1, +2) with two degrees of positive performance above the neutral or unobserved 
grade of ‘0,’ and two degrees of negative performance below.  This arithmetic 
combined with the conceptualization of each measure relating to levels of likely 
expertise rather than actual expertise, translated into the following scoring and 
weighting rules. 
(i)  Conceptual Depth 
Conceptual depth was assessed by analysing the issues identified by participants as 
they considered two test cases, Case A and Case B.  As previously noted, Case A 
concerned the merger of two manufacturers of reinforced concrete products.  
Depending on the degree to which participants focused on the functionality of the 
products in question, both in absolute terms and relative to their consideration of 
geographic issues, they would be scored as follows: 
a) Participants who undertook a balanced analysis of (product) functionality and 
(geographic) characteristics were scored at ‘0.’  This neutral score would also 
be given to participants who did not consider this case;   
 
b) Those participants who placed significantly greater focus and relied more on 
geographic substitution (indicating superficial analysis) were scored at -1.  If 
they went on to develop arguments to suggest that there might be no geographic 
overlap between the parties (thereby indicating that the participant had relied 
predominantly on an analysis of the characteristics of the products rather than 
their functionality), they were scored at -2; and 
 
c) Participants who focused more on product functionality and supply-side 
substitution, were scored at +1.  Those who relied predominantly on product 
and production substitution (with minimal consideration of, or reliance on, 
geographic issues), were scored at +2. 
 
Case B concerned interstate freight-forwarding inclusive of a shipping component over 
the sea channel separating mainland Australia from Tasmania.  Depending on the 
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degree to which participants were able to identify and separate the vertical components 
of the relevant services – and then whether or not they identified the risk of vertical 
foreclosure arising from the vertical integration of the acquirer – they would be scored 
as follows: 
a) Participants who identified that the central issues in this case would revolve 
around increased market concentration in freight-forwarding services, leading 
them to characterize the transaction in purely horizontal merger terms, would be 
scored at ‘0.’  The same neutral score would be given to participants who did 
not consider this case or whose views could not be clearly ascertained;  
 
b) Participants who characterized the relevant services as integrated logistics or 
shipping services, were scored at -2.  This score reflected the fact that such a 
characterization would have the effect of automatically precluding the 
consideration of the deeper vertical foreclosure risk; and   
 
c) Participants who identified a potential vertical foreclosure issue whereby there 
was a risk that the integrated acquirer may restrict access to freight forwarding 
after the merger was completed, were scored at +2.   
 
There was no clear method for assigning scores at -1 or +1 given the ostensibly limited 
nature of the conceptual analysis that could be undertaken by participants in this case.  
In this regard, Case B permitted a less fine-grained assessment of conceptual depth 
compared to Case A.  However, it was still important that the deepest level of 
conceptual analysis in both cases be scored equally at +2.  Hence, the only scores 
possible for Case B analyses were -2, ‘0’ and +2. 
 
(ii)  Exceptional Reasoning 
As noted in Section 4 above, an ideal response according to this measure would be a 
unique reasoning strategy which: 
i. The participant relied upon in a material sense when assessing the case (trivial 
strategies were excluded); 
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ii. Was firmly based on known facts, experience and inferential insight, rather than 
superficial distinctions and dubious assumptions;  
 
iii. Reflected extensive specialist knowledge in competition law analysis; and 
 
iv. Was novel, creative and compelling. 
 
The assessment of participants’ performances against this ideal response was based on 
the Berlin Group’s 7-point scale as set out in its 1994 Manual.272  The first level of that 
scale (Level 1) denotes a response with ‘very little’ similarity with the ideal response.  
The mid-level rating (Level 4) denotes a response that is ‘moderately’ similar.  The 
highest rating (Level 7) indicates responses that are ‘a great deal’ similar to the ideal 
response.   
Importantly, instructions in the Manual identify the avoidance of extreme ratings as a 
natural approach for some raters, but one that should be avoided.  Raters are advised to 
suppress such ‘reservations towards extreme praise or extreme criticism’ in 
unnecessary attempts ‘to avoid false judgments.’273  As the authors explain, the 
assessment process is not one of judgment in a subjective or values sense, but of 
performance against the objective criteria set out in the ideal response.
274
 
In the present study, exceptional reasoning strategies that bore ‘very little’ similarity to 
the four elements of the ideal response would receive a -2 score.  Strategies that were 
‘moderately’ similar would be rated at ‘0’ – or at -1 or +1 if a slightly less or slightly 
more positive case could be made, respectively.  Strategies that were ‘a great deal’ 
similar to the ideal response would be rated at +2.   
The decision to limit this study’s scale to 5 points (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2) rather than the 
Manual’s original 7-points (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) was done to ensure consistency with the 
other measures.  There were no obvious disadvantages associated with this change, 
apart from a loss of potential (though in practice very little) interpretive richness 
compared to a 7-point scale. 
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(iii)  Comprehension Errors 
Comprehension errors were assessed across all the cases considered by each 
participant.  Not only were the seriousness and materiality of individual errors relevant, 
but also the number of times errors were made in a cumulative sense. 
Participants who made two or more trivial or non-material errors would be scored at -1.  
One or more material comprehension errors, that is, errors that could be considered 
detrimental to a participant’s overall assessment of a case, would result in a score of -2.   
Participants whose only error related to misstated information or poorly expressed 
descriptions in the provided documentation (most notably the ACCC’s misleading 
comparison of the merger parties in Case B) would be scored at ‘0,’ even though the 
misunderstandings that resulted were in some instances material.  Participants who 
overcame or corrected for such misstatements and bad descriptions (and who otherwise 
made no significant errors) would be scored at +1. 
(c)  Summary 
The solicitation of participants for this study involved a managed sampling of both 
partners and non-partners in order to ensure a range of specialist legal expertise 
amongst volunteer participants. However, this simple binary distinction was considered 
insufficient for ranking participants according to their likely levels of expertise.  The 
advantage of this distinction was that it was useful for volunteer-solicitation purposes 
and was broadly related to expertise levels.  But using it to rank participants for the 
purposes of subsequent testing in the course of this study would have been clearly sub-
optimal. 
Having identified five measures of likely expertise – inclusive of a modified partner 
and non-partner rule – the relevant definitions and relevance of these measures could be 
presented in conceptual or abstract terms.  However, their effectiveness depended on a 
workable, and theoretically defensible, scoring and weighting methodology.  Absent a 
means of translating the relevant theoretical concepts into quantifiable measures, the 
ultimate aim of ranking participants according to their levels of likely expertise would 
not have been possible. 
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The above scoring and weighting procedures were conservatively, yet logically, 
framed.  First, the uncertainties surrounding the significance of sign-off responsibility 
and the 10,000-hour rule were contained within a three-step scoring range of -1 to +1.  
This delimited the remaining three performance measures to a five-step scoring range 
of -2 to +2 (for measures three and four) and from -2 to +1 (for measure five), thereby 
facilitating intra-score flexibility while ensuring inter-score compatibility.  The result 
was a maximum cumulative-score range of -8 to +7 across all measures, which was 
deemed broad enough to capture relative differences with sufficient nuance while 
avoiding excessive distance between participants with the highest and the lowest 
overall scores. 
Secondly, the use of five measures reduced reliance on any one measure, while the 
concept of ‘level of likely expertise’ further ameliorated concerns regarding unobserved 
behaviours.  At the same time, the above scoring and weighting system could be 
expected to produce ranking results that would be efficacious in the context of the 
study’s overall objectives.  In these regards, the above methodological choices were 
considered sufficiently innovative to overcome the novelty of this aspect of the study, 
and yet workable in terms of relevant theoretical and practical requirements.   
D  Test Procedure 
The procedure for testing the cognitive skills of study participants was central to this 
study’s overall design.  It was amongst the first issues to be considered in a conceptual 
and theoretical design sense.  But it would become the last step in the front-end process 
by which suitably qualified volunteers were solicited, ranked and tested.  In terms of 
procedural sequence, therefore, it is appropriate to discuss the testing process now. 
The issues discussed below relate to the instructions that guided participants through 
the testing process, the decision to use actual merger review case documentation 
(instead of hypothetical merger case materials), the significance of the information-
limited and time-constrained design of the representative task, the manner in which the 
specific test cases were selected, and how various practical issues were addressed using 
largely technological solutions to enable the remote testing of busy professionals via 
the telephone and Internet.   
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1  Task Instructions 
The representative task in this study required participants who specialised in Australian 
competition law to assess legal-risk based on market inquiry letters relating to four 
pending merger investigations which were at the time being actively considered by the 
ACCC.
275
  These letters – which were addressed generically to interested parties – were 
downloaded from the mergers page of the ACCC’s website and presented to 
participants according to procedures described further below.  For the participant who 
specialised in New Zealand competition law, documents in the form of Statements of 
Preliminary Issues, which are roughly equivalent to the ACCC’s market inquiry letters, 
were taken from the website of the CC.
276
   
Each participant was provided written instructions as to their specific task.  These 
instructions included a summary of the methodological basis for the testing process in 
which they were participating.  This information was included in the website used to 
guide participants through their interviews (see further Sections 5 and 6 below).  The 
relevant webpage on which these written instructions were provided is reproduced in 
Figure 3.1 below.  
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FIGURE 3.1 – Methodology Page from Test Website 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
‘Think-aloud’ analysis involves reading a document analytically and vocalizing your 
thoughts as they occur to you.  In this study, you will engage in think-aloud analysis as you 
read through and assess preliminary merger clearance cases. 
 
Your Task:   
To assess (hypothetically) the level of difficulty involved in securing merger 
clearance. As you consider the issues relevant to your assessment for each case, talk 
constantly – as if to yourself. 
 
Importantly, do not try to explain why you are thinking about certain issues, just that you are 
thinking about those issues.  This will provide the best evidence of how you naturally think. 
Explanations require additional cognitive processing (such as formulating coherent sentences 
and ensuring the logical presentation of ideas).  This could distract you from your task and 
compromise your usual analytical approach. 
 
Why This Methodology? 
 
Think-aloud analysis overcomes a key problem in studies of this kind, namely:  Experts often 
do not know what or how they do what they do, and even if they do know, they cannot 
explain it.  This is why traditional interviews and questionnaires alone have historically 
yielded very little information about how experts really think. 
 
By thinking aloud without trying to make sense of your vocalizations, you will generate 
verbal data that can be studied using scientific methods (such as verbal protocol analysis) to 
develop a better understanding of the cognitive elements of applied competition law analysis. 
 
Keep Talking – To Yourself  
 
What you say during the following exercises may sound incoherent and even confused.  This 
is normal and is in no way a sign of any lack of expertise.  Analytical thinking often involves 
apparent leaps in logic, repetitive questioning, periods of doubt and even confusion.  These 
are all attributes of expert analysis and precisely what we are seeking to observe. 
 
Almost certainly, you will need to work against your training and experience as a 
professional adviser.  When speaking to clients, we never want to sound inarticulate or 
unsure of ourselves.  When speaking with junior staff, we have to avoid sounding confused or 
incoherent.  But in this exercise, an uncensored, ‘stream of consciousness’ mindset is 
required. 
 
Because it can feel unnatural to ‘think aloud’ while reading a case, you may sometimes stop 
talking.  If this happens, you will be prompted to ‘keep talking’ so that your thoughts 
continue to be vocalized and recorded. 
 
Apart from this prompting, you should proceed as if you are alone and talking to yourself. 
 
 
The instruction in this Methodology Page for participants to ‘assess the level of 
difficulty in securing merger clearance’ was a formulation developed during the pilot 
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tests for this study.
277
  The original instruction was simply to predict the outcome of a 
case, that is, whether or not it was likely to be cleared by the relevant competition 
authority.  This is similar to the test stated in Figure 3.1 insofar as it also involves a 
predictive element.  In practice, however, assessing the level of difficulty of a case was 
considered more realistic inasmuch as – according to comments made by one pilot 
study participant and other participants involved in the actual study – clients commonly 
ask for such advice when assessing the commercial and legal risks associated with their 
merger proposals.   
Moreover, using test instructions that ask for a level of difficulty discourages binary 
thinking in which a ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ response might be offered.  Assessing difficulty 
levels seemed to involve – and arguably required – a deeper analysis of risk elements 
leading to greater reflection on the indeterminacy of specific issues.  This was 
considered likely to produce richer vocalizations. 
2  Use of Actual Merger Review Cases 
As noted in Part A of this chapter, in some competition law jurisdictions the 
competition authority has a role in reviewing, authorising and clearing merger 
proposals, either formally or informally.  These authorities typically publish the basic 
facts of pending merger proposals for the purpose of inviting public comment on 
possible issues of concern.  While this is not a universal practice,
278
 it is the usual 
approach adopted in the jurisdictions in which the present study was conducted.
279
 
These pre-decision publications typically offer a factual overview of the proposed 
transaction and identify potential competition issues.  They may also include a list of 
questions about the scope of relevant markets and related considerations, and can 
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sometimes state or imply the merger proponents’ arguments as to why their transaction 
should be allowed to proceed.  Within weeks – though sometimes months – of 
publishing such documents, competition officials announce their decision either to not 
oppose the transaction or to undertake a more in-depth second-stage review, which may 
ultimately jeopardise the merger proponents’ plans.  The majority of transactions 
subjected to informal review are permitted to proceed, with a small number having 
clearance conditions attached to them.  Few mergers are opposed following a public 
review, and even fewer end up in litigation.
280
 
As previously discussed, not only does this area of competition law practice draw on 
specialist legal skills, merger cases themselves are relatively easy to describe in 
summary form and do not require time-consuming analyses of a generic kind.  The only 
remaining issue from a study design perspective was therefore whether to use 
hypothetical or actual merger review cases. 
In this instance, the use of actual cases was preferred over hypothetical scenarios.  First, 
actual cases, in the form of merger review letters and Statements of Preliminary Issues 
published by the ACCC and CC, respectively, were readily available in the two 
competition law jurisdictions familiar to the participants in this study.  Second, the 
selected cases provided realism without known outcomes, which presented the 
opportunity to compare the accuracy – or usefulness – of participants’ opinions.  
However, this would also be a double-edged sword.  The impending nature of these 
cases meant that all participants would need to be tested within a four to five week 
time-frame or otherwise the published results of a case could unfairly benefit later 
participants and confound subsequent analysis.
281
  This restricted window of 
opportunity would inevitably limit the number of study participants, although the 
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Competition and Consumer Commission, Informal Merger Review Process Guidelines (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, September 2013).  For a guide to the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission’s approach, see its Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines (Commerce Commission, July 
2013). 
281
 For the four ACCC test cases used in this study, the number of calendar days from the date of a 
merger clearance application to the ACCC’s final decision ranged from 57 to 72 days.  The market 
inquiry letters used in this study were issued between three and four weeks after the merger clearance 
applications had been lodged.  This limited window of opportunity was not an issue for the New Zealand 
expert who was the sole participant from that jurisdiction and therefore the test cases he assessed only 
needed to remain undecided up to the day of his testing. 
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logistics of testing up to 20 participants were considered to be a potentially more 
significant limiting factor.
282
 
Hypothetical cases, on the other hand, would have needed to be prepared by the 
researcher, whose editorial preferences would have been unavoidably reflected in the 
final documentation, even if authored by a third party.  In addition, hypothetical 
scenarios can suffer from artificiality, insufficient complexity (or over-complexity) and 
superficial factual depth.  There is also the risk of unforeseen inconsistencies and 
critical gaps existing within a fictional factual-matrix.  Further, distracting ambiguities 
and participants obsessing over minor technical errors are further consequences of 
mishandled hypothetical case studies.  In combination, these negative potentialities 
could have substantially compromised the validity and richness of the resulting verbal 
data. 
3  Information-Limited and Time-Constrained 
The experiment-like nature of the representative task as explained to participants was 
integral to its design.  Participants were purposely given limited information about each 
case and were constrained by the time allotted for them to provide their opinions.  The 
extensive use of limited information tests by experimental psychologists in real-world 
settings has been documented by Hoffman,
283
 Schweickert et al,
284
 and Shadbolt and 
Burton.
285
  According to Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, tests of this kind are particularly 
useful ‘in probing the specialized sub-domain knowledge or reasoning of experts.’286   
The risk in the present context was that such a task could prove too artificial and all that 
would be tested was participants’ strategizing about an unrealistic task that could not be 
completed because of unrealistic information and time limitations.  According to 
                                                          
282
 Based on previous studies of this broad type (which have often involved teams of researchers working 
together), a general expectation was that a minimum of fifteen participants in this study would strike a 
reasonable balance between generating useful data sets and ensuring feasibility for a single researcher 
working alone.  
283
 RR Hoffman, ‘The Problem of Extracting the Knowledge of Experts from the Perspective of 
Experimental Psychology’ (1987) 8 AI Magazine 53. 
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 R Schweickert, AM Burton, NK Taylor, EN Corlett, NR Shadbolt and AP Hedgecock, ‘Comparing 
Knowledge Elicitation Techniques:  A Case Study’ (1987) 1 Artificial Intelligence Review 245. 
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 NR Shadbolt and AM Burton, ‘Kowledge Elicitation Elicitation Techniques:  Some Experimental 
Results,’ in KL McGraw and CR Westphal, Readings in Knowledge Acquisition (Ellis Horwood,1990). 
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 Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, above n 140, 104. 
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Newell,
287
 Jenkins
288
 and Crandall, Klein and Hoffman,
289
 this is a recognised 
methodological issue, not just for think-aloud verbal protocol analysis but for 
psychological testing generally.  Hence, the objective became to create a task that was 
controlled in information availability and in timeframe, but which was capable of 
yielding ‘data that possess ecological relevance, validity, and representativeness.’290   
The information contained in the ACCC’s market inquiry letters and the CC’s 
Statements of Preliminary Issues was not overly detailed, yet it was considered 
sufficient to provide enough background for participants to work with.  These 
documents consisted of up to half a dozen pages of text which, as was confirmed in the 
pilot tests, could be scanned and considered in sufficient depth within a loosely-
imposed 10-minute time limit.  Any fewer pages would likely have meant materially 
insufficient information.  More than half a dozen pages, on the other hand, could have 
resulted in information overload in the sense that participants could have legitimately 
spent all their allotted time simply reading through the documentation.  The Statements 
of Preliminary Issues published by the CC came close to this limit.  However, these 
documents also included large portions of standardised wording which could be – and 
were – largely ignored or glossed-over by participants. 
A 10-minute time limit per test-case was stated but not actively enforced so to assess 
the self-monitoring skills of participants and specifically their ability to sense elapsed 
time and finish within the time limit – a skill that legal professionals may develop 
under a billable hour system where every 6 or 10-minute block is counted as a billable 
unit.  It also added a degree of pressure to the legal-risk assessment task, which was 
considered likely to add to the realism of the task in the sense that lawyers in practice 
often have limited time to form their preliminary opinions.  This limit had the added 
advantage of facilitating an expectation amongst participants that they would be able to 
complete up to four test-case assessments during their 45-minute to one-hour 
interviews. 
 
                                                          
287
 A Newell, ‘You Can’t Play a Game of 20 Questions with Nature and Win’ in WG Chace (Ed), Visual 
Information Processing (Academic Press, 1973), 283. 
288
 JJ Jenkins, ‘Four Points to Remember:  A Tetrahedral Model of Memory Experiments’ in L Cermak 
and F Craik (eds), Levels of Processing in Human Memory (Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates, 1978) 429. 
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4  Test-Case Selection  
At the beginning of the testing phase of this study, 10 ACCC market inquiry letters and 
four Statements of Preliminary Issues by the CC were selected as possible test cases.  
These cases were, at the time of participant interviews, listed in chronological order 
(according to submission date) on the respective websites of the two competition 
authorities as merger transactions currently under review.  Accordingly, they were 
neither hypothetical nor selectively chosen in the sense that the researcher’s preferences 
might otherwise have been reflected in determining which transactions the participants 
would ultimately consider.  Moreover, they were not unusual cases and nor were they 
concerned with obscure transactions in a substantive sense when compared with the 
completed review cases also listed at the time on the competition authorities’ 
websites.
291
 
These 10 market inquiry letters and four Statements of Preliminary Issues were 
uploaded to the study website where they could be viewed by participants during the 
testing process.  At the researcher’s direction, participants clicked a link on a relevant 
page of the website which made the first letter or Statement of Preliminary Issues 
appear on their computer screens.  Participants were then asked to confirm whether or 
not they had any direct or indirect knowledge of the transaction described in the 
document.  This question was easily answered once a participant had briefly scanned 
the first page of the letter or statement.  Any such knowledge disqualified that test case, 
leading the participant to close the opened webpage and select another letter until they 
found a transaction about which they had no special knowledge.  General knowledge 
concerning the identity of the parties or familiarity with the industry concerned was not 
a disqualifying condition.
292
   
                                                          
291
 The industries involved in these test cases were, in a broad sense, similar if not the same as those 
industries in which well-known court cases had been decided, such as those involving building products, 
transportation services, and agricultural and livestock services.  In other words, these cases were more a 
‘staple’ of competition law jurisprudence than aberrant or atypical. 
292
 Each participant was also required before-hand to complete a practice exercise and a practice case 
prior to undertaking their think-aloud analysis of these test cases.  The practice exercise involved a 
participant thinking aloud while counting the windows in their home.  This exercise was based on the 
practice exercises described in the Appendix to Protocol Analysis.  The practice case was a market 
inquiry letter or Statement of Preliminary Issues relating to a merger transaction that had already been 
cleared by the ACCC or CC, respectively.  The purpose of this preparation, which followed the 
procedures detailed in the Appendix to Protocol Analysis, was to ensure participants’ familiarity with the 
think-aloud problem solving technique.  It also permitted the researcher to explain further certain aspects 
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As anticipated in the design of the case selection process, the first participant in this 
study – who was first by virtue of being the first to volunteer and arrange a time to 
participate in the study
293
 – disqualified the first two ACCC market inquiry letters, but 
successfully completed his think-aloud analysis of the following four letters.  These 
four transactions were then labelled Case A,294 Case B,295 Case C296 and Case D.297  
Subsequent Australian-law participants were instructed to analyse only those four 
cases, which they all did with the exception of two participants not completing Case A, 
five not completing Case B, two not completing Case C and one not completing Case 
D.
298
  The New Zealand competition law specialist did not consider any of these cases, 
but rather analysed three of the four CC cases originally selected from its website.  
These transactions were described in the Statements of Preliminary Issues labelled 
cases E, F and G.299   
Summaries of the facts and outcomes of each test case are provided in Appendix B. 
5  Remote Interviews 
The remote interviewing of participants – in this instance via long-distance telephone 
calls – was an arrangement the researcher considered was supported both theoretically 
and empirically, although no similarly distant arrangements were found in the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of the methodology, including reminding participants of the importance of their continuous vocalization 
while assessing legal risk for each case.  
293
 This participant was the first individual to volunteer for the study, and in this sense his self-selection 
was a random event or at least one that did not reflect a choice on the part of the researcher. 
294
 Case A – Rocla Pty Ltd – proposed acquisition of Beresford Concrete Products Pty Ltd (Informal 
Review 51157, Date Commenced 23 April 2013, Date Completed 19 June 2013). 
http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1110327/fromItemId/750991  
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Review 50982, Date Commenced 22 March 2013, Date Completed 30 May 2013). 
http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1115976/fromItemId/751046  
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(Informal Review 50798, Date Commenced 19 March 2013, Date Completed 30 May 2013). 
http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1115891/fromItemId/751046  
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 The primary reason for a participant not considering a case was their prior knowledge of the 
transaction.  A secondary reason was lack of time for those participants who took longer completing the 
pre-test questionnaire or the practice case. 
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 Case E – Perry Metal Protection Limited/ CSP Coating Systems, 24 December 2012, withdrawn 24 
May 2013 –  http://www.comcom.govt.nz/clearances-register/detail/781; Case F –  Bertelsman SE & Co. 
KGaA and Pearson plc, File Number 14007, 20 December 2012, Cleared 19 March 2013, Decision 
Number [2013] NZCC 6 – http://www.comcom.govt.nz/clearances-register/detail/780; Case G – Bligh 
Finance Limited and Hire Equipment Group Limited (Hirepool/Hirequip), File Number 13913, 16 
October 2012, Cleared 21 February 2013, Decision Number [2013] NZCC 2 – 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/clearances-register/detail/772. 
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literature.  In Protocol Analysis the authors note that a researcher need not be present 
during the think-aloud problem solving process, although historically this was 
necessary so that he or she could monitor participants’ performances and prompt them 
to ‘keep talking’ when needed.300  Even so, Ericsson and Simon posited that a timed 
buzzer or similar device might be adequate for this purpose.
301
 
With advances in technology there is no longer a compelling reason for the personal 
presence of the researcher – and potential benefits in them being absent as confirmed 
by Klinger’s research in the 1970s.302  Christensen, in a more recent think-aloud study 
testing legal reading skills, recorded how she intentionally left her test subjects alone 
because she believed it would increase the reliability of her data.
303
  Her approach was 
consistent with Ericsson and Simon’s view that social interaction is not helpful during 
the performance of the representative task because in such a setting ‘demands for 
coherence and reasonable completeness’ can compromise the otherwise ‘close 
correspondence between verbal protocol and the actual processes used to perform the 
task.’304  
In the present study, the advantages of being able to test a larger number of highly-
specialist, time-constrained professionals distributed across Australia’s major 
commercial centres outweighed any concerns over the apparent novelty of using 
telephone interviews to guide participants through a website containing standardised 
instructions and test materials.  The fact that the researcher was able to prompt 
participants effectively whenever they stopped speaking (which was rarely required), 
further indicated that the fundamental requirements of an effective think-aloud problem 
solving test were met.  Moreover, no participant indicated that this approach was 
uncomfortable for them, presumably because they were all experienced advisers 
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familiar with discussing complex matters via the telephone, albeit in this instance they 
were required to speak to themselves.
305
 
All participants were adroit at scrolling up and down the on-screen documents and 
seemed generally comfortable with this aspect of the test process.  Some participants 
vocalized their decisions to jump back to earlier pages, while it was apparent from a 
review of the transcripts that others were jumping back and forth quite freely albeit 
without a situational commentary.  While it is likely that most participants would have 
preferred hard copy documents if given the choice, the approach adopted did not of 
itself create obvious problems in terms of document navigation, comprehension or 
reasoning processes.  Indeed, it may well have resulted in greater vocalization of 
cognitive activity. 
6  Technology 
The recording and analysis of participants’ think-aloud vocalizations relied heavily on 
several technologies, some of which were Internet-based while others took the form of 
specialised software.  The primary challenge was the remote location of the researcher 
who was for the duration of the study based in Hong Kong, several thousand kilometres 
away from the study participants located in various cities in Australia.  Other 
challenges related mainly to ensuring that the study could be conducted cost-effectively 
by a single researcher. 
As previously noted, all interviews were conducted via telephone.  This had a number 
of advantages.  First it meant that testing could be completed remotely so no face-to-
face meetings were needed.   Logistics constraints were therefore limited to finding 
appropriate interview times that suited both the participant and the researcher.  
Secondly, as participants were typically in their own office at the time of their 
interviews, disruption to their day was minimised.   Thirdly, last minute rescheduling 
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 It is noted, however, that during the pilot tests one participant indicated a preference for a hard copy 
document on which he could note his thoughts, draw diagrams and flip back and forth between pages.  
He explained that for him, drawing diagrams of ownership and market structures was part of his usual 
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was easily accommodated simply by changing the time of an interview.
306
  Had in-
person interviews been necessary, this would have potentially required re-scheduling 
the researcher’s travel (and accommodation) arrangements and re-booking meeting 
rooms.    
Because lawyers and professional economists have for decades conducted much of 
their work over the telephone, this was assumed to be a familiar medium, albeit there 
was the obvious novelty of having to think-aloud while engaging in legal-risk 
assessment tasks.   
All telephone calls were initiated by the researcher using Skype-Out
307
  mostly to 
participants’ office landlines, at minimal cost.308    Those participants who chose to be 
interviewed via Skype were interviewed without the video option to ensure consistency 
with those participants who only used the telephone.  There were four times during 
interviews where the call connection failed.  Fortunately, these temporary 
disconnections occurred during the preliminary stages of the calls and not during 
participants’ analysis of test cases.309  
To guide participants through the test procedures, a dedicated website was used in 
parallel with the telephone interview.
310
 This websites was built for free on 
Wordpress.com,
311
 although the time spent on constructing over 20 interconnected-
webpages (each structured as an independent website to prevent participants 
independently ‘surfing’ through the test procedures) was not insignificant.  This free 
on-line service permitted the creation of password protected pages which the researcher 
used to regulate the pacing of interviews and to confirm participants’ consent to the 
conditions of their involvement, including their agreement to the audio recording of 
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 One law firm partner provided only 40 minutes’ notice of his interest in being interviewed.  This ‘take 
it or leave it’ offer was not missed because of the flexibility of being just a telephone call away and of 
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their think-aloud problem solving.
312
    All the test cases used in the study were 
uploaded to this website so that participants could open and close them as instructed.   
One of the most important features of the website was that it enabled the use of 
standardised descriptions of methodology and procedures (such as the Methodology 
Page reproduced in Figure 3.1 above).  This ensured that all participants were given the 
same information in the same sequence during their interviews.  The introductory e-
mails sent to prospective participants contained links to the first three pages of the 
study website which individuals could read at their convenience to learn more about the 
study and determine whether or not they wished to volunteer.
313
    
The use of Skype enabled the telephone interviews with participants to be recorded 
using Call Graph software.
314
    This free software started recording automatically once 
a call began and stopped when the call was ended.  These recordings were formatted as 
MP3 audio files and stored on the researcher’s password-protected computer hard 
drive.  These files were subsequently transcribed using f4 transcription software,
315
 
which produced a text document that was linked to the original audio file by way of 
embedded time-code stamps.  This meant that by clicking on any phrase in the text the 
associated audio would replay from that point.  
The analysis software used was MAXQDA,
316
 which converted the f4 documents into 
files that could be analysed with reference to observed performance and behavioural 
differences.  By maintaining the pre-established connection between text and audio file, 
the researcher could review at any time how a phrase was vocalized, including the level 
of confidence and the general tone of a participant’s response on specific issues.  This 
was in addition to having available the full-text transcript of each participant’s think-
aloud verbalizations. 
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 To gain access to the website questionnaire and problem-solving tests, participants were required to 
confirm their consent to participate by clicking a ‘Yes’ button on the website Consent Form and then 
enter a password provided by the researcher.  
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E  Analysis 
The post-testing phase of this study – the so-called back-end phase – required the 
analysis of the think-aloud verbal transcripts generated by study participants as they 
assessed the level of legal risk involved in securing clearance in each of the merger-
review test cases.  The first task in this phase involved grouping participants according 
to their levels of likely expertise.  The second involved conceptualising a method for 
identifying apparent differences between how participants from each of these expertise 
groups tackled the chosen representative task.  The third involved finding theoretical 
references from previous studies on which to construct coherent explanations as to the 
likely cognitive bases for the observed differences.   
This part is divided into three sections.  Section 1 briefly describes the manner in which 
participants were allocated to one of three groups according to their levels of likely 
expertise as determined from the scoring process described in Part C above.  This 
description includes a discussion of a proposed alignment between participants’ likely 
expertise scores (and group allocation) and the categorisation of expertise development 
outlined in Hoffman’s Scheme. 
Section 2 explains the choice of an exploratory approach to finding relevant differences 
between the assessment behaviours of participants from different groups.  Because 
there were no previous studies with the same focus on legal specialists and analytical 
objectives, it was decided that a more open approach to categorising different 
behaviours would better serve the overall goal of identifying expertise-based cognitive 
differences. 
Section 3 lists the findings of previous studies potentially relevant to developing 
explanations, based on cognitive analysis, for the results of this study.  This includes 
the 3-step problem solving framework used to analyse the operations of participants 
long-term, short-term, and working memories, as well as a complementary analysis of 
participants’ reliance on intuition and analytical reasoning.  Reference is also made to 
previous studies which were considered relevant if not ultimately instructive in an 
analytical or interpretive sense. 
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1  Participant Groups 
To facilitate the identification of cognitive differences associated with different levels 
of domain expertise, prior to testing each participant was ranked according to their 
cumulative scores of likely expertise as determined via the process discussed in Part C 
above.  They were then allocated to one of three groups: Group A for the highest-
ranked participants and Group C for the lowest-ranked participants.   Group B 
participants would be those ranked in the middle ranks, between these two outer 
groups. 
The choice of weighting parameters used to rank participants potentially yielded a 
maximum score of +7 and a minimum score of -8, for a total spread of 16 points.  The 
grouping of participants according to whether they fell into group A, B or C – each of 
which contained a range of five score points – would be determined along the lines 
described in Table 3.1 below.   This table also indicates how these groupings were 
assumed to correspond to the categories of apprentice, journeyman, expert and master 
under Hoffman’s Scheme. 
TABLE 3.1 – Participant Groupings According to Hoffman’s Scheme 
                 
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
                 
RANKING 
SCORES 
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
 
GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
 
As shown, Group A participants on the right-hand side of the table would be assumed 
to only contain masters and experts, Group C to the left only journeymen and 
apprentices, and Group B in the middle a mixture of all categories.  Some participants 
in this middle group might perform more like experts or masters, while others could 
perform more like apprentices and journeymen. 
Significantly, the interval between the lowest-ranked members of Group A and the 
highest-ranked members of Group C was six points (-3 to +3).  This interval is greater 
than the result of any single measure of likely level of expertise used in the ranking 
process.  This meant that the closest-ranked members from each of these two groups 
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were distinguishable across more than one measure.  For members at the centre-points 
of these two groups (-5 and +5) the difference in likely levels of expertise was even 
more significant; and for those participants at the extremes the difference were greater 
still.  The larger the intervals, the greater the level of confidence as to observed 
differences associated with different levels of likely expertise. 
Within each group, however, it was more difficult to apply a ranking system.  The 
separation of participants by just one or two points could not be viewed as a significant 
difference given the assumptions underlying the scoring methodology.  Accordingly, it 
was decided that beyond placing participants within one of the above three groups, no 
intra-group ranking would be applied.  This meant that all Group C participants, for 
instance, would be assumed (at least initially) to possess the same level of likely 
expertise.  It also meant that an ordinal ranking of all participants based on their scores 
alone would be neither feasible nor necessary within the conceptual framework of the 
study. 
2  Identifying Differences 
This study was driven by a qualitative approach to identifying relevant behavioural 
differences between participants.  This meant first examining any observed patterns of 
behaviour that appeared to be associated more with Group C or Group A participants.  
This approach contrasted with the prescriptions for pre-selected protocol codings based 
on ‘entities (processes) postulated by a theory’ and recorded ahead of time in a coding 
manual.
317
  The ultimate focus of that methodological approach is protocol typology 
and the measurement of relative frequencies of procedural functions,
318
 which is 
different from – and to a large extent inconsistent with – the objectives of this study. 
That said, statistically significant differences between Group C participants and Group 
A participants would also be of interest in addition to purely qualitative differences.  If 
populations within one of these groups displayed performance or behavioural 
characteristics that were statistically distinguishable from populations in the other 
group, this could be of greater significance than less common, idiosyncratic differences 
potentially attributable more to personality differences than differences associated with 
levels of expertise.  Given the aim of securing the involvement of up to 20 volunteers 
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for this study, it was considered that statistically significant data could prove both 
meaningful and useful.   
The analytical approach adopted for this study was by design exploratory.  The aim was 
to identify – for the first time – cognitive differences between individuals with differing 
levels of expertise within a single specialist domain of law rather than to test any 
preconceived hypotheses about what form these differences might take.  This led to the 
adoption of a more map-like approach – as opposed to an architectural, model-refining 
approach – to use Baddeley’s characterisation of his own approach.319  It also 
conformed to the investigatory principles espoused by Toulmin.
320
  Viewed in this 
broader context, the objective of the present research was not to rely on the falsification 
of a prior theoretical position, but rather to contribute to ‘generating fruitful questions 
that will increase our knowledge’ as is arguably more productive in the early stages of 
theory development.
321
 
Parallels with this approach can be found in the study of macrocognition, a term first 
associated with the work of Cacciabue and Hollnagel,
322
 and subsequently Klein et 
al.
323
  Klein et al state that macrocognition is ‘a level of description of the cognitive 
functions that are performed in natural (versus artificial laboratory) decision-making 
settings.’324  It is distinguishable from the study of microcognition which focuses on 
‘the building blocks of cognition,’ which are general and invariant cognitive processes 
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used in all types of decision-making and problem-solving.
325
  According to the same 
authors, the ‘naturalistic perspective’ is an effective approach to studying macrognition 
insofar as it can enable the observation of subjects in real-world settings where data can 
be overwhelming (or too few), complexities unavoidable, goals ill-defined, some 
variables simply unknowable, and where ‘research participants are domain practitioners 
rather than college students.’326  
Klein, writing on his own, uses the term ‘naturalistic investigation’ to describe how 
researchers can use empirical research methods to identify phenomena and ideas at the 
early stages of inquiry, and how these phenomena can be tested in laboratory settings 
later.
327
  He describes having undertaken his own investigations of this kind when 
lacking the ability to test hypotheses owing to not knowing what he might find – even 
though he knew enough to persist with the expectation that new phenomena, insights 
and ideas would be the likely result of his efforts.
328
   
In a similar way, without the benefit of earlier research comparing the reasoning 
strategies of experienced legal specialists (especially where these individuals are 
selected and ranked according to a series of measures rather than by mere assumption), 
it was decided to adopt an exploratory approach approximating the perspectives 
described by the above researchers.  The descriptive account of participants behaviour, 
which as argued by Lipshitz et al is an appropriate focus for research on naturalistic 
decision making,
329
 was also favoured in this study as a way of avoiding what Elstein 
has described as prescriptions based on theories that preclude inferences from the 
actually observed behaviours of experts.
330
 
At the same time, however, the think-aloud problem solving dimension of the present 
study distinguishes it from a purely naturalistic investigation favoured by Klein whose 
most recent treatise on the nature of insight relied on 120 case studies drawn from 
incidents recorded in the media and in ‘books, especially those describing innovations 
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and discoveries.’331  While he also reviewed interview transcripts, these were selected 
from investigations undertaken up to thirty years earlier and were not of a think-aloud 
problem solving kind – nor were they any more structured than retrospective accounts 
given by interviewees in response to probing questions.
332
  In contrast, the present 
study implemented a structured information elicitation methodology; one that followed 
closely the techniques and guidelines developed by Ericsson and Simon in Protocol 
Analysis. 
Lastly, this study was designed with a data-driven orientation.  While the theoretical 
foundations described in this chapter were constructed in a manner consistent with 
Ericsson and Simon’s prescriptions for effective think-aloud verbal protocol analysis, 
these authors also expressly acknowledged that new phenomena may be missed when a 
theory-driven orientation is followed too narrowly.
333
  This is notwithstanding there can 
also be risks associated with ‘the entanglement of data with theory,’334 which is another 
reason why in a study such as this, more information rather than less should be 
recorded to facilitate the subsequent identification of potentially confounding or 
undermining factors.  Where such factors are apparent to the researcher, they can then 
be addressed directly.  If not, they can at least be subjected to scrutiny by others who 
can consider both methods and results together. 
This commitment to describing and recording the entire research process followed 
Lundgren-Laine and Salantera’s recommendation that this be done ‘so that the reader is 
able to follow the solutions of the researcher.’335  It also enables the researcher to 
explore salient issues and ignore less relevant ones, in the knowledge that such 
decisions could be subjected to detailed review.
336
  In those instances where this study 
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diverges from the prescriptions and guidelines for analysing verbal protocols by 
Ericsson and Simon, it was considered sufficient that the reasons for adopting the 
chosen approach were made explicit.
337
  This was specifically the case in the adoption 
of Yang’s contextual approach to protocol analysis over Ericsson and Simon’s more 
traditional ‘information processing style’ of analysis.338 
Yang’s conception of ‘a functional model and multi-layered categorization scheme, 
developed inductively from the transcripts themselves,’339 was central to this study’s 
methodological approach.  It also provided a theoretical basis for the selective choice of 
protocols and the relaxation of assumptions relating to the need for coding schemes to 
be self-contained, involve mutually exclusive codings, and be comprehensive.  This 
was necessary to facilitate practicability and to avoid the common criticism of coding 
schemes that are ‘too reductive and mechanical in complex environments.’340 
An ancillary advantage of this approach, which maximised the adoption of a more 
transparent, long-hand approach to protocol analysis described in the following 
chapters, was that should the theories and hypotheses developed during the course of 
this research ultimately prove invalid or misguided, at least the evidence relied upon 
will have been recorded with the possibility of being reused (or at least subjected to 
detailed review) by future scholars.  This was another feature of this study that satisfied 
the need for contextual relevance and comported with Baddeley’s empirical 
approach.
341
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3  Cognitive Analysis 
The cognitive analysis in this study began with identifying performance and 
behavioural differences between participants as they sought to complete their assigned 
legal-risk assessment tasks.  Where these differences (which in the first instance would 
appear as largely qualitative) could be aligned with differences in levels of likely 
expertise, those differences would be recorded.  This was not intended to be a 
comprehensive survey given the limitations of the test design and given that this would 
be the first time that some of these differences had been identified.  Rather, attention 
would be given to the most apparent and most clearly definable differences – and to 
those differences that seemed to have greatest distinguishing power between participant 
groups. 
In terms of the granulatory of the analysis, it was decided to adopt a broad 
macrocognitive perspective rather than a microcognitive one, to use the terminology of 
Cacciabiue and Hollnagel.
342
  Attention would therefore be given not so much to ‘the 
building blocks of cognition,’ but rather to ‘the development of descriptive models of 
processes such as decision making, sensemaking and problem detection.’343   This 
analysis would not be undertaken within a purely naturalistic setting, however, but 
through combining naturalistic elements (such as current merger review cases and 
actual review documentation) with laboratory-like efficiency and control (principally 
carefully conceived and administered think-aloud problem solving procedures).   
To facilitate this exploratory approach, an investigatory methodology was chosen that 
would enable all aspects of the problem-solving process to be captured within a flexible 
yet theoretically sound framework.  That framework, which is discussed in section (a) 
below, describes the three steps of effective problem-solving from the input of data 
from the environment, to the retrieval of relevant information from a participant’s long 
term memory, to drawing inferences and forming opinions relevant to the task at hand.  
It was anticipated that using this approach would yield insights into the areas or stages 
of the problem-solving process where differences in legal expertise might manifest in 
observable forms. 
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Having analysed the results from the application of the above framework to the 
transcripts of participants, it subsequently became apparent that the explanations for 
why these results were observed could be expanded.  While the research question for 
this thesis had by this stage been largely answered, it was considered both relevant and 
meaningful to investigate the deeper cognitive drivers behind these differences.  To this 
end, an analysis of participants’ reliance on intuition and analytical reasoning as noted 
in section (b) below was also undertaken.    
Lastly, the findings and results of previous studies were used as references for observed 
expertise traits, both to help identify what the underlying cognitive differences might be 
in a given instance and also to determine to what extent this thesis confirms the 
findings of earlier research.  At the same time, it was not expected that any exact 
matches would be observed because of the broad approach adopted for this study, 
which was not designed to test any specific cognitive trait.  Further background to this 
aspect of the analysis process undertaken in this study is provided in section (c) below, 
which discusses potentially relevant findings concerning general expertise traits 
(subsection (i)) and from expertise studies that have investigated specialist legal 
thinking skills (subsection (ii)). 
(a)  Three-Stage Problem Solving 
Feltovich, Prietula and Ericsson conceptualise three distinct stages of effective 
problem-solving.
344
  These stages, which are listed below, were considered an 
appropriate and sufficiently flexible analytical framework for the analysis of 
participants’ cognitive strategies while engaging in this study’s representative task.  In 
addition, reference was made to Baddeley’s findings concerning the role of working 
memory (‘WM’), which acts as the ‘central executive’ for processing information 
present in short-term memory (‘STM’) as well as knowledge stored in long-term 
memory (‘LTM’).345  These three stages of the problem-solving process – adapted for 
present purposes to the legal-risk assessment task presented to study participants – can 
be stated as follows: 
                                                          
344
 Paul J Feltovich, Michael J Prietula and K Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from Psychological 
Perspectives,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 41, 58. 
345
 See A Baddeley, ‘Short-Term and Working Memory,’ in E Tulving and F Craik (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Memory (Oxford University Press, 2000) 77;  A Baddely, ‘Is Working Memory Still 
Working?’ (2002) 7(2) European Psychologist 85; Baddeley, above n 319. 
110 
 
Stage 1:   Seeking and perceiving data from the environment, which in this 
study was restricted to the information provided in the market 
inquiries letters and Statements of Preliminary Issues documents that 
participants were required to read and assess; 
Stage 2:   Retrieving relevant information from LTM and combining it with 
environmental data within WM.  This information included both 
technical legal knowledge (assumed to be common to all 
participants), knowledge of similar and analogous cases, and 
knowledge of relevant industries; and 
Stage 3:   Drawing inferences from the data provided and knowledge retrieved 
from LTM, both to form opinions on levels of legal risk and to 
determine the kinds or forms of further data required to complete a 
legal-risk assessment.   
Unlike a written assignment or a formal opinion provided after a thorough 
consideration of all relevant issues, the verbal protocols of participants in this study 
were expected to reveal information relatable to each of the above stages.  It would 
therefore be possible to identify when a participant was reading or clarifying the 
information provided in the test-case documentation (Stage 1), when they were 
identifying relevant issues based on their recall of facts and analogies from their LTM 
(Stage 2), and when they were synthesising from the provided data and drawing 
inferences about the level of difficulty the merger parties were likely to face in securing 
clearance from the relevant competition authority (Stage 3). 
With the plan of assigning each participant to one of Group A, Group B or Group C 
(and therefore their approximate status as an apprentice, journeyman, expert or master 
based on their likely expertise scores), it would then be possible to compare their 
performances in each of these three areas with reference to their determined levels of 
expertise.  Where participants in one group performed consistently differently from 
participants in another group in a particular area, further investigations could be 
undertaken into those differences with reference to the relevant stage of their analysis 
in which those differences were most apparent.   
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(b)  Intuition and Analytical Reasoning 
The emphasis on generating data using the above problem-solving framework yielded 
findings that both satisfied the study’s research question and raised further questions 
that were not originally contemplated during the study design process.  This possibility 
was anticipated by the study’s exploratory approach.  Of course, not all further 
questions could be accommodated within the confines of this thesis.  It was therefore 
decided to focus only on investigating the more compelling indicators relating to 
differences in how participants with different levels of apparent expertise used their 
intuition and analytical reasoning. 
For this purpose, the work of researchers involved in the cognitive analysis of decision-
making and judgment was referenced.  The central contribution in this context was the 
work of Kahneman and Tversky on the interaction of System 1 and System 2 
thinking,
346
 which distinction has been the subject of a large number of studies by other 
researchers
347
 and was most recently popularised in Kahneman’s 2011 book Thinking, 
Fast and Slow.
348
   A more detailed introduction to this framework is provided in Part 
D of Chapter 6, which in chronological terms is appropriate given that this 
methodology was applied after the main findings of the thesis, as set out in the earlier 
parts of Chapter 6, were confirmed and found to be suggestive of further thinking 
differences. 
(c)  Expertise Traits 
Studies by previous researchers who have used think-aloud verbal protocol analysis to 
study expertise and expert performance informed both the methodological design of 
this study and the decision to focus on certain aspects of the performances of 
participants.  However, the relevance of these earlier studies was limited given the aim 
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of this study to compare experienced legal specialists (rather than novices) in the same 
field of legal practice.   
As noted in Chapter 2, previous researchers have either examined cognitive differences 
outside the area of law or investigated how lawyers think but in general law-related 
terms, that is, outside a specialist area of law.  Furthermore, studies of lawyers that 
have used the methodologies discussed here have invariably compared novices in a 
knowledge domain with domain experts, which is different to the present approach 
which seeks to analyse cognitive differences between specialists in the same knowledge 
sub-domain where even the most inexperienced participants could have been 
considered experts in most generic settings. 
In addition, the small number of participants in many of these studies increased the 
likelihood that observed differences merely reflected the individualistic attributes of 
certain participants, rather than any group-wide phenomena.  This issue becomes more 
problematic when novices are excluded from testing, as in this study.  Whereas the 
differences between novices and experts can be both readily identified and directly 
associated with differences in domain knowledge, such distinctions are not as clear-cut 
when domain knowledge is no longer a variable.  When the number of participants 
increases, however, larger sample-size comparisons become possible and tests for 
statistical significance become feasible.  The results from this type of study are 
therefore less likely merely to reflect individual idiosyncrasies. 
Given that the generalizability of findings was a key objective of this study, previous 
research which focused on the verbal protocols of just one or two individuals was 
considered less likely to be relevant.  Nevertheless, there were two areas of possible – 
although potentially only indirect – relevance concerning possible cognitive differences 
between the participants in this study, namely, previously identified general expertise 
traits and specialist legal expertise traits. 
(i)  General Expertise Traits 
The first area of potential relevance was previous research undertaken in the broader 
field of expertise and expert performance.  Amongst the many scholars in this area, 
several have focused attention on specific expert traits that appeared of interest in the 
context of distinguishing different levels of legal specialists.   
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These researchers have shown how experts can display a deeper conceptual 
understanding of problems than novices do,
349
  though sometimes they gloss over the 
details.
350
  Experts can also demonstrate a better understanding of their own 
limitations
351
 (and display more conservative tendencies when giving their opinions
352
).  
But they can also be over-confident in their own abilities
353
 as well as in those of junior 
colleagues and novices considering the same issues.
354
  Experts’ ability to self-monitor 
may include automatically correcting comprehension and reasoning errors, while their 
conclusions and strategies are likely to be better than novices and intermediates,
355
 
although this may not always be the case.
356
   
Experts have also been found to be able to see patterns in data that novices cannot;
357
 
and sometimes it is the atypical case – with rare or unusual facts or issues – that most 
effectively reveals these exceptional abilities.
358
  At the same time, domain experts can 
be less flexible in their methods
359
 and more dependent on contextual information.
360
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Experts also typically use less cognitive effort to solve problems within their field of 
expertise, often because they utilise more efficient and effective strategies
361
 and 
sometimes because they can recall ‘instant’ solutions, thereby avoiding intermediate 
steps of analysis.
362
 
(ii)  Specialist Legal Expertise Traits  
Studies that have directly investigated legal and law-related thinking skills, fall into two 
groups.  The first consists of those investigations that have considered generic legal 
thinking skills, such as reading court cases, accessing information from reference 
databases and passing bar exams.  As previously discussed, most of these studies have 
involved comparisons between novices (often law students) and presumed experts.  
While these studies are helpful in a broad sense, they shed minimal light on what to 
expect when a range of competent legal specialists are presented with the same 
problem-solving tasks grounded in their common knowledge-domain.  Even so, it was 
considered possible that such studies could prove useful in a confirmatory sense insofar 
as these observed expert-novice differences might be evident amongst the participants 
in this study.  
A second group of think-aloud verbal protocol studies involving lawyers have focused 
on specialist fields of law.  As has been noted, these studies have investigated 
differences between participants with either a lot of or very little (and at times no) 
specialist domain knowledge.  In this sense, these have been tests of knowledge rather 
than cognitive ability per se, since the least knowledgeable participants were, by 
design, limited in their ability to compete directly against the domain experts in the set 
problem-solving tasks which invariably required extensive domain-specific knowledge. 
Colon-Navarro’s study described how his four expert legal specialists were faster at 
diagnosing relevant legal issues, had more effective mental schema to deal with 
problems in their area, and possessed extensive procedural knowledge.
363
  He also 
noted how they were able to develop better strategies and plans as to next steps for their 
client.  Moreover, he made special mention of how one of his experts was able to draw 
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on his knowledge of recent policy changes at a political level to aid assessment of the 
likely success of different options.  However, two of the experts in Colon-Navarro’s 
study had less than five years of specialist experience,
364
 whereas in the present study, 
all participants had, as a minimum, five years specialist experience, with potentially 
more than half having no fewer than ten years.  Further, there were to be no domain 
novices in this study.   
Weinstein’s three experts were simply described as ‘outstanding practitioners’ in SSD 
claims.
365
  He compared the problem-solving abilities of these lawyers with those of a 
small group of novices and one experienced lawyer who had no specialist expertise in 
the relevant field of law.  His findings were therefore potentially of limited reference 
value.  Further, Weinstein’s observations regarding this non-specialist but experienced 
practitioner lacking ‘both substantive knowledge and domain-specific models for 
dealing with the much more ill-structure problem’ in that study,366 added little to the 
contributions of the other studies cited in this chapter.   
As with Colon-Navarro’s research, Weinstein’s study provided methodological 
guidance for this study, particularly insofar as his approach to testing lawyers depended 
on appropriately designed representative tasks for the purpose of think-aloud problem 
solving.  More substantively, he noted how his ‘experienced solvers’ were less likely to 
follow the format of the file documents, but rather organised the ‘basic information 
according to a deeper, idiosyncratic pattern, building a schematic’ based on a legal 
rules.
367
  This contrasted with his ‘inexperienced solvers’ who were more likely to 
follow the order of evidence as set out in the file.
368
  While all individuals invited to 
participate in the present study would likely have been classified as experienced solvers 
by Weinstein based on their years of specialist experience in competition law 
(apprentices and above), it was considered possible that these observed differences may 
persist beyond the apprenticeship stage. 
Weinstein also discussed how his participants were distinguishable by the degree to 
which they were able to engage in forward (typically, expert) rather than backwards 
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(novice) reasoning
369
 (which is a commonly cited but not conclusive distinction in the 
expertise literature
370
), how his experts tended to set more realistic and efficient goals 
based on the information available,
371
 and how inexperience was revealed in the 
imprecise and generalised use and recall of information.
372
  Weinstein’s analysis of the 
subexpert’s performance was considered less relevant insofar as it focused on how this 
participant’s reasoning strategies were affected by a lack of domain-specific knowledge 
of SSD claims. 
F  Conclusion 
The methodology described in this chapter sought to avoid ‘the temptation to study 
differences in performance between experts and novices because there are readily 
available tasks to measure such differences.’373  It aimed instead to compare the 
performances of different levels of legal specialists, all of whom were equally 
knowledgeable – in terms of substantive law and relevant procedures – within the 
specialist domain of competition law.  This would require both the voluntary co-
operation of a sufficient number of suitably qualified competition law specialists, and 
the identification of a representative task that could test cognitive abilities at the higher 
end of the expertise spectrum (it was neither necessary nor appropriate to attempt to 
accommodate the lack of knowledge of any novice participants).   
This methodology was developed to answer the research question guiding this study 
which is focused on finding readily identifiable and measurable cognitive differences 
associated with different levels of specialist legal expertise.  As described, the chosen 
approach was comprehensive, extending from the identification of relevant theories of 
cognition and expert-knowledge solicitation, to technological considerations associated 
with the logistics of securing the co-operation of a sufficient number of suitably 
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qualified volunteers capable of performing the representative task, which was designed 
specifically to test the essence of their specialist legal expertise. 
The involvement of qualified participants was recognised at the outset to be a not 
insignificant challenge.  The intrusive nature of the testing process and the lack of any 
direct benefits to otherwise busy professionals may explain in large part the historical 
lack of similar studies.  Researchers who have adopted broadly equivalent 
methodologies have commonly resorted to using law students, who are traditionally a 
plentiful and willing source of test subjects for this kind of empirical research.  The 
present study, however, set a number of minimum requirements such that all the 
individuals to be tested would be considered experts in most if not all previous studies 
that sought to test generic legal thinking skills.    
This study utilised publicly available information and targeted e-mails – as well as the 
recommendations of other participants – to identify and secure the involvement of a 
range of participants.  The use of web-based technologies facilitated long-distance 
interviews and enabled a broader geographical spread of participants compared to the 
less flexible logistics and higher implementation costs of in-person interviews.  The 
flexibility of being able to source participants from across the major commercial 
centres in Australia facilitated the possibility of a viable sample size from both 
methodological and feasibility perspectives. 
The representative tasks in this study were naturalistic inasmuch as they required 
participants to assess live merger review cases of a kind commonly handled by 
specialist competition law practices in major Australian and New Zealand law and 
competition economics firms.  By providing incomplete information under time-
constrained test conditions it was considered possible to use the set tasks to focus on 
the essence of expertise in this domain, namely, the exercise of applied economic 
analysis within a specific regulatory context.  Strict adherence to the theoretical 
principles underlying think-aloud problem solving and verbal protocol analysis would 
permit the rigorous assessment and comparison of the cognitive processes revealed 
through the vocalizations of participants. 
Merger review cases were identified as an appropriate context in which to devise a 
representative task to test participant’s cognitive performances.  This was based on an 
assumption that merger review matters are an area of activity that only competition law 
118 
 
specialists are capable of assessing from a legal risk perspective.  The assessment 
activity itself would require both substantive analysis (including defining relevant 
markets and assessing market contestability) as well as procedural considerations 
relating to the administrative role of competition authorities, whose anticipated 
decisions would be the ultimate focus.  The instruction to perform a legal risk 
assessment on the information provided reflected the real-world expectations of merger 
proponents seeking the advice of competition law specialists. 
The test cases used in this study were selected via a process within which the researcher 
exerted minimal editorial or subjective influence.  It began with downloading 
information about then current merger-review cases from the public registers on the 
websites of the ACCC and CC.  The relevant market inquiry letters and Statements of 
Preliminary Issues were subsequently offered as possible cases from which participants 
could choose depending on their prior knowledge of the transactions in question.  No 
participant knew or could have known the outcome of any case, and for the most part 
the industries and issues in each case were unfamiliar to every participant.  At the same 
time, the cases themselves were neither obscure nor so technically demanding that any 
participant would be unable to proceed with their assessment for lack of technical or 
general commercial knowledge. 
The method for ranking participants according to their levels of likely expertise utilised 
five different measures.  Two of these measures were experience-based, namely, 
attested sign-off authority – or partnership promotion in law firm terms – and years of 
specialist experience.  The other three were performance-based and focused on 
participants’ conceptual abilities, instances of exceptional reasoning and examples of 
comprehension errors.  These latter three measures required a preliminary assessment 
of participants’ analysis of the test cases used in the study.   
With reference to assumptions about the levels of likely expertise amongst members of 
the sample group, it was theorised that participants could be divided into three groups 
(groups A, B and C) according to their levels of likely expertise, and particularly 
whether they were likely to be experts/masters (Group A) or apprentices/journeymen 
(Group C), based on Hoffman’s Scheme of traditional expertise development.  Then, by 
identifying those analytical strategies suggestive of patterns of cognitive performance 
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more likely to be associated with only one of these groups, it was considered possible 
to relate such differences to participants according to their levels of likely expertise.   
These identified differences would then be assessed within an analytical framework 
based on (a) the three stages of effective problem-solving described by Feltovich, 
Prietula and Ericsson and augmented by Baddely’s research on memory functions, (b) 
the concepts of intuitive and analytical reasoning developed by Kahneman amongst 
other researchers in the field of decision-making and judgment, and (c) previous studies 
which have identified (i) general expertise traits (that is, relevant traits identified in 
studies not involving specialist lawyers), and (ii) specialist lawyer traits, chiefly those 
identified in studies by Colon-Navarro and Weinstein. 
The methodological principles underlying the overall approach of this study were those 
most closely resembling the naturalistic perspectives of researchers such as Klein et al, 
with exploratory imperatives aligned with Baddeley’s empiricism, Toulmin’s 
philosophy of scientific investigation, and Klein et al’s methods of observation and 
continual revision of conceptions rather than adherence to ‘a single, predefined 
procedure.’374  This was considered appropriate given that there had not previously 
been a study like this which had sought to investigate cognitive differences between 
higher-level legal specialists in the same field of law. 
At the same time, the knowledge elicitation techniques used in this study followed the 
practices recommended by Ericsson and Simon in Protocol Analysis.  In this respect, 
there was a strong conventionality in the methodology used and in the connections this 
study would have to numerous previous studies that have successfully generated data 
capable of supporting compelling theories of cognition in the investigation of expertise 
and expert performance. 
Lastly, with the possible replication of this study in mind, it was noted that the actual 
ACCC letters used in this study are no longer available on the ACCC’s website.  On the 
one hand this creates an obvious problem regarding the availability of these documents 
for future researchers.  On the other hand, it ensures that the novelty of these cases is 
preserved for future studies.  Of the four ACCC merger review cases used in this study, 
                                                          
374
 Klein et al, above n 324, 83. 
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only the ACCC’s decision in the last case was publicised by way of a media release.375  
The outcomes of the other cases were unreported.  It is therefore highly probable that 
within a few months of their completion there will be little or no retained knowledge of 
them amongst a large proportion of potential future participants with the requisite 
levels of experience and specialisation in competition law analysis.  The same test 
cases could therefore be used again, which could significantly enhance the 
comparability of results of any future research and those of the present study.   
With this possibility in mind, a separate website has been created on which all of the 
documents used in this study can be accessed and downloaded by future researchers.
376
  
In addition, the website used for conducting the interviews has been preserved as an on-
line reference for future researchers wishing to undertake similar studies – or who want 
to attempt to replicate the results of this one.
377
 
The methodology described in this chapter forms the basis for discussion throughout 
the rest of this thesis.  This discussion continues with the next chapter which records 
the profiles of the competition law specialists who volunteered to participate in the 
study.  This includes an analysis of the differences and similarities between these 
individual legal specialists.  Some of these differences were found to be statistically 
significant, and others not.  The core of the chapter, however, is dedicated to applying 
the five measures of likely expertise developed in Part C of the present chapter, and to 
the calculation of resulting expertise scores and relative rankings.  These rankings are 
then used to allocate individual participants to one of Group A, Group B or Group C as 
discussed in Part E above, which was necessary for the identification of performance 
and behavioural differences in chapters 5 and 6. 
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 Case D – Ruralco:  http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-to-not-oppose-ruralcos-proposed-
acquisition-of-elders-rural-services 
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IV  PARTICIPANTS 
 
The previous chapter described a methodology for analysing cognitive differences 
between competition law professionals who varied in their levels of specialist legal 
expertise.  That methodology, which was aimed at highlighting readily identifiable and 
measurable differences of this kind, assumed the involvement of 15 to 20 appropriately 
qualified individuals, all of whom would participate as volunteers without any financial 
or other reward.   These volunteers were to be ranked according to their levels of likely 
expertise, thereby enabling their placement within groups A, B and C, which were 
aligned to Hoffman’s Scheme’s categories of apprentice, journeyman, expert and 
master.   
The previous chapter also described a testing framework constructed around a specific 
representative task and a knowledge-elicitation technique that would enable the 
recording of think-aloud verbal protocols for subsequent analysis.  That framework 
required the involvement of participants whose various metrics and levels of likely 
expertise could be confirmed and compared, which in turn required a methodology that 
would provide a firm foundation for the subsequent tests and analyses. 
This chapter documents the profiles of the participants who volunteered to take part in 
this study.  This information includes background information for each participant as 
well as comparative and statistical data relevant to the discussion of cognitive 
differences in subsequent chapters.  This chapter also documents the scoring and 
ranking process which culminated in the allocation of participants to Group A, Group B 
or Group C according to the format of Table 3.1 from the previous chapter.  
Part A of this chapter recounts how approximately 80 lawyers and economists who 
specialise in competition law were invited to be involved in this study, the professional 
backgrounds of those 20 individuals who ultimately participated, and what their 
differences and similarities were with respect to a number of relevant criteria.  This 
includes a comparative analysis of their years of general and specialist experience, their 
statuses within their firms or organisations, and the numbers of merger matters on 
which they had previously worked.   Statistical data are also provided to establish 
dividing lines between those participants who were, for the purposes of the selection 
122 
 
process, presumed to have had greater expertise than other participants, which was a 
necessary requirement in the selection process and a reference for subsequent rankings. 
Part B describes how the five previously described measures of likely expertise were 
applied to these 20 participants.  This includes details concerning participants’ sign-off 
authority (Measure 1), whether or not they satisfied the so-called 10,000-hour rule 
(Measure 2), evidence of their capabilities in relation to conceptual analysis (Measure 
3), instances of exceptional reasoning (Measure 4), and comprehension errors when 
assessing the test cases (Measure 5).   This information is summarised in tabular form 
and overall ranking scores determined according to the procedures described in the 
previous chapter. 
The remainder of Part B considers statistically significant differences between 
participants in Group A, Group B and Group C, which groups were based on the 
previously explained assumptions regarding the range of participants in this study.  The 
resulting comparisons are discussed in the context of the analysis to be undertaken in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
Part C compares the expertise ranking of individual participants according to the 
methodology used in this study, with the rankings of leading professionals according to 
two international legal directories.  This exercise provides further confirmation of the 
high-levels of expertise represented by higher-ranked participants.  It also permits a 
comparative discussion of the differences and similarities between the results of this 
study’s ranking methodology and these alternative ranking schemes.   
A  Overview of Participants  
The process of selecting participants for this study began with sending standardised e-
mails to partners and senior associates in major Australian law firms – and to their 
counterparts in economics firms and competition authorities – spread across all the 
main commercial centres in Australia.  These e-mails explained the nature of the study 
and pro-actively sought to allay prospective participants’ concerns about issues such as 
confidentiality and the required time-commitment to complete a test interview.
  
Approximately 80 e-mails were sent out in a staged or staggered process so as to gauge 
and manage recipients’ responses thereby ensuring, as far as practicable, an even 
balance between partner and non-partner level participants.  After 20 volunteers had 
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agreed to participate and were tested on a rolling basis, no further e-mails were sent 
out.
378
 
Of the 20 individuals (14 lawyers and six economists) who volunteered to participate in 
this study, 12 were from five of the top seven law firms in Australia as measured by 
total revenue for the 2011/2012 financial year.
379
  Another participant was from a 
leading boutique firm which had for several years won national awards for its 
competition law practice.
380
  The remaining legal professional, who had previously 
been a senior competition law partner in a national law firm, held a very senior position 
with a regulatory authority.  Four of the economists who participated were from three 
of Australia’s most prominent competition economics firms, that is, from firms that are 
part of a small group of economic consultancies routinely engaged by the largest 
Australian law firms and whose consultants consistently appear as expert economists in 
Australian competition law court cases.
381
  The other two economists were from 
regulatory authorities.  Geographically, at the time of their interviews, participants were 
spread across the major business centres in Australia, with eight located in Sydney, six 
in Melbourne, four in Brisbane, and one each in Perth and Canberra.
382
 
By virtue of the selection methodology used, these 20 participants were divisible into 
two broad categories, namely, partner-level and non-partner-level.  Within each 
category there were 7 lawyers and 3 economists.  In the preliminary analyses of 
participants in the discussion below, the partner-level participants were numbered 
anonymously from S01 to S10 (lawyers were numbered S01 to S07 and economists 
S08 to S10).  The non-partner participants (who all confirmed that they did not have 
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 Three participants, who were all partner-level specialists, were previously known to the researcher.  
Another four individuals volunteered to participate at the suggestion of other participants, who had either 
undertaken to contact the prospect directly or permitted the researcher to use their names by way of 
introduction.  These additional volunteers comprised one partner-level participant and three non-partners.   
379
 ‘Top 35 Law Firms by Revenue for FY 2011/12,’ in ‘Australia’s Top Law Firms Revealed,’ Business 
Review Weekly, 1 August 2012 
http://www.brw.com.au/p/sections/focus/australia_top_law_firms_revealed_vvZ5sZcs7mnCsgi2pdqCF
M   
380
 All the law firms represented in this study were also included in the list of 10 Australian law firms 
rated for their competition law expertise in Who’s Who Legal and Chambers and Partners 
(www.whoswholegal.com and  www.chambersandpartners.com accessed 10 May 2014). 
381
 All three economics firms represented in this study were included in the list of six Australian 
economics firms specializing in competition economics published by Who’s Who Legal 
(www.whoswholegal.com accessed 10 May 2014).  Chambers and Partners does not rank competition 
economists. 
382
 The study’s sole specialist in New Zealand competition law was temporarily resident in Australia at 
the time of his interview. 
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sign-off responsibility within their organisations) were numbered S11 to S20 (lawyers 
numbered S11 to S17 and economists S18 to S20). 
Statistically significant differences and similarities between these two groups of 
participants were identified based on their answers to a series of preliminary questions.  
These questions (reproduced in Appendix A) related primarily to participants’ 
experiences and qualifications.  Insofar as the two groups could be demonstrated to be 
significantly different in key areas (such as years of specialist experience), but similar 
in others (such as degree of specialisation and number of mergers considered in the last 
five years), the more likely there would be a broad allocation of participants across the 
expertise spectrum and therefore the more meaningful the ultimate results of the study.  
The same statistical methods and assumptions were applied to these tests as were 
applied to the tests for statistical significance reported elsewhere in this study.
383
 
On this basis, it was possible to confirm with 95 per cent confidence that the partner-
level participants, taken as a distinct sample group, had:  
 more years of general professional experience than the study’s non-partners (an 
average of 30 years compared with an average of 9.3 years);  
 
 more specialist professional experience in competition law or competition 
economics (22.9 years compared with 7.9 years);  
 
 worked on more merger cases during their careers (108.6 compared with 30.6); 
and  
 
 more years of sign-off responsibility (16.9 years compared with 0 years).384    
These were the key areas of difference identified during the preliminary assessment of 
participants. 
                                                          
383
 All tests for statistical difference in this study took the form of Student T-Tests with a null hypothesis 
of ‘no difference between the two sample groups’ and assumptions of a two-tailed distribution, two-
sample unequal variance, and normal distribution.  The confidence interval was set at α = 0.05 (95% 
confidence level). 
384
 Each non-partner was asked to explicitly confirm that they did not possess sign-off responsibility for 
their firm. 
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The following Table 4.1 records individualised information for each participant.  To 
ensure anonymity, the numbering of participants has been randomised – in this instance 
only – so that, for instance, participant S06 is by his designation a partner-level lawyer 
(being within the group S01 to S07), but he is not the actual S06 whose verbal 
protocols are discussed in subsequent chapters.  In other words, within each of the 
categories of lawyer partner, partner-level economist, non-partner lawyer and non-
partner-level economist, the numbering has been randomised.  But the placement of an 
individual within an expertise category is accurate.  This is to avoid readers with 
knowledge of a particular participant’s background (including the participant 
themselves) being able to trace their performance in this study from the data below.
385
 
  
                                                          
385
 Assurances of confidentiality and anonymity were critical to securing participants’ agreement to be 
involved in this study.  The fact that audio recordings would be made of participants’ real-time analyses 
of cases they had never seen before, was something that several participants said they were uneasy about, 
but that given the privacy safeguards of the study, they could accept it.  One participant said that the 
biggest issue for him was having a recording made of his initial reactions to problems, where those 
reactions would normally not be expressed.  However, he also understood – as did the other participants 
– that this requirement went to the heart of the testing and analytical methodology of the study.  It is also 
important to note that where a particular participant went poorly on a test case, it was preferable – as a 
matter of courtesy, if nothing else – that they not be able to identify themselves as that participant.   
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TABLE 4.1 – Participant Differences:  Partner-level vs Non-partner Level 
 Participant 
General 
Experience 
(Years) 
Specialist 
Experience 
(Years) 
Sign-off 
Responsibility 
(Years) 
Merger Matters 
Career to Date 
(Number) 
386
 
Partner-level 
Lawyers 
S01 35 30 25 150+ 
S02 51 25 25 150+ 
S03 20 14 3 10 
S04 23 25 12 150+ 
S05 18 13 10 120 
S06 23 10 14 6 
S07 35 35 25 150+ 
Partner-level 
Economists 
S08 30 30 15 150+ 
S09 35 35 20 150+ 
S10 30 12 20 50 
 
Average 
(SD) 
30 
(9.8) 
22.9 
(9.8) 
16.9 
(7.4) 
108.6+ 
387
 
(61.6) 
Non-partner 
Lawyers 
S11 13 13 0 100 
S12 7 6 0 6 
S13 8 7 0 20 
S14 10 7 0 20 
S15 10 12 0 5 
S16 8 6 0 50 
S17 9 6 0 20 
Non-partner 
Economists 
S18 8 7 0 20 
S19 10 5 0 30 
S20 10 10 0 35 
 
Average 
(SD) 
9.3 
(1.7) 
7.9 
(2.8) 
0 
30.6 
(27.7) 
 
In terms of similarities between these two groups, it could not be shown that there was 
any statistically significant difference between the group of 10 partner-level 
participants and the group of 10 non-partner participants in relation to:   
 their degree of specialisation in competition law during the last twelve months 
as measured by the percentage of their billable time spent on competition 
                                                          
386
 The number of mergers a participant had worked on during their career was a generalised point of 
comparison only given that many participants found it difficult to remember how many merger matters 
they had worked on and because their level of involvement and responsibility varied significantly.  The 
nature of the matters themselves also made direct comparisons problematic.   For example, one non-
partner had worked on the same merger for two years, while another had considered 5 mergers, none of 
which had led to a merger review application.   
387
 Several expert participants estimated that they had worked on over 200 merger matters during their 
careers.  Rather than seek a specific number, the figure of 150+ was used in these instances.  This was 
not considered a significant rounding issue given the already noted problems with comparing numbers of 
merger matters directly. 
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matters (the average across all participants was 77%);  
 
 the number of merger matters they had worked on during either the preceding 
12 months (3.8 matters on average) or over the last five years (20 matters on 
average);  
 
 for those partners and non-partners who had worked as employees at a 
competition authority, the number of years of experience they had spent in those 
roles (the average for five partners and five non-partners with such experience 
was 8.2 years); and 
 
 the number of years that these 10 participants had spent reviewing mergers at a 
competition authority (average 4.1 years). 
In addition to these statistics, other comparisons were made on a simple arithmetic 
basis.  These comparisons highlighted additional differences between the partners and 
the non-partners in this study.  For instance, three of the former category of participants 
had taught in post-graduate competition law courses, but none of the latter had.  This 
was consistent with the Hoffman Scheme’s traditional definition of a master being one 
who is, among other things, qualified to teach lower-level specialists.   
Further, as noted in the previous chapter regarding Hoffman’s Scheme, being a master 
(the highest level of expert) meant ‘being part of an elite group of experts whose 
judgments set the regulations, standards, or ideals’388 within their domain.  Four of the 
partner-level participants in this study ostensibly demonstrated these attributes having 
authored authoritative competition law reference-texts, appeared as expert witnesses in 
landmark court cases, set the policies of competition authorities, and influenced the 
formulation of competition laws themselves.    
On the other hand, there were areas where no obvious arithmetic differences existed 
between the partners and non-partners involved in this study.  The number of 
participants with post-graduate qualifications in competition law was equal between the 
two groups.  Each group contained one participant with a PhD and two participants 
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 Robert R Hoffman, ‘How Can Expertise be Defined? Implications of Research from Cognitive 
Psychology’ in Robin Williams, Wendy Faulkner and James Fleck (Eds), Exploring Expertise:  Issues 
and Perspectives (Macmillan, 1998) 84. 
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with a competition law LLM.  Nine or 90% of the partner-level participants 
volunteered that merger review cases were a focus of their practices, while 8 or 80% of 
the non-partners made the same claim.  Four or 40% of both groups stated that they 
spent more than half their time on litigation or ‘back-end’ work.  Four partner-level 
participants and three non-partners stated that they devoted most of their billable time 
to advisory and transactional work, which is also termed ‘front-end’ work.  The 
remaining two partners and three non-partners characterised their practices as a mixture 
of both front-end and back-end work.  Five partners and five non-partners had either 
worked for or were currently working for a competition authority.  
The fact that all participants worked for leading law or economics firms, or with 
competition authorities, ensured that their work experience was likely to have been of a 
comparable quality.  As discussed in the previous chapter, smaller organisations were 
considered unlikely to maintain substantial specialist practices in competition law or be 
able to attract the highest level clients with the most complex competition law issues, 
unless they were boutique firms that specialised in competition law or competition 
economics.    
Only senior associates and partners (or their non-law equivalents) at these organisations 
were invited to participate.  This ensured that, as a practical matter, their minimum 
years of specialist experience in competition law would be no fewer than five years 
based on the common practice that promotion to senior associate typically requires 
several years of specialisation in a particular area of law or economics.  In the other 
empirical studies of legal thinking skills reviewed in previous chapters, most if not all 
of these non-partners would have been considered experts in those expert and novice 
comparisons.
389
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 For instance, in the research reported by Colon-Navarro and Weinstein (and also by non-law scholars 
such as Lundeberg), measures of expertise were predominantly used in a loose, relative sense.  While the 
experts in these studies were ostensibly more expert (or at least more experienced) than the novices and 
subexpert in the subject field of law, their expertise in a more absolute sense was open to question.  
Colon-Navarro’s four experts had 3, 5, 13 and 14 years of specialist experience in immigration law 
(Fernando Colon-Navarro, ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer:  Expert-Novice Differences in Simulated Client 
Interviews’ (1997) 21 The Journal of the Legal Profession 107, 121).   Weinstein’s three experts were 
simply described as ‘outstanding practitioners’ with no reference to how many years they had practiced 
social security disability law (Ian Weinstein, ‘Lawyering in the State of Nature:  Instinct and 
Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving’ (1998-1999) 23 Vermont Law Review 1, 18).   Lundeberg’s ten 
experts, who were presumed to be experts in reading court cases, were either lawyers or law professors 
‘who had practiced law or at least taught two years’ (Mary A Lundeberg, ‘Metacognitive Aspects of 
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The decision not to involve participants with less than 5 years specialist experience in 
competition law was made for a number of reasons, several of which were noted in 
parts B and C of Chapter 3.  First, this study was not intended to be a comparison 
between, on the one hand, novices who had had little or no exposure to competition law 
issues and, on the other hand, much more experienced competition specialists.  
Moreover, it was critical that technical legal knowledge should not be a distinguishing 
characteristic between participants, at least not with regards the chosen representative 
task.  Second, the representative task itself required a relatively deep understanding of 
legal and procedural issues that could not be assumed of less experienced participants.  
The prospect of otherwise having to rely on a simpler or more straightforward task that 
novices could attempt risked leaving the more experienced legal specialists 
unchallenged, which would have been a serious flaw in the study’s overall design. 
As to the prospect of designating participants with up to 10-years’ experience to be 
apprentices, this was considered to be within the traditional categorisation of 
apprentices having ‘about one to 12 years’ experience in the craft guilds,’390  and their 
being individuals ‘undergoing a programme of instruction beyond the introductory 
levels.’391  In addition, the next step up to journeyman – that is, ‘a person who can 
perform a day’s labour unsupervised’392 – was not a status that could be assumed for all 
participants.  Some of the more experienced non-partner level participants did, 
however, state that they had effective autonomy up to the point of sign-off in most 
instances.     
Attention was also given to ensuring that no single firm or organisation was represented 
by more than three study participants.  This was made possible through the adoption of 
the staggered approach to soliciting prospective participants.  Where this number had 
been reached for any one organisation, another would be approached.  However, for the 
most part there seemed to be a natural limit of three individuals per firm choosing to 
volunteer.    
                                                                                                                                                                         
Reading Comprehension:  Studying Understanding in Legal Case Analysis’ (1987) 22(4) Reading 
Research Quarterly 407, 410). 
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 M T H Chi, ‘Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil 
Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 21, 22. 
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 Ibid. 
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These statistics confirmed, at least in a general sense, that the participants in this study 
were sufficiently similar in some areas and sufficiently dissimilar in others to ensure 
that the first-order methodological requirements of the study were met.  Prima facie, all 
participants were experienced competition law specialists working at the higher end of 
their profession either in private practice with a leading law or economics firm, or with 
a competition authority.  Moreover, no single firm or city could have been considered 
over-represented. 
Second, every participant had demonstrably adequate specialist knowledge of the 
relevant merger review laws and procedures.  This was subsequently confirmed insofar 
as no participant needed or requested any technical references or guidance to assist in 
their analysis of the test cases.  Their apparent familiarity with merger review laws and 
procedures was not a precondition to any participant’s selection.  It was nevertheless 
confirmation that merger cases were an appropriate focus for a study of specialist 
competition law expertise.   
Third, these 20 volunteer participants were plausibly divisible into two distinct groups 
with statistically significant differences, namely, a group of 10 participants with 
partner-level status and a group of 10 participants without such status.  From this arose 
a reasonable expectation – anticipated in the design of the study – that within the 
former group would likely be experts and masters within the meanings of these terms 
as used in Hoffman’s Scheme, and within the latter group journeymen and apprentices.  
This mix of otherwise broadly homogenous specialist competition lawyers and 
economists was considered an appropriate starting point for further ranking.
393
  
B  Participant Rankings 
The first five sections of this part record how the five measures of likely expertise 
discussed in Part C of the previous chapter were applied to each individual who 
volunteered to participate in this study.  The measures used, as well as their associated 
scoring and weighting, were described at length in the previous chapter.  The 
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 One distinction not considered relevant to the findings of the present study was the gender of the 20 
participants who took part, of whom five were women and fifteen were men.  There was no targeting of 
any one gender in the solicitation of volunteers.  Participants’ involvement was ultimately a matter of 
personal choice and availability.  Regarding the use of a single pronoun, this was considered preferable 
to avoid unnecessarily highlighting the gender of participants throughout the thesis, and the male 
pronoun was confirmed via a literal toss of a coin.  
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discussion below is solely concerned with the application of the relevant principles and 
substantive requirements.   
The last section of this part summarises the aggregated results of the scores of likely 
expertise for each participant.  This includes comparisons between the three different 
groups of participants as allocated according to Hoffman’s Scheme.  This comparison 
includes additional statistical analysis to indicate the ways in which these groupings 
differed from and were similar to the initial grouping of participants as either partner-
level or non-partner level legal specialists. 
1  Partnership (Sign-off Responsibility) 
For most participants in this study, their status as, on the one hand, law firm partners or 
principals in economics firms, or, on the other, non-partners or senior associates within 
their organisations, was clear.  What was not clear for some members of the former 
group was whether or not their promotion to partnership or principal reflected their 
specialist competition law expertise at the time of their promotion.   
Two participants had become competition law specialists less than five years prior to 
becoming partner (S03, S07).  Another two had been partners for up to eight years 
before they became specialists in this area of law (S02, S08).  Accordingly, these 
participants’ promotion to a position with sign-off responsibility was ostensibly for 
reasons other than their competition law expertise. 
Within the framework of the present assessment of specialist expertise, these four 
participants were assigned a neutral score on this particular measure, but subsequently 
received the maximum score under the 10,000-hour measure.  Had they not held 
partnership status at the time of testing, such as the senior associates in this study, they 
would have received a -1 score under the present measure.  As it was, they were scored 
at ‘0.’ 
In relation to the three participants who worked for competition authorities, it was 
initially assumed that those individuals who were likely to be made partners in a private 
sector firm, should they make the move, were to be scored positively on this measure.  
The first of these participants (S01) had previously been a senior partner in a leading 
national law firm.  Moreover, he had originally been promoted to the partnership in that 
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firm as a competition law specialist.  Accordingly, his status as an expert on this 
measure was clear, and he received a score of +1.   
The second participant (S10) had held senior roles in competition authorities for well 
over a decade.  His decisions were in most practical senses final in those capacities, 
though formally subject to official authorisation.   During the participant-selection 
process he had been categorized as a partner-level participant owing to the level of 
responsibility he held within the government, which was ostensibly equivalent to that 
of a law firm partner.  However, he was given a neutral score of ‘0’ on the basis that 
there was no actual confirmation of him achieving partnership status as a result of a 
vote of his peers.  In other words, there was no recorded attestation by those who stood 
to be disadvantaged by his judgments on competition law issues. 
The third government employee (S19) had previously worked as a consultant with a 
prominent economics firm and had only recently re-joined the government.  His 
relatively limited years of experience and confirmed status at below partner-level while 
in private practice, confirmed that he should be classified as a non-partner without sign-
off responsibility and hence was given a score of -1. 
These individual assessments against this first measure of specialist legal expertise are 
summarized in the following table. 
TABLE 4.2 – Sign-off Responsibility Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
Sign-off 
Responsibility 
+1 0 0 +1 +1 +1 0 0 +1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
 
2  10,000 Hours 
With the exception of one partner (S02), all participants with sign-off responsibility had 
twelve or more years’ experience as competition law specialists and were scored at +1 
on this measure.  Participant S02 had ten years’ experience, and according to the 
methodology described in the previous chapter, was scored at ‘0.’   
Seven of the non-partners participants (S11, S12, S14, S15, S16, S19 and S20) had 
fewer than 8 years’ experience as competition law specialists and were therefore given 
scores of -1.  Two non-partners (S13 and S17) had twelve or more years’ specialist 
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experience and were given scores of +1.  Like participant S02, non-partner S18 had ten 
years’ specialist experience and was scored at ‘0.’  
The following table summarizes these results.  
TABLE 4.3 – 10,000 Hours Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
10,000 hours 
(10 years) 
+1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 0 -1 -1 
 
3  Conceptual Depth 
Partner-level participants S04, S05, S08 and S09 had each identified issues indicating 
that their analysis had been conceptually deep either in their assessment of Case A or 
Case B, or of both cases.  Non-partners S15 and S19 performed similarly well on these 
cases.  These six participants were therefore each scored at +2 according to the scale of 
conceptual depth established in the previous chapter.  Which is to say, these 
participants had focused on product functionality and production substitution in relation 
to the concrete products of Case A and/or had highlighted the risk of vertical 
foreclosure in shipping services as a possible post-merger scenario in Case B. 
Partner S02 was assessed as being at the next level of analysis and was scored at +1 on 
this measure.  This was based on his having concluded in Case A that manufacturers of 
other concrete products could switch to produce the products supplied by the merger 
parties.  Participant S17 received the same score for his analysis of demand-side 
substitution in Case A. 
Partner S03 and non-partners S11, S16 and S18 undertook a balanced analysis of Case 
A and, with the exception of S18 who did not consider this second case because of his 
prior knowledge of the transaction, adopted a similar approach in Case B.  Each of 
these participants was scored at ‘0’ for conceptual depth.  Non-partners S01 and S06 
considered neither case and were therefore also scored at ‘0’ by default. 
Partner S10 was scored at -1 for conceptual depth because he focused mostly on 
geographic issues in Case A and did not identify the vertical issue in Case B.  However, 
he did not go as far as non-partners S13 and S14, who both favoured arguments in these 
cases as to likely limited competition between the parties pre-merger.  These arguments 
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were aimed at allaying post-merger competition concerns, but were based on 
superficial (and erroneous) assumptions about the relevant industries.  Accordingly, 
both these participants were scored at -2 on this measure. 
Non-partner S12 focused briefly on demand-side substitution in Case A and, while 
erroneously concluding that the merger parties in Case B serviced different customers, 
did not go as far as S13 and S14 in relying on ‘no-overlap’ arguments.  Accordingly, 
like S10, this participant was scored at -1. 
Non-partner S20 was amongst the most superficial of all participants in his analysis of 
both cases, concluding in Case A that because he had not personally heard of either 
party they were likely to be small players in the concrete market and that therefore 
there was unlikely to be any serious competition issue.  In Case B, he concluded that 
that transaction would be problematic principally because of the substantial size of the 
merger parties’ businesses in the national marketplace for freight-forwarding services.  
This participant was scored at -2 for conceptual depth.  
These scores are recorded in the following table. 
TABLE 4.4 – Conceptual Depth Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
Conceptual 
Depth 
0 +2 0 +2 +2 0 0 +2 +2 -1 0 -1 -2 -2 +2 0 +1 0 +2 -2 
 
4  Exceptional Reasoning 
There were six examples of exceptional reasoning across all study participants, that is, 
reasoning that was unique in the context of a given case and which was material to 
determining how the case was assessed by the participant in question.  For each of 
these examples, an assessment was made against the ideal response described in 
Section 4 of Part C of the previous chapter. 
Partner S01, because of his status as a specialist in New Zealand competition law, 
considered cases that no other participant considered.  It was therefore difficult to 
determine the uniqueness of this participant’s assessments.  However, his approach was 
considered sufficiently similar in tone to the reasoning of S06 in Case C (as described 
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below), that his reasoning was assessed as being at least as exceptional and deserving 
of a positive score against the ideal response. 
The second case considered by participant S01 (Case F) concerned a merger transaction 
involving book publishing businesses.  Within less than 10 seconds of commencing to 
read the test case document, he had concluded that the case would be cleared by the 
CC.  The basis for this conclusion, as he went on to explain, was that publishing was a 
‘declining business’394 with ‘low barriers to entry.’395  After re-confirming that 
clearance was ‘not a problem’396 and that it was therefore not necessary for him to read 
the case any further,
397
 participant S01 stated that the only remaining task would be to 
‘plod through and explain it all’398 to CC staff. 
This assessment was scored at +2 on the grounds that participant S01 had relied on his 
reasoning strategy to a material extent, that his reasoning was based on known facts, 
experience and inferential insight, that it reflected extensive specialist knowledge, and 
that it was novel, creative and compelling.  It also turned out to be correct inasmuch as 
the transaction was eventually cleared by the CC.  However, being correct about the 
final outcome of a case was not necessarily confirmation of specialist expertise, as was 
apparent in the exceptionally superficial – but ultimately correct – reasoning 
demonstrated by non-partner S20 in Case A as discussed further below.
399
 
Participant S03 provided a very confident assessment in his analysis of Case C.  His 
confidence was based on an assessment that the ACCC’s questions were ‘of a very 
general nature’400 and looked like ‘they’re designed to assuage some complaint’401 
rather than because a substantive issue existed.  Moreover, he noted that the ACCC’s 
inquiries were being made ‘some time after the fact,’402 which further suggested a lack 
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of urgency or concern.  It is to be recalled that Case C concerned an already completed 
transaction. 
But the ultimate confirmation that the transaction would be cleared (or not challenged 
by the ACCC by way of a court action seeking divestiture) was S03’s observation that 
as an international merger it was likely that formal opposition could only be initiated 
under Section 50A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  This section, he noted, 
‘creates another whole level of protection for the entities because the Commission can’t 
actually do that much about it if it falls under this statutory provision,’403 which – in the 
broadest terms – requires more complicated administrative steps than initiating court 
action under Section 50 as stated in the ACCC’s letter. 
S03 concluded his assessment stating, ‘so I would be advising the parties in half an 
hour that they really don’t have anything to worry about, subject to finding out some 
more information.’404 
This assessment was scored at +1.  First, it was unique (no other participant had cited 
the relevance of Section 50A), it was based on known facts and on insight consistent 
with a high degree of specialist legal knowledge, and it was sufficiently compelling to 
convince S03, not unreasonably, that it would provide an adequate answer to the 
ultimate question regarding the likelihood of regulatory opposition.  However, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, it is doubtful that Section 50A would actually apply 
in this instance given that Section 50, as asserted by the ACCC, would likely oust the 
former provision’s jurisdiction.  Moreover, Section 50A has not to date been used by 
the ACCC in any case, notwithstanding it has been part of Australian competition law 
since 1986.
405
 
Accordingly, S03’s risk assessment strategy satisfied to a large extent the elements of 
an ideal response as specified in this study.  It did not, however, rank as highly as the 
responses of the other positively-rated exceptional responses by S01, S06 and S09 
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(which were in technical legal terms completely accurate) and therefore was given a +1 
score rather than a +2 score as these other participants were given.  
Participant S06 sought merely to confirm, as a matter of fact, that the transaction in 
Case C had been concluded or ‘signed, sealed and delivered’ to use this participant’s 
own words.
406
  Having satisfied himself that this was the case, he concluded within less 
than 30 seconds that the only possible remedy was divestiture and that in his view ‘the 
chances of a court granting divestiture of any merger case in Australia – unless it’s such 
a clear cut case – is going to be virtually zero.’407  He then went on to recall two past 
cases which were relevant to this point. 
Like S01, participant S06 very quickly formed a concluded and compelling view on the 
likely outcome of the case he was considering.  Whereas several other participants 
spent over ten minutes before making their assessment in Case C (three participants – 
S12, S18 and S19 – took 14 minutes and longer), this partner-level participant took just 
under two minutes to establish perhaps the strongest conceptual argument based on the 
limited information available.  Rather than provide a direct answer based on the 
substance of the case, S06 framed the central issue as whether or not this was likely to 
be an extreme case – more extreme than any other in Australian competition law 
history – such that it might result in the first ever successful divestiture action by the 
ACCC. 
Participant S12 had also vocalized that the ACCC had never before brought a 
successful divestiture case against a consummated merger.  However, his immediate 
follow up thought was ‘but who’s to say this is not going to be the first.’408  Instead of 
realizing immediately at that point, as S06 had done, that Case C would therefore need 
to be the most extreme such case to be in jeopardy, S12 then embarked on a 14 minutes 
and 30 seconds analysis in which he first concluded that the transaction was likely to be 
opposed.  Subsequently he said the case would likely be cleared, but that work would 
need to be done to overcome what he had erroneously considered was ‘a bit of 
confusion here on the ACCC’s part’409 about the precise nature of the transaction itself. 
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Participant S06’s reasoning in Case C was considered both unique and compelling.  It 
also drew on his deep specialist knowledge of this area of law (including a recital of the 
details of two previous cases, both of which were decided almost a quarter of a century 
earlier
410
), and reflected a creative approach in that it established a narrow focus for 
further analysis, that is, whether or not this case was likely to be the most extreme in 
anti-competitive terms compared to all previous cases the ACCC had considered since 
the commencement of the relevant merger laws in the late 1970s.  Placed in that 
context, the case became immediately tractable, subject to confirming a limited number 
of factual details.  Participant S06 was therefore scored at +2 for this example of 
exceptional reasoning. 
Participant S09 demonstrated exceptional reasoning in both the cases he considered.  In 
respect to Case A, he was the only participant to identify that there could be production 
substitution possibilities such that a manufacturer of reinforced concrete box culverts 
could switch to producing concrete drainage pits, depending on relative price and 
demand signals.  This insight suggested a basis for viewing these products as co-
existing within the boundaries of the same product market.  The analytical effect of this 
perspective was to broaden the parameters of the relevant market and reduce 
competition law risk.   
In Case D, participant S09 suggested that the best way of determining the geographic 
extent to which individual rural merchandise stores supplied their products (a critical 
issue in the case) was to review invoices held in each store’s internal records and 
determine from them the locations of their customers (and what they bought).  This, he 
opined, was a far better approach to determining how far farmers were willing to travel 
to purchase their rural merchandise than to ask the farmers directly, which he believed 
demonstrated a lack of understanding on the part of ACCC staff. 
Both of the above perspectives were unique.  They also indicated S09’s deep expert 
knowledge and practical experience in competition law matters.  Moreover, they raised 
issues on which these cases would be likely to turn in evidentiary and analytical senses, 
although S09 admitted to not knowing the outcome of his suggested further inquiries.  
As both assessments were insightful, compelling and relevant to determining how easy 
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clearance was likely to be in these cases, this participant’s exceptional reasoning was 
scored at +2. 
Participant S12 has already been noted for not linking the significance of Case C being 
concerned with a concluded merger and the fact that the ACCC had never successfully 
secured divestiture in such cases.  Compared with S06’s more insightful assessment of 
those facts, S12 arguably performed less like an expert in that instance.  However, S12 
had done better than most other participants who had not even recalled the historical 
track record of the ACCC in such cases. 
Yet it was in his assessment of Case B where S12 most clearly demonstrated his less-
than-expert status.  He was the only participant to misunderstand the relationship 
between the acquiring party in that case and its existing joint-venture shipping partner.  
At one point he correctly identified the vertical integration between Toll (the freight-
forwarder) and Toll ANL (the shipping joint-venture).  However, he then became 
convinced that Toll ANL was also a freight-forwarder in its own right and a direct 
competitor of Toll and the target business, Linfox Trans-Bass.  This was incorrect 
factually and misleading in the sense that it led S12 to characterize the merger as a 
reduction in the number of competitors in the market from three to two.  This, in turn, 
led him to conclude that his ‘competition advice would be that this [merger between 
Toll and Linfox Trans-Bass] is likely to be opposed by the ACCC.’411 
As no other participant relied on a similar series of mistaken inferences, and because 
this line of reasoning was based on factual errors that ultimately led S12 to conclude 
that the case would be opposed – which it was not – this example of exceptional 
reasoning was scored at -2 against the ideal response.   
The last example of exceptional reasoning was that of non-partner S20 in Case A.  This 
participant’s conclusion that there would be no competition issue in this case was based 
on the following analysis: 
If I had to say [how easy clearance would be], I guess I think on the one hand … 
concrete products sort of have a history of competition issues … on the other hand I 
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haven’t heard of these companies … so I’m assuming they are … perhaps fairly small 
ones … so there is a fairly good chance that the merger would go, will be cleared.
412
 
While the size of the merger parties was noted as a relevant factor by other participants 
in other cases (S20 again noted this factor in Case D), only S20 raised this issue in this 
case.  Moreover, he relied substantially if not wholly on this factor, doing so even while 
acknowledging that the only basis for his inference about the size of the parties was that 
he had personally not heard of them.  Rather than try to understand the significance of 
the parties’ businesses based on the information provided about how many 
manufacturing and sales sites they had established (the acquirer had a presence in most 
Australian states), who their customers were, and the degree of product substitution that 
might exist (both on the demand and supply-sides of the market), this participant relied 
on his personal experience in an industry with which he admitted he was unfamiliar. 
This reasoning strategy was scored at -2 on the basis that it relied on dubious 
assumptions, did not reflect an extensive, specialist knowledge in competition law, and, 
while novel, was not compelling. 
The other participants in this study were scored at ‘0’ on this measure, not because their 
reasoning strategies were necessarily better than those of S12 or S20 or worse than 
those of S01, S03, S06 or S09, but because their approaches were more common.  The 
sole purpose of this measure was to identify outlier reasoning strategies which were 
both unique and material to the assessments of the participants in question. 
The results against this fourth measure of likely expertise are summarized in the 
following table.  
TABLE 4.5 – Exceptional Reasoning Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
Exceptional 
Reasoning 
+2 0 +1 0 0 +2 0 0 +2 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 
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5  Comprehension Errors 
The most common error made by participants in this study concerned the ACCC’s 
description of the merger parties in Case B, although comprehension errors were 
identified in several other cases as well.  In Case B, the ACCC’s letter had provided a 
description of the cargo carried by the shipping joint-venture in which the acquirer, 
Toll, was a party.  This was followed by a description of the freight-forwarding service 
provided by the target, Linfox Trans-Bass.  The result was that several participants 
mistakenly assumed that these businesses had different customer bases:  The former as 
a carrier of trucks, motor vehicles and infrastructure equipment, and the latter as a 
carrier of consumer goods and retail products.  In fact, both Toll and Linfox Trans-Bass 
provided the same kinds of freight-forwarding services, but Toll was the only one that 
was vertically integrated into shipping. 
Partners S02, S04 and S10, and non-partners S11, S12, S13 and S14, considered that 
both parties were integrated logistics operators.  This was incorrect as only Toll was 
vertically integrated over the shipping routes in question.  Partner S07 and non-partners 
S16 and S20 did not consider the vertical issue at all, but rather proceeded on the basis 
that the transaction only concerned freight forwarding and, therefore, involved only a 
horizontal market-concentration issue.  Each of these participants was scored, initially 
at least, at -1 according to the scoring scale described in the previous chapter. 
The reason for this score of -1 rather than -2 was that while errors of comprehension 
were made by these participants, their assessments were not dependent on their 
mistaken understanding of the vertical integration issue.   
Participants S12, S13 and S14, on the other hand, made a further material error by 
concluding that the merger parties serviced different customers.  But only S13 and S14 
relied on this assessment to develop an argument that the parties’ operations were 
therefore more complementary than competitive, and hence there was unlikely to be a 
competition problem.  This was a material error by these two participants and their 
scores were further reduced to -2 on this basis.
413
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Participants S10, S12 and S17 noted a possible difference in the customer bases of the 
merger parties, but did not make anything more of this issue.  Participants S10 and S17 
had identified other more compelling issues.  Participant S12, on the other hand, 
dismissed the no-overlap argument on the basis that over time the parties could become 
competitors, even if they were not competitors now.  Accordingly, he would have 
presumably relied on this argument if time had not been an issue.  In any event, on this 
specific issue this participant made an ostensibly less material error than S13 and S14, 
and for this reason was scored at -1 in relation to his assessment of this case. 
Participant S12 was, however, the overall worst performer of all participants in terms of 
material comprehension errors.  As previously noted, he was the only participant to 
erroneously view the shipping joint-venture Toll ANL as an independent competitor in 
the freight-forwarding market.  He also mistakenly recalled that Toll had bought ANL 
‘a few years ago,’ according to an article he believed he had read previously.414  In 
Case C he contended that the ACCC had made a typographical error in its market 
inquiries letter insofar as it had confused the ‘fact’ that only one of the parties hired 
intermediate bulk containers while the other supplied them for sale.  The reality was 
that both parties hired them and the ACCC’s letter was correct.  In Case D, S12 
mistakenly believed that the merger parties sold tractors to farmers, that the ANZ Bank 
had previously bought the target companies’ banking operations, that the target 
company provided a form of consumer credit with interest free periods like a retail 
furniture store, and that the acquirer ‘made’ its own fertilizer. 
While not all of these comprehension errors could be considered material, some were, 
and the others implied poor recall and self-monitoring skills.  Accordingly, S12 was 
scored at -2 for multiple errors, some of which were material. 
The best performing participants under this measure were partners S05 and S08, and 
non-partners S15 and S19.  Participants S05 and S08 made no apparent errors in any 
test cases and despite the ACCC’s poorly drafted description of the parties had 
managed to identify not only that Toll was the only vertically integrated party in Case 
B, but that vertical foreclosure was likely to be an issue in the case.   Participants S15 
and S19 had also correctly identified both the vertical integration of Toll alone and the 
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vertical foreclosure issue.  However, these two non-partners also made one error each.   
In Case D, S15 had thought that ‘crop protection’ was a financial service provided by 
the parties when in fact it involved the supply of chemicals and pesticides.  In Case C, 
S19 mistakenly observed that this case was the first time that a countervailing power 
issue had been raised in the test cases to that point.  In fact it had been previously 
mentioned in Case A.  On balance, these were considered trivial errors that should not 
affect the scores given to these participants. 
Accordingly, participants S05, S08, S15 and S19 were the only participants in this 
study to be scored at +1 on this measure.  The remaining participants (S01, S03, S06, 
S09 and S18 who did not consider Case B and who otherwise made no apparent errors) 
were scored at ‘0,’ which may be considered a conservative result given that at least 
some of them may have performed as well as S05, S08, S15 and S19 in terms of 
overcoming the ACCC’s unintended ‘red herring’ about the differences in services 
provided by the freight-forwarding merger proponents in Case B. 
The above results are presented in the following table.  
TABLE 4.6 – Comprehension Errors Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
Comprehension 
Errors 
0 -1 0 -1 +1 0 -1 +1 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 +1 -1 -1 0 +1 -1 
 
6  Summary 
The measure-by-measure scores described above as well as the cumulative scores of 
likely expertise for each participant are summarized in Table 4.7 below.   
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TABLE 4.7 – Summary of Likely Expertise Scores 
MEASURE S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 
Sign-off 
Responsibility 
+1 0 0 +1 +1 +1 0 0 +1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
10,000 hours 
(10 years) 
+1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 0 -1 -1 
Conceptual 
Depth 
0 +2 0 +2 +2 0 0 +2 +2 -1 0 -1 -2 -2 +2 0 +1 0 +2 -2 
Exceptional 
Reasoning 
+2 0 +1 0 0 +2 0 0 +2 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 
Comprehension 
Errors 
0 -1 0 -1 +1 0 -1 +1 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 +1 -1 -1 0 +1 -1 
TOTALS +4 +1 +2 +3 +5 +4 0 +4 +6 -1 -3 -7 -4 -6 +1 -3 0 -1 +1 -7 
 
For the purpose of the analysis described in the next part of this chapter, a more useful 
presentation of this information (using just the total likely expertise scores for each 
participant), is reconfigured in Table 4.8 further below.  This table is an adaption of 
Table 3.1 from Chapter 3.  It clarifies which participants were within which of groups 
A, B and C.  The non-partners identified during the participant-selection phase of this 
study are shown in the shaded boxes.  When contrasted with the partner-level 
participants in unshaded boxes, the points of overlap can be seen amongst the Group B 
participants, who were categorized as an indeterminate mixture of all levels of likely 
expertise under Hoffman’s Scheme.   
TABLE 4.8 – Participant Groupings According to Scores of Likely Expertise 
                  
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
Shading 
indicates: 
Non-partners 
                 
          S19   S08    
  S20    S16  S18 S17 S15   S06    
 
 
S12 S14  S13 S11   S10 S07 S02 S03 S04 S01 S05 S09  
SCORES -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
 
GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
 
Table 4.8 shows that within Group B, non-partner participants S15, S17, S18 and S19 
were in expertise terms indistinguishable from partner-level participants S02, S03, S07 
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and S10.   In Group A, partners S01, S04, S05, S06, S08 and S09 appear towards the 
top (right-hand side) of the table as the most likely experts and masters in the study, 
while in Group C non-partners S11, S12, S13, S14, S16 and S20 appear towards the 
bottom (left-hand side) of the table as most likely apprentices and journeymen 
according to Hoffman’s Scheme. 
Within each of these three groups, the variation in scores was an important analytical 
feature.  With a maximum range of 5 points between members of the same group (for 
example, Group B extends from -2 to +2, inclusive) there was reduced reliance on any 
one measure of likely expertise and thus an allowance for possible errors in the scoring 
process.  By treating Group A participants as equivalent in terms of their levels of 
likely expertise, whether any individual in this group scored better or worse on any 
single measure (for instance, participant S09 received a +2 score on exceptional 
reasoning, while S04 received a score of ‘0’ simply because he provided no evidence of 
exceptional reasoning) was less important.  At the same time, members of Group A as a 
whole were clearly possessed of greater levels of likely expertise than members of 
Group C. 
Testing for statistically significant differences between groups A, B and C yielded 
similar results to those generated from the tests for statistical differences undertaken 
between partner-level participants and non-partners as described in Part A above.  
While the sample sizes were smaller after dividing participants into three groups and 
therefore comparisons were potentially less meaningful, the following conclusions are 
noted as regards the points of difference and similarity between the participants in each 
group. 
There were statistically significant differences between groups A and C in terms of:   
 average years of general experience (Group A, 32.3 years; Group C, 8.7 years);  
 
 average years of experience as a competition law specialist (Group A, 24.3 
years; Group C, 7.3 years);  
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 average number of merger matters over their careers to date (Group A, 110 
matters; Group C, 20.2 matters); and  
 
 average number of years of sign-off responsibility (Group A, 17.5 years; Group 
C, 0 years).    
These averages were approximately equivalent to the averages noted previously for 
partners and non-partners.  
At the same time, there were no statistically significant differences between these two 
groups in terms of: 
 average degree of competition law specialisation during the prior 12 months;  
 
 average number of mergers matters considered during the last 12 months or last 
5 years; 
 
 average years working for a competition law authority; or  
 
 average years working in the mergers branch of a competition law authority.   
As to straight arithmetic comparisons, both groups had two participants whose 
practices were ‘front-end’ focused and two who maintained a 50/50 balance between 
front-end and back-end work.  In addition, two members of Group A had a ‘back-end’ 
or litigation focus, as did two members of Group C.  Both groups had one participant 
with a Master of Laws degree in competition law and one participant with a doctorate 
in competition law economics.  Both groups had two participants with economics 
qualifications.  Group A had four participants with legal qualifications.  Group C had 
five participants with legal qualifications, one of whom had both economics and law 
qualifications but practiced as a lawyer rather than as an economist. 
Comparing Group B with each of Group A and Group C, participants in Group A had 
on average more general professional experience than participants in Group B (32.3 
years; 18.4 years).  There was also a difference between average years of specialist 
experience in competition law, but only at the 90 per cent confidence level, which in 
this study was below the required threshold.   
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Compared to Group C, participants in Group B had on average more general 
professional experience than participants in Group C (18.4 years; 8.7 years).  They had 
also worked on more merger matters (on average) during their careers to date (76 
matters compared to 20.2 matters), and they had more years of sign-off responsibility, 
with no participant in Group C having had any sign-off responsibility. 
One explanation for the above differences is that experience (and therefore, by 
extension, age) was the underlying factor separating these participant groupings.  
Simply by having spent more years practicing professionally, participants were more 
likely to have considered more merger matters and to have had more years as partners.   
Apart from these areas, however, there were no other statistically significant 
differences between these groups, at least not across the range of statistics recorded in 
the preliminary questionnaire completed by all participants.  Moreover, when 
estimating the age of those participants in Group A (age was not explicitly covered in 
the questionnaire), the average was likely to have been around 60 years.  The only 
aberration in this sense was one participant in Group A who was estimated to be in his 
mid-40s.   
The sole statistically significant difference between Group B and Group A participants 
was that the latter  participants had, on average, more years of general professional 
experience, which simply reflects the fact that they were on average older.  In terms of 
all other recorded data, there were no statistically significant differences between these 
groups, apart from Group A’s participants being assessed as having greater levels of 
likely expertise.   
As between groups B and C, the transition from the lower group to the higher group 
was associated with differences in years of general professional experience, number of 
mergers worked on career to date, and years of sign-off responsibility.  Again, age can 
plausibly explain these differences. 
A tentative conclusion about participants’ levels of specialist legal expertise was 
therefore that older specialist lawyers and economists are likely to be more expert than 
younger specialists, and that this association continues to be observable as an 
individual’s age rises to 60 years and beyond.  In this sense, specialist legal expertise is 
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arguably cumulative and continuously increasing, even up to one’s mid-70s, which was 
a milestone that had been reached by at least one of the participants in Group A. 
Comparisons were also performed between Group A and the original group of partner-
level participants, and between Group C and the original group of non-partner 
participants.  No statistically significant differences were observed in either instance 
with regard to any of the above measures.   
C  Comparisons with Industry Ratings 
Two of the more prominent research and ranking organizations that publish directories 
on specialist legal practices globally are Who’s Who Legal415and Chambers and 
Partners.
416
  Their directories, both in hard-copy and on-line formats, rank law firms 
and lawyers (and in the case of Who’s Who Legal economics firms and economists as 
well) who provide Australian competition law advice.  In broad terms, the research 
methodologies used by both directories are similar with some reliance on background 
information submitted by the subject law and economics firms, but with an emphasis 
on interviews conducted directly with peers and clients.   
Who’s Who Legal emphasizes that paid entries are not available in its directory and that 
its identification of legal specialists is ‘based upon comprehensive, independent survey 
work with both general counsel and private practice lawyers.’417 It further claims that 
its listings reflect ‘specialists who have met independent international research 
criteria.’418  Chambers and Partners similarly states that its ranking judgments are 
based on ‘interviews with those active in the market – mainly clients (who can be law 
firms instructing other law firms) and other lawyers with whom they work’ and on 
‘assessing recent work done.’419  For firms and individual lawyers, the relevant criteria 
are ‘legal knowledge and experience, their ability, their effectiveness, and their client 
                                                          
415
 www.whoswholegal.com (accessed 14 May 2014) describes itself as identifying ‘the foremost legal 
practitioners in 34 areas of business law. We feature over 16,000 of the world’s leading private practice 
lawyers in over 100 countries and pride ourselves on the integrity and authority of our findings. It is 
impossible to buy entry into this publication.’ 
416
 www.chambersandpartners.com  (accessed 14 May 2014) describes The Chambers Guides as ‘ranking 
the best law firms and lawyers since 1990’ in over 185 jurisdictions.  According to the website, a survey 
of 20,000 in-house counsel revealed that over half use the Guides to identify prospective legal service 
providers.  This statistic is claimed to be higher than for any rival guides or law firm directories. 
417
 www.whoswholegal.com/about accessed 14 May 2014. 
418
 www.whoswholegal.com/about accessed 14 May 2014. 
419
 http://www.chambersandpartners.com/methodology accessed 14 May 2014.  
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service.’420  In its FAQ page, Chambers and Partners reiterates that a law firm cannot 
be guaranteed a listing in its directories merely by submitting information about its 
practices, and that listing ultimately relies on ‘the feedback of clients, peers and other 
independent market sources.’421 
Another organization, The Legal 500,
422
 also provides directory services for users of 
specialist legal services, but appears to emphasise and rely to a greater extent on law 
firms furnishing the information upon which The Legal 500 research staff base their 
assessments.
423
  Primarily for this reason it was considered to be less objective and, in 
the context of the present study, less relevant than the ranking approaches of the other 
two directory publishers.  In addition, whereas both Who’s Who Legal and Chambers 
and Partners included some or all of the participants in this study in their listings of 
leading Australian competition lawyers and economists, none of these participants were 
included in The Legal 500’s list of leading individuals in its competition and trade 
category.
424
  This is notwithstanding that all the law firms represented in this study 
were listed among the top eight Australian firms ranked in that category by The Legal 
500.
425
   
Comparing the rankings of participants undertaken in this study with the rankings 
conducted annually by Who’s Who Legal and Chambers and Partners served a two-
                                                          
420
 http://www.chambersandpartners.com/methodology accessed 14 May 2014.  
421
 http://www.chambersandpartners.com/faqs accessed 14 May 2014.  
422
 The Legal 500 describes itself as providing ‘the most comprehensive worldwide coverage currently 
available on legal service providers, in over 100 countries.’  It also claims that its law firm directory 
service is ‘widely chosen [by its clients] for its definitive judgement of law firm capabilities over 
publications such as those compiled by Chambers and Partners or Martindale-Hubbell.’  
www.legal500.com accessed 14 May 2014.  
423
 Whereas Who’s Who Legal emphasizes that listings in its directory cannot be paid for and Chambers 
and Partners emphasizes the importance of its 150 full-time research staff whose primary role is to 
interview clients and other third parties, The Legal 500’s editorial guidelines begin with a focus on 
timetables for law firms to submit information about their practice areas and to nominate referees.  Firm 
nominated referees are explicitly given less weight by Chambers and Partners which explains its 
preference for (and the necessity of) independent third-party inputs, but these referees appear to be the 
primary source of third-party information for The Legal 500.  In its website’s FAQ page, The Legal 500 
states that its ‘editorial research is based on firm’s written editorial submissions, and follow-up research 
with firms and their referees.’  Firms can also make submissions in relation to ‘each practice area for 
which you believe your firm warrants recommendation.’  Paid profiles for individual lawyers are also 
available within The Legal 500, and these must be written by the firms themselves.  However, The Legal 
500 states that this information is not provided to the research side of its operations, which is described 
as separate from its paid services division. 
424
 http://www.legal500.com/c/australia/competition-and-trade accessed 14 May 2014.  
425
 Ibid.  
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fold purpose.
426
  First, it confirmed the quality of the highest ranked participants in this 
study.   While all the firms represented in this study were rated by these two industry 
research organisations as having the leading competition law departments in Australia, 
all partner-level lawyers in this study were also individually rated as experts by one or 
both of these publishers.
427
   
Secondly, two of the 24 corporate lawyers identified by Who’s Who Legal as experts in 
Australian competition law were participants in this study – and two of the 11 
economics experts identified in that publication also participated in this study.  While 
these absolute numbers are small, the selection process devised for this study yielded a 
not insignificant sample size of 8% of Who’s Who Legal’s expert competition lawyers 
and a sample size of 18% for the publication’s expert competition law economists (the 
overall sample size, inclusive of both lawyers and economists, was 11% of the total 
population of national competition law and economics experts ranked by this 
publication).  In relation to Chambers and Partners’ rankings, only lawyers were 
eligible for inclusion in its list of 46 individual expert Australian competition law 
experts.  Six of these lawyers participated in this study, which constituted a 13% 
sample from that list of the purported best competition lawyers in Australia. 
Comparing the rankings in this study with the experts identified in the above guides to 
Australian competition lawyers and economists enabled the researcher to consider the 
extent of agreement between these peer and client-survey rankings, on the one hand, 
and rankings based on the methodology used here, on the other.   
As can be seen from the following table, the participants in this study who were listed 
in Who’s Who Legal were scored at no lower than +2 points (just outside Group A), 
with the majority being within Group A, which was the group assumed to include 
experts and masters in competition law and economics.  Given that S09 and S08 were 
excluded from Chambers and Partners’ assessment because they were not lawyers, it 
can be seen in the table below that that directory’s assessment also coincided 
substantially with the ranking of lawyers according to their scores of likely expertise.  
                                                          
426
 No ranking publication was consulted during the scoring and ranking phase of participants in this 
study.  It was only after ranking had been completed that confirmatory reference was sought from 
external directories. 
427
 The only partner-level competition lawyer in this study not listed in either of these industry ratings 
publications is S01, who was a New Zealand competition lawyer (and hence would not appear in the 
Australian listings) and who is in any event no longer in private practice having taken up a senior 
position with a competition authority. 
151 
 
For the most part, the bands of experts used by Chambers and Partners comport with 
this study’s rankings, albeit that participant S05 is ranked materially higher in this 
study (Inclusion in Band 1 of the Chambers and Partners framework denotes higher 
expertise than inclusion in Band 4). 
TABLE 4.9 – Comparisons with Industry Ratings428 
                  
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
 
 
APPRENTICES/JOURNEYMEN 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
 
EXPERTS/MASTERS 
 
Shading 
indicates: 
Chambers & 
Partners (C&P) 
Australian 
Competition Law 
Expert (Expertise 
Band indicated by 
superscripts 1-4) 
 
* Indicates: 
Who’s Who Legal 
(WWL) Australian 
Competition Law 
/ Economics 
Expert 
                 
          S19       
  S20    S16  S18 S17 S15   S08*    
 
 
S12 S14  S13 S11   S10 S07
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 S02
3
 S03
2* S043 S061* S054 S09*  
SCORES -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
 
GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
 
Significantly, the present study only sought to assess technical expertise, not whether 
an individual provided high or low levels of client service or was easy or difficult to 
work with in a team.  Nor did it consider subjective inputs from third parties such as 
clients, colleagues or other industry players.   In these respects the present approach 
contrasted with the methodological approaches of Who’s Who Legal and Chambers and 
Partners, which both purported to give most weight to interviews conducted by their 
respective research staff with lawyers and law firm clients. 
While this study referenced participants’ total years of professional experience (both 
general and specialist) and partnership status, it relied more on three performance-based 
measures as assessed via participants think-aloud transcripts recorded during their 
analysis of test cases.  This may explain why participant S05 (who had been a partner 
less than 5 years at the time of his interview) was rated more highly in this study than 
he was by Chambers and Partners.  He simply had less time than other more 
established partner-level participants to develop a reputation amongst client and peers.  
                                                          
428
 Participant S01 is not included in this table because he is not an expert in Australian competition law, 
but rather in New Zealand Competition law, and hence would not be listed in either of these 
publications’ Australian law assessments. 
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As it was, this participant was expressly singled-out in Chambers Asia-Pacific 
Commentary for his reputed ‘excellent technical knowledge.’429  
With reference to the differences between groups A, B and C, all four of the lawyer 
participants in Group A appeared in the Chambers and Partners 2014 list of 46 
Australian competition law experts.  At the same time, one of the five participants in 
this group was listed amongst Who’s Who Legal’s 24 legal experts, and two were 
included in its list of 11 competition economics experts.  Three of the participants in 
Group B were also listed in the Chambers and Partners 2014 rankings, whereas one 
Group B member was named in the Who’s Who Legal list.  None of the participants in 
Group C appeared in either Chambers and Partners or Who’s Who Legal’s 2014 
listings of Australian competition law and economics experts.  This higher prevalence 
of listed participants in Group A compared to Group B, and the fact that no listed 
experts appeared in Group C, suggested material agreement between the participant 
selection process and ranking scores used in this study and the identification of legal 
and economics experts by these two industry research publications. 
At the same time, however, the methodology developed for this study assigned 
participants to one of three groups according to their levels of likely expertise.  There 
was no parallel to this feature in the research methodologies used by the two industry 
research publications.  Moreover, the ranking framework applied here extended to non-
partner level professionals.  This was not a feature of these other publications, but it 
was critical to the design of this study.  Without an ability to identify both lower-level 
and higher-level legal specialists from a given group of individuals (and to do so in a 
graduated manner), a meaningful comparison between their cognitive performances 
would not have been possible.  In these regards, neither Who’s Who Legal nor 
Chambers and Partners could have provided sufficient data for the analysis described 
in the following chapters. 
D  Conclusion 
This chapter described the results of the participant selection process outlined in the 
previous chapter.  It highlighted participants’ background details and explained how 
these were in some instances similar and in other instances different in areas relevant to 
                                                          
429
 The page/webpage reference for this quotation is omitted to protect this participant’s anonymity. 
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an analysis of their cognitive abilities as competition law specialists.  It also discussed 
the breadth and depth of this particular sample of participants, who were widely 
distributed geographically and who worked in different organisations, but who were 
also involved in providing essentially the same forms of specialist legal services at the 
same premium-end of the corporate law market.  When initially dividing these 
volunteers into partners and non-partners, the main statistically significant differences 
between the two groups were their average years of general and specialist experience, 
their possession of sign-off responsibility, and the average number of merger matters in 
which they had been involved during their careers to date.   
This information indicated that the profiles of these participants comported with the 
objectives of the study inasmuch as any identified differences in cognitive skills would 
more likely be attributable to factors other than differences in technical legal 
knowledge.  At the same time, the areas of similarities identified provided confidence 
that variables other than those reflecting cognitive ability were minimized.   
The results of the ranking and grouping methodologies from the previous chapter were 
then discussed.  This included a detailed description of the manner in which individual 
participants were assessed and ranked against five measures of likely expertise.   These 
rankings were then reflected in Table 4.8, which indicated which participants were in 
which groups according to the terminology used by Hoffman’s Scheme.  The highest-
ranked participants in Group A (S01, S04, S05, S06, S08 and S09) were depicted as a 
combination of experts and masters.  The mid-ranked participants in Group B (S02, 
S03, S07, S10, S15, S17, S18 and S19) were depicted as a combination of apprentices, 
journeymen, experts and masters.  The lowest-ranked participants in Group C (S11, 
S12, S13, S14, S16 and S20) were depicted as a combination of apprentices and 
journeymen.   
The remainder of the chapter focused on the extent to which the above groupings had 
preserved relevant distinctions between different levels of participants.  These 
distinctions were confirmed to be those relating to length of professional experience, 
but not those relating to differences in technical legal knowledge.  Comparisons were 
also made between the rankings generated in this study and the rankings of legal 
specialists published by two legal industry research organisations.  These comparisons 
suggested that the levels of expertise amongst the higher-ranked participants were high 
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in an absolute sense, and that their ranking scores were in broad agreement with these 
industry publications notwithstanding fundamental differences in ranking methodology.  
At the same time, those alternative methodologies were considered incapable of 
categorizing all participants in this study, given the present focus on comparisons 
between apprentices, journeymen, experts and masters within the same specialist field 
of law. 
The ranking of participants in this chapter, and more particularly their allocation to one 
of Group A, Group B or Group C, was a necessary step prior to the analysis of test 
results discussed in following chapters.  By arranging the participants according to their 
relative levels of expertise, and by assuming a range of expertise from apprentice to 
master according to Hoffman’s Scheme, the comparisons of different assessment 
behaviours could be related back to a participant’s level of likely expertise as a 
competition law specialist.  Identifying the categories of behaviours and performance 
characteristics that most clearly reveal these differences is the focus of the next two 
chapters. 
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V  RESULTS 
 
The test results presented in this chapter confirm that legal specialists with different 
levels of likely expertise in the same field of law do think differently when assessing 
legal risk in information-constrained and time-limited contexts.  The observed 
differences include how less expert participants were more prone to laboured reasoning 
and incorrect assessments, and how they spent more time, on average, identifying 
issues than synthesising them prior to forming a legal-risk opinion.  More expert 
participants, on the other hand, consistently provided correct assessments based on 
substantive legal and economic analyses, whereas the few less-expert participants who 
correctly assessed the level of risk in specific cases did so based on superficial 
analyses. Greater expertise was also associated with higher rates of verbalisation 
generally as well as during the identification and synthesis of issues. 
Part A of this chapter provides an overview of the data collected from study 
participants and how these data were categorised both qualitatively and quantitatively 
to identify differences in how participants with different levels of likely expertise 
assessed legal risk.  This part also explains some methodological choices that were 
made as part of the exploratory approach adopted during data analysis.  There is also an 
introduction to the next two parts of the chapter which describe the qualitative and 
quantitative results of this analysis.   
Part B records the results of the qualitative analysis concerning the apparent ease with 
which participants reasoned during their assessments of legal risk, the conclusiveness 
of their assessments, how accurate their predictions of likely outcomes were, and 
whether they relied on superficial or substantive legal and economic analyses when 
forming their views.  In each of these areas, differences were identified between how 
participants with higher levels of likely expertise performed compared with participants 
with lower levels of likely expertise based on the participant rankings described in the 
previous chapter. 
Part C details the results of the quantitative analysis that was applied to participants’ 
think-aloud transcripts.  This analysis focused on verbalisation rates and time spent on 
identifying issues and on drawing inferences on those issues.  It covers the inter-group 
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comparisons between Group A and Group C participants as well as intra-group 
comparisons between members of these groups in the areas of ease of reasoning, 
certainty of assessment, assessment accuracy and depth of analysis.   
Part D concludes the chapter by summarising the qualitative and quantitative 
differences identified.  It also confirms the relevance of these differences as preliminary 
responses to the research question, and as contextual background to the analysis 
presented in Chapter 6. 
A  Overview 
The 20 participants in this study generated a total of 73 think-aloud verbal transcripts 
containing their vocalised legal-risk assessments for test-cases A, B, C, D, E, F and G.   
The average time taken to complete an assessment was 7 minutes 46 seconds, which 
was comfortably within the 10 minute time limit loosely enforced for each test case.
430
  
The resulting transcripts exceeded 70,000 words in total, with an average of 965 words 
per test-case and 3,522 total words per participant,
431
 each of whom completed, on 
average, 3.65 test cases.
432
 
To ensure that the analysis of these data involved comparisons between legal specialists 
with different levels of likely expertise, the principal focus was on differences in 
assessment behaviour between Group A and Group C participants, as Group B 
participants were considered a likely mix of various levels of specialist expertise as 
noted in the previous chapter.  This focus facilitated the search for associations between 
the traditional levels of expertise development described in Hoffman’s Scheme on the 
                                                          
430
 The least time taken to provide an opinion on a case was 1 minute and 38 seconds (Participant S01 for 
Case F).  The most time was 17 minutes and 8 seconds (Participant S19 for Case D).     
431
 Generally only whole words were transcribed.  Participants’ vocalizations such as ‘oh,’ ‘um,’ ‘mmm’ 
and time-fillers such as ‘dut dut dut’ uttered while scanning a page, were only occasionally transcribed.  
Because the original audio recording could always be replayed by clicking on the relevant text in a 
transcript (a feature of the analysis software used as discussed in Section 6 of Part D of Chapter 3) these 
vocalizations could be audibly reviewed at any time during the analysis process and therefore phonetic 
transcription of non-word vocalizations did not need to be comprehensive or exhaustive. 
432
 These statistics were comparable to those of Baltes et al who also required their test participants to 
complete more than one representative task in their think-aloud wisdom studies.  In two such studies, the 
average time that a participant spent engaging in the set problem-solving task was 5 minutes for one 
study and 6.8 minutes for the other.  The average number of words spoken was 561 and 699 per task, 
respectively.  As in those studies, the verbal data collected in this study, assessed on a per-participant 
basis as well as in aggregate, were considered sufficient for conducting the proposed verbal protocol 
analyses.  See PB Baltes, UM Staudinger, A Maercker and J Smith, ‘People Nominated as Wise:  A 
Comparative Study of Wisdom-Related Knowledge’ (1995) 10(2) Psychology and Aging 155, 160; 
Smith, J and PB Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge:  Age/Cohort Differences in Response to Life-
Planning Problems,’ (1990) 26 Developmental Psychology 494, 499. 
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one hand (masters and experts in Group A and apprentices and journeymen in Group 
C), and, on the other hand, different cognitive skills and thinking strategies. 
According to the exploratory approach used in this study, a teleological perspective was 
adopted to identify comparative parameters that most effectively highlighted 
differences between Group A and Group C participants.  The aim was not to provide a 
comprehensive account of all possible differences, but rather to identify specific 
differences that were readily apparent and appeared to reflect different thinking skills 
and strategies relatable to differences in levels of specialist legal expertise.  Both 
qualitative and quantitative comparisons were considered. 
The qualitative measures chosen highlighted assessment behaviours that could be 
ascertained from reading each transcript and categorising it according to the relevant 
participant’s ease of reasoning, the certainty of their assessments, their assessment 
accuracy compared with the actual outcomes of the test cases, and whether the analysis 
on which they relied was substantive or superficial.  As this process was of a general 
nature and relatively straightforward to implement, it was considered unnecessary to 
involve a second assessor to confirm these categorisations as is usually required when 
individual protocols are dissected according to detailed coding procedures in word-
frequency studies, for instance.
433
  Instead, a descriptive approach to the discussion of 
individual transcripts is provided in this chapter in order to provide a more complete 
picture of the factors behind the categorisation decisions.   
Support for the single-assessor approach is provided by Crandall, Klein and Hoffman 
who identify a number of circumstances in which reliance on inter-coder reliability is 
unnecessary.
434
  Using the example of Hoffman, Coffey and Ford’s analysis of weather 
forecasting procedures,
435
 they explain that when the coding is simple or a 
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 The most recent example of this more detailed approach to protocol-analysis involving lawyers’ 
think-aloud verbalisations, was Chay’s 2006 study in which the verbal transcripts of his four participants 
were segmented according to list of 15 discrete codes.  These codes depended on inferences about  
cognitive processing in the areas of control procedures, information gathering procedures, attribute 
identification procedures, and move identification procedures.  See Allan James Chay, Lawyer Problem 
Solving: An Investigation of the Knowledge Used in Solving Practical Legal Problems (PhD Thesis, 
Griffith University, 2006) 92. The present study, however, focused on general performance measures that 
could be objectively assessed.   There was also greater tolerance for errors given this study’s broader 
research objectives and exploratory approach. 
434
 Beth Crandall, Gary Klein and Robert R Hoffman, Working Minds:  A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Cognitive Task Analysis (The MIT Press, 2006) 102. 
435
 RR Hoffman, JW Coffey and KM Ford, A Case Study in the Research Paradigm of Human-Centered 
Computing: Local Expertise in Weather Forecasting (National Technology Alliance, 2000). 
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comprehensive accounting of protocols is not required, a second assessor is not 
essential.  Similarly, where the researcher is him or herself a domain expert, as was the 
case in the present study, confirmation of their coding decisions – particularly by a less 
expert third party – is unlikely to add much further value either methodologically or in 
terms of data quality.  It is further noted that Ericsson and Simon concede that inter-
coder ‘reliability does not imply validity of encoding,’436 which is the principal issue in 
exploratory analyses of the kind adopted here. 
In any event, the findings of this study are not intended to support conclusive 
statements asserting cause and effect relationships or other ‘strong claims about 
reasoning processes,’ for which higher-levels of scientific rigour are required.437  
Rather, they are intended to be observational with the aim of providing practical 
insights and to lay the groundwork for further research in which multiple assessors of 
verbal protocols will be important.   
The quantitative data analysed in this study were compiled within the six weeks 
following the completion of test interviews.  However, they were not immediately 
analysed as the researcher’s attention switched to exploring qualitative comparisons for 
the next several months.  Once qualitative categorisation had been settled, the 
quantitative data were retrieved and analysed.  This is relevant for allaying concerns 
that qualitative categories may have relied on or been influenced by earlier quantitative 
assessments. 
There were two types of quantitative data extracted from participants’ transcribed 
think-aloud verbalisations.  The first was their rate of verbalisation as measured by how 
many words per minute they vocalised.  The second was the total time they spent 
considering a given test case as well as time spent on the tasks of identifying issues and 
engaging in synthesis during the process of assessing legal risk.  To facilitate the 
analysis of both types of quantitative data, each transcript was divided into 10-second 
segments within which individual words were counted and relevant assessment tasks 
identified according to a simple, two-stage flowchart.  Further details of this 
methodology are discussed in Part C below. 
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B  Qualitative Results 
As noted above, legal-risk assessments by participants were categorised qualitatively in 
four different ways.  The first was the ease with which a participant reasoned while 
assessing a test case.  The second was how certain they were about their conclusions as 
to the likely outcome of the case.  The third was whether those assessments that were 
conclusive, and which therefore contained a clear opinion, were either correct or 
incorrect having regard to how the particular case was ultimately decided by the 
relevant competition authority.  Lastly, those assessments which were conclusive and 
correct were categorised according to whether they involved superficial or substantive 
legal and economic analyses. 
The following discussion of the categorisation process and results includes descriptive 
examples to illustrate relevant assessment behaviours.  Tabular summaries are also 
provided to give a sense of the relative incidence of particular behaviours amongst 
more and less expert legal specialists in Group A and Group C, respectively. 
1  Ease of Reasoning 
The analysis of participants’ ease of reasoning focused on whether they engaged in 
laboured reasoning or unlaboured reasoning.    
Laboured reasoning was characterised by extended consideration of both relevant and 
irrelevant issues, as well as repeated references to insufficient information.  Unlaboured 
reasoning was, by comparison, efficient and more linear in its progression.  Participant 
reasoning was assumed to be of this latter type by default, unless there was evidence 
that a participant was struggling to identify key issues or consistently referred to 
irrelevant information and/or repeated their earlier points of contention without 
resolving outstanding issues.  Laboured reasoning also typically resulted in longer 
legal-risk assessments, although this in itself was insufficient to distinguish laboured 
reasoning from merely thorough reasoning.
438
   
Examples of laboured reasoning included:   
                                                          
438
 For instance, S11 took 4.49 minutes to complete his assessment of Case B, which assessment was 
identified as involving laboured reasoning (as confirmed by a confused and contradictory summing up of 
the case), while S10 took 11.80 minutes to assess Case D yet did not engage in laboured reasoning but 
rather undertook a particularly thorough consideration of relevant issues. 
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 Participant S19’s reasoning in Case D (extending over 16 minutes, or more than 
twice the average assessment duration) which included his admission of having 
‘run out of puff’;439  
  
 Participant S18’s ten-minute assessment of the same case, half-way through 
which he vocalised that he was ‘sort of flagging here, getting tired’440 before 
commenting that ‘you know, you can’t, can’t reach a conclusion … based on a 
market inquiries letter, ultimately,’441 and then admitting three minutes later to 
only being able to speculate on the outcome of the case;442  
 
 Participant S17’s consideration of possible arguments in Case B regarding other 
competitors in the market (an earlier inference) followed by a discussion of:  the 
probability that such rivals may not service the same customer base; an apparent 
absence ‘of, I guess, aggression on behalf of the ACCC’443 based on the 
wording of the market inquiries letter; and a query about whether the relevant 
geographic market might be broader than the ACCC suggested, which could 
further ameliorate concerns subject to the qualification ‘although … the 
information provided is really pretty thin;’444 and  
 
 Participant S14 who began to summarise his assessment of Case D after more 
than 13 minutes of analysis, as follows:  
seems to me that this is something that, you know … yeah, I just don't, I just 
don't have a sense, to be honest, of how big these guys are compared to any 
other players in the market … I mean if there is another big wholesaler or a big 
retail chain out there … then I would think that would be enough … but if 
there's no other big retail chains – retailer of agriproducts – and no other 
wholesaler … and these guys are, you know, it's a merger of one and two … 
then I would think this could be a difficult merger to get through … but if there 
is even just one other big player out there … then instinctively I feel this is a 
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doable deal … perhaps with some very small local divestitures or remedies in 
some local markets.
445
    
Twenty risk assessments in this study were identified as involving laboured reasoning 
with the remaining 53 involving unlaboured reasoning. These instances of laboured 
reasoning represented 27% of all risk assessments recorded.  The distribution of this 
type of reasoning, however, was skewed towards Group C participants, with 12 (50%) 
of that group’s assessments including laboured reasoning.  Group B participants 
demonstrated such reasoning in 8 instances (27% of the cases that group considered).  
None of the participants in Group A engaged in laboured reasoning. 
The following table shows the incidence of both laboured and unlaboured reasoning in 
each of groups A, B and C. 
TABLE 5.1 – Ease of Reasoning 
C
A
SE
S GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
S12 S20 S14 S13 S11 S16 S10 S18 S07 S17 S02 S15 S19 S03 S04 S01 S06 S08 S05 S09 
A ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● ● 
B ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ●  ● ≈≈ ● ● ●  ●   ● ●  
C ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ≈≈ ● ● ● ≈≈ ● ● ● ● ≈≈ ● ●  ● ● ●  
D ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ● ● ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ● ≈≈ ● ●  ● ● ● ● 
E                ●     
F                ●     
G                ●     
≈≈ – Laboured Reasoning       ● – Unlaboured Reasoning         
 
With one exception, all Group C participants engaged in laboured reasoning in at least 
one instance, with three doing so in two or more instances.  The one Group C 
participant who did not engage in laboured reasoning (S20) was subsequently assessed 
as having undertaken superficial analyses in two cases, as discussed further below.  By 
contrast, none of the assessments by Group A participants was categorised as involving 
either laboured reasoning or superficial analyses. 
This suggested that laboured reasoning was associated with lower levels of specialist 
legal expertise.  This has intuitive appeal inasmuch as the assessment of legal risk may 
be expected to be more difficult – and therefore more laboured – for less expert 
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specialists, while some may choose to pre-emptively rely on superficial analysis as in 
the case of S20 and other Group C participants noted in Section 4 below.   
2  Certainty of Assessment 
Participants’ certainty in assessing legal-risk in the test cases was categorised as either 
conclusive or inconclusive, with a minority refusing to provide any assessment. 
A conclusive assessment consisted of a definite statement by a participant as to the 
level of legal risk associated with a particular transaction.  It was also accompanied by, 
at most, only limited qualifying statements.  A conclusive assessment reflected a 
confident, though possibly slightly qualified, statement that a merger transaction would 
or would not be cleared by the relevant competition authority.  From a client’s 
perspective, such an assessment would likely be viewed as both clear and actionable. 
Examples of conclusive assessments included:   
 Participant S01’s conclusion in Case G that ‘you’d expect to get the tick in the 
long run … not a hard one;’446  
 
 Participant S03’s statement in Case C that he ‘would be advising the parties in 
half an hour that they really don’t have anything to worry about;’447  
 
 Participant S08’s unqualified statement in Case C that ‘this is capable of 
clearance;’448  
 
 Participant S04’s assessment in Case A in which the apparent existence of low 
barriers to entry and broad product market definitions led him to conclude, ‘it 
seems to me that there is a real chance of securing clearance;’449   
 
 Participant S12’s statement in Case B that, ‘if I was acting for Toll my 
competition advice would be that this [transaction] is likely to be opposed by 
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the ACCC;’450   
 
 Participant S17’s conclusion in respect of Case D that ‘this transaction has a 
strong argument for it to be cleared, and … the parties can have a level of 
confidence that it will be;’451 and  
 
 Participant S05’s conclusion in Case B: 
I think the Commission is going to have, again, some difficulty with this 
merger … I think Toll is going to need to be approaching the Commission with 
some sort of assurance or undertaking around how they’re going to conduct 
their business in the future … particularly in regard to their shipping service … 
even that may not be enough.
452
 
Conclusive assessments, of which there were 28 instances representing approximately 
38% of all risk assessments, were observed across all levels of likely expertise.  The 
highest incidence was amongst Group A participants, who provided firm opinions in 12 
instances (63% of all legal risk assessments contributed by this group, including S01 
who considered cases E, F and G), while Group B participants contributed 9 instances 
(30% of all assessments by this group) and Group C participants contributed 8 
instances (33% of all their assessments). 
In four instances participants refused to provide any assessment of legal risk.  These 
were recorded as neither conclusive nor inconclusive assessments.  Responses in this 
category included:   
 Participant S07’s statement in respect of Case A that ‘there’s not enough 
information here, I think actually, to make an assessment of what you think the 
outcome would be;’453   
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 S06’s conclusion in respect to Case D: ‘It’s impossible to advise on this matter 
… impossible;’454 and  
 
 S09 in Case A, who after identifying what he considered to be ‘the key things 
we need to know’455 said, ‘I’m in really no position to help to give information 
… to give any indication of how likely they [the merger parties] are to succeed 
without knowing a lot more.’456 
The following table shows the incidence of conclusive, inconclusive and ‘no 
assessments.’  
TABLE 5.2 – Certainty of Assessment 
C
A
SE
S GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
S12 S20 S14 S13 S11 S16 S10 S18 S07 S17 S02 S15 S19 S03 S04 S01 S06 S08 S05 S09 
A ─ ● ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ na ─ ● ─ ─ ─ ●   ● ─ na 
B ● ─ ─ ─ ─ ● ─  ● ─ ─ ─ ●  ─   ● ●  
C ─ ● ─ ─ ● ● ─ ● ● ● ● ─ ─ ● ●  ● ● ●  
D ─ ─ ─ ● ● ─ ─ ─ ─ ● ─ ─ ─ ─ ─  na ● ─ na 
E                ●     
F                ●     
G                ●     
● – Conclusive Assessment         ─   Inconclusive Assessment        na  – No Assessment  
 
On a purely percentage basis, conclusive assessments of legal risk were greatest 
amongst more expert legal specialists and less common amongst less expert legal 
specialists.  However, all but one Group C participant demonstrated at least the 
capability to provide a conclusive assessment of legal risk, with half of these 
participants (S20, S11 and S16) doing so in 50% of the cases they considered.  While 
S01 and S08 in Group A also did so in 100% of the cases they considered, none of the 
other Group A participants was better than those three Group C participants on this 
measure. 
Of course, a conclusive yet inaccurate or incorrect assessment cannot be equated with 
an accurate or correct one.  Even a complete novice could provide a conclusive but 
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wrong answer to the problems posed.  The issue of assessment accuracy is discussed in 
the next section. 
Those participants who refused to provide an assessment of legal risk in this study were 
either in Group A or Group B.  No Group C participant refused to complete this part of 
their task.  While all participants were specifically requested and reminded of the 
ultimate aim of their assessment of the test cases, participants S06, S07 and S09 
considered the task impossible to complete based on the insufficient information 
available and their own lack of familiarity with the relevant industries. 
One explanation for this was the relative seniority of these three participants, all of 
whom had more than 30 years professional experience and were amongst the study’s 
oldest participants.  These individuals may therefore have been less likely to comply 
with a request to perform the required task than their less senior and younger 
colleagues, all of whom at least attempted some form of either conclusive or 
inconclusive assessment.  Complaints regarding the difficulty of the task in the absence 
of more information were common across all participants, but only those most self-
assured – or perhaps more predisposed to intransigence – expressly refused to provide 
an assessment.  
3  Assessment Accuracy (Conclusive Assessments Only) 
Where a participant provided a conclusive assessment of legal risk in a test case, it was 
possible to determine the accuracy of that assessment by comparing it to the actual 
outcome of the case as recorded in the official clearance statements issued by the 
ACCC or CC.  This comparison was not possible for inconclusive assessments which 
were either indeterminate or so heavily qualified that these participants’ views could 
not be ascertained objectively. 
The conclusive assessments identified in this study were categorised into four different 
groups according to a participant’s stated view or opinion on the likely outcome or risk 
involved in a case.  These four groups were then classified as either correct or incorrect 
having regard to how closely such assessments matched the known outcomes of the 
cases, about which none of the participants had prior knowledge given that at the time 
of testing neither the ACCC nor the CC had completed their own assessments. 
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The first two categories of opinion were those conclusive assessments which correctly 
predicted that the transaction in question would be cleared without any conditions or 
undertakings being required by the relevant competition authority.  These two 
categories were: (a) assessments that implied or included an express statement to the 
effect that the test case in question was ‘No problem, a straightforward case,’ or (b) 
assessments that intimated that clearance was ‘Doable, but work needed.’  As all the 
test cases were ultimately cleared, but it was not feasible for the researcher to determine 
how straightforward or difficult it was for the merger parties to secure clearance from 
the ACCC or CC in any given instance, both these forms of assessment were 
considered correct assessments of legal risk. 
The other two categories of legal-risk assessments were those that reflected a 
participant’s view that: (a) ‘Undertakings would likely be required,’ or (b) ‘The 
transaction is likely to be opposed.’  Given that both these scenarios were inconsistent 
with actual outcomes of the cases, these assessments were categorised as incorrect.   
The examples of conclusive assessments provided in the previous section that were 
categorised as correct on this basis, included participant S01’s response in respect to 
Case G, S03 in respect to Case C, S08 in respect to Case C, S04 in respect to Case A 
and S17 in respect to case D.   The assessments of S05 and S12 in respect to Case B, 
and S11 and S13 in respect to Case D were examples of assessments categorised as 
incorrect. 
Correct assessments were, as a percentage of all assessments made by participants 
within a group, most prevalent within Group A, where 11 or 58% of all assessments 
and 10 or 91% of all conclusive assessments were of this kind.  Only participant S05’s 
assessment in respect to Case B was categorised as an incorrect conclusive assessment.  
Amongst Group B participants, eight or 27% of all assessments were correct in the 
above sense.  There was one incorrect assessment made by a Group B participant (S07 
in Case B).  Group C participants produced four correct and four incorrect assessments, 
which meant that 17% of all assessments were correct and 17% were incorrect, with the 
remaining 66% of Group C assessments being categorised as inconclusive. 
There was a further categorisation of those participants who assessed a case within the 
first 60 seconds of their consideration of the relevant test-case documentation.  This 
occurred in three instances:   
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 Participant S16, who upon reading that no prior clearance had been sought by 
the acquiring party, stated at the 46-seconds mark in his assessment of Case C, 
‘oh, if they thought it was easy and a non-issue, then …’457 after which he 
completed a superficial analysis while acknowledging, ‘I’m probably heavily 
influenced by the fact that the parties proceeded without clearance;’458  
 
 Participant S06’s statement at the 27-seconds mark in his assessment of Case C, 
‘in my view, the chances of a court granting divestiture of any merger case in 
Australia – unless it is such a clear cut case – is going to be virtually zero;’459 
and  
 
 Participant S01’s statement at the 6-seconds mark in his assessment of Case F, 
‘oh, publishers … yes, this will be cleared.’460 
These categorisations of correct and incorrect conclusive legal-risk assessments are 
shown in the following table. 
TABLE 5.3 – Assessment Accuracy (Conclusive Assessments Only) 
C
A
SE
S GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
S12 S20 S14 S13 S11 S16 S10 S18 S07 S17 S02 S15 S19 S03 S04 S01 S06 S08 S05 S09 
A                     
B ●     ●   ●          ●  
C      *           *    
D    ● ●                
E                     
F                *     
G                     
● – Incorrect Assessment       – Correct  Assessment        * – Immediate Correct Assessment         
 
While there was a greater percentage of correct conclusive assessments amongst Group 
A participants compared to Group C participants, there were four instances in which 
Group C participants conclusively and correctly assessed legal risk in a test case.  At 
the same time, incorrect conclusive assessments were predominantly confined to Group 
C participants, although one Group A participant (S05) also provided such an 
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assessment.  In general terms, however, Group A participants appeared more capable of 
correctly assessing the test cases than Group C participants.  Given that they had no 
specific factual or legal knowledge advantage, this would seem to be at least in part 
explained by the former possessing greater legal expertise. 
A further investigation was undertaken as to whether or not these correct assessments 
were all based on substantive analyses, or whether some were more akin to guessing.  
These issues are considered in the next section. 
Regarding those participants who were able to formulate conclusive and correct 
assessments within the first 60 seconds of considering a test case (there were no 
examples of similarly truncated incorrect concluded assessments), there were only three 
instances in which this was observed, two of which involved Group A participants and 
one involving a Group C participant.  The substantiveness of these assessments, as an 
aspect that could potentially distinguish the more expert of these assessments from the 
less expert one, is also considered below. 
4  Depth of Analysis (Correct Conclusive Assessments Only) 
Within the category of correct conclusive assessments of legal risk, some participants 
relied on superficial or circumstantial analyses, while others relied on substantive legal 
or economic analyses.  This distinction was readily apparent and provided an 
opportunity to separate those participants who gave a correct assessment but were in 
effect guessing or using circumstantial observation to inform their views, from those 
who had engaged in reasoned and analytically compelling analyses despite the limited 
availability of information and time.    
Examples of superficial or circumstantial analyses leading to correct conclusive 
assessments, included:   
 Participant S20’s view that because he had not heard of the merger parties in 
Case A, they were likely to be small businesses such that there would be ‘a 
fairly good chance that the merger would go, will be cleared;’461  
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 Participant S07’s abrupt and full acceptance of an inferred argument that the 
merger parties in Case C had no material overlap between their businesses 
despite the test-case document stating otherwise;462 and 
 
 The circumstantial presumption by S02, S11, S16, S17 and S20 that the fact that 
the merger parties in Case C had completed their transaction without prior 
approval from the ACCC meant that there was unlikely to be a competition 
problem, especially given the high-profile status of the acquirer and the 
likelihood that they would have sought prior legal advice from ‘one of the well-
respected competition teams around town,’463 which would have advised the 
parties to notify ‘if it was needed.’464  
Only participants in groups B and C formed correct conclusive assessments based on 
superficial or circumstantial analyses.  The actual number of instances where such 
assessments were observed, however, was not substantial.  The majority were by Group 
C participants (four cases representing 17% of all cases considered by participants in 
this group), with Group B participants engaging in this form of assessment analysis in 
three instances, or in 10% of all legal risk assessments by these participants.  
Examples of correct conclusive assessments based on substantive legal or economic 
analyses, included:   
 Participant S08’s belief that the merger described in Case C would be ‘capable 
of clearance … on the basis that there are imports’465 and that buying the 
products at issue ‘has to be, I would have thought, an alternative to hiring 
them;’466   
 
 Participant S01’s reasoning in Case G that the parties were probably seeking to 
merge their equipment-hire businesses ‘because they are struggling … and 
they’re really looking to buy some market share in a declining market’467 in 
circumstances where ‘the Internet age has really, really cut into a business like 
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this, providing opportunities to people to pool equipment, pool resources of this 
kind and hire it out;’468 and 
 
 Participant S19’s view in Case B ‘that the Commission would be unlikely to 
have competition concerns … in this industry’469 especially given that the likely 
existence other shipping service providers in the relevant market, meant ‘it 
would be difficult to argue that the barriers to becoming a freight forwarder 
were sufficiently high that the Commission would’470 oppose the proposed 
transaction.  
Those participants who engaged in this form of legal-risk assessment were from either 
Group A or Group B.  There were no instances where Group C participants relied on 
substantive analyses when forming their correct assessments of legal risk.  There were 
five instances where a Group B participant undertook this kind of assessment.  This 
represented 17% of all assessments undertaken by Group B participants.  The 11 
instances in which Group A participants formed correct conclusive assessments based 
on a substantive legal or economic assessment, represented 58% of all assessments 
made by those participants. 
These statistics are reflected in the following table. 
TABLE 5.4 – Depth of Analysis (Correct Conclusive Assessments Only) 
C
A
SE
S GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
S12 S20 S14 S13 S11 S16 S10 S18 S07 S17 S02 S15 S19 S03 S04 S01 S06 S08 S05 S09 
A           M    M   M   
B             M     M   
C        M      M M  M M M  
D          M        M   
E                M     
F                M     
G                M     
 – Superficial Analysis      M – Substantive Analysis         
 
This table shows how correct conclusive assessments based on substantive analyses 
were the default or most common responses to the legal-risk assessment task by Group 
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A participants.  By contrast, most Group C participants either provided inconclusive 
assessments or incorrect conclusive assessments.  Only a minority of Group C 
participants provided a correct conclusive assessment, but all of these were based on 
superficial analyses.  No Group C participant correctly assessed legal risk in any test 
case using analyses as substantive as those relied on by the above-indicated Group A 
participants. 
This confirmed earlier concerns about giving equal evidentiary weighting to (a) the 
conclusive assessments of Group A and Group C participants, and (b) to their correct 
assessments of legal risk.  While there were examples of conclusive assessments and 
correct conclusive assessments amongst both groups, only Group A participants 
contributed correct conclusive assessments based on substantive analyses.  Moreover, 
they were able to do so in more than 50% of the test cases they considered, with two 
Group A participants (S01 and S08) producing legal-risk assessments of this type in 
respect to every test case they considered. 
This observation suggests that in an information-constrained and time-limited context, 
correct conclusive legal-risk assessments based on substantive analyses are associated 
with (and may therefore require) higher levels of specialist legal expertise, most likely 
at the levels of expert and master within Hoffman’s Scheme.  Further, such assessments 
may be predicted most of the time within such a group.   
The legal specialists at the apprentice and journeyman levels of expertise in this study 
were significantly less likely to provide correct conclusive legal-risk assessments in the 
same context, and only did so based on superficial analyses.   
5  Summary 
The preceding categorisation of legal-risk assessments identified a number of 
qualitative differences between Group A participants and Group C participants who 
represented legal specialists with comparatively greater expertise and legal specialists 
with comparatively less expertise, respectively.  These differences, which related to 
participants’ ease of reasoning, certainty of assessment, assessment accuracy (for 
conclusive assessments only), and depth of analysis (for correct conclusive assessments 
only), constituted the first responses to this study’s research question, inasmuch as 
these results confirm that legal specialists with different levels of expertise but the same 
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level of technical legal knowledge can be readily identified as thinking differently from 
one another when assessing risk in an information-constrained and time-limited 
context.  Moreover, these differences can be explicitly described such that they can be 
listed and, to an extent, measured. 
A summary of these differences is presented in the Table 5.5 below. 
TABLE 5.5 – Summary of Assessment Behaviours 
C
A
SE
S GROUP C GROUP B GROUP A 
S12 S20 S14 S13 S11 S16 S10 S18 S07 S17 S02 S15 S19 S03 S04 S01 S06 S08 S05 S09 
A ≈≈  ≈≈ ≈≈ ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ na ≈≈  ● ● ●     ● na 
B ≈X ● ≈≈ ● ≈≈ X ●  X ≈≈ ● ●   ●    X  
C ≈≈  ≈≈ ≈≈  * ● ≈    ● ≈≈    *    
D ≈≈ ● ≈≈ X X ● ● ≈≈ ● ≈ ● ● ≈≈ ● ●  na  ● na 
E                     
F                *     
G                     
  Correct Assessment     ≈  Laboured Correct Assessment     *  Immediate Correct Assessment       Correct Assessment (Superficial Analysis) 
*  Immediate Correct Assessment (Superficial Analysis)      X  Incorrect Assessment     ≈X  Laboured Incorrect Assessment 
≈≈  – Laboured Inconclusive Assessment     ●  – Unlaboured Inconclusive Assessment     na  – No Assessment 
 
 
This table permits some additional vertical (by participant) and horizontal (by case) 
observations. The apparent differences between Group A and Group C participants on 
an individual-by-individual basis indicate that while all but one member of the former 
group produced at least one substantively-based correct conclusive legal-risk 
assessment, none of the latter group did.  Further, as individuals Group C participants 
were far more likely to engage in laboured reasoning, produce incorrect conclusive 
assessments and provide correct conclusive assessments based on superficial analyses.   
In terms of differences between different test cases, neither Case A nor Case C 
produced any incorrect risk assessments.  Case B resulted in three such assessments, 
including the incorrect conclusive assessment by S05 from Group A.  A third of Group 
C participants produced incorrect conclusive assessments in respect of Case D, while 
the Group A participants considering this case either engaged in inconclusive but 
unlaboured reasoning, refused to provide an assessment or provided a correct 
conclusive assessment based on substantive analysis. 
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The highest number of correct assessments overall was for Case C, which involved a 
completed transaction.  This case was atypical in that most clearance applications are 
sought before completion of the merger transaction, a point acknowledged by every 
participant who considered this case.  This fact provided the opportunity for superficial 
analyses based on the inference that because the parties had not considered it necessary 
to seek prior approval, the ACCC would not oppose the transaction.  Half of the Group 
C participants considering this case relied on this inference, but none of the Group A 
participants considering it did. 
C  Quantitative Results 
Ericsson and Simon describe a direct relationship between an individual’s rate of 
verbalisation and the stream of non-oral information to which they are attending when 
problem-solving.
471
  This relationship permits a number of assumptions regarding 
cognitive function based on both the rate and the focus of an individual’s verbalised 
protocols when assessing legal risk as in this study.   
As to a participant’s rate of verbalisation (‘ROV’472), as measured by words-per-minute 
(‘wpm’), Ericsson and Simon identify a number of studies where this metric has been 
used to assess cognitive performance,
473
 including: Ohlsson’s observation, confirming 
Simon and Simon’s earlier findings,474 that the ROV often remains constant for an 
individual’s problem-solving across different problems;475 Simon and Simon’s finding 
that novice physicists verbalise, on average, significantly more slowly than expert 
physicists;
476
 and studies by Sargent,
477
 Montgomery and Allwood,
478
 and Deffner
479
 
demonstrating how more difficult problems (primarily in the form of anagrams) 
reliably decrease verbalisation rates.   
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Johnson
480
 and Durkin
481
 have similarly recorded how problem-solvers reduce their 
ROV when cognitive activity becomes more intense, or when they are experiencing 
difficulties in solving a given problem.  Ericsson and Simon also note how test subjects 
may become ‘silent when … reorganising their perceptions of a problem.’482  
There are a variety of methods for measuring wpm when assessing an individual’s 
ROV.  For this study guidance was taken from Deffner’s segmentation of verbalised 
transcripts into 4-second intervals.
483
  In this study, 10-second intervals were chosen as 
a more manageable unit of segmentation given the number of transcripts requiring 
analysis
484
 and to avoid as much as possible dividing phrases between segments.  In 
each 10-second interval the number of words, rather than the number of letters as used 
by Deffner, was counted.
485
  This enabled the tracking of verbalisation rates and 
accordingly cognitive load at different stages of the legal risk-assessment process.   
Regarding the counting of non-words such as ‘um’ and ‘er,’ these were not included.  
However, words such as ‘okay’ and ‘yes’ when used as stand-alone statements to 
convey an understanding of the test documentation, were counted. 
As to the focus of participants during their assessment of legal risk in individual cases, 
the 10-second intervals used for calculating ROV presented the opportunity to 
categorise where a participant was focusing their attention during any given interval.  
The number of possible categories of focus was limited to three:  (a) Reading or 
clarifying the provided documentation; (b) Identifying or noting specific legal or 
factual issues, but not in the context of forming an immediate, overall opinion; and (c) 
Synthesising the provided information and combining it with information drawn from 
long-term memory (‘LTM’) to form an opinion on the likely level of legal risk 
presented in a given test case.  These categories were considered to be broadly 
consistent with the three stages of effective problem-solving identified by Feltovich, 
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 Johnson, ES ‘An Information Processing Model of One Kind of Problem Solving’ (1964) 4 
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 With 9 hours, 45 minutes and 13 seconds of transcribed verbalisations generated by participants 
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 While not every word conformed to the 5-letter standard, it was assumed that given the level of 
generality to which this information would be ultimately analysed, the size of words within each 10-
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Prietula and Ericsson
486
 and with Baddely’s conceptualisation of the functions of 
working memory (‘WM’), short-term memory (‘STM’) and LTM.487   
With reference to these researchers’ theoretical framework, a participant’s reading and 
clarifying of the test-case documentation was assumed to involve the seeking and 
perceiving of data from the environment.  Identifying specific legal and factual issues 
involved considering factors relevant to the assessment of legal risk, which necessarily 
involved the retrieval of relevant (and sometimes irrelevant) information from LTM 
before combining it with environmental data within WM.  The synthesis of information 
perceived from the test-case documents and information retrieved from LTM in the 
course of forming an opinion (or indicating the further information required to form an 
opinion) was assumed to involve the drawing of inferences from the information 
available in WM (a process termed synthesis) as described in the third stage of 
effective problem-solving.  This conceptualisation was considered theoretically sound 
given that such categorisation was both comprehensive and sufficient for the needs of 
subsequent analysis based on the above authors’ problem-solving framework as 
described in Section (a) of Part 3 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The following two-stage flowchart was used to categorise each 10-second segment of 
each transcript as involving one of the three cognitive tasks of reading and clarifying, 
identifying issues or synthesis. 
CHART 5.1 – Flowchart for Categorising Participant Task-Focus 
 
Is the participant mostly … 
Drawing inferences as to the 
likely outcome, ease or 
difficulty of the case? 
NO 
Retrieving information from their LTM, 
ie, information not apparent from the 
face of the test-case document?  
NO 
 
READING & CLARIFYING 
 
YES  YES   
SYNTHESIS  IDENTIFYING ISSUES   
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 Feltovich, Paul J, Michael J Prietula and K Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from Psychological 
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With respect to the classification of synthesis – the first step of the categorisation 
process – it was possible to confirm that this was the most likely task focus by working 
back from a participant’s opinions on the outcome of a case.  When this confirmatory 
process was undertaken, there was often an explicit lead-in statement made by the 
participant to the effect, ‘So what do I think will happen in this case?’ or ‘So, summing 
all that up, I think that …’  In other instances, the break between simply identifying 
issues – which commonly arose during the reading of the documentation – and the 
synthesis of the information brought into WM for the purposes of forming a view on 
the attendant legal risk, was usually apparent even when explicit signalling was absent. 
Once a transcript had been divided into 10-seconds intervals and the words in each 
such segment counted (and converted to a wpm equivalent), the participant’s focus was 
identified as being the main or primary focus for that interval using the above 
flowchart.  This enabled both time-spent and wpm calculations to be made with respect 
to each task.  An example of how transcripts were apportioned and categorised 
according to this approach is provided in Appendix C. 
This approach to coding was considered a valid alternative to segmentations according 
to inferred mental processes
488
 and attempts to identify ‘ideas’.489  Not only was it 
consistent with an accepted theoretical framework relating to the roles of various 
memory functions within the problem-solving space, it provided a simple and easily 
administered segmentation of protocols based solely on objectively-determined time 
intervals.  This avoided uncertainties concerning the nature and duration of individually 
inferred thought processes, in which regard the study reported by Goor and 
Sommerfeld,
490
 where the authors categorised protocols based on 3-second intervals, 
was both instructive and supportive of the chosen approach.
491
  
With respect to the task of reading and clarifying, it was not considered helpful to rely 
on verbalisation rates in this area.  This was because some participants read silently 
                                                          
488
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with only sporadic verbalisations while others read out loud, sometimes at great speed.  
Comparisons between participant’s ROV based on these different approaches were 
therefore more likely to reflect personal preferences or habits than any generalizable 
cognitive traits.  Time spent on reading and clarifying as a proportion of overall 
assessment time was ultimately calculated by deducting from total time the time a 
participant spent identifying issues and engaging in synthesis.   
The comparisons reported in this part of the chapter are of two broad types.  The first 
involved comparing the legal-risk assessment performances of Group C participants 
against the performances of Group A participants.   This inter-group comparison type 
was intended to highlight apparent differences in cognitive performance based on the 
different levels of expertise represented by these two groups.  To use the terminology 
from Hoffman’s Scheme, these comparisons were conceptualised as comparisons 
between apprentices and journeymen on one side, and experts and masters, on the 
other.   
These comparisons, which made use of the previously identified qualitative differences 
in legal-risk assessment approaches, were as follows:  (a) All Group C participants 
against an all Group A participants baseline; (b) Laboured reasoning by Group C 
participants against an all Group A participants baseline; (c) Unlaboured reasoning by 
Group C participants against an all Group A participants baseline; (d) Unlaboured 
reasoning, excluding superficial analyses, by Group C participants against an all Group 
A baseline; (e) Superficial analyses by Group C participants against an all Group A 
baseline; and (f) Incorrect assessments by Group C participants against an all Group A 
baseline. 
While it was possible to undertake further comparisons involving conclusive 
assessments, inconclusive assessments, correct assessments and incorrect assessments, 
this was considered likely to significantly expand the scope of the thesis and lead to a 
proliferation of statistics of questionable marginal value.  As the aim was to highlight a 
more manageable number of differences between how legal specialists with different 
levels of likely expertise think differently from one another, only the above 
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comparisons of an inter-group type were undertaken.  These comparisons were 
considered the most relevant based on the prior inter-group results.
492
 
The second broad type of comparison documented in this part of the chapter involved 
intra-group comparisons.  First was a comparison between the best Group A 
participants against the rest of the Group A participants as a baseline.  For the purposes 
of this comparison, those Group A participants who had formed correct assessments of 
legal risk based on substantive analyses were considered more expert than those Group 
A participants who had provided an inconclusive or incorrect assessment, or who did 
not provide any assessment.  While this may be considered a simplistic distinction, the 
objective was to identify what those Group A participants who achieved the best results 
(in terms of accuracy, reasoning methodology and usefulness for their hypothetical 
clients) did differently from their peers.  In effect, it was an attempt to determine if the 
cognitive traits that distinguish masters from experts could be hypothesised and 
explained using statistical data. 
A further level of intra-group comparison was between Group C participants, who were 
all assumed to be within the apprentice and journeyman categories according to their 
relative levels of specialist legal expertise.  The objective here was to understand better 
Group C participants’ propensity for laboured assessments, which as discussed in the 
previous part of this chapter was an obvious distinguishing feature of Group C 
assessment behaviour compared with Group A participants’ assessment approaches.  
By comparing those Group C assessments that involved laboured reasoning against 
those that did not, the aim was to identify those cognitive differences indicative of this 
kind of reasoning within a group of similarly-ranked legal specialists.   
Lastly, the following sections include a considerable amount of quantitative detail.  
Rather than consign this information to an appendix, it was considered important to 
include it here for two reasons.  First, it furthers the open analytical approach of this 
thesis and avoids obscuring the underlying methodological decisions on which its 
findings rely.  Second, the graphical information presented below is central to the 
analysis undertaken in subsequent chapters, which confirmed the value of presenting its 
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associated quantitative data here – where it serves a necessary explanatory function – 
rather than including them simply as addendum entries.    
1  Inter-Group Comparisons between Group C and Group A participants 
(a)  All Group C Against Group A Baseline 
A number of statistically significant differences were identified when comparing the 
ROV and task focus of all Group C participants against the baseline metrics of 
participants in Group A.  Other differences were observed, but these were not found to 
be statistically significant and therefore the null hypothesis that there was no difference 
could not be dismissed.
493
  The following statistics are reflected in Graph 5.1 further 
below, and references to columns are to the numbered columns in that graph.  
In terms of verbalisation rates, as measured by wpm, Group C participants as a whole 
and across all test cases were 12% slower on average (Column 1).  Whereas Group A 
participants averaged 126 wpm, Group C participants averaged only 111 wpm.  Group 
C participants were also 17% slower in their verbalisation rates, on average, when 
identifying issues (118 wpm compared to Group A’s 142 wpm) (Column 2) and 8% 
slower when engaging in synthesis (129 wpm compared to 140 wpm)(Column 3).   
There were no statistically significant differences in average ROV between Group A 
and Group C participants as regards identifying issues as a ratio of their average ROV 
for cases overall (Column 4).  In other words, both groups appeared to verbalise more 
quickly when identifying issues compared to their average ROV (at around 110% of 
their overall ROV), and there was no statistically significant difference as to this actual 
increase.  
Similarly, both groups’ ROV when identifying issues as a ratio of their average 
synthesising ROV (Column 5) could not be statistically differentiated (again, both 
groups verbalised faster when synthesising compared to their overall ROV).   
There was also no statistically significant difference identified between the ROV of 
Group C and Group A participants in terms of their ratio of synthesis wpm to average 
                                                          
493
 As previously stated in Part A of Chapter 4 (see above n 383), all tests for statistical significance in 
this study took the form of Student T-Tests with a null hypothesis of ‘no difference between the two 
sample groups’ and assumptions of a two-tailed distribution, two-sample unequal variance, and normal 
distribution.  The confidence interval was set at α = 0.05 (95% confidence level). 
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wpm (Column 6).  Even though it appeared that the ROV of Group A participants was 
on average the same regardless of whether they were identifying issues or engaging in 
synthesis and that Group C participants appeared to verbalise 12% faster when 
synthesising than when identifying issues, there was no statistically significant 
difference between the groups on this metric. 
These results are presented graphically as follows: 
GRAPH 5.1 – All Group C Against Group A Baseline: Rate of Verbalisation*  
 
Graph 5.1 is constructed around the ROV of Group A participants as the baseline for 
comparisons with Group C participants in each of the above areas identified in columns 
1 to 6.  Where Group C participants as a whole and on average were observed to have a 
lower ROV than Group A participants, the columns extend downwards to the extent of 
the percentage difference.  As can be seen from this graph, Group C participants had 
lower ROV on the first three measures relating to:  average or overall wpm when 
attending to a test case (Column 1); average wpm when identifying issues (Column 2); 
and average wpm when synthesising issues (Column 3). 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 of this graph record when participants in either Group C or Group 
A were observed verbalising appreciably faster or slower when identifying issues or 
engaging in synthesis compared to their overall ROV or when engaging in the other 
task.  Where such differences were statistically significant (or not significant as in the 
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above case), inferences may be drawn concerning the cognitive performance or 
strategies employed by participants with different levels of likely expertise. 
The next graph shows how, on average, Group C participants allocated their time to 
reading and clarifying the test-case documents, identifying issues and synthesising 
issues in a manner different from Group A participants, who were assumed to possess 
greater specialist legal expertise.   
GRAPH 5.2 – All Group C Against Group A Baseline: Time Allocation* 
 
 
Graph 5.2 records how Group C participants spent, on average across all test cases, 
almost double the amount of time identifying issues compared to the time that Group A 
participants spent on this task.  Specifically, in Colum 2 above, Group C participants 
are shown to have spent on average 97% more time on this task (2.74 minutes vs 1.39 
minutes).  This is notwithstanding there was no statistically significant difference 
between the average total-time taken by Group C and Group A participants in 
completing their assessments.  
This difference in identifying time was one of three areas where statistically significant 
differences were identified between Group C and Group A participants in relation to 
how they allocated their time when assessing the test cases.     
As a ratio of total time, Group C participants also spent 43% less time on synthesis than 
Group A participants (24% vs 42% of total assessment time)(Column 5).  In respect to 
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synthesis time compared to time spent identifying issues, their ratio (of 138%) was 
59% smaller than Group A participants’ ratio (of 340%)(Column 6).  In other words, 
while Group C participants spent on average almost 1.4 more time on synthesising 
issues than identifying issues, Group A participants spent on average 3.4 times more 
time on synthesis than on identifying issues.   
The overall picture presented by these results is that Group C participants when 
compared with Group A participants, were more focused on – and allocated 
significantly more time to – identifying issues than on synthesising them when 
assessing legal risk in the context of this study. 
Having explained the form and significance of the above graphs, for greater efficiency 
these visualisations can be combined to form the following multi-purpose graph.   
GRAPH 5.3 – All Group C Against Group A Baseline* 
 
 
This graph permits the further observation that although Group C participants were, on 
average, slower than Group A participants when identifying issues in terms of their 
ROV, they spent proportionally longer considering such issues (Column 2).   
As with the previous two graphs, the interpretation of Graph 5.3 requires an 
appreciation for the nature of percentage comparisons.  Whereas in Column 2 it is clear 
that Group C participants spent, on average, almost double the amount of time 
identifying issues compared to Group A’s average time, it is less obvious that a 
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differential of comparable magnitude exists in Columns 5 and 6 in relation to the 
comparison of synthesis ratios.  Because these two other columns measure negative 
percentages, they can never be more than 100.  If the baseline was to be reversed, such 
that Group C participants’ performances were the benchmark, the resulting positive 
reading would be that Group A participants spent on average around 100% more of 
their time, in proportional terms, on synthesis compared to overall time spent – or 
double that of Group C participants. 
Accordingly, a mental conversion is required to ensure that negative readings below the 
baseline are not discounted because of presentational limits inherent in this graphical 
format.   
This combined graph presentation will be used to record the quantitative analysis of 
time and task data in the remainder of this chapter.   
(b)  Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group A Baseline 
Laboured reasoning was identified in Part B of this chapter as a behaviour that most 
Group C participants engaged in, but which no Group A participants did.  It was 
therefore considered a defining characteristic of how less expert legal specialists 
assessed legal risk in this study compared to how more expert specialists did.   
The following graph shows the results of the quantitative comparison between those 
instances in which Group C participants engaged in laboured reasoning and the 
unlaboured reasoning of all Group A participants. 
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GRAPH 5.4 – Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group A Baseline* 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, Group C participants who engaged in laboured reasoning took, on 
average, 67% longer overall to assess legal risk in the test cases when compared against 
Group A participants (11.31 minutes vs 6.76 minutes)(Column 1).  However, it was not 
apparent that this was because they had a lower overall ROV, as no statistically 
significant difference in this metric was found in terms of their overall assessment of 
test cases.  Rather, it would appear that they took longer to complete their assessments 
because they verbalised more, not slower. 
This difference in time spent assessing cases was ostensibly the result of these Group C 
participants spending, on average, over three times as many minutes identifying issues 
than Group A participants (4.45 minutes vs 1.39 minutes)(Column 2).  It can also be 
inferred that they worked harder when identifying issues inasmuch as their ROV was 
13% less, on average, compared with Group A participants on this task (124 wpm vs 
142 wpm)(Column 2).  However, this percentage difference cannot explain the total 
observed difference in time taken on this task.  
Group C participants who engaged in laboured reasoning spent essentially the same 
amount of time – in absolute terms – engaged in synthesis as Group A participants, at 
least insofar as no statistically significant difference was found on this measure 
(Column 3).  But this appears to be because they spent more time assessing cases 
overall.  As a proportion of total time spent, these Group C participants allocated 45% 
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less time, on average, to synthesising issues compared to Group A participants (23% vs 
42%) (Column 5).  Given that no meaningful difference was detected in relation to their 
reading and clarifying time compared to Group A participants (Column 7), this 
reduction in synthesis time was wholly or largely the result of their having allocated 
over 80% more of their overall assessment time to identifying issues (38% vs 
21%)(Column 4). 
This conclusion was confirmed by these Group C participants spending only two thirds 
of the time they spent on synthesis on identifying issues compared to Group A 
participants, who spent 3.4 times more time on synthesis than on identifying issues 
(70% vs 340%)(Column 6). 
(c)  Group C Unlaboured Reasoning Against Group A Baseline 
Those Group C participants who engaged in unlaboured reasoning did not spend any 
more or any less time than Group A participants identifying issues, although their ROV 
was 20% slower when undertaking this task (113 wpm vs 142 wpm)(Column 2 in 
Graph 5.5 below).  Their slower ROV in this context would seem to explain their 
overall slower ROV when assessing legal risk in the test cases (105 wpm vs 126 
wpm)(Column 1) given that their ROV during synthesis was, on average, 
indistinguishable from that of Group A participants’ (Column 3) and their ROV was 
higher when synthesising compared to their overall ROV (Column 5).  In other words, 
they sped-up more when synthesising compared to their overall ROV, but this was 
because their overall ROV was lower than that of Group A participants.  As noted, 
there was no statistically significant evidence that they actually synthesised at a higher 
ROV relative to participants in Group A (Column 3). 
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GRAPH 5.5 – Group C Unlaboured Reasoning Against Group A Baseline* 
 
 
However, this subgroup of Group C participants took 28% less time, on average, than 
Group A participants to complete their assessments of legal risk (4.85 minutes vs 6.76 
minutes)(Column 1).  This was despite their overall ROV being 17% lower.  The 
specific area in which they appeared to cut back was synthesis.  With respect to this 
task, unlaboured assessments by Group C participants involved devoting 55% less time 
to synthesis, in absolute terms and on average, than Group A participants (1.24 minutes 
vs 2.76 minutes)(Column 3) and 38% less time as a proportion of their overall 
assessment time (26% vs 42%)(Column 5).  At the same time, the fact that their ROV 
was 13% higher than that of Group A participants when synthesising compared to their 
overall ROV does not fully explain this reduced time spent on synthesis (Column 5). 
When compared to Group A participants’ legal-risk assessments, assessments by Group 
C participants who engaged in unlaboured reasoning appeared to differ from those who 
undertook laboured assessments mainly in their reduced allocation of time for 
identifying issues and for completing their overall assessments.  This overall reduced 
time came mainly at the expense of time spent on synthesis.  It may therefore be 
hypothesised that the unlaboured nature of these participants’ assessments was related 
to their doing less in terms of identifying issues and in doing less (and faster) synthesis. 
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(d)  Group C Unlaboured Reasoning (excluding superficial analyses) Against Group A 
Baseline 
After excluding superficial analyses from those assessments identified as involving 
unlaboured reasoning, there was a further reduction of differences between unlaboured 
reasoning assessments and the assessments by Group A participants.  This suggested 
that unlaboured reasoning involving superficial analyses, of which there were only four 
instances amongst Group C participants, involved a different risk assessment approach 
in terms of the cognitive measures applied here. 
The absence of these four assessments from the comparative analysis between 
unlaboured assessments and Group A assessments eliminated the previously noted 
overall difference in time taken to complete the test cases between these two groups – 
or at least a statistically significant difference.  This suggested that the previous 
observation that Group C unlaboured assessments were, on average, 28% shorter in 
duration than Group A assessments, was mostly if not wholly attributable to the 
superficial analyses which were a subset of unlaboured assessments. 
(Superficial analyses are separately compared against Group A assessments in the next 
section.) 
The following graph provides a more complete picture of unlaboured assessments with 
superficial analyses excluded, compared with Group A assessments. 
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GRAPH 5.6 – Group C Unlaboured Reasoning (Excluding Superficial Analyses) 
Against Group A Baseline* 
 
As noted in the comparison between all Group C assessments and all Group A 
assessments, Group C participants as a whole had lower ROV than Group A 
participants.  This was not the case, however, in relation to laboured assessments, 
which was somewhat unexpected.  Participants engaging in unlaboured assessments, on 
the other hand, whether including or excluding superficial assessments, verbalised on 
average 16% slower overall (106 wpm vs 126 wpm) and 22% slower when identifying 
issues (111 wpm vs 142 wpm) as compared with Group A participants.  With the 
exclusion of assessments involving superficial analyses, the ROV of unlaboured 
assessments was 9% lower, on average, compared to Group A assessments (128 wpm 
vs 140 wpm)(Column 3 above). 
The other apparent constant was less time spent on synthesis.  Unlaboured assessments 
inclusive of superficial analyses involved 55% less time on synthesis compared to 
Group A assessments (see Column 3 of Graph 5.5).  Unlaboured assessments excluding 
superficial analyses, on the other hand, involved 42% less time (1.54 minutes vs 2.76 
minutes)(Column 3).  This reflected the considerably shorter duration of superficial 
analyses. 
However, there was no statistically significant difference on this measure when 
considering either all Group C participants or simply those who engaged in laboured 
assessments (refer sections (a) and (b) above).  Presumably this was because those 
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assessments were longer overall and therefore in absolute terms these participants spent 
longer on synthesis, even though in relative terms they spent less time as a proportion 
of total time and time spent on identifying issues as observed in the previous sections. 
Because unlaboured assessments were generally shorter than other Group C 
assessments, absolute allocations of time spent on various tasks were less.  However, in 
proportional terms, as noted in Columns 4 to 7 in Graph 5.6 above, unlike the other 
Group C assessments there was no significant difference between unlaboured 
assessments (excluding superficial analyses) and Group A assessments on this measure.  
This again raised questions about the differences between Group C assessments 
involving superficial analyses and Group A assessments.  This comparison is discussed 
next. 
(e)  Group C Superficial Analyses Against Group A Baseline 
Group C assessments involving superficial analyses were small in number (as 
previously noted, there were only four such assessments), although statistically they 
had a disproportionate significance in the context of the present analysis.  Mindful of 
both these factors (a small sample size with a big statistical effect), comparisons were 
undertaken between these assessments and the Group A baseline, the results of which 
are summarised in the following Graph 5.7.  
GRAPH 5.7 – Group C Superficial Analyses Against Group A Baseline* 
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Unlike the other categories of Group C assessments, participants engaging in 
superficial analyses were not significantly slower than Group A participants in terms of 
their overall verbalisation rates nor in terms of their ROV when identifying issues or 
engaging in synthesis.  Moreover, they appeared to be the only category of Group C 
participants assessed to this point who were appreciably faster – 17% faster, on average 
– than Group A participants when synthesising compared to their overall ROV (129% 
vs 110%)(Column 5).  In other words, they sped up more than any of the other Group C 
or Group A assessment types relative to their overall ROV when engaging in synthesis.  
This was presumably because their synthesis was more superficial and therefore 
cognitively less demanding. 
Notwithstanding that their ROV were not significantly higher in relation to any other 
measures (relative to Group A participants), those Group C participants who engaged in 
superficial analyses spent substantially less time than Group A participants engaging in 
synthesis in both absolute and relative terms.  Again, this was ostensibly a hallmark of 
their shorter and more superficial approaches. 
Overall, these Group C participants spent, on average, 45% less time considering cases 
compared to Group A participants (3.72 minutes vs 6.76 minutes)(Column 1) and 77% 
less time engaging in synthesis (0.63 minutes vs 2.76 minutes)(Column 3).  They also 
spent 60% less time synthesising as a proportion of overall time (17% vs 42%)(Column 
5), which was only partly explained by their higher ROV in this area.  Arguably the 
most significant difference, however, was their spending 80% less time synthesising 
relative to their time spent identifying issues when compared to Group A participants 
(59% vs 340%)(Column 6).  In this regard, they appeared to be much more strongly 
biased towards identifying issues than on synthesising them compared to their more 
expert colleagues. 
(f)  Group C Incorrect Assessments Against Group A Baseline 
Incorrect assessments were small in number relative to all assessments, with four such 
assessments provided by Group C participants and one by a Group A participants.  The 
interpretation of comparative data based on this sample must therefore be undertaken 
carefully, as was the case with assessments involving superficial analyses.  The 
following graph shows the average percentage differences between the performances of 
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the Group C participants in these incorrect assessments as measured against all Group 
A assessments. 
GRAPH 5.8 – Group C Incorrect Assessments Against Group A Baseline* 
 
 
One obvious feature of these comparative data is the absence of statistically significant 
differences in terms of time spent considering the relevant test cases overall or 
identifying issues or the synthesis of those issues.  In these areas, the four incorrect 
assessments by Group C participants are statistically indistinguishable on the above 
cognitive measures. 
But the apparent ROV differences are arguably just as significant, if not more so.  
While the sample size is small, as shown in Column 2 the 25% lower ROV amongst 
these participants when identifying issues in the course of making incorrect 
assessments was unusual.  None of the preceding Group C comparisons against the 
same baseline yielded this large an average difference.  These incorrect assessments 
were associated with an average ROV for identifying issues of 107 wpm, compared to 
an average of 111 wpm for unlaboured reasoning excluding superficial analyses, which 
was the next lowest ROV for this task.  The lower average ROV overall when assessing 
cases of 111 wpm (compared to Group A’s 126 wpm) and when synthesising issues of 
129 wpm (Group A 140 wpm) are similar to the results for the other Group C 
comparisons above. 
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The 6% higher ROV when synthesising compared to overall average ROV when 
assessing these test cases (Column 5) is not a significant difference compared to other 
Group C comparisons against the Group A baseline.  However, the 22% higher average 
ROV when synthesising compared to identifying issues is significant (122% vs Group 
A 100%)(Column 6).  Ostensibly, this is more reflective of their lower ROV when 
identifying issues (Column 2) than their higher ROV when synthesising.   
While not statistically significant, but in the interests of completeness, the following 
statistics relate to the sole incorrect assessment by a Group A participant.   
Participant S05 incorrectly assessed high legal risk in Case B.  In doing so, his overall 
ROV was 141 wpm (which was significantly higher than the average overall ROV of 
111 wpm for the Group C incorrect assessments
494
).  In addition:  S05’s average ROV 
when identifying issues was 149 wpm (compared to 107 wpm for the Group C 
incorrect assessments
495
); his average ROV when synthesising was 154 (compared to 
129 wpm
496
); and, his ROV when synthesising compared to his ROV when identifying 
issues was 103%, which was closer to the Group A average of 100% than to the 
average amongst Group C incorrect assessments of 122%. 
Apart from the fact that he incorrectly assessed the level of legal risk in Case B, in 
terms of the above ROV measures S05 otherwise appeared to perform more like his 
Group A colleagues than the Group C participants who also provided incorrect 
assessments. 
(g)  Summary 
The first comparison in this part was between all Group C participants and all Group A 
participants.  The quantitative differences identified and shown in Graph 5.3 related 
first to Group C participants’ lower average ROV when assessing the test cases overall, 
when identifying issues, and when engaging in synthesis.  In relation to time spent on 
these tasks, Group C participants spent, on average, almost double the time identifying 
issues compared to Group A participants, but substantially less time engaged in 
synthesis as compared to their overall average time spent assessing cases and as 
                                                          
494
 The highest overall ROV amongst Group C incorrect assessments was 118 wpm for S11D. 
495
 The highest ROV when identifying issues amongst Group C incorrect assessments was 119 wpm for 
S12B. 
496
 The highest ROV when synthesising amongst Group C incorrect assessments was 134 wpm for S11D. 
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compared to their time spent identifying issues.  These were the generalised 
quantitative differences identified between, on the one hand, the assumed apprentices 
and journeymen in Group C and, on the other, the experts and masters in Group A. 
When isolating the performances of those Group C participants who engaged in 
laboured reasoning, similar and more exaggerated results were recorded.  In terms of 
ROV, however, laboured reasoning was associated with higher verbalisation rates than 
for Group C participants generally.  Specifically, there was no statistically significant 
difference between Group C laboured assessments and the assessments by Group A 
participants in terms of overall ROV, nor in their ROV during synthesis.
497
  This 
suggested that laboured reasoning, as it had been defined and applied in the 
categorisation of legal-risk assessments in this study, did not necessarily entail greater 
cognitive intensity or cognitive load.  Instead, it was associated with spending three 
times longer identifying issues
498
 (explainable in part because laboured reasoning 
typically, though not always, resulted in significantly longer overall assessment times), 
and more than double the amount of time spent on this task compared to (i) time spent 
overall, and (ii) time spent on synthesis.
499
   
Unlaboured assessments by Group C participants resulted in other statistically 
significant differences against the Group A baseline.  Unlaboured reasoning involved 
lower ROV, on average, in terms of the overall assessment and in terms of identifying 
issues.
500
  However, when compared to Group A participants, unlaboured reasoning 
was found to involve a more significant increase in ROV when synthesising compared 
to average ROV for the assessment process overall.
501
  In this respect, unlaboured 
reasoning appeared to be associated with less cognitively intensive synthesis and more 
cognitively intensive issue identification.  At the same time, these Group C participants 
spent less time assessing cases overall, less time engaging in synthesis and less time 
engaging in synthesis as a proportion of total assessment time when benchmarked 
against the Group A participants’ baseline performances in these areas.502 
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 Columns 1 and 3 of Graph 5.4. 
498
 Column 2 of Graph 5.4. 
499
 Columns 5 and 6 of Graph 5.4. 
500
 Column 1 of Graph 5.5. 
501
 Column 5 of Graph 5.5. 
502
 Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Graph 5.5. 
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Lastly, quantitative comparisons were undertaken between legal-risk assessments 
involving unlaboured reasoning excluding superficial analyses, superficial analyses 
alone, and incorrect assessments against the Group A baseline.  These comparisons 
yielded further confirmation that unlaboured reasoning in a substantive sense was 
associated with lower ROV overall, when identifying issues and when engaging in 
synthesis.
503
  It was also associated with less time spent on synthesis.
504
  Otherwise in 
terms of the allocation of time across the tasks of identifying issues and reading and 
clarifying information, assessments involving unlaboured reasoning were, on average, 
statistically indistinguishable from Group A assessments as a whole.   
Superficial analyses were associated with much shorter assessments compared to the 
baseline assessments, and with much less time spent on synthesis in absolute terms, as 
a proportion of overall assessment time and as compared to time spent identifying 
issues.
505
  Superficial analyses otherwise involved statistically the same ROV as the 
baseline assessments, except for a comparatively higher ROV when synthesising 
compared to overall ROV.
506
  Incorrect assessments by Group C participants involved 
significantly lower ROV when identifying issues compared to the baseline statistics and 
to other Group C assessments.
507
  However, it was noted that the samples sizes for both 
superficial analyses and incorrect assessments were small in statistical terms. 
2  Intra-Group Comparisons  
The focus of the preceding discussion were comparisons between legal-risk assessment 
behaviours associated with different levels of specialist legal expertise as represented in 
groups A and C.  These inter-group comparisons revealed quantitative differences in 
several of the areas where qualitative differences between Group A and Group C 
participants had been identified.  Where these differences were found to be statistically 
significant, hypotheses were postulated concerning the role played by participants’ 
different levels of expertise in creating these differences. 
In this section, a different approach is adopted.  The focus here is not on gross expertise 
differentials, but on differences between different legal-risk assessment approaches and 
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 Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Graph 5.6. 
504
 Column 3 of Graph 5.6. 
505
 Columns 1, 3, 5 and 6 of Graph 5.7. 
506
 Column 5 of Graph 5.7. 
507
 Column 2 of Graph 5.8. 
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strategies amongst participants in the same group.  Having identified, for instance, the 
higher incidence of laboured reasoning amongst lower ranked legal specialists (Group 
C participants) compared with higher ranked ones (Group A participants), the nature of 
laboured reasoning was investigated further by comparing the quantitative 
performances of participants who differed on this measure, but who otherwise 
possessed a similar level of specialist legal expertise by virtue of being allocated to the 
same group of similarly ranked participants. 
The first comparison of this kind sought to identify what distinguished the best Group 
A assessments from the other assessments by Group A participants.  This is followed 
by comparisons concerning the nature of laboured, unlaboured and superficial 
assessments amongst Group C participants. 
(a)  Best of Group A Against Rest of Group A 
There was only one statistically significant difference found between those Group A 
participants who provided accurate legal-risk assessments based on substantive 
analyses (the so-called Best of Group A) and the rest of Group A participants’ 
assessments.
508
  This difference concerned the amount of time spent identifying issues, 
as shown in the following graph. 
GRAPH 5.9 – Best of Group A Against Rest of Group A Baseline* 
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Whereas in all other respects both categories of Group A participants’ assessments 
were indistinguishable in statistically significant terms on the remaining six 
quantitative measures used in this study, the Best of Group A spent substantially less 
time, in absolute terms, engaged in the task of identifying issues.  Using the Rest of 
Group A as the baseline, the Best of Group A assessments allocated, on average, 54% 
less time to identifying issues than their similarly ranked colleagues (0.95 minutes vs 
2.07 minutes)(Column 2).  When the Best of Group A is used as the baseline, this 
statistically significant difference indicates that the rest of Group A spent 118% more 
time identifying issues than the former group’s assessments. 
This result is consistent with the expertise-related findings previously noted where time 
spent identifying issues was a distinguishing trait between Group A participants and all 
of Group C participants’ assessments, and in particular their assessments involving 
laboured reasoning.  This result also comports with the hypothesis that as a legal 
specialist’s level of expertise increases (from Group C to Group A, and from the Rest 
of Group A to the Best of Group A), time spent identifying issues reduces, both in 
absolute terms and in some instances relative to the amount of time spent on synthesis.  
What was surprising is that this ability appears to continue to improve even amongst 
the most experienced and highest-ranked legal specialists. 
(b)  Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group C Unlaboured Reasoning 
Amongst Group C participants there was a similar distinction between what appeared 
to be better performances (legal-risk assessments involving unlaboured reasoning) and 
worse performances (assessments involving laboured reasoning).  For the purposes of a 
quantitative comparison between these two groups of otherwise similarly ranked legal 
specialists, assessments involving unlaboured reasoning were used as the statistical 
baseline.  The results are shown in the following Graph 5.10. 
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GRAPH 5.10 – Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group C Unlaboured 
Reasoning Baseline* 
 
 
Insofar as this graph reflects differences attributable to or the result of laboured 
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although both forms of reasoning have higher ROV than their overall ROV.  In other 
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Laboured reasoning is also associated in this comparison with more than double the 
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even greater.  Laboured reasoning is associated here with, on average, 328% more time 
identifying issues compared to unlaboured reasoning (4.45 minutes vs 1.04 
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identification of issues took, on average, almost as long as the total assessment time for 
assessments involving unlaboured reasoning. 
Twice the amount of time, in absolute terms, was also spent on synthesis by those 
Group C participants engaging in laboured reasoning compared to those engaging in 
unlaboured reasoning (2.57 minutes vs 1.24 minutes)(Column 3).  This was ostensibly 
because their overall assessment time was on average significantly longer.  As a 
proportion of total assessment time, laboured reasoning involved spending, on average, 
72% more time identifying issues (38% vs 22%)(Column 4).  Given that there was 23% 
less reading and clarifying time amongst those participants who engaged in laboured 
reasoning as a percentage of total assessment time (40% vs 52%)(Column 7), issue 
identification was ostensibly the principal reason why assessments with laboured 
reasoning took significantly longer than those with unlaboured reasoning. 
(c)  Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group C Unlaboured Reasoning (Excluding 
superficial analyses) 
Lastly, quantitative comparisons were undertaken between legal-risk assessments 
involving laboured reasoning and legal-risk assessments involving unlaboured 
reasoning but excluding assessments based on superficial analyses.  As can be seen 
from the following graph, this resulted in a number of statistically significant 
differences relating to time spent during assessments overall, identifying issues and 
engaging in synthesis.   
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GRAPH 5.11 – Group C Laboured Reasoning Against Group C Unlaboured 
Reasoning (Excluding Superficial Analyses) Baseline*  
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109% as shown in Column 1 above (11.31 minutes vs 5.42 minutes
509
).  The exclusion 
of superficial analyses did not change the percentage differential in time spent 
identifying issues between laboured and unlaboured reasoning assessments.  Laboured 
reasoning was still, on average, associated with 328% more time on this measure (4.45 
minutes vs 1.04 minutes)(Column 2). 
In relation to time spent on synthesis, there was a less substantial (although still 
statistically significant) difference between those assessments involving laboured 
reasoning and those involving unlaboured reasoning with superficial analyses excluded.  
As shown in Column 3 of Graph 5.11, the former category of assessments involved 
67% more synthesis in absolute terms (laboured 2.57 minutes vs unlaboured excluding 
superficial analyses 1.54 minutes).  This difference ostensibly reflected the fact that 
assessments with laboured reasoning were, on average, longer in duration.  The fact 
that the proportion of synthesis as compared to total time was not found to be 
statistically significant between these two categories of assessment (Column 5) 
confirms this conclusion.   
In addition to laboured reasoning being associated with longer legal-risk assessments 
compared to ones involving unlaboured reasoning excluding superficial analyses, the 
proportion of time spent identifying issues was also greater.  After superficial analyses 
had been excluded, this difference was greater than when they were included.  As 
shown in Column 4 of Graph 5.11, time spent identifying issues as a proportion of 
overall assessment time in laboured reasoning was more than double unlaboured 
reasoning (111% more) when superficial analyses were excluded (38% vs 18%).  When 
superficial analyses were included with unlaboured assessments, laboured reasoning 
involved only 73% more time spent on identifying issues as a proportion of overall 
assessment time (38% vs 22%).
510
  
Excluding superficial analyses otherwise reduced the statistically significant 
quantitative differences associated with laboured and unlaboured reasoning in terms of 
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 The overall duration of assessments with unlaboured reasoning inclusive of superficial analyses 
averaged 4.85 minutes. 
510
 Column 4 of Graph 5.10. 
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the proportion of participants’ time spent on reading and clarifying the data provided in 
the test documentation.
511
 
(d)  Summary 
The comparison of the Best of Group A against the Rest of Group A baseline 
confirmed that there was generally no meaningful difference between these two groups 
on most of the quantitative measures used here.  The one exception was a statistically 
significant difference in time spent by the Best of Group A on identifying issues.  In 
absolute terms, even though there was no statistically significant difference between 
time spent overall on assessing the test cases, the Best of Group A participants spent 
less than half the time identifying issues compared with the baseline.
512
  The magnitude 
of this difference was perhaps surprising.  Given that this was an area where less expert 
participants in Group C were distinguishable from more expert participants in Group A, 
time spent on this task also appears to have been a reliable point of distinction between 
different levels of expertise at the higher end of the specialist legal expertise 
continuum. 
With assessments involving unlaboured reasoning as the baseline (both inclusive of and 
excluding superficial analyses), comparisons against assessments involving laboured 
reasoning confirmed a common theme.  Laboured reasoning by Group C participants 
was associated with spending, on average, more than four times the amount of time 
identifying issues in absolute terms (due in part to laboured reasoning leading to longer 
overall assessment times),
513
 and more than 70% and up to 111% more time spent on 
identifying issues as a proportion of total assessment time compared to the baseline 
statistics of unlaboured Group C assessments.
514
  There was not, however, a 
corresponding increase in synthesis time as a proportion of total time (even though 
laboured reasoning typically involved spending more time on synthesis in absolute 
terms) as compared to the unlaboured reasoning baseline, whether including or 
excluding superficial analyses.
515
  The recorded lower overall average ROV and 
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 See the nil result in Column 7 of Graph 5.11 compared with the result in Column 7 of Graph 5.10. 
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 Column 2 of Graph 5.9. 
513
 Column 2 of Graph 5.10. 
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 See Column 5 of graph 5.10 and 5.11, respectively. 
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 See the nil results in Column 5 of graphs 5.10 and 5.11. 
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reduced increase in ROV when engaging in synthesis compared to overall ROV only 
existed when superficial analyses were included in the baseline measures.
516
 
D  Conclusion 
This chapter described in detail several different ways in which the verbal data elicited 
from participants in this study were categorised to highlight cognitive differences 
between higher and lower-ranked legal specialists.  The ranking of participants, in 
terms of their levels of likely expertise in competition law was undertaken prior to the 
above analysis and permitted attention to be given to observed behavioural and 
performance differences between Group A and Group C participants, who were deemed 
to include either experts and masters (Group A) or apprentices and journeymen (Group 
C) as defined by Hoffman’s Scheme of progressive, domain-specific expertise.   
Qualitative differences between the performances of participants in these two groups 
were analysed in terms of ease of reasoning, certainty of assessment, assessment 
accuracy and depth of analyses.  In each of these areas, test results indicated that legal 
specialists with different levels of expertise think differently when faced with the same 
risk-assessment tasks requiring the exercise of their specialist legal skills.  Specifically, 
lower-ranked participants had an observed greater propensity for laboured reasoning, 
inconclusive assessments, incorrect assessments and correct assessments based on 
superficial analyses.  Higher-ranked participants, on the other hand, engaged only in 
unlaboured reasoning, and provided a greater number of correct conclusive 
assessments, all of which relied on substantive legal or economic analyses.  Only 
higher-ranked participants refused to provide any risk assessment in individual cases. 
Quantitative differences between Group A and Group C participants were then 
considered with reference to verbalisation rates and time spent identifying issues and 
synthesising those issues in the course of assessing legal risk.   An overall comparison 
between the performance of participants in these two groups suggested that lower-
ranked participants, as a whole and on average, had lower ROV when assessing the test 
cases generally, and also when identifying issues and engaging in synthesis.  They also 
spent approximately twice the amount of time identifying issues and half the time 
synthesising those issues compared to their allocation of time to the overall assessment 
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task and to identifying issues.  More detailed comparative results yielded further data 
concerning quantitative differences between these two groups in relation to several of 
the above areas where qualitative differences had been observed.  Quantitative 
differences were also recorded between participants within the same expertise group.  
This involved comparisons between the best performances of Group A participants 
compared to the other performances of Group A participants, and between Group C 
participants who engaged in either laboured or unlaboured reasoning. 
Given the objectives of the methodology underlying this study and in particular the 
identification of cognitive differences guided by an exploratory comparison of different 
assessment behaviours arising from the original research question, the results from the 
analyses recorded in this chapter provide a focus for the discussion in the next chapter.  
That discussion, which involves further consideration of the above results, marks the 
final stage of the study’s empirical investigation. 
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VI  ANALYSIS 
 
The test results recorded in the previous chapter highlighted a number of differences 
between how legal specialists with different levels of expertise assess legal risk in an 
information-constrained and time-limited context.  The following discussion seeks to 
explain these differences with the aim of providing a detailed description of cognitive 
traits and indicators associated with different levels of specialist legal expertise.  These 
traits and indicators form the basis of a response to the research question, which is 
concerned with finding readily identifiable and measurable differences between how 
legal specialists with different levels of expertise think when assessing legal risk. 
Part A of this chapter focuses on the time participants spent identifying issues while 
assessing test cases.  This task was conceptualised as a cognitive activity requiring the 
retrieval of relevant information from a participant’s Long-Term Memory (‘LTM’).  
Based on the test results and comparisons between participants with differently levels 
of expertise, a statistically significant association was observed between the proportion 
of total assessment time spent on this task and participants’ levels of expertise.  This 
association appeared to reflect lower-level participants’ less efficient and less effective 
retrieval of information from LTM, which in qualitative terms included spending more 
time recalling irrelevant and low-quality information.   
Part B describes how higher-level participants, when compared to lower-level 
participants, spent significantly more time (as a proportion of total assessment time) 
drawing inferences from the information in their Working Memory (‘WM’).  There was 
no statistically significant data to link this difference to lower-level participants’ greater 
propensity for inconclusive assessments.  However, there was a meaningful association 
between this measure of cognitive activity and the ability of higher-level participants to 
base their correct assessments on the substantive analysis of relevant issues while the 
correct assessments of lower-level participants relied on superficial analyses. 
Part C describes comparisons between the rates of verbalisation (‘ROV’) of participants 
with different levels of expertise as they engaged in the legal-risk assessment tasks used 
in this study. It identifies those contexts in which lower-level participants appeared to 
have exerted greater cognitive effort, and where higher-level experts maintained more 
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consistent verbalisation rates as they switched between retrieving relevant information 
from their LTM and drawing inferences from information in their WM. 
Part D discusses the deeper cognitive processes that appear to have shaped the different 
ways in which study participants engaged with the test cases.  This involves an analysis 
of the ‘why’ behind the ‘how’ of the observed identifiable and measurable differences.  
The theoretical base of this analysis is the work of Kahneman and others on the roles of 
intuition and analytical reasoning in decision-making and matters of judgment.  This 
includes a consideration of the extent to which participants relied on one or other of 
these thinking types and the nature of the self-monitoring process across different 
levels of legal specialists.  
Part E reviews other factors that could have influenced the results and inter-group 
analyses presented in this chapter.  This review covers the potential influences of 
external time pressures on participants, participants’ access to Internet search while 
assessing test cases, the novelty of the testing procedures, and the relevance of 
participants’ prior experience with merger matters, their professional focus, whether or 
not they had economics qualifications, the degree to which they specialise in 
competition law, and their experience as staff of a competition authority. 
Part F concludes the chapter with a summary of the findings and analysis presented.  
This summary includes a table that lists the key behavioural identifiers, performance 
traits and cognitive indicators associated with different levels of specialist legal 
expertise.  It also highlights those identifiers, traits and cognitive indicators unique to a 
specific level of expertise.  The relevance for these findings in relation to the research 
questions is also indicated. 
The discussion in this chapter involves a return to traditional definitions for the four 
expertise levels of study participants.  The previous chapter focused on observed 
qualitative and quantitative differences between Group A and Group C participants.  
Based on the methodology used to select and rank participants, these two groups were 
assumed to contain individuals at the apprentice and journeyman levels (Group C) and 
at the expert and master levels (Group A).  Rather than continue with references to 
these two groups, the more descriptive terminology of Hoffman’s Scheme and the 
traditional conceptualisation of developmental expertise are used in this chapter.    
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In this context, the term ‘apprentice’ refers to those Group C participants who engaged 
in laboured reasoning when assessing a test case.  Strictly speaking, it was their 
assessments that were considered to be apprentice-level, as the same participant might 
have also engaged in unlaboured reasoning in another case, where their assessment 
would be considered that of a journeyman.  It was the ease of reasoning evident in the 
assessment itself that established the appropriateness of the descriptor ‘apprentice’ 
when laboured reasoning was identified, and the descriptor ‘journeyman’ when it was 
not. 
This approach assumed that each assessment was a discrete event independent of a 
participant’s performance in any previous or subsequent test-cases.  While this 
introduced a complication to the analysis in terms of associating levels of expertise to 
individuals only indirectly, participants could still be categorised according to how 
often or to what degree they engaged in behaviours associated with certain levels of 
specialist legal expertise.  For instance, participant S12 who engaged in laboured 
reasoning in each of the test cases he considered, could be categorised as more of an 
apprentice than, say, s16 who engaged in unlaboured reasoning in three of the four test-
cases he considered, and may therefore be considered more a journeyman, even though 
he engaged in laboured reasoning in one instance.   
The characteristics of laboured reasoning included the extended consideration of both 
relevant and irrelevant issues, difficulties with identifying key or pivotal issues, 
repeating earlier points of contention without resolution (in contrast to more linear 
problem-solving approaches) and typically longer assessment times.  These risk-
assessment traits were found to be strongly associated with lower-levels of specialist 
expertise inasmuch as 50% of all legal-risk assessments by Group C participants 
included laboured reasoning, while no such reasoning was observed in the assessments 
of Group A participants. 
Assessments undertaken by Group A participants were divided into expert and master 
assessments on the basis that the latter category of assessments resulted in conclusive 
and correct opinions based on substantive legal and economic analyses.  These 
assessments, which demonstrated most clearly the highest level of legal expertise, 
constituted 50% of all assessments undertaken by Group A participants in relation to 
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test cases A, B, C and D.
517
  As noted in the preceding chapter, time spent identifying 
issues was the main area of statistically significant, quantitative difference between 
these master-level performances and those of other Group A participants, which were 
considered to be merely expert-level.
518
 
Just as laboured assessments were the hallmark of Group C participants insofar as they 
were not observed amongst Group A participants, so conclusive and correct 
assessments based on substantive analyses were the hallmark of Group A participants.  
It was therefore logical to use such assessments as a means of distinguishing between 
more expert and less expert intra-group assessments.  However, there remained an 
unavoidable arbitrary character to such distinctions, which was arguably more of an 
issue in relation to higher-ranked participants.  This is because the increase in context-
dependency amongst this group could be anticipated to result in even the highest level 
experts refusing to offer any assessment of legal risk on grounds of having insufficient 
information.  Accordingly, inconclusive and ‘no-assessment’ responses could not 
always be assumed to be associated with less expertise compared with responses that 
were conclusive, correct and soundly based. 
On the other hand, none of the correct assessments by Group A participants involved 
guessing.  They were therefore compelling, as well as correct, for the right reasons.  
They were also demonstrations of complete responses to the representative task set for 
participants, and in this sense were considered optimal.  Moreover, as half of Group A 
assessments fell into this category, comparative statistics were more likely to be 
meaningful than if they represented a significantly smaller or larger portion relative to 
the incomplete responses amongst Group A participants.  For these reasons, it was 
considered reasonable to use such assessments as the hallmark of master-level 
performance, notwithstanding the likely conservative bias.     
A  Identifying Issues – Retrieving Information from LTM 
The proportion of total assessment time spent identifying issues was a clear 
differentiator between study participants with different levels of specialist legal 
                                                          
517
 Participant S01’s assessments in relation to test cases E, F and G were referenced for the qualitative 
comparisons between Group A and Group C risk assessments, but not for the quantitative analysis 
described in the previous chapter.  This participant’s assessments are similarly used, where appropriate, 
for illustrative purposes in this chapter. 
518
 On average, correct assessments by Group A participants involved 54% less time identifying issues as 
compared to the other assessments undertaken by Group A participants.  See Graph 5.9. 
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expertise.  Not only did it separate apprentices and journeymen from experts and 
masters, it also distinguished assessments by apprentices from those of journeymen, 
and those by experts from those of masters.  The following chart depicts these results. 
CHART 6.1 – Average Proportion of Total Time Spent Identifying Issues 
 
These scatter points indicate statistically significant differences between different 
pairings of these four levels of expertise.
519
  As between apprentice-level assessments 
(those involving laboured reasoning) and journeyman-level assessments (unlaboured 
reasoning), there was a statistically significant difference between the former 
participants’ spending, on average, 38% of their total assessment time identifying 
issues while the latter spent only 22%.
520
  As between experts and masters, the 
assessments of the former group involved, on average, double the amount of time 
identifying issues compared to the latter, but the same overall time when assessing 
cases.
521
  While the statistical significance of the difference between these expert and 
master-level assessments with respect to time spent identifying issues as a proportion of 
total time was just outside the 95% confidence interval,
522
 there was a statistically 
                                                          
519
 With respect to the dotted ellipses in the chart approximating the variance from the mean of individual 
sample points within each of the above four expertise levels, these are simply illustrative.  They are not 
intended to indicate any specific numeric values, but rather offer a sense of the general assumptions 
underlying distribution around these means.  The most significant aspect of these visual signifiers in this 
chart is the statistically distinct statuses of the apprentice and master averages, and the indistinct statuses 
of journeyman and expert averages as between each other. 
520
 See Graph 5.10 in the previous chapter. 
521
 See Graph 5.9 in the previous chapter. 
522
 Student’s T-Test p = 0.0657.  
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significant difference when words verbalised while undertaking this task were 
compared, which confirmed the above distinction.
523
 
As between journeyman and expert-level assessments, both of which involved 
unlaboured reasoning, there was no evidence of a statistically significant difference 
between the average proportion of total time these participants spent identifying issues, 
whether considering time spent or words verbalised.
524
 
The trend-line in Chart 6.1 approximates the above differences as a function of a 
participant’s level of expertise.   Given that these are averaged data, care must be taken 
in interpreting this line too literally.  That said, an analysis of variance at the 95% 
confidence level suggests that there is explanatory power in this line-of-best-fit.
525
 
1  Discussion 
Given that laboured versus unlaboured assessments distinguished apprentices from 
journeymen, and correct conclusive assessments based on substantive legal or 
economic reasoning separated the masters from the experts, it can be contended that 
both these areas of difference were to a substantial degree based on, or materially 
related to, time spent on identifying issues. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the task of identifying issues involved the 
cognitive processing required in Stage 2 of the effective problem-solving model 
described by Feltovich, Prietula and Ericsson
526
 as informed by Baddely’s 
conceptualisation of the functions of WM, short-term memory (‘STM’) and LTM.527  
                                                          
523
 All tests for statistical significance included data relating to words verbalised as well as to time spent 
and words-per-minute as shown in the previous graphs.  This was an alternative measure used to confirm 
marginal statistical results.  In this instance, the result for words verbalised when identifying issues as an 
average proportion of total words verbalised by experts and masters during their assessments were found 
to be from statistically distinct samples.    
524
 See Graph 5.5 in the previous chapter. 
525
 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) undertaken using SPSS software with respect to the power 
regression line in this chart resulted in a p-value of 0.026 (which was within the 95% confidence interval 
used in this study), and an adjusted R
2
 = 0.924, indicating explanatory significance.  One noteworthy 
assumption underlying this chart is that the horizontal distances between each of these levels of expertise 
(as indicated by the numbers 1-4 on the horizontal axis) are equidistant.  Which is to say, the above chart 
relies on the assumption that one unit separates each of these four levels of expertise, which was an 
assumption that could not be confirmed within the scope of this study. 
526
 Paul J Feltovich, Michael J Prietula and K Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from Psychological 
Perspectives,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 41. 
527
 A Baddeley, ‘Short-Term and Working Memory,’ in E Tulving and F Craik (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Memory (Oxford University Press, 2000) 77; A Baddeley, ‘Working Memory:  Theories, 
Models, and Controversies’ (2012) 63 Annual Review of Psychology 1. 
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The defining characteristic of this stage is the retrieval of relevant information from 
LTM, from where it enters into STM/WM and is subjected to the drawing of inferences 
in Stage 3 of this model. 
 
Feltovich, Prietula and Ericsson have observed that, ‘[i]n practice, a large part of expert 
problem solving is being able to access relevant knowledge, at the right time, for use in 
working memory.’528  The longer time taken and, as will be noted further below, the 
lower ROV while attempting to retrieve such knowledge, was plausibly caused by the 
lower-ranked legal specialists either not having sufficient knowledge available in their 
LTM or not having it in as easily accessible form compared to their more expert 
colleagues.   
The unavailability of directly relevant information in LTM seems the less plausible 
possibility insofar as only a small minority of participants indicated any familiarity 
with the industries in which the merger parties in the test cases operated.  Some knew 
of one or other of the parties, but in other contexts or for other reasons.  In this general 
sense, all participants were equally disadvantaged as far as direct prior knowledge on 
which to base an opinion on the underlying economic impact of the mergers in 
question.  In terms of technical knowledge of the law, through the choice of 
representative task and the process for selecting participants – as well as from 
confirmatory comments made by participants themselves in the pre-test interview and 
during testing – there was no reason to believe that any participant had a better 
understanding of how the relevant laws operated either procedurally or substantively 
than any other participant. 
It is more likely that those participants who engaged in unlaboured reasoning were able 
to find more effective analogical data from their LTM more quickly, which is more an 
issue of accessibility and information organisation.  Based on cues within the test-case 
documentation, higher-level participants were likely better able to recognise the 
significance of the provided data and to match it with relevant information in their 
memories.  They were also likely better at avoiding consideration of the kinds of 
irrelevant information that would increase their time on Stage 2 processes without 
advancing their assessment of legal risk.   
                                                          
528
 Feltovich, Prietula and Ericsson, above n 526, 58. 
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With respect to their use of analogies, whereas experts and masters used appropriate 
and specific analogies, apprentices tended to rely on inappropriate and vague analogies.  
To illustrate this point, expert and master-level participants S04, S08 and S09 
consistently used directly applicable analogies and made specific references to previous 
cases and analogous industries.  In Case A, S04 analogised with other building 
materials which could be substituted with one another in functional terms.
529
  In Case 
B, S08 specifically referenced the Toll/Patrick merger and the related railway business 
that he correctly noted had similarities to the instant case.
530
  In Case C, S04 correctly 
referenced the ‘CHEP-type’ business model as being analogous to how IBC’s are 
pooled for hire,
531
 while S08 made a similarly direct comparison with pallet hiring.
532
  
In Case D, S04 identified similar market-definition issues raised in several other 
industries, including radiology, pathology services, supermarkets, liquor stores and 
petrol retailing.
533
  Participant S09 similarly compared the analysis of rural 
merchandise stores to supermarket merger analysis.
534
 
Apprentice-level participants S12, S14 and S20, on the other hand, formulated poor and 
sometimes misleading analogies and typically used vague references to identify them.  
In Case C, S12 spent over 8% of his total assessment time considering the injection 
moulding technologies of the Pact Group, which he thought may be relevant although 
there was no indication in the test case documents or in the final clearance decision that 
this was ever considered by the ACCC.
535
  In the same case, S14 described how the 
issues in the case were ‘bringing back memories now of some work I’ve done in the 
past where – I don’t know if it was IBCs, but similar,’536 while S20 considered imports 
in that case to be ‘quite important because I think I worked on a previous case where 
imports for a similar type of product were quite a significant constraint.’537  In Case D, 
S12 incorrectly compared the merger parties’ finance operations to those of a furniture 
                                                          
529
 S04A Line 140-142. 
530
 S08B Line 142-149. 
531
 S04C Line 41-43. 
532
 S08 Line 174-178. 
533
 S04D Line 72-76. 
534
 S09D Line 165-168. 
535
 S12C Line 56-65. 
536
 S14C Line 176-178. 
537
 S20C Line 65-66. 
212 
 
retailer
538
 and S14 drew incorrect parallels between wool broking and the licensing of 
mortgage and insurance brokers.
539
 
At the highest end of the expertise spectrum, masters needed the least amount of time 
to identify issues and did so with no apparent disadvantage to their overall legal-risk 
assessments.  This may be explained by their not having to search as widely or with as 
much effort to locate relevant information within LTM.  The information they did find 
was also of higher quality as evidenced by their correct assessments.   
The obvious parallel is with chess grandmasters, whom De Groot found did not 
consider more moves than intermediate players, just much better ones.
540
  In this 
respect, participants S06 and S01 both demonstrated near instant correct assessments 
based on very short response times during which they were unlikely to have undertaken 
a wide ranging search for relevant information, but rather were able to focus very 
quickly on the one or two factual issues that would prove determinative.  This comports 
with Klein et al’s Recognition-Primed Decision model in which highly expert 
individuals ‘generate effective courses of action without having to consider more than a 
single option.’541 
In Case C, S06 sought to confirm just one fact, namely, that the relevant merger 
transaction had already been completed.  From that he was able to infer that the only 
possible remedy would be divestiture and that this was a highly unlikely outcome.  
Other participants who considered this case, specifically S12 and S19, also noted the 
significance of divestiture, but did not draw the same conclusion as S06 that the 
likelihood of this remedy was the determining factor. 
In Case F, S01 only needed to read the names of the merger parties and perceive the 
case to be about publishing to conclude that clearance would likely be granted.  His 
subsequent description of the reasons for this reaction revealed a general knowledge of 
the publishing industry and the impact of technological advances on the production and 
                                                          
538
 S12D Line 17-23. 
539
 S14D Line 249-255. 
540
 See A De Groot, Thought and Choice in Chess (Mouton, 1965).  See also G A Klein, ‘A Recognition 
Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making,’ in G A Klein, J Orasanu, R Calderwood and 
C E Zsambok (eds), Decision-Making in Action:  Models and Methods (Ablex, 1993) 138.    
541
 Garry Klein, Karol G Ross, Brian M Moon, Devorah E Klein, Robert R Hoffman and Erik Hoffnagel, 
‘Macrognition’ (2003) 3 Human-Centered Computing 81, 82. 
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distribution of published products.  This was sufficient for him to form a conclusive 
and correct opinion on the likely outcome of the case within less than 10 seconds. 
Contrast this with the laboured reasoning of S12 and S14’s assessments of Case A and 
Case B, in which their immediate reactions
542
 were that clearance would likely be 
problematic given information retrieved from their LTM concerning the history of 
competition problems in the concrete industry (Case A)
543
 and the ACCC’s ongoing 
concerns about acquisitions by businesses as big as Toll (the acquirer in Case B).
544
  
Participant S11 similarly stated within seconds of reading the market inquiries letter in 
Case B that, ‘I think the ACCC is likely to have greater concerns about [this 
transaction] just by nature of the companies involved … and I know the ACCC has 
looked at these transactions fairly closely in the past involving Toll and Linfox.’545 
The journeymen assessments of S20 in Case A and S16 in Case B, also involved 
immediate reactions to the nature of the industry (S20 in Case A
546
) and to the merger 
parties (S16 in Case B
547
).  These reactions were also negative in the sense that they 
tended to raise the perceived level of legal risk, although neither of these participants 
went on to engage in laboured reasoning in either case. 
The immediate, negative perceptions verbalised in these assessments reflected 
participants’ awareness of issues relating to the industry and to the parties involved in 
these transactions.  Moreover, the information they verbalised was readily available in 
their LTM from where it was accessed within the first few seconds of reading these test 
                                                          
542
 Immediate reactions were considered to be those reactions of participants that were relevant to the 
likelihood of clearance and which occurred within the first 60 seconds of their commencing reading of a 
test case. 
543
 ‘Just my initial thinking is that this industry … so, yeah there’s [been some] section 46 proceedings 
… suggests that this industry is pretty concentrated … I know there’ve been other matters in this sector 
… so it’s one that the ACCC watches closely.’  S12A Line 5-13; ‘So I know that the concrete industry is 
obviously a concentrated one in Australia and has had a, you know, history of cartel-type conduct … so 
the ACCC is always going to look at mergers like this pretty closely.’  S14A Line 3-6. 
544
 ‘I haven’t worked in this industry … so Toll I know is of major interest to the ACCC, after it acquired 
Patrick and then there was the undertakings and the split out of Asciano … the ACCC has got a big 
interest in everything they do.’  S12B Line 3-8; ‘I’m also thinking in the back of my head that the freight 
forwarding has been another area where cartel conduct has occurred in the past … so again that makes 
me think that the ACCC will look very closely at transactions that touch on this area, because they’re 
familiar with it.’  S14B Line 31-35. 
545
 S11B Line 7-11. 
546
 ‘So, my first thought is that concrete is a product where you often get collusion … so, probably have 
to bear that in mind … there’s often competition problems in the supply of concrete I think because 
geographic markets are so small … partly due to that reason.’  S20A Line 3-10. 
547
 ‘Okay, Toll … always a Commission favourite.’  S16B Line 1-3. 
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case documents.  But their concerns were misplaced, and in over half of these instances 
these negative reactions were followed by laboured reasoning. 
In none of the expert or master-level assessments was there evidence of similar 
immediate retrieval of negative (incorrect) information in relation to any test case.  
These participants did not verbalise such reactions, even though it can be safely 
assumed that they would have been at least equally as aware of the histories of these 
industries and the significance of the relevant merger parties in competition law sense: 
the concrete industry has, for instance, been of perennial interest to the ACCC (and to 
other competition authorities in other jurisdictions) as the above apprentices and 
journeymen indicated.  This information was, it would seem, simply not considered 
relevant to bring into WM by these higher-level experts given the task at hand. 
This may suggest an indiscriminate or impulsive response by mainly apprentices but 
also by two journeymen, who made immediate connections between what they were 
reading and information in their LTM.  Their verbal protocols revealed that they did not 
filter this information for relevance, but rather acknowledged it as soon as they had 
accessed it.  This could be confirmation of Weinstein’s finding that less expert lawyers 
are identifiable by their imprecise and generalised use and recall of information.
548
 One 
of the more extreme examples of such thinking was S14’s ‘automatic’ references to 
possible Foreign Investment Review Board issues and merger-filing obligations in 
other countries as part of his initial framing of cases A and B.
549
  Such matters were 
wholly irrelevant to the legal-risk assessment task at hand. 
Apart from the immediate, positive reactions of S06 in Case C and S01 in Case F as 
mentioned above, the only other immediate reaction at the higher levels of expertise 
was by S08 in Case B where he immediately commented on the apparent narrowness of 
the ACCC’s focus on a Bass Strait market.  The nature of his reaction suggested that 
within less than 10 seconds of commencing to read the relevant market inquiries letter, 
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 Ian Weinstein, ‘Lawyering in the State of Nature:  Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem 
Solving’ (1998-1999) 23 Vermont Law Review 1, 38. 
549
 In Case A, S14 verbalised ‘in Attachment A we’ve got Rocla – oh, okay, so it’s a subsidiary of 
Fletcher Building, which is a New Zealand company … so I’m automatically thinking we may need to 
consider merger filings in New Zealand as well as Australia … and also the possibility of FIRB clearance 
as well.’  Line 19-25; In Case B, S14 verbalised ‘so, again, as soon as I hear global provider I always 
think about requirements for merger filings in other countries.’ Line 13-14. 
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this master-level participant
550
 had already identified the analytical significance of the 
ACCC’s choice of a restricted geographic market and its potential to unnecessarily 
heighten competition law concerns.
551
 
Whether these higher-level experts ignored the more general information about the 
parties and industries noted by the lower-level participants, or whether they simply 
went directly to the more determinative knowledge in their LTM without even 
considering this additional information, is not clear.  Given the speed at which their 
reactions occurred, however, and the lack of any verbalised acknowledgments amongst 
these higher-level participants, it is feasible to propose that it was the latter process.  
This suggests that the mental focus of these participants precluded the triggering of 
excursions into related but not directly relevant contextual data held in their LTM. 
An intermediate-level response may have been evident in participant S07’s 
consideration of Case B.  His assessment of this case had signs of both the apprentices’ 
impulsive retrieval of historical information and a higher-level self-monitoring to 
maintain his focus on the set task.  After noting the potential for the merger parties to 
have problems with the ACCC given their historically strained relations with the 
competition authority and their general prominence within their industry, S07 re-
directed his focus by noting, ‘but again, what you need to do is to go through and just 
see what this letter is indicating in terms of what it is that is being sold.’552  He 
nevertheless went on to conclude incorrectly that the proposed transaction would likely 
be opposed.  
With respect to those higher-level participants who refused to provide an assessment 
because of a lack of available information, a likely explanation is that these experts 
were more contextually dependent than less expert participants.  More specifically, 
participant S06 who had performed at the master-level in Case C verbalised in Case D 
that the assessment task was impossible for him to complete without having more 
information.  Participant S09, who was the highest-ranked participant in the study, 
similarly stated that he was unable to provide an assessment without satisfying his need 
                                                          
550
 All of participant S08’s legal-risk assessments were judged as being master-level insofar as they were 
correct when compared against the actual outcomes of the cases and they relied on substantive legal and 
economic analyses. 
551
 ‘Oh, it’s a very narrow market.’  S08B Line 3.  This participant went on to elaborate later in his 
assessment, ‘I must say that freight forwarding narrowly defined in just Tasmania and the Mainland 
seems a bit, a bit silly.’  S08B Line 93-94. 
552
 S08B Line 18-19. 
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for further information regarding production processes (Case A) and internal sales 
records (Case D), amongst other requirements.  Instead of providing inconclusive 
assessments, these two participants consistently refused to provide any opinion.   
Participant S07 also refused to provide an opinion with respect to Case A, but this 
appears to have been a reaction to the novelty of the testing process itself.  He 
subsequently went on to provide a conclusive – but incorrect – assessment in respect of 
Case B, a correct assessment based on superficial analysis in Case C and an 
inconclusive but unlaboured assessment in Case D.  Neither S06 nor S09 could be 
persuaded to state even a qualified view, except for S06’s initial and correct response in 
Case C where he immediately identified determinative information from the context of 
the case. 
2  Response to the Research Question  
Laboured or apprentice-level reasoning involved more time identifying issues both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of total assessment time.  This was ostensibly 
because these participants did not screen out irrelevant information as much or as 
effectively as higher-level participants.  The highest-level participants may not have 
even needed to undertake such screening because their focus precluded the 
consideration of such information in the first place.  This further reduced their time 
spent identifying issues.  In general terms, apprentice-level assessments lacked 
screening, while journeyman and expert-level assessments engaged in screening – but 
there was no evidence that master-level assessments involved even the triggering of 
irrelevant or non-determinative information in LTM which would require screening. 
Correct conclusive assessments observed during this study may be explained by 
master-level participants retrieving higher quality information from their LTM.  Expert-
level assessments involved more than twice as much time identifying issues compared 
to master-level assessments, which may have been because they spent more time 
considering the relevance of information and searching for determinative information.  
Master-level assessments involved less time identifying issues in absolute terms and as 
a proportion of total assessment time – yet their assessments were of higher quality 
(insofar as they were conclusive and correct) ostensibly because they relied on the 
retrieval of less information which was determinative.  This behaviour may be 
explained by their better and more detailed risk-assessment schema which made clear 
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what information was required and provided cues as to where to find this information 
in LTM through more effective analogising. 
Expert-level participants who concluded that they did not have access to determinative 
information refused to provide an assessment.  This suggested that their risk-
assessment objective was a conclusive view, whereas lower-level participants were 
content – or at least could be persuaded – to provide inconclusive assessments.  
Moreover, these experts were highly discriminating and prescriptive as to the kinds of 
further data they required, which supports the view that they had a clearer focus on 
what was important (a benefit of more detailed and effective problem-solving schema), 
and that the quality or determinative-potential of that information was crucial to their 
deliberations.  In other words, they would rather not waste their time considering a case 
without the information they believed was necessary to provide a conclusive view, 
which was the only objective they considered. 
B  Synthesis – Drawing Inferences 
Inferring the level of legal risk in a test case or the types of further information required 
to assess such risk, were considered acts of synthesis within Stage 3 of the model of 
effective problem-solving.  In this final stage of the problem-solving process, 
information drawn from LTM is combined with data gathered from the environment 
and stored in STM to enable inferences to be drawn from WM to achieve the ultimate 
objective of the problem-solving task, which in this study was to assess the likely 
outcome of a merger clearance application.   
The following chart shows how the average proportion of total assessment time spent 
engaging in synthesis was different depending on participants’ levels of expertise. 
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CHART 6.2 – Average Proportion of Total Time Spent Engaging in Synthesis 
 
Adopting the same approach as Chart 6.1, this chart describes the statistically 
significant differences between apprentices and journeymen on the one hand, and 
experts and masters on the other, with respect to how much time they spent, on 
average, on synthesis as a proportion of total assessment time.  The indicated 
differences are based on data presented in the previous chapter and recorded in graphs 
5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.9 and 5.10.  The result is a chart in two parts depicting the separation of 
higher level experts from lower level ones, but not between participants within these 
two groups. 
1  Discussion 
Legal-risk assessments by apprentices and journeymen both had statistically 
indistinguishable and a significantly lower proportion of synthesis time to total time 
compared to experts and masters (an average 24% vs 42%).  This suggests that it was 
not a measure with as strong an association with laboured reasoning as time spent 
identifying issues.   As previously shown in Graph 5.10, apprentices, who were defined 
as Group C participants who engaged in laboured reasoning, spent more than three 
times as long as journeymen identifying issues in absolute terms, and 73% more as a 
proportion of total assessment time.   This indicated that laboured reasoning involved 
more time identifying issues. 
With respect to synthesis, however, there was no statistical difference between these 
two Group C sub-groups as shown in the above Chart 6.2.  Together they spent 45% 
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less time than experts and masters on this Stage 3 task.  Less time spent synthesising 
was something that these lower-level participants had in common with each other, but 
not with the other two groups. 
Another common trait or attribute was the higher rate of inconclusive assessments 
which was observed amongst apprentices and journeymen, but not amongst experts and 
masters.  Overall, the former two groups had a combined 70% incidence of 
inconclusive assessments compared with the latter two groups’ combined 25% 
incidence of inconclusive assessments.  Amongst masters, there were no inconclusive 
assessments as their assessments were by definition both conclusive and correct. 
Other shared traits amongst lower-level participants were (i) correct assessments based 
on superficial analyses, which occurred in four instances amongst apprentices and 
journeymen (17% of all Group C assessments), and (ii) incorrect assessments, which 
also occurred four times amongst this group (17% of all their assessments) and only 
once amongst the experts (a 6% incidence). 
Less time synthesising as a proportion of total time was therefore viewed as a possible 
causal or symptomatic factor of inconclusiveness, superficiality in forming a conclusive 
assessment, and inaccuracy in assessing legal-risk. 
Inconclusive assessments by apprentices and journeymen involved, on average, less 
than half the time spent on synthesis as a proportion of total assessment time compared 
to all the assessments by experts and masters (20% vs 42%).
553
  However, when 
inconclusive assessments and conclusive assessments by apprentices and journeymen 
were compared to each other, there was no statistically significant difference in this 
area.
554
  Neither was there any difference between their assessments in terms of time 
spent identifying issues as a proportion of total assessment time. 
Statistically, therefore, it could not be concluded that less time spent on synthesis as a 
proportion of total assessment time was any more strongly associated with inconclusive 
assessments than more time spent on identifying issues.  In other words, inconclusive 
assessments could not be distinguished from the conclusive assessments of similarly 
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 These results were not presented in the previous chapter, but were recorded during the study.  The 
relevant Student’s T-Test p-value = 0.0019 indicated that the difference between these samples on the 
measure of proportion of total assessment time spent on synthesis was statistically significant. 
554
 This intra-group assessment result was also not presented in the previous chapter, but was recorded to 
during the study.   
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ranked participants in terms of time spent on synthesis.  Accordingly, such assessments 
could not be said to be uniquely associated with (or caused by) less time spent on 
synthesis. 
Superficial assessments, however, were found to be strongly associated with less time 
spent on synthesis, in both absolute and proportional terms.  Compared to experts and 
masters, journeymen who undertook superficial assessments engaged in 77% less time 
synthesising in overall terms, and 60% less time as a proportion of total assessment 
time.  Further, their time spent on synthesis as a ratio of time spent identifying issues 
was 83% less.  At the same time, there was no statistically significant difference 
between these superficial assessments and those of experts and masters in relation to 
time spent identifying issues, either in absolute or proportional terms.
555
 
Compared to assessments with laboured reasoning, superficial assessments (which 
were a sub-category of unlaboured reasoning) involved, on average, less time on 
synthesis overall (0.63 minutes vs 2.57 minutes) because such assessments were, on 
average, significantly shorter (3.72 minutes vs 11.31 minutes).  In terms of time spent 
engaged in synthesis as a proportion of total assessment time, there was no statistically 
significant difference between assessments with laboured reasoning and superficial 
assessments.
556
 
Compared to the other assessments involving unlaboured reasoning, superficial 
assessments also involved less time on synthesis in absolute terms because they were 
shorter assessments.  However, there was no statistically significant difference between 
these two types of assessment when comparing average time spent on synthesis as a 
proportion of total assessment time.
557
  
Given that superficial assessments by the journeymen in this study involved, on 
average, significantly less time spent on synthesis as a proportion of total assessment 
time as compared to experts and masters, but not in comparison to other assessments by 
apprentices and journeymen involving unlaboured and laboured reasoning, it is 
plausible to conclude that superficiality of analysis is associated with proportionally 
less time spent synthesising issues. 
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 These results were presented in Graph 5.7 in the previous chapter. 
556
 These results were not presented in the previous chapter, but were recorded during the study.   
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 These results were not presented in the previous chapter, but were recorded during the study.   
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This is supported by Graph 5.7 which showed that the only statistically significant 
areas of difference between superficial assessments and the substantive assessments of 
higher-level experts – apart from less total assessment time – was less time spent on 
synthesis.  At the same time, there was no less time spent on identifying issues. 
Whereas laboured reasoning was considered in the previous section to be associated 
with more time spent identifying issues (a Stage 2 problem-solving issue), 
superficiality therefore appears to be associated with less time spent synthesising issues 
(a Stage 3 issue).  In other words, superficiality is not a matter of identifying fewer 
issues or doing so less thoroughly, but in truncating the synthesis or inference stage of 
the legal-risk assessment process.  Moreover, this appeared to be a reliable point of 
difference between apprentices and journeymen as a group compared to experts and 
masters as a group, as evidenced by the consistently lower levels of synthesis observed 
across all of the former groups’ assessments.558 
The incidence of assessments based on superficial analyses was greatest in relation to 
Case C, which atypically concerned a completed merger transaction.  Participants S20, 
S11 and S16 all based their assessment of legal risk in this case on the circumstantial 
fact that the parties had not sought prior clearance approval, and therefore that 
clearance would not be a problem.  No expert or master-level participant relied on this 
fact.  Rather they engaged in substantive analysis to reach a correct conclusion. 
Why lower-level experts had a greater propensity for superficial analyses is not clear.  
One possibility is that they consciously or subconsciously sought out short-cuts to 
minimise the need for synthesis, or they may have simply adopted a more opportunistic 
mindset.  Or they might have considered more time spent identifying issues to be a 
better problem-solving strategy.  Experts and masters, on the other hand, were more 
focused on synthesis at the expense of identifying issues (and they did not react to 
superficial shortcuts).  Their assessments were therefore more likely to be built on 
stand-alone, reasoned analysis and to be more consistently effective. 
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 See: Graph 5.3 (Group C participants overall and on overage spent 43% less time synthesising as a 
proportion of total time compared to Group A participants); Graph 5.4 (Group C laboured reasoning 
involved 45% less time on synthesis as a proportion of total time); Graph 5.5 (Group C unlaboured 
reasoning involved 38% less time on synthesis as a proportion of total time); and Graph 5.7 (Group C 
superficial assessments involved 60% less time on synthesis as a proportion of total time). 
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These results may reflect the findings of previous studies that experts engage in a 
deeper conceptual analysis of problems than novices – and this may blind them to 
superficial short-cuts.  Such a mindset may be necessary to achieve the more efficient, 
effective and substantive strategies that the highest-level experts use to solve problems.  
It may also indicate a greater confidence and willingness to engage in synthesis, even 
when information is constrained and time is limited. 
An example of the more efficient use of information was participant S06’s ability to 
decide Case C correctly with just one piece of contextual information, namely, that the 
only remedy available to the ACCC in this case was court-ordered divestiture, which he 
considered was a highly unlikely outcome.  Both S12 and S19 similarly noted that 
divestiture was the only remedy available, while S12 further recalled that there had 
been no previous successful divestiture actions by the ACCC against completed 
mergers.  Participant S19 interpreted the ACCC’s interest in the case as a sign of 
unusual vigilance that he believed ‘does sharpen the mind.’559 
In this instance, S06 was able to immediately engage in synthesis and provide a correct 
and substantively reasoned legal-risk assessment within less than one minute.  After 
noting the same contextual information, S12 by contrast embarked on a 14-minute, 
inconclusive assessment in which he spent more than double the amount of time 
identifying issues than engaging in synthesis.  Participant S19 similarly provided an 
inconclusive assessment after more than 14 minutes of further analysis involving 
almost 50% more time identifying issues than engaging in synthesis. 
An example of deeper conceptualising during synthesis in Stage 3 of the problem-
solving process was S09’s identification of required information and where to look for 
it.  In Case A, this Group A participant inferred that it was necessary to understand 
more about the manufacturing process for the reinforced concrete products produced by 
the merger parties, and that this information would best be sought directly from 
personnel working in the manufacturing plants.  In Case D, he inferred that the scope of 
the geographic market around each rural merchandise store in that case could be most 
effectively established from the sales records of the parties.  Other less expert 
participants had either not understood the key issues in these cases or were only 
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capable making a general complaint on the need for more – but largely unspecified – 
industry information. 
In summary, those participants who spent more time engaging in synthesis as a 
proportion of total assessment time appeared to have had a clearer idea of what 
information was most important and how to best to get it.  When they found 
determinative data, they correctly identified it as such and then stopped seeking to 
identify further issues.  Their focus was, in this sense, on synthesis and the inferring of 
propositions likely to lead to a conclusive – and correct – legal-risk assessment. 
The accuracy of participants’ assessments was the third area where the reduced 
emphasis on synthesis amongst apprentices and journeymen may have some 
explanatory significance.  This is because the incidence of incorrect conclusive 
assessments was much higher amongst these participants than amongst experts and 
masters, who also engaged in more synthesis.  An obvious issue was therefore whether 
there might be a connection or an association between less synthesis and incorrect 
assessments. 
Comparisons between, on the one hand, assessments by apprentices and journeymen 
that resulted in incorrect opinions on the level of legal risk in a particular test case and, 
on the other hand, the assessments of experts and masters (only one of which was 
incorrect), suggested that time spent on synthesis was not a distinguishing factor.  
Rather, it was the relative rates of verbalisation when synthesising compared to overall 
ROV and the ROV when synthesising compared to the ROV when identifying issues, 
where differences were observed. 
Graph 5.8 in the previous chapter showed that there were no statistically significant 
differences between the above two groups in terms of synthesis time, either in absolute 
or proportional terms.  But it did show that, on average, participants producing 
incorrect assessments verbalised 12% slower overall, 25% slower when identifying 
issues and 11% slower when engaging in synthesis.  At the same time, they sped up 
more when synthesising compared to their overall verbalisation rate, and their ROV 
when synthesising was 22% higher as a ratio of their ROV when identifying issues as 
compared to experts and masters. 
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As these were the only noted differences, and because the next section focuses 
exclusively on differences in verbalisation rates, these issues are discussed further 
below. 
2  Response to the Research Question 
Inconclusive assessments could not be directly associated with less time spent 
synthesising as there was no statistically significant difference on this measure between 
the inconclusive and conclusive assessments of apprentices and journeymen.  This is 
notwithstanding that overall, apprentices and journeymen engaged in synthesis 
significantly less as a proportion of total assessment time when compared to experts 
and masters. 
Correct assessments by journeymen based on superficial analyses appeared to be 
associated with less time spent synthesising, both as between such assessments 
compared to other journeymen and apprentices, and compared to experts and masters.  
In fact, superficial assessments were the most different from experts and masters-level 
assessments in respect of this measure.  At the same time, these journeymen were 
indistinguishable from higher-level experts and masters as a whole in terms of time 
spent identifying issues.  Reduced synthesis therefore appeared to be causally related to 
or a symptom of superficial analysis. 
One possible explanation for this is the more serious approach experts and master-level 
participants had to conceptualising the issues and to crafting their own stand-alone 
analyses.  This may have prevented them from taking side-trips into possible superficial 
assessments, even when they explicitly noted that the circumstances for such 
assessments exist.
560
 If so, this may be seen as another aspect of the more detailed 
schema that also prevents them from engaging in the wide-ranging identification of 
issues associated with laboured reasoning as discussed in the previous section.  
Meanwhile, less expert legal specialists remain alert to any opportunities to avoid 
engaging in synthesis insofar as this task is more difficult for them than for their more 
expert colleagues who are more capable of forming their own reasoned opinions. 
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 For instance, S04 recognised in his assessment of Case C that the merger parties had completed their 
merger without seeking ACCC clearance, but he then went on to complete a thorough analysis of product 
substitution and barriers to entry.  Similarly, S05 explicitly reiterated that this case involved a completed 
transaction, but made no further comment on this fact, while S08 simply noted ‘completed transaction … 
okay, so it’s already happened,’ and then embarked on his longest analysis of the four cases he correctly 
assessed (S08C Line 9-11). 
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Experts and masters may also have the advantage of being able to synthesise more 
efficiently and effectively with limited information.  For example, S06 was able to base 
his reasoning as to why the transaction in Case C would not be opposed merely on the 
fact that divestiture was the only remedy available to the ACCC.  Other less expert 
participants noted the same point, but only S06 could discern the deeper significance of 
this fact in the context of the legal-risk assessment task.  He did not embark on the 
further identification of issues, because this was unnecessary.  It was also unnecessary 
for him to reflect on the fact that the parties had not sought prior clearance, which 
would ostensibly have taken more time to consider and result in a less robust 
assessment in terms of substantive analysis. 
It is also possible that by being better at identifying issues, experts and master-level 
participants lay the groundwork for easier and more efficient synthesis and drawing of 
inferences.  Because they know or can infer what information is most relevant and 
useful, they reduce their effort identifying issues.  This also means that they have 
higher-quality information to work with when engaging in synthesis.  Both these traits 
may be traced back to a more effective mental schema that remains operational even 
(or, perhaps, especially) when time is constrained and available information is limited. 
C  Verbalisation Rates – Cognitive Load 
Verbalisation rates, which are measured as words-per-minute (‘wpm’), provide 
information about the cognitive load or thinking difficulty that a participant is 
experiencing while solving a problem.  In simple terms, the higher a participant’s ROV 
the less cognitive capacity is being used as evidenced by their still being able to freely 
verbalise their thoughts.  Low ROV is conversely associated with the use of greater 
mental effort to the point that verbalisation becomes more difficult and less fulsome.  
Previous studies and theoretical support for these relationships and associations 
between ROV and cognitive activity were discussed above in Part C of Chapter 5. 
The following chart shows the average ROV for all four levels of study participants in 
relation to their overall assessment of test cases, their identification of issues (Stage 2 
of effective problem solving) and their engaging in synthesis (Stage 3). 
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CHART 6.3 – Average Verbalisation Rates 
 
1  Discussion 
As with previous charts, the markers on this chart indicate statistically significant 
differences between participants according to their expertise category.  For the most 
part, the ROV of apprentices and journeymen were assessed as being equal.  The 
exception was that in overall terms, assessments by journeymen had a lower average 
ROV than assessments by apprentices (105 wpm vs 117 wpm).
561
  Expert and master 
assessments were found on average to have equal ROV – and substantially higher ROV 
than apprentices and journeymen – on all measures.  This suggested that participants in 
the two higher-level expert categories experienced less cognitive difficulty undertaking 
the given legal-risk assessment tasks compared to those in the two lower-level expert 
categories.  Moreover, this was the case in terms of assessments overall as well as in 
relation to the identification and synthesis of issues. 
Chart 6.3 also shows that the ROV of experts and masters was very similar whether 
they were engaged in Stage 2 or Stage 3 analysis, that is, whether they were retrieving 
information from their LTM or drawing inferences in WM.  The ROV of apprentices 
and journeymen, however, was different depending on their stage of assessment.  These 
participants’ ROV when drawing inferences (engaging in synthesis) was higher than 
their ROV when retrieving information (identifying issues).  This suggested that the 
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latter task was more taxing in terms of cognitive effort than the former task, whereas 
between experts and masters there was not as noticeable a difference. 
After reviewing the results of various inter-group and intra-group comparisons with 
respect to ROV as discussed in the previous chapter, the general finding was that Stage 
2 tasks were more difficult – in a cognitive load sense – for lower-ranked participants.  
In most instances, the lower ROV’s for apprentices and journeymen when identifying 
issues was more than could be explained by their lower overall ROV.  Their lower 
ROV when synthesising, as compared to the ROV of experts and masters when 
synthesising, was more easily explained as a function of their simply having a lower 
ROV across their assessments generally.  In those instances when their ROV for 
synthesis was higher relative to their overall ROV, it did not follow that their ROV for 
synthesis was higher in an absolute sense, but only relation into their comparatively 
lower overall ROV. 
One group of journeymen, however, increased their ROV when synthesising compared 
to their overall ROV, which was statistically the same as for the higher-ranked 
participants.  These were the participants who engaged in superficial analyses.  Not 
only did they spend less time engaging in this Stage 3 task compared to experts and 
masters as noted in the previous part, they also sped up more compared to their overall 
average.
562
  This further suggested that this difference was integral to or at least a 
feature of their superficial approach.  In effect, their synthesis of issues required less 
cognitive effort precisely because it was so superficial, that is, shorter and less taxing.  
Compared to the baseline assessments of experts and masters with respect to their ROV 
when identifying issues: assessments with laboured reasoning (apprentice-level 
assessments) involved 13% lower ROV; assessments with unlaboured reasoning 
(journeyman-level assessments) involved 20% lower ROV on this Stage 2 task; 
superficial assessments (a subset of journeyman-level assessments) had ROV that were 
statistically no different; and incorrect assessments had 25% lower ROV. 
Compared to the baseline of assessments with unlaboured (journeyman) reasoning, 
however, none of the above intra-group differences was statistically significant.  In 
other words, while there appeared to be differences between these Group C 
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 See Graph 5.7 in the previous chapter.  Their rate of increase from overall ROV to ROV while 
synthesising was 17% higher than for experts and masters. 
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subgroupings when compared against the Group A baseline, none of these differences 
were statistically significant inter se.  The only exception was the previously noted (and 
depicted in the above chart) lower overall ROV for assessments with unlaboured 
reasoning (journeyman assessments) compared to assessments with laboured reasoning 
(apprentice assessments).   
The inconclusiveness of these comparisons may have arisen from small sample sizes, 
particularly given that intra-group comparisons involved a total population of no more 
than a third of all samples recorded in the study.  Accordingly, larger sample sizes may 
have revealed more and greater differences at the required level of statistical 
confidence. 
Another factor was the process of counting words for each 10-second interval 
categorised as either identifying issues or synthesising issues.  Reading and clarifying 
was not subjected to word-counts directly because, as previously noted, such 
differences would be too easily influenced by differences in individual reading styles – 
some of which involved high rates of verbalization while others involved silent reading. 
Instead of counting letters and then calculating 5-letter words as Deffner had done 
within his 4-second intervals,
563
 whole words were counted for this study, which 
inevitably meant that the lengths of words could materially affect the words-per-minute 
calculation performed for each 10-second interval.  This lack of precision, while 
unavoidable within the generalised nature of the present approach, arguably reduced the 
reliability of statistical comparisons based on these data.  This was less a problem for 
overall ROV, but it was likely to have had an impact on the smaller-sample 
comparisons at the task-by-task level.  
That said, there was sufficient statistical robustness in two key areas to permit the 
formulation of some useful propositions relating to this thesis’ research question and 
the reasons behind the qualitative differences noted in the previous chapter. 
2  Response to the Research Question  
Overall, apprentices and journeymen appeared to have had to work harder than experts 
and masters to perform the legal-risk assessment tasks presented in the test cases.  More 
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particularly, they expended greater cognitive effort while retrieving information from 
their LTM and while engaging in synthesis.  This may explain the laboured nature of 
some assessments, the inconclusive nature of others, and why more of their 
assessments were incorrect.  It may also provide insights into why some of these 
participants could have been motivated to seek out superficial answers, while experts 
and masters, who had the capacity to engage in substantive analyses with little apparent 
increase in cognitive load, had no such need. 
Those journeymen who based their correct assessments on superficial analyses were 
shown to increase the ROV of their synthesis at a greater rate than more expert 
participants.  This ostensibly reflected the former group’s success in making synthesis 
easier for themselves by identifying superficial and circumstantial information that 
obviated the need for more substantive analyses.   This supports the earlier suggestion 
that journeyman-level participants actively search for such short-cuts to their analysis, 
while experts and masters either ignore or are blind to them. 
Lastly, with respect to journeymen’s apparent lower overall ROV compared to 
apprentices (but the same ROV as apprentices when identifying and synthesising 
issues), this is logically explained by their verbalising less while reading and clarifying.   
As reflected in Graph 5.10 in the previous chapter, unlaboured reasoning involved 
spending, on average, 52% of total assessment time to reading and clarifying, whereas 
laboured reasoning involved only 40% of total assessment time on this task.
564
  It 
therefore follows that a lower verbalisation rate while reading would lower 
journeymen’s overall ROV while their ROV when identifying and synthesising issues 
remained the same as for apprentices. 
This may indicate that journeymen read the test-case documentation more intensively, 
perhaps looking for data on which to base a conclusive view, even (or especially) if this 
involved superficial analyses.  Laboured reasoning, on the other hand, involved 
apprentices getting lost in their own thoughts, and more specifically expending greater 
effort on trying to retrieve relevant information from their LTM. 
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D  Intuition and Analytical Reasoning 
A different but complementary approach to analysing these data involves applying a 
conceptual framework developed by Kahneman and others
565
 that distinguishes 
between two types of cognitive processes first labelled by Stanovich and West as 
System 1 and System 2 thinking.
566
  Kahneman has popularised this framework in his 
book Thinking, Fast and Slow.
567
  In simple terms, the distinction between these 
different thinking types is that System 1 (intuition or thinking fast) relies on intuitive 
insights and System 2 (analytical reasoning or thinking slow) involves judgments based 
on analytical reasoning.   
Kahneman describes System 1 cognition as ‘typically fast, automatic, effortless, 
associative, implicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged.’568   
System 2 cognition, on the other hand, is distinguished by reasoning that is, in 
comparison to System 1 thinking, ‘slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be to be 
consciously monitored and deliberately controlled.’569  In terms of the relationship 
between these cognitive processing types, System 2 thinking is present in all 
judgments, whether or not such judgments begin with intuitive impressions generated 
by System 1 thinking.
570
   
System 2 cognition is associated with self-monitoring and with the qualities of overt 
behaviour.
571
  When these functions of System 2 thinking leave an initial System 1 
impression unchanged, the final decision or solution is said to be intuitive.
572
  
Kahneman anthropomorphises the relationship between these two types of thinking 
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with the observation that ‘System 2 monitors the activities of System 1.’573  But he also 
states that such monitoring can be lax even when effortful
574
 and does not always result 
in a better result than intuition alone may produce.
575
  On this latter point, Dijkstra, van 
der Pligt and van Kleef have more recently provided evidence that in some contexts – 
particularly when intermediate-level subjects are tested – an individual’s performance 
may be improved by reducing the influence of System 2 reasoning on otherwise correct 
intuitive responses.
576
 
Based on the data generated in this study and the preceding analysis of the reasoning 
behaviours and problem-solving effectiveness of study participants, there are two areas 
where further inferences may be drawn in relation to expertise-related cognitive 
differences amongst legal specialists.  These concern participants’ bias towards or 
greater reliance on System 1 or System 2 thinking, and the effectiveness of their 
System 2 self-monitoring and control functions.       
1  Reliance on System 1 or System 2 Thinking 
The design of the representative task used in this study effectively precluded successful 
completion using System 2 reasoning alone.  This is because insufficient information 
was provided to participants for them to undertake a fully-reasoned assessment of legal 
risk.  The test-case documents were essentially just lists of questions directed at 
individuals familiar with the merger parties and relevant industries.  The only 
inferences that could be drawn from these documents were those based on facts that 
were provided in the brief background summaries and those that were incidental to – or 
which could be deduced from – the questions themselves.   
For these reasons the initial expectation was that the most competent participants in this 
study would provide inconclusive but unlaboured assessments.  Yet some participants 
were able to provide correct assessments based on substantive analyses, while others 
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provided incorrect assessments, and still others provided inconclusive and laboured 
assessments, while several provided correct assessments based on superficial analyses.  
These outcomes, and their distribution across the expertise spectrum, may be explained 
in terms of individual participants’ reliance on either System 1 or System 2 cognition as 
reflected in the data analysed in this chapter. 
The key to this analysis is the incidence and reliance on cues in the test documents as to 
what the likely outcome of a case would be, and how such cues were subsequently 
processed by each participant.  In this regard, Kahneman describes five different ways 
in which a judgment (or in this case a legal-risk assessment) may be made: 
1.  An intuitive judgment or intention is initiated [System 1 thinking], and 
 (a)  Endorsed by System 2; 
 (b)  Adjusted (insufficiently) for other features that are recognised as relevant; 
 (c)  Corrected (sometimes overcorrected) for an explicitly recognized bias; or 
 (d)  Identified as violating a subjectively valid rule and blocked from overt 
expression. 
2.  No intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgment is computed by System 2.
577
 
Intuitive judgments were observed in the transcripts of participants at two points within 
the legal-risk assessment process.  First were those that occurred within the first minute 
of reading the test case documentation.  Amongst the master-level participants these 
occurrences often related to the ultimate outcome of a case, rather than just individual 
issues.  They were also rarely adjusted or changed when subjected to System 2 
monitoring.  These judgments, which were proven correct in master-level 
assessments,
578
 were therefore of the above 1(a) or (b) type.  In terms of the previously 
discussed data, this method of reasoning was associated with minimal time identifying 
issues in terms of Stage 2 problem-solving.   
The initial intuitive responses of apprentices and journeymen, however, were either 
incorrect
579
 and/or were changed during the course of System 2 reasoning.
580
  This 
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behaviour was consistent with options 1(c) and (d) outcomes, which reflect a greater 
reliance on System 2 reasoning over System 1 intuition inasmuch as System 2 
reasoning prevails as the principal mediator of the verbalised legal-risk assessment.  
Typically, however, these intuitive judgments were more in the form of observations 
that were only tentatively held and 42% of the time these participants corrected their 
initial assumptions.   
A second type of intuition occurred throughout the legal-risk assessment process, often 
as component inputs to the reasoning process.  These were the minor insights and 
informed-guesses.  Insofar as they involved the identification of relevant and irrelevant 
issues, they were part of and ostensibly contributed to the extended time that 
apprentices spent on Stage 2 problem-solving.  But this type of intuition also occurred 
during Stage 3 of the problem-solving process in which participants were likely to have 
been switching between System 1 and System 2 thinking as they raised and then 
assessed different intuitive insights. 
Where only few or no intuitive responses were forthcoming, participants were forced to 
rely on System 2 processing (Option 2 above).  Inasmuch as lower-ranked participants 
were less likely to generate intuitive insights, they had to work harder at System 2 
reasoning (which is inherently more effortful) and therefore needed to rely more on 
insufficient data from the provided test-case documents.  But these participants also had 
a tendency to persevere in this task and to consider contradictory and inconclusive 
information.  This resulted in laboured reasoning and inconclusive results, which were 
hallmarks of apprentice-level assessments.  Journeymen and experts, however, limited 
their recall of information from LTM ostensibly to avoid laboured reasoning once they 
had determined that simply identifying more issues would not yield a conclusive result. 
Spending an extended period trying to reason through the legal-risk assessments in this 
study arguably reflected an overreliance on intelligence over experience.  Stanovich 
and West have shown that the ability to engage in System 2 processing is correlated 
with intelligence,
581
 but this is likely to be attenuated by having more experience.  It is 
therefore likely that over-confidence was at least partly the cause of lower-ranked 
                                                                                                                                                                         
580
 Assessments in which an initial framing of a case was materially changed during the course of the 
participant’s subsequent consideration of the case were (Apprentice level) S12A and S14B (Journeyman 
level) S20A. 
581
 Stanovich and West, above n 566. 
234 
 
participants spending more time trying to plough through the assessment process and in 
particular the Stage 2 retrieval of information from LTM.  This lack of inspired 
searching was ostensibly also reflected in the lower ROV of apprentices.   
The inconclusiveness of such labouring was also likely a System 2 phenomenon, which 
Kahneman defines as ‘a metacognitive appreciation of one’s ability to think 
incompatible thoughts about the same thing.’582  This is an apt description of the 
observed laboured reasoning and inconclusive assessments of apprentices.  It also 
suggests why masters were able to provide correct and conclusive assessments:  they 
relied more heavily on their System 1 intuition and avoided the increased doubt 
inherent in System 2 deliberations. 
Journeymen’s assessments were either incorrect or superficial.  This may be explained 
by their dependency on System 2 reasoning, which either failed to correct their 
incorrect intuitions and assumptions, or permitted the ‘blurting out of whatever comes 
to mind’583 because of the mentally demanding nature of the set task.  In this latter 
regard, journeymen were the only participants from groups A and C to assign 
overriding significance to the fact that the merger parties in Case C had not sought prior 
approval form the ACCC.  Yet as one participant, who provided this kind of 
assessment, admitted:   
You also would assume that the parties wouldn’t have dared completed the acquisition 
and then inform the ACCC at a later date, if there was anything near a competition 
problem that would create risk for them … I’ll now read on and address the 
background and go through the factors … but I can see my conclusion already that that 
alone is going to suggest there are strong prospects that the Commission will not have 
concerns with this deal
584
 
Because this response was reasoned, it was outside the scope of System 1 intuition and 
is best viewed as superficial System 2 thinking, a fact that this participant seems to 
have conceded by acknowledging the need to continue with his more detailed 
assessment.  Such behaviour was seen in three other instances where significance was 
assigned to the post-merger status of this case but the participant still proceeded to 
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engage in further System 2 reasoning.
585
  This contrasts with the master-level 
participant who immediately and intuitively focused on this issue (in a System 1 sense) 
and identified it as determinative in a substantive sense.
586
  It also contrasts with the 
other master-level participants who assigned minimal significance to this issue in 
favour of their more substantive analysis of the case.
587
 
In this sense, those participants who provided a superficial but correct assessment in 
Case C were probably relieved to have identified this non-substantive inference as a 
short-cut to otherwise laboured and inconclusive reasoning.  But those master-level 
participants who noted this feature were more likely to be focusing their System 2 
reasoning on monitoring their intuitive responses to the case, something that their 
lower-ranked colleagues lacked.  The one master who immediately understood the 
importance of this issue in the context of precedent enforcement action by the ACCC 
(that is, its failure to secure court orders against a completed merger during the 
preceding 25 years), relied on intuition confirmed by an encyclopaedic knowledge of 
this area of law and a highly-efficient indexing of that knowledge within his mental 
schema.  
Other evidence that higher-level participants relied more on their intuition included:  
the speed at which they identified relevant issues (masters were the fastest); their 
readiness to rely on their intuition rather than over-think their initial conclusions 
thereby introducing doubt and inconclusiveness; and their higher ROV when 
considering cases which is consistent with greater reliance on System 1 rather than 
System 2 thinking.  The fact that some masters were able to quickly provide complete 
and correct responses to the set task also indicates that they were able to complete the 
required cognitive tasks concurrently rather than serially, which Kahneman considers 
‘the most useful indication of whether a given mental process belongs to System 1 or 
System 2.’588 
Overall, masters and experts expended less effort completing the test cases because 
they relied more on their intuition, while the laboured and inconclusive reasoning of 
apprentices could be attributed to their attempting to reason their way through the cases 
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in the absence of intuitive insights.  The less laboured identification of issues by 
journeymen was explicable by their relying on System 2 reasoning to selectively 
identify issues, but then not fully engaging their System 2 self-monitoring which 
resulted in incorrect and superficial assessments. 
2  System 2 Self-Monitoring 
As noted in the reasoning options listed by Kahneman above, all judgments involve 
System 2 reasoning.  Part of this is the slow, serial and effortful processes of logical 
reasoning that is not initiated by System 1 intuition, but rather is a substitute for it 
(Option 2).  Another part of System 2 reasoning involves monitoring System 1 
cognition and adjusting the ultimate judgment or decision according to what an 
individual deems to be the correct or desired outcome.  Having concluded that higher-
level participants, and in particular master-level participants, in this study likely relied 
more on System 1 thinking than System 2 reasoning when compared to lower level 
participants (most obviously apprentices), the role of System 2 in shaping the legal-risk 
assessments provided by participants is discussed below. 
Intuition is considered the main reason why masters and experts, and to a degree 
journeymen, spent less time identifying issues and retrieving information from their 
LTM.  This explains why these participants spent less time in Stage 2 problem-solving 
compared to apprentices, with masters taking the least time of all because they relied 
more on their intuition – and did so more effectively – than any other participants.  The 
relevant data of time spent on this cognitive task according to participants’ levels of 
expertise were shown in Chart 6.1. 
Yet in relative terms, experts and masters spent more of their total assessment time 
drawing inferences and engaging in synthesis.  This was shown in Chart 6.2.  The 
question therefore arises as to why they spent more time engaged in self-monitoring 
when their intuitive responses were ultimately proven correct (and were not overridden 
by their System 2 reasoning) and their inconclusive assessments were nevertheless 
unlaboured.  More time spent engaging System 2 thinking suggests that there should 
have been more extensive adjustments to their initial views, more doubt reflected in 
inconclusive assessments and more laboured thought reflected in lower ROV. 
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To begin with, equating more time spent in Stage 3 problem-solving (synthesis) with 
more System 2 thinking is simplistic.  System 2 reasoning occurs constantly throughout 
the legal-risk assessment process, including during times when participants retrieve 
information from LTM.  Assessing whether such information is or is not relevant in 
relation to a specific legal issue will inevitably involve System 2 analysis. 
Second, it is possible for one participant to have engaged in more System 2 reasoning 
than another participant, but to have actually spent less time engaging in the self-
monitoring functions associated with such reasoning.  For instance, under Option 2 of 
Kahneman’s model of reasoning note above, there is no System 1 intuition to adjust 
for.  This means that any such adjustments would only apply to inferences and 
conclusions generated via System 2 thinking.  Accordingly, when time is limited and 
the generation of reasoning in the absence of intuition is effortful, the actual time spent 
engaged in effective self-monitoring may be minimal even though, overall, System 2 
thinking was the predominant reasoning activity. 
Third, some inferences and conclusions are likely to require more self-monitoring by 
virtue of their greater extent and sophistication.  Accordingly, several minor or 
obviously flawed inferences could take significantly less time to check and adjust for 
than one extended and more sophisticated chain of thought.  In this context, the higher 
the quality of an inference or possible argument, the more time it takes to assess it.  
Conversely, lower quality inferences and arguments can be quickly dismissed. 
Fourth, as noted previously, it is possible to engage in System 2 self-monitoring at 
varying levels of substantiality.  A superficial check for inconsistencies and flaws may 
not be fully effective, but it will take less time than a more thorough consideration of 
all relevant issues.   
With these factors in mind, it can be hypothesised that apprentices spent less time 
engaged in self-monitoring than experts and masters, even though they spent more time 
engaged in System 2 reasoning overall.  This is because they were more reliant on such 
thinking in the absence of reliable intuition.  Moreover, their System 2 thinking was 
focused on identifying issues and making sense of the test cases such that most of the 
time they spent on this slow type of thinking was included in their spending more time 
in Stage 2 of the problem-solving process.  This left them with less time to self-monitor 
and suggests that the issues they self-monitored were not as substantial or as high 
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quality as those generated by higher-ranked participants who relied on intuitive 
insights.  Accordingly, less time was spent and less time was needed for self-
monitoring by these lower-level participants. 
Journeymen had fewer issues to consider based on their spending less time identifying 
issues compared to apprentices.  However, they spent a roughly equivalent proportion 
of their total assessment time engaging in synthesis, which on its face suggests that they 
spent the same proportion of time engaged in self-monitoring – or even more given that 
they were likely to have generated and then considered fewer substantive issues.   
A plausible explanation is that journeymen also spent considerable time generating 
issues with System 2 thinking while retrieving relevant information from their LTM 
(Stage 2 problem-solving).  Judging from their lower ROV while engaging in this 
cognitive task, they ostensibly worked harder than apprentices at this task.  Insofar as 
this created more pressure on them to identify relevant issues, they responded by 
lowering their standards of self-monitoring in an effort to provide a conclusive 
assessment of some kind, even if such assessments were incorrect or superficial.  It is 
also possible that they were more aware than apprentices of the difficulties of the set 
task in the absence of intuitive insight, and sought to remedy this by grasping at low-
hanging fruit.  This could explain why journeymen were attracted to the superficial 
assessment of Case C (the case involving a completed merger), whereas experts 
exercised greater control over the substantive quality of their assessments and masters 
were able to rely more fully on their intuition. 
Experts and masters spent, in proportional terms, equal amounts of their assessment 
time on Stage 3 synthesis.  For experts, who spent the same amount of their total 
assessment time identifying issues as journeymen, they likely spent more time 
monitoring their responses to the legal-risk assessment task.  Even if they spent an 
equal amount of their System 2 thinking identifying issues, their greater time spent 
drawing inferences suggests that they would have spent materially more time assessing 
the quality of those inferences.  Insofar as they did not experience the same levels of 
intuitive insight as masters, experts would have spent more time confirming when they 
did not have sufficient information on which to form a concluded view.  This ostensibly 
explains why they avoided the incorrect and superficial assessments of journeymen. 
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Masters arguably spent more time than lower-level participants engaging in self-
monitoring as part of their System 2 thinking.  They did not need to generate issues 
using this type of thinking because they relied predominantly on their intuition for this 
task.  Nevertheless, their increased self-monitoring did not result in any major 
adjustments to their intuitive responses, and there was no evidence that any System 2 
adjustments reduced the accuracy or effectiveness of their prior indicated responses.  
This result accords with Raab and Johnson
589
 and Gigerenza and Brighton’s590 
contention that such intuitive judgments (to use Kahneman’s terminology for System 1 
decisions that remain unchanged by System 2 deliberation) conform with a ‘take-the-
first’ heuristic which mediates ‘superior expert decision making in highly time-
constrained domains.’591   
Masters also did not experience greater doubt after engaging in more System 2 
thinking.  This was presumably because of the quality of the issues they identified and 
because of their ability to avoid focusing on test-case details at the expense of a broader 
problem-perspective, an attribute that Dijkstra et al suggest protects against the 
potential detrimental effects of reasoning on judgment.
592
 
In these regards, the performance of the masters in this study appears to have confirmed 
the contentions of Klein,
593
 Kahneman
594
 and Dijkstra et al
595
 that intuition rather than 
deliberation in the kinds of information-limited and time-constrained situations used in 
this study is likely to yield the best results.  It also indicates that masters have 
developed a greater trust in their own intuition and that they resist making adjustments 
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to their intuitive insights, even when new information (like the low-hanging fruit 
grasped by journeymen in Case C) appears.
596
    
This analysis is also supported by Klein’s conclusions597 that highly expert decision-
makers do not choose between options, but rather focus on only one or two, running 
each to their ultimate conclusion through a rigorous self-monitoring process.  This was 
likely reflected in the master-level participants in this study spending less time 
identifying issues and more time drawing inferences and making sure everything was in 
alignment to provide a high-quality and correct assessment of legal risk. 
3  Response to the Research Question 
This response to the research question offers an explanation for the readily identifiable 
and measurable differences noted above in parts A, B and C of this chapter.  It does not 
identify any further differences of that kind, although it may be possible in some 
circumstances to do so using these findings either directly or indirectly.  The better 
view is that the present analysis is of a complementary nature insofar as it provides 
further depth to the analysis undertaken in the previous three parts of this chapter. 
Apprentices in this study relied heavily on System 2 thinking to identify issues and 
retrieve information from their LTM.  This approach was effortful and led to laboured 
and inconclusive assessments.  Apprentices’ extensive use of System 2 reasoning, 
which involved detailed analyses of conflicting considerations, increased doubt and 
indecision.  These participants engaged in limited self-monitoring of a relatively large 
number of low-quality issues.  A key distinguishing feature of apprentices thinking was 
their overconfident reliance on their intelligence (reasoning) over their experience 
(intuition), which resulted in laboured inconclusiveness when assessing legal risk under 
the test conditions of this study. 
Journeymen also relied on System 2 reasoning to identify issues, but did not identify as 
many as apprentices.  It is possible that they sensed the futility of a purely reasoned 
response, perhaps because they were more globally aware.  However, in the absence of 
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major intuitive insights (and under the pressure of the testing process) they searched for 
low-hanging fruit as a means of providing at least some form of concluded view, even 
when this led to superficial or incorrect results.  These participants did not undertake 
extensive self-monitoring but spent less time on this task further contributing to their 
low quality assessments.  The behaviour of blurting out responses to the legal-risk 
assessment task ostensibly reflected a response to the constraints of the test procedures 
and inadequate self-monitoring.  It may have also reflected journeymen’s attempted 
substitution of guessing for intuition. 
Experts maintained a balanced reliance on System 1 and System 2 thinking.  However, 
insofar as they did not have any significant intuitive insights they could not provide 
conclusive assessments of legal risk.  Nevertheless, their self-monitoring was extensive 
and they avoided the low-quality responses that journeymen provided.  They also 
considered fewer issues than journeymen, which allowed them to spend more of their 
time monitoring their System 2 reasoning.  Experts refused to be drawn into guessing 
the likely outcomes of the test cases, and when they determined that they had 
insufficient information they consciously avoided giving a response.  This, in addition 
to an absence of laboured reasoning, indicated effective self-monitoring within their 
System 2 processing. 
Masters relied most on their System 1 intuition and were, as a consequence, focused on 
just one or two key issues.  This reduced the time they spent retrieving information 
from LTM and allowed them more time to engage in extensive self-monitoring.  This 
self-monitoring was effective insofar as it neither adversely affected their correct 
intuitions nor introduced doubt into their assessments.  In this latter respect, they 
avoided the apprentice’s mistake of struggling with an overly detailed focus on the 
facts of the test cases at the expense of the bigger picture.  They therefore escaped the 
tendency of deliberative thought to focus attention only ‘on accessible and reportable 
information.’598  Masters’ greater experience both increased their chances of correct 
intuitive responses to the given task and ensured that these participants would be 
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willing and able to capitalise on such responses without overthinking their 
deliberations.  
E  Other Factors 
The above discussion focused on identifying, measuring and explaining the different 
legal-risk assessment behaviours of study participants with different levels of specialist 
legal expertise.  These behaviours covered the ease with which participants undertook 
the legal-risk assessment task (laboured vs unlaboured), the certainty of their 
assessments (conclusive vs inconclusive), the accuracy of their assessments (correct vs 
incorrect – conclusive assessments only), and the depth of their analysis (superficial vs 
substantive – conclusive and correct assessments only).  In each of these areas, 
quantitative data – combined with problem-solving theory and findings from research 
on decision-making and judgment – were used to explain the observed differences 
between higher-ranked legal specialists and lower-ranked legal specialists. 
To facilitate this analysis, special care was taken to select study participants who shared 
common professional backgrounds and specialist technical knowledge.  Nevertheless, it 
was not possible to exclude all factors that could have impacted on and influenced the 
observed data in ways not fully captured by the results and chosen theoretical approach.   
Below is a brief discussion of the more obvious of these factors and their possible 
effects on the above analysis.  
1  External Time Pressures 
All prospective participants were asked to set aside 45 minutes to one hour of their time 
to be interviewed for this study.  The fact that no individual sought to end an interview 
in less time suggests that no participant was under pressure to rush their assessment of 
any test case, which were nominally presented as requiring 10-minutes each to assess. 
However, it is conceivable that some participants – perhaps more likely the more junior 
ones – were concerned about being seen within their organisations as wasting time on 
an activity for which neither they nor their firm would benefit directly.  Moreover, 
these participants may have been more susceptible to (and more aware of the possibility 
of) being abruptly interrupted and asked to work on other things immediately.  The 
more senior participants were perhaps less likely to have had this concern. 
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One behaviour potentially affected by this influence was correct conclusions based on 
superficial analyses.  External time pressures could have provided the motivation to 
select the fastest method for assessing legal risk, which for some participants may have 
resulted in a tendency towards guessing, analytical short-cuts and perfunctory self-
monitoring.  Their aim could have been simply to get through the cases as quickly as 
possible, by whatever means. 
While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely it was something that had a 
disproportionate influence on more junior participants, that is, those participants in 
Group C categorised as apprentices and journeymen.  In addition to the three Group C 
participants who relied on superficial analyses in forming their opinions, there were 
three Group B participants who adopted the same strategy.  The first of these latter 
participants had 13 years professional experience, the second 23 years professional 
experience, and the third 35 years professional experience.   
More generally, the fact that all participants had volunteered their time and were not 
pressured to do so suggests that they were favourably disposed to the aims of the study 
and were motivated to provide their fullest involvement.  Insofar as each participant 
had freedom to schedule their interviews for convenient times and always had the 
option of re-scheduling them, concerns that they were subject to the more obvious 
pressures of their workplace were allayed. 
2  Internet Searching 
Participants were required to follow prompts, answer questions and read test-case 
documentation on the study’s testing website.  Being connected to this on-line portal in 
their offices meant that they would also have had access to Internet search engines and 
other resources to help them complete the assessment task.  For instance, they could 
have searched for information on merger parties or found out more about relevant 
products or details of the industries concerned.  This potential might have favoured 
younger participants in Group C more than Group A participants, who may have been 
less likely to automatically undertake such searches as questions arose in their minds. 
This possibility cannot be ruled out.  However, it seems improbable that on-line 
searches were undertaken given the fulsome nature of all participants’ verbalisations 
and the fact that many participants – including those in Group C – completed 
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assessment tasks while admitting that they did not fully understand the nature of the 
industry or the relevant products or services.  These factors suggested that Internet 
searching was not an actual issue of concern, even if the possibility existed by virtue of 
the study’s reliance on on-line testing.  
3  Novelty of the Testing Procedure 
It was clear from the responses of all participants that they had never been asked to 
undertake legal-risk assessments in the manner required for this study.  At the same 
time, no participant indicated that they did not understand what their task was.  Indeed, 
most appeared able to immerse themselves quickly into the role of adviser in each case, 
with some commenting that they had had experienced analogous situations during their 
professional careers, although not in this precise format. 
It is nevertheless possible that some more senior participants could have had greater 
difficulty adapting to the on-line format of the testing process and more generally felt 
unused to having such strict limitations on available information and time.  As noted in 
the previous chapter in relation to those participants who refused to provide an 
assessment in some cases, these were senior practitioners who may have been more 
dependent on having greater amounts of contextual information than was made 
available to them. 
Apart from this possibility, there was no actual indication that Group A and Group C 
participants reacted differently to the novelty of the test procedures in terms of its 
hypothetical setting or reliance on restricted information in the form of on-line 
documentation. 
4  Mergers Experience 
While the majority of participants indicated that merger review cases were a specific 
focus of their professional practices, the number of such matter on which they had 
worked during the prior 12 months, 5 years and their careers-to-date varied.  However, 
when comparing Group A participants and Group C participants, the only statistically 
significant difference between them in this area was that Group A participants, as a 
whole and on average, had been involved in more merger matters than Group C 
participants during their careers-to-date.  This was consistent with their having had 
longer careers. 
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It is also important to recall that merger cases were used as test cases in this study 
because they raised a single, substantive question of law (‘Is this merger likely to 
substantially lessen competition?’) and this question required the analysis of issues 
common not just to merger review cases, but also to a wide range of other cases 
commonly handled by competition law specialists.  One of the most important and 
generic of these issues was the delineation of relevant product and geographic markets, 
which is central to most assessments of legal risk in competition law cases not just 
merger cases. 
In terms of ease of reasoning, those Group C participants who engaged in laboured 
reasoning were generally less experienced in merger matters, although one of these 
participants had been involved in 50 such matters during the last five years, which was 
the third highest response across all participants for this time period.  In addition, the 
three Group B participants who engaged in laboured reasoning at least twice had been 
involved in 30, 35 and 100 matters during their careers-to-date.  Moreover, one of the 
highest ranked and best performing participants in Group A had worked on only 10 
merger cases during his 20-year career. 
There was a similar result when comparing those Group C participants who provided 
inconclusive assessments or incorrect opinions with those participants in groups A and 
B who performed better but who had similar (and in some instance less) experience in 
terms of their involvement in previous merger matters.  As noted in Section 1 above, 
correct assessments based on superficial analyses were not restricted only to more 
junior participants, nor to participants who had worked on only a limited number of 
merger matters.  Two of the Group B participants who completed such assessments had 
each worked on over 100 merger cases during their careers. 
However, in terms of incorrect assessments considered as stand-alone outcomes, there 
appeared to be a possible association between how many merger matters these 
participants had considered during their careers to date and their incorrect conclusions.  
Indeed, this may have been a reason why the sole Group A participant, who had only 
been involved in 10 merger matters during his 20-years career, provided an incorrect 
assessment.  The other four Group C participants who had provided incorrect 
assessments had career statistics of 6, 5, 20 and 50 merger matters.  However, the one 
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Group B participant who provided an incorrect assessment had been involved in more 
than 150 merger matters during his career.  
An additional complicating factor was the difficulty of determining what constituted 
involvement in a merger matter.  In one instance, it may have involved primary 
carriage of major transaction all the way through the merger review process.  In 
another, it could have been half a day’s research to determine that no merger clearance 
application was required.   
Lastly, with respect to the Group A participant who incorrectly believed that the 
transaction in Case B would be opposed (and who, as noted, had been involved in only 
20 merger matters during his career), he provided a correct assessment in Case C based 
on a substantive analysis of the key issues in that case.  No Group C participant who 
provided an incorrect assessment also provided a correct assessment on such a basis in 
any case.  It is also recalled that this Group A participant’s performance in Case B was 
more similar to other Group A assessments than Group C assessments on each of the 
quantitative measures discussed above. 
5  Professional Focus 
All participants were asked whether their specialist legal practices were focused more 
on front-end advisory work, back-end litigation work, or a balance of both front-end 
and back-end work.  There was no statistically significant difference between the mix 
of practices amongst Group A participants and amongst Group C participants.   
In relation to laboured reasoning, two Group C participants who engaged in this form 
of reasoning focused on back-end work, one focused on front-end work, and two had 
balanced practices.  Amongst the three Group B participants who engaged in laboured 
reasoning, one focused on back-end work, one on front-end work and one had a 
balanced-practice.  Laboured reasoning therefore did not appear to be related to a 
participant’s professional focus. 
There was a similar mix of professional practices amongst those participants who 
provided inconclusive assessments, while the six participants who provided incorrect 
conclusive assessments had back-end (two participants), front-end (one participant), 
and balanced (three participants) practices.  The practices of the 14 participants who 
provided correct conclusive assessments were similarly varied. 
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In terms of the three Group C participants who based their correct assessments on 
superficial analyses, each had a different practice focus.  Similarly, amongst the four 
Group B participants who provided this kind of assessment, one had a balanced 
practice, one a front-end practice, and two had back-end practices.  This same variation 
was evident amongst the five Group A participants who provided correct assessments 
(Two had front-end practices, two had balanced practices, and one had a back-end 
practice).
599
 
6  Economics Qualifications  
Given that the assessment of legal risk in competition law cases typically involves 
economic analysis – as was the case in each test-case in this study – having economics 
qualifications could have given some participants an advantage in completing their 
assessments of merger cases.  There were six participants who had economics 
qualifications and who also practiced as competition economists.  Another two had 
economics qualifications but practiced as lawyers. 
As between groups A and C, there was no statistically significant greater incidence of 
practising competition economists in one group or the other.  However, one participant 
in Group C was a lawyer with economics qualifications.  None of the lawyers in Group 
A had economics qualifications. 
The five Group C participants who engaged in laboured reasoning were lawyers, 
including the one who also had economics qualifications.  In Group B, two of the three 
participants who engaged in laboured reasoning were economists, and the third was a 
lawyer without economics qualifications.  Unlaboured reasoning was engaged in by 
economists and lawyers with similar levels of incidence in each category and across all 
groups. 
Conclusive and inconclusive assessments were provided by both economists and 
lawyers, and lawyers with economics qualifications.  Correct and incorrect assessments 
and correct assessments based on superficial analyses and on substantive analyses were 
similarly provided by a mixture of economists and lawyers.   
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 Amongst the three Group A participants who provided two or more correct assessments, one had a 
front-end practice, one had a balanced-practice, and the last had a back-end practice. 
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7  Degree of Specialisation 
All participants were asked to state the degree to which they had specialised in 
competition law during the previous 12 months.  This calculation was based on how 
much of their billable time during that period was spent on competition law matters.   
Amongst the 11 participants who had spent more than 50% but less than 75% of their 
time during the last 12 months on competition law matters, three had engaged in 
laboured reasoning , two had provided three or more inconclusive assessments, five had 
given incorrect assessments, and eight had given correct assessments, of which three 
were based on superficial analyses. 
Amongst the nine participants who had spent 75% or more of their time during the last 
12 months on competition law matters, two had engaged in laboured reasoning, four 
had provided three or more inconclusive assessments, one had given an incorrect 
assessment, and six had given correct assessments, of which three were based on 
superficial analyses. 
The two areas of potential difference between these statistics concerned inconclusive 
assessments and incorrect assessments.  Generally, those participants who had 
specialised for more than 75% of their time were twice as likely to provide 
inconclusive assessments, while those who had specialised less than 75% of their time 
were four times more likely to provide incorrect assessments. 
Why those participants who specialised more should provide more inconclusive 
assessments is unclear.  A possible explanation is that this variable was overshadowed 
by the fact that only some Group B and Group C participants (but no Group A 
participants) provided three or more inconclusive assessments, suggesting that it was 
their level of expertise rather than their degree of specialisation that contributed to their 
records of fewer conclusive assessments. 
Why those participants who specialised less provided more incorrect assessments may 
be explained by their lacking current knowledge of recent merger review cases and 
therefore being less familiar with the ACCC’s current views on specific issues.  
However, simply specialising less in competition law does not necessarily mean 
involvement in fewer merger matters compared to someone else who spends all their 
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time in this field of law, but who has been involved in one large litigation case for two 
years. 
Moreover, as discussed next, three of the six participants who provided incorrect 
assessments had previously worked as a member of staff at the ACCC, with one having 
worked specifically in the ACCC’s mergers branch.   
8  Regulatory Experience 
Ten participants in this study had either prior or current experience working as a 
member of staff at a competition authority.   In respect to laboured reasoning, incorrect 
assessments, correct assessments based on substantive analyses and correct assessments 
based on superficial analyses, there were no material differences between these 
participants, taken as a group, and those participants without experience working with a 
competition authority. 
In respect to inconclusive assessments, however, those participants who had worked or 
were working with a competition authority were twice as likely to provide such an 
assessment as compared to other participants.  However, it is possible that this was not 
a significant finding inasmuch as it relates to only six participants, four of whom had 
competition authority experience and two of whom did not.   
F  Summary and Conclusion 
The following table summarises the analysis in parts A, B, C and D of this chapter.  It 
maps the key differences identified between the different levels of legal specialists who 
participated in the information-constrained and time-limited legal-risk assessment tests 
conducted during this study.  For each level of legal specialist, the key behavioural 
identifiers, performance traits and cognitive indicators are shown, with those indicators 
unique to a particular level of expertise in bolded text.  Participants’ expertise-related 
reliance on intuition and analytical reasoning are presented as a sub-category of their 
performance traits as shown in italics in Column 2.   
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TABLE 6.1 – Summary of Expertise Identifiers, Performance Traits and 
Cognitive Indicators  
 1. IDENTIFIABLE BY 2. PERFORMANCE TRAITS 3. COGNITIVE INDICATORS 
M
A
ST
ER
 
 Correct legal-risk assessments 
based on substantive analyses 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 [Refusals to give an assessment 
when insufficient information 
available]600 
 Identifies key issues easily, and very quickly 
 Avoids irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Uses appropriate and specific analogies 
 Ignores/glosses-over short-cuts that minimise 
synthesis 
 Synthesises issues efficiently and effectively 
 Very low proportion of total 
assessment time spent retrieving 
information from LTM 
 High proportion of total assessment 
time spent drawing inferences 
 Low overall cognitive effort 
 Consistently high ROV whether 
retrieving information from LTM or 
drawing inferences 
 Heavy and effective reliance on intuition 
 Extensive and effective self-monitoring 
 Avoids deliberative doubt 
EX
P
ER
T 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Refusals to give an assessment 
when insufficient information 
available 
 
 Identifies key issues easily 
 Avoids irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Uses appropriate and specific analogies 
 Ignores/glosses-over short-cuts that minimise 
synthesis 
 Synthesises issues efficiently and effectively 
 Low proportion of total assessment time 
spent retrieving information from LTM 
 High proportion of total assessment 
time spent drawing inferences 
 Low overall cognitive effort 
 Consistently high ROV whether 
retrieving information from LTM or 
drawing inferences 
 Integrated intuition and reasoning 
 Extensive and effective self-monitoring 
 Limits deliberative doubt 
JO
U
R
N
EY
M
A
N
 
 Correct legal-risk assessments 
based on superficial analyses 
 Unlaboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Incorrect legal-risk assessments 
 Issue identification is laboured. 
 Identifies short-cuts that minimise synthesis 
 Identifies irrelevant and low-quality issues 
 Synthesis is inefficient and limited/superficial 
 Low proportion of total assessment time 
spent retrieving information from LTM 
 Low proportion of total assessment time 
spent drawing inferences 
 High overall cognitive effort 
 Significantly lower ROV when retrieving 
information from LTM than when 
drawing inferences 
 Substitutes guessing for intuition 
 Limited and ineffective self-monitoring 
 Tendency to blurt out premature responses 
A
P
P
R
EN
TI
C
E 
 Laboured reasoning 
 Inconclusive assessments 
 Incorrect legal-risk assessments 
 
 Issue identification is laboured, and 
extensive 
 Uses vague and inappropriate analogies 
 Identifies irrelevant and low-quality issues  
 Synthesis is inefficient and limited/superficial 
 High proportion of total assessment 
time spent retrieving information from 
LTM 
 Low proportion of total assessment time 
spent drawing inferences 
 High overall cognitive effort 
 Significantly lower ROV when retrieving 
information from LTM than when 
drawing inferences 
 Heavy reliance on analytical reasoning 
 Limited self-monitoring 
 Overwhelmed by deliberative doubt 
 
Each of the differences noted in this table is supported by the observations and 
statistically significant quantitative comparisons recorded in Chapter 5, and by the 
foregoing analysis.  For the reasons previously discussed, these differences do not 
appear attributable to the factors and potential confounding influences identified in Part 
E.  To the extent permitted by the limitations of a study of this kind, the selection of 
participants and the testing methodology used in this study were focused on – and were 
                                                          
600
 Insofar as master-level participants may have refused to provide an assessment in certain cases 
because of lack of information provided in the test-case documentation – which responses were 
arbitrarily categorised as expert-level only – mention is made of this as identifiable assessment behaviour 
amongst masters as well as amongst experts. 
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assumed to be largely effective in – highlighting cognitive differences associated with 
different levels of specialist legal expertise. 
Not all the differences that might exist in this area were recorded in this study.  The 
sample-size was not large, although it was larger than previous studies of a similar 
type.  The representative task chosen to test the cognitive abilities of study participants 
was of a specific kind and could not encapsulate all possible activities that require 
specialist legal skills or which could vary depending on the level of expertise of the 
individuals involved.  Further, not all the data generated in this study were or could be 
subjected to analysis – only those data identified and analysed in this chapter. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, the above table offers a useful summary of the 
findings of this study.  More particularly, it provides an overview of the key issues 
relevant to answering the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis, 
namely: 
In what readily identifiable and measurable ways do legal specialists with 
different levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think 
differently when assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-
constrained contexts? 
Considering in turn each level of expertise according to Hoffman’s Scheme and the 
traditional model of progressive expertise development, the following sections 
summarise the distinguishing features of the different cognitive approaches adopted by 
the participants in this study as they undertook the representative legal-risk assessment 
task.  The analysis undertaken in Part D, which focused on the use of intuitive and 
analytical reasoning, is also included in these summaries.  While not strictly required as 
a response to the research question, this additional analysis offers an explanatory 
context in which to assess the above-listed measures.   
1  Apprentices 
The apprentices in this study were identifiable by their laboured reasoning and 
inconclusive assessments.  Laboured reasoning was not identified amongst experts and 
masters.  Inconclusive assessments were noted amongst higher-level participants, but 
they were predominantly associated with apprentices.   
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In terms of identifying issues, apprentices undertook both laboured and extensive 
searches for relevant information.  However, this information was often irrelevant or of 
low-quality.  An example was their poor use of analogies.  Given that analogies were 
an important input into the assessment process because the test-case documentation had 
very little descriptive information and participants’ LTMs were also lacking in direct, 
relevant information about the industries concerned, an inability to use this cognitive 
skill effectively disadvantaged lower-level legal specialists. 
These performance behaviours were reflected in apprentices spending a high proportion 
of their total assessment time retrieving information from their LTM.  Like 
journeymen, this cognitive task required greater cognitive effort than they expended on 
drawing inferences, which were less of a priority and more superficially undertaken. 
The key elements of apprentices reasoning strategies in terms of System 1 and System 
2 thinking were their:  heavy reliance on System 2 analytical reasoning in the absence 
of reliable System 1 intuitive responses; limited System 2 self-monitoring in terms of 
effective testing and control of their reasoned responses; and high levels of doubt 
attributable to excessive deliberations over low-quality details. 
2  Journeymen 
Journeymen were most readily identifiable by their providing correct assessments of 
legal risk based on superficial analyses.  Unlike experts and masters, they appeared to 
actively identify opportunities to avoid engaging in synthesis.  When no such 
opportunities were available, their conclusions were incorrect, possibly because they 
did not spend enough time on synthesis.  This may have been because like apprentices 
they had to work hard to identify relevant issues (although unlike apprentices they did 
not undertake as extensive searches for relevant information).  It is also possible that 
the relatively low-quality of the information retrieved from their LTM was unlikely to 
yield better results even with more time drawing inferences. 
These behaviours were reflected in or were associated with journeymen’s unique 
combination of spending a low proportion of their time both on retrieving information 
from LTM and drawing inferences.  They spent 30% more time, in a proportional 
sense, reading and clarifying the test case documentation than apprentices did.  This 
may have been because they were more focused on searching the provided data for 
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opportunities to undertake superficial analyses in the absence of high-quality retrieved 
information and their ability to synthesise such information as efficiently and 
effectively as higher-level experts. 
Like apprentices, journeymen also relied on System 2 reasoning to identify issues, but 
did not identify as many as apprentices did.  Their limited self-monitoring was 
insufficient to prevent the blurting out of premature responses.  It also permitted the 
superficial guessing of issues and outcomes in the absence of intuitive insights. 
3  Experts 
Experts were similar to journeymen in that they spent less of their total assessment time 
identifying issues compared to apprentices.  But unlike journeymen, experts avoided 
identifying irrelevant and low-quality issues.  They were also better able to synthesise 
those issues.  Perhaps for this reason they spent a much higher proportion of their 
assessment time drawing inferences and maintained a consistent level of cognitive 
effort whether retrieving information from LTM or drawing inferences.  This 
combination of less time identifying issues and more time synthesising was unique to 
experts. 
Some experts in this study refused to provide an assessment because they had 
insufficient information to do so conclusively.  This may have reflected their greater 
dependence on contextual information.  They also glossed-over apparent analytical 
short-cuts as did masters, and were able to identify key issues quickly, although not as 
quickly as masters. 
Experts demonstrated a more moderated reliance on System 2 thinking.  Like 
journeymen they lacked determinative intuitive insights.  However, their self-
monitoring was extensive, although not excessive, and they avoided the low-quality 
responses that journeymen provided to the point of refusing to provide any assessments 
of legal risk.   
4  Masters 
Masters in this study were, by definition, the only participants capable of providing 
correct assessments of risk based on substantive legal and economic analyses.  They 
were also the fastest at identifying key issues, which explained why they spent the least 
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amount of their total assessment time retrieving relevant information from their LTM.  
They otherwise spent essentially the same proportion of their time drawing inferences 
as experts did.  This combination of very little assessment time spent identifying issues 
and a large proportion of time engaging in synthesis was a distinguishing characteristic 
of masters. 
The insufficiency of provided information may have led some masters to refuse to 
provide any opinion on legal risk and thus their assessments were characterised as 
expert-level only.  They glossed-over analytical shortcuts, avoided irrelevant and low 
quality issues, demonstrated low overall cognitive effort compared to journeymen and 
apprentices, and their synthesis of issues required no more cognitive effort than 
identifying issues but was demonstrably efficient and effective. 
Masters were the most intuitive of all participants inasmuch as their System 1 intuition 
was both reliable and correct.  Their System 2 reasoning was also effective insofar as it 
neither adversely affected their correct intuitions nor introduced excessive doubt into 
their assessments.  On this basis, they avoided getting bogged down in factual details 
and did not overthink their assessments of legal risk. 
5  Conclusion 
The results of this study as recorded in the previous chapter and analysed above, form 
the basis for a list of readily identifiable and measurable ways in which legal specialists 
with different levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think 
differently when assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-constrained 
contexts.  This list comprises the qualitative identifiers in Column 1 of Table 6.1 and 
the quantitative cognitive indicators in Column 3 of the same table.  Column 2 of this 
table provides explanatory information relating to the problem-solving and decision-
making performances of the different levels of legal specialists in this study, although 
these are largely based on inference and are therefore less easily identified and 
measured directly. 
These differences were summarised and compiled according to the categories of 
apprentice, journeyman, expert and master.  These categories relied on the conceptual 
framework of Hoffman’s Scheme which was derived from the developmental ranking 
of expertise used by Middle Ages craft guilds.  The particularisation and specificity of 
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these category summaries provides for the first time a basis for distinguishing between 
individual legal specialists with different levels of expertise in the same field of law.   
The next chapter concludes this thesis with a review of the studies and research on 
which this study relied.  It also provides a consideration of the implications of the 
above findings for previous scholarship concerned with the cognitive analysis of legal 
expertise and for future research opportunities. 
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VII  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis described the methodology and results of an empirically-based response to 
the following research question: 
In what readily identifiable and measurable ways do legal specialists with 
different levels of expertise (but the same technical legal knowledge) think 
differently when assessing legal risk in information-limited and time-
constrained contexts? 
Part F of the previous chapter lists a number of qualitative identifiers, performance 
traits and cognitive indicators that provide a means of distinguishing four levels of legal 
specialists according to their levels of expertise rather than their legal knowledge.  This 
is the first time such a list has been constructed.  Based on the findings of this study, a 
number of further research opportunities now exist with the potential for advances in 
relation to:  the cognitive development of legal expertise; the formal accreditation of 
legal specialists; assessments by consumers of legal services; the development of legal 
talent within law firms; and legal education, particularly at intermediate and advanced 
levels.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. 
Part A reviews the previous research on which this thesis relied.  It then describes areas 
where the findings of this thesis appear to confirm the findings of previous studies 
regarding the cognitive abilities of legal experts.  It also highlights a number of areas 
where, in light of the results of this study, a reassessment of previous studies may be 
warranted.  This includes a discussion of the similarities and differences between this 
thesis and previous research in terms of both methodology and results. 
Part B discusses limitations affecting and resulting from the scope and investigatory 
approach of this thesis.  These include the implications of using verbal protocol 
analysis to assign participants to their initial expertise groups, the exploratory and map-
like analytical approach of the study, the focus on those participants initially ranked 
above and below the main body of participants, the restricted utilisation of these un-
ranked participants, the decision to not employ additional assessors, the inherent 
inefficiencies of the chosen analytical approach, and the missed opportunity to require 
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participants to provide a percentage estimate as to the likely success of each case they 
considered. 
Part C identifies specific areas of future research which may be facilitated by or benefit 
from the manner in which this thesis was developed and the response it has provided to 
the above research question.   These areas of future research extend across the 
disciplines of cognitive psychology, lawyer accreditation schemes, consumer 
information, law-firm talent management and legal education.  In addition, there is the 
opportunity to replicate this study and reproduce the results of this thesis using the 
detailed methodological descriptions provided above and the availability of the actual 
on-line testing platform developed during the course of this research project. 
Part D offers a concluding statement to this thesis.  
A  Previous Research 
1.  Reliance 
This thesis relied on established sources of theoretical and empirical research from the 
fields of cognitive psychology and expertise studies.
601
  It was more specifically guided 
by studies that have used think-aloud problem solving and verbal protocol analysis to 
investigate legal thinking skills.
602
  These studies included contributions by researchers 
                                                          
601
 These sources include: K Anders Ericsson and Herbert Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as 
Data (The MIT Press, 1984/93); K Anders Ericsson, ‘Protocol Analysis and Expert 
Thought:  Concurrent Verbalizations of Thinking during Experts’ Performance on Representative Tasks’ 
in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 223; the 
contributions of medical researchers such as Patel and Groen (V L Patel and G J Groen, ‘Developmental 
Accounts of the Transition from Medical Student to Doctor:  Some Problems and Suggestions’ (1991) 
25(6) Medical Education 527); and the pioneering work of the Berlin Group – P B Baltes and U M 
Staudinger, ‘Wisdom:  A Metaheuristic (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mind and Virtue Toward Excellence’ 
(2000) 55 American Psychologist 122; P B Baltes, U M Staudinger, A Maercker and J Smith, ‘People 
Nominated as Wise:  A Comparative Study of Wisdom-Related Knowledge’ (1995) 10(2) Psychology 
and Aging 155; Staudinger, U M, J Smith and P B Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge in a Life Review 
Task:  Age Differences and the Role of Professional Specialization’ (1992) 7 Psychology and Aging 271; 
Staudinger, Ursula M, Jacqui Smith and Paul B Baltes, Manual for the Assessment of Wisdom-Related 
Knowledge (Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education, 1994); J Smith and P B 
Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge:  Age/Cohort Differences in Response to Life-Planning Problems,’ 
(1990) 26 Developmental Psychology 494. 
602
 For example: Crombag et al’s failed attempts in the 1970s (H F M Crombag,  J L De Wijkerslooth 
and E H Van Tuyl Van Serooskerken, ‘On Solving Legal Problems’ (1975-1976) 27 Journal of Legal 
Education 168); the contributions of Lundeberg (Mary A Lundeberg, ‘Metacognitive Aspects of Reading 
Comprehension:  Studying Understanding in Legal Case Analysis’ (1987) 22(4) Reading Research 
Quarterly 407), Christensen (Leah M Christensen, ‘Legal Reading and Success in Law School:  An 
Empirical Study’ (2006-2007) 30 Seattle University Law Review 603), Oates (Laurel Currie Oates, 
‘Leveling the Playing Field:  Helping Students Succeed by Helping Them Learn to Read as Expert 
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such as Nievelstein et al,
603
 Colon-Navarro,
604
 Weinstein
605
 and Chay
606
 who focused 
on the cognitive analysis of specialist legal expertise, albeit primarily within the 
framework of the knowledge-based, novice-expert dichotomy.  
A key study-design decision influenced by these prior studies was the choice of a 
representative task to test participants’ subdomain expertise rather than merely their 
generic legal skills – or simply their ability to complete an artificial task lacking 
ecological validity.  Direct guidance was taken from those studies that provided 
theoretical and practical commentary on these and related issues, such as the 
appropriate instructions to give to participants and how to eliminate case-specific 
knowledge advantages. 
The initial ranking of study participants relied on the cumulative research by a variety 
of scholars,
607
 including Hoffman
608
 from whose research Hoffman’s Scheme609 was 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Lawyers’ (2006) 80 St John’s Law Review 227), Deegan (Dorothy H Deegan, ‘Exploring Individual 
Differences Among Novices Reading in a Specific Domain:  The Case of Law’ (1995) 30(2) Reading 
Research Quarterly 154) and Stratman (James F Stratman, ‘When Law Students Read Cases: Exploring 
Relations Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection’ (2002) 34(1) Discourse 
Processses 57) on generic legal skills mainly relating to reading; and the theoretical discussions of 
Mitchell (John B Mitchell, ‘Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers 
the Implications for Legal Education’ (1989) 39 Journal of Legal Education 275), Blasi (Gary L Blasi, 
‘What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory’ (1995) 
45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313) and Krieger (Stefan H Krieger, ‘The Development of Legal 
Reasoning Skills in Law Students:  An Empirical Study’ (2006) 56(3) Journal of Legal Education 332) 
regarding the utility of undertaking the cognitive analysis of substantive legal expertise. 
603
 Fleurie Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, Henny P A Boshuizen and Frans J Prins, ‘Expertise-Related 
Differences in Conceptual and Ontological Knowledge in the Legal Domain’ (2008) 20(6) European 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology 1043. 
604
 Fernando Colon-Navarro, ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer:  Expert-Novice Differences in Simulated Client 
Interviews’ (1997) 21 The Journal of the Legal Profession 107. 
605
 Ian Weinstein, ‘Lawyering in the State of Nature:  Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem 
Solving’ (1998-1999) 23 Vermont Law Review 1. 
606
 Allan James Chay, Lawyer Problem Solving: An Investigation of the Knowledge Used in Solving 
Practical Legal Problems (PhD Thesis, Griffith University, 2006). 
607
 Principally: M T H Chi, ‘Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics,’ in K Anders 
Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise 
and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 21; M T H Chi, P Feltovitch and R Glaser, 
‘Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices’ (1981) 5 Cognitive 
Science 121; Ericsson, above n 601; David Z Hambrick, Frederick L Oswald, Erik M Altmann, Elizabeth 
J Meinz, Fernand Gobet and Guillermo Campitelli, ‘Deliberate Practice: Is That All It Takes To Become 
An Expert?’ (2013) 45 Intelligence 34; Phillip L Ackerman, ‘Nonsense, Common Sense and Science of 
Expert Performance: Talent and Individual Differences’ (2013) 45 Intelligence 6; Lesgold et al (1988); 
Weinstein, above n 605; Chay, above n 606; Staudinger et al, Manual for the Assessment of Wisdom-
Related Knowledge, above n 601; C E Greaves, H Zacher, B McKenna and D Rooney, ‘Wisdom and 
Narcissism as Predictors of Transformational Leadership’ (2014) 35(4) Leadership & Organization 
Development Journal 335. 
608
 Robert R Hoffman, ‘How Can Expertise be Defined? Implications of Research from Cognitive 
Psychology’ in Robin Williams, Wendy Faulkner and James Fleck (eds), Exploring Expertise: Issues and 
Perspectives (Macmillan Press Limited, 1998) 81. 
609
 For a summary of Hoffman’s Scheme see Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
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derived as a means of categorising different levels of expertise in a traditional 
progressive sense.  The chosen testing methodology involving limited information and 
time-constrained interviews relied on practical guidance from other researchers,
610
 
theoretical insights from the acknowledged pioneers in the field
611
 and examples from 
those who have focused on lawyer-specific assessments.
612
  The exploratory nature of 
the subsequent analysis relied on the work of still other theoreticians and 
practitioners.
613
  
The main points of departure from prior studies were the classification of novel legal-
risk assessment behaviours that were derived from observation, and the generation of 
quantitative data relating to the participants’ focus on different cognitive tasks.  The use 
of verbalisation rates to measure cognitive load was not new, although the division of 
transcripts into 10-second intervals to facilitate time and task analysis was a variation 
on Deffner’s approach614 that has not been previously utilised.  These were considered 
appropriate adaptations to facilitate the cataloguing of readily identifiable and 
measurable differences between the different levels of legal specialists involved in this 
study.  
2  Confirmation  
This thesis is primarily concerned with investigating new perspectives on how legal 
experts think with reference to the traditional progressive framework of Hoffman’s 
Scheme, which describes the categorisation of apprentices, journeymen, experts and 
masters.  Further, the emphasis in previous chapters was on finding readily identifiable 
and measureable cognitive differences, not just theoretical or purely inferential ones.  
                                                          
610
 For instance: Hoffman, above n 608; Beth Crandall, Gary Klein and Robert R Hoffman, Working 
Minds:  A Practitioner’s Guide to Cognitive Task Analysis (The MIT Press, 2006). 
611
 Ericsson and Simon, above n 601. 
612
 Colon-Navarro, above n 604; Weinstein, above n 605; Chay, above n 606. 
613
 For example: A Baddeley, ‘Working Memory:  Theories, Models, and Controversies’ (2012) 63 
Annual Review of Psychology 1; Gary Klein, ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (2008) 50(3) Human 
Factors 456; Gary Klein, Karol G Ross, Brian M Moon, Devorah E Klein, Robert R Hoffman and Erik 
Hoffnagel, ‘Macrognition’ (2003) 3 Human-Centered Computing 81; Paul J Feltovich, Michael J Prietula 
and K Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives,’ in K Anders Ericsson, 
Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 41; G Deffner, Think Aloud – An Investigation 
of the Validity of a Data Collection Procedure (Peter Lang, 1984); D P Simon and H A Simon, 
‘Individual Differences in Solving Physics Problems,’ in R Siegler (ed) Children’s Thinking:  What 
Develops? (Erlbaum, 1978) 325; E S Johnson, ‘An Information Processing Model of One Kind of 
Problem Solving’ (1964) 4 Psychological Monographs 78. 
614
 Deffner used 4-second intervals and counted individual letters rather than whole words.  See Deffner, 
above n 613. 
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Nevertheless, there were a number of incidental findings that appeared to confirm the 
results recorded by previous researchers.  These include, in the context of expertise 
studies in general: 
 Higher-level participants (experts and masters) generally used more effective 
and efficient risk assessment strategies, with masters being able to correctly 
evaluate risk based on substantive analysis
615
 and recall ‘instant’ solutions (that 
is, solutions that appeared to avoid intermediate steps) on this basis.
616
 
 
 There was evidence that higher-level legal specialists were less flexible in their 
methods
617
 and more dependent on contextual information,
618
 which may 
explain the refusals by two expert/master-level participants to provide any 
assessment because of insufficient background information. 
 
 The atypical case in this study (Case C which involved a completed merger 
transaction) revealed differences between higher-level participants,
619
 who 
either provided an instant solution based on their expert knowledge or 
successfully undertook a substantive and conceptually difficult assessment, and 
on the other hand lower-level participants who either took analytical short cuts 
(and provided a superficial analysis) or struggled to complete their assessments. 
 
 The responses of some higher-level participants suggested that they had 
glossed-over unimportant details,
620
 while their more effective self-monitoring 
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skills
621
 could explain why they verbalised fewer comprehension and analytical 
errors than lower-level participants.
622
 
 
With respect to incidental findings relating specifically to legal expertise, the results 
reported in this thesis appeared to be confirmatory of previous research in the following 
areas: 
 Higher-level (more expert) participants were faster at diagnosing the legal 
issues, at least in the sense of more quickly identifying the key factual 
information in the test-case documents.
623
  The area of law itself was known at 
the start of the tests, so there was no testing of whether or not participants could 
identify the applicable legal rules.  
 
 The better performance of higher-level participants was likely to have been 
explained by their possessing more effective mental schemas for assessing legal 
risk in the context of the test-cases used in this study.
624
 
 
 Higher-level participants had a clearer and more specific idea of what further 
information they required – and they had more effective strategies for how to 
get that information.  Lower-level experts tended to be more vague in these 
areas.
625
  
 
 Lower-level participants generally exhibited less precise and more generalised 
use and recall of information.  This was particularly evident in instances of 
laboured reasoning and in lower-level participants’ greater focus on retrieving 
information which was generally of a lower quality than that relied upon by 
higher-level participants.
626
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A critical point of divergence between this thesis and previous studies concerns the 
underlying explanation for these observed differences.  Other researchers have 
concluded that lower-level participants (typically legal novices in the form of current or 
recently graduated law students) think differently from higher-level participants 
because they do not know the area of law as well.  This was not the case in the present 
study where no participant had less than five years specialist experience or required any 
guidance concerning relevant laws or procedures.   
The cognitive differences noted in this thesis were, by design, attributable to factors 
other than differences in levels of technical legal knowledge.  This is reflected in this 
study’s finding that cognitive abilities increase over time even when legal knowledge 
remains constant, which is an observation that had not been previously demonstrated 
using the methodologies and experimental techniques used here. 
3  Reassessment  
This thesis indicates that differences in how legal specialists think are evident at each 
level of development from apprentice to master.  This is an important finding inasmuch 
as these differences have been largely ignored or overlooked in previous research into 
legal thinking skills.  This suggests a need to reassess some past studies, although this 
issue is likely to be less of a problem in straight novice-expert comparisons and when 
analysing generic thinking skills such as those relating to reading cases. 
It is relatively straightforward to find an individual with a novice-level understanding 
of an area of law.  Accurately identifying and securing the co-operation of expert legal 
specialists is more challenging.  One reason for this is that amongst these latter 
individuals there can be a significant variation in levels of expertise.  Much of the 
present study was concerned with separating participants into their appropriate 
expertise category within the same specialist area of law.  This has not been the 
practice in previous research. 
Considering first the research of Colon-Navarro,
627
 Weinstein
628
 and Chay,
629
 it is not 
clear whether or which of their legal specialists were apprentices, journeymen, experts 
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or masters.  By assumption, Colon-Navarro treated his four experts, who had 
specialised in immigration law for between three and 14 years, to think similarly to 
each other, but differently from his experienced and inexperienced novices.  Weinstein, 
on the other hand, did not provide details for his three putative experts other than to 
characterise them as ‘outstanding’ legal professionals.  Chay grouped his two 
experienced practitioners in the same general category, even though one of them had 
specialised in family law for only six years and the other had 22 years of family law 
experience yet did not practice in this area exclusively. 
Those researchers who have purported to study how legal experts think when engaging 
in generic tasks or who have tested for specialist skills but without using think-aloud 
problem solving or protocol analysis techniques, have also not addressed the 
assumptions underlying their choices and groupings of experts.  For Marchant et al,
630
 a 
tax expert was a tax professional with one to eight years’ experience with a 
multinational accounting firm.  For Nievelstein et al,
631
 a specialist in civil law was an 
academic with an average of 5.9 years’ post-doctoral experience.  For Lundeberg,632 a 
legal expert was a lawyer with at least two years’ practising or teaching experience.   
Such assumptions are arguably less of an issue insofar as many generic skills are likely 
to have a monotonic correlation to domain expertise such that, in some circumstances, a 
successful law student may be as good a reader of court cases as a senior partner in a 
law firm.  Nevertheless, a reassessment of these studies may be instructive given the 
findings of this thesis.  
The observation that the cognitive skills of participants in this study appeared to 
improve according to their levels of expertise while their legal knowledge, in a strictly 
technical sense, remained constant, may call into question previous research that has 
purported to demonstrate differences in thinking skills based on variations in legal 
knowledge amongst participants (the common novice vs expert comparison).  In those 
studies, the observed differences were likely to have been the result of differences in 
both legal knowledge and cognitive ability.  Insofar as this fact was not made clear or 
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was overlooked, this thesis provides a basis for reassessing – or at least clarifying – the 
conclusions of those previous studies.   
In the case of Weinstein’s subexpert who was a very experienced lawyer but who 
lacked knowledge of the relevant legal subdomain being tested, his inferior 
performance compared to experts in the domain was the result of not knowing the law 
rather than not being able to think like an expert lawyer.  Similarly, Mitchell’s faculty 
colleagues were experts in their own fields of law, but they failed to perform as well as 
their criminal law counterparts when assessing a hypothetical criminal law case.
633
  
Colon-Navarro’s study and Chay’s doctoral dissertation, however, relied on 
comparisons in which both relevant specialist legal knowledge and cognitive ability 
based on legal experience and expertise were tested.  In these studies it may be 
necessary to reconsider which of these two factors contributed more to the observed 
differences in performance. 
Based on the results of the present study – and in particular the confirmatory findings 
noted in the previous section – differences in expertise or experience-related cognitive 
abilities regardless of legal knowledge ostensibly had explanatory significance in 
relation to Weinstein and Colon-Navarro’s findings, and potentially Chay’s as well.  
Whether this points to the overriding effects of generic legal thinking skills or age-
related wisdom, or both, is something that future researchers could consider with 
reference to the discussion presented in this study. 
B  Study Limitations 
The aim of this thesis was to find readily identifiable and measurable differences 
between the cognitive abilities and risk-assessment approaches of legal specialists with 
different levels of expertise.  As an empirical study it required a range of practical as 
well as theoretical considerations.  Some of these considerations led to decisions that 
limited – in some instances unavoidably – the scope and findings of the study.  This is 
notwithstanding that the key objectives of the thesis were achieved.    
The use of protocol analysis to assign participants to groups A, B or C restricted 
subsequent analysis of their verbal protocols.   Having identified instances of 
exceptional reasoning, conceptual depth and comprehension errors to determine 
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whether or not some participants would be placed in a particular group, these 
behaviours could not be later referenced as evidence of performance differences 
between these groups – at least not directly.  In effect, the analysis performed at the 
ranking stage was an analysis of differences based on previous research on the 
cognitive skills and abilities associated with different levels of domain expertise.  The 
differences subsequently identified were new and allowed for more nuanced 
assessments, but were also complementary to, rather than substitutable for, the earlier 
recorded differences.    
This was considered an acceptable trade-off since the practical aims of the study 
warranted a focus on broader macrocognitive processes and statistically significant 
differences rather than on piece-meal – and potentially individualistic – verbal 
protocols.   
The methodological approach used to rank participants in this study was described in 
detail.  It was also shown to be dependent on the researcher possessing an in-depth 
familiarity with this area of law.  Without an understanding of the fundamental 
elements of competition law analysis and an ability to analyse the test-cases 
beforehand, it would not have been possible to determine workable indicia and 
weightings for the different categories of analytical approaches that were observed.   
This contrasts with the measures developed later in the study which constitute a more 
accessible alternative for determining different levels of specialist legal expertise.   
A related issue concerns the exploratory and map-like aspirations of this study.  
Because the analytical perspective of this thesis was that of a foundational study to be 
used as a tool for future researchers and for more practical applications, generalisations 
and the use of aggregated data were both necessary and desirable.  Having sought to 
establish an essentially generic basis for distinguishing different levels of expertise 
using the traditional categories of apprentice, journeyman, expert and master, some 
more subtle differences were inevitably overlooked.   
For instance, where just one or two participants in group A, B or C demonstrated a 
particular cognitive skill, this would likely not have met the threshold requirement of 
statistical significance when comparing different groups.  Any number of such 
differences could have been discussed.  But their utility in the broader context of the 
thesis, which sought to use broad strokes to highlight different legal-risk assessment 
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behaviours with potential application in other specialist areas of law, was viewed as 
limited. 
This is not to say that more fine-grained analyses could not have been undertaken.  
Rather, this was not the approach chosen given the research question that had been 
posed and the limits on the length of this thesis.  As noted elsewhere in this chapter, 
more detailed analyses have not been precluded in terms of the data recorded in this 
study or further research projects.  Indeed, seen in the context of the overall aims of this 
thesis, such further research can be expected to benefit from the results and findings 
presented here, particularly insofar as sample-groups of legal specialists may now be 
more confidently ranked according to their levels of expertise. 
The initial ranking of participants in this study relied on a form of differential analysis 
in which only those participants who could be distinguished from the main group of 
participants could be confidently categorised as experts and masters (Group A) or 
apprentices and journeymen (Group C).  This approach relied on a number of 
assumptions about the sample of volunteers who participated in the study and the 
appropriateness of a presumed normal distribution of levels of expertise.  Apparent 
concerns were to a degree ameliorated by only ascribing relative levels of likely 
expertise to individual participants, rather than more conclusive scores of absolute 
expertise.  Moreover, within each group no further intra-group ranking was attempted.  
Yet there remains the possibility that some participants were categorised either higher 
than their actual levels of expertise or, the more likely scenario given the conservative 
nature of the ranking process, lower than their actual levels of expertise.   
A further price paid under this approach was the restricted usability of Group B 
participants.  Because these participants were not separable according to their levels of 
likely expertise – which was unavoidable given the comparative, clustering approach 
adopted for initial ranking purposes – observed differences between these participants 
both internally and with the other two groups would be necessarily inconclusive.  The 
main value of the legal-risk assessments performed by these participants was as 
descriptive examples of different reasoning behaviours.  This was on one view a design 
inefficiency and one which, even if ultimately unavoidable, resulted in the suboptimal 
utilisation of study volunteers. 
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A related issue was the size of the Group B category, and specifically whether it was 
too broadly defined.  On the one hand, it was important that Group A and Group C 
participants be separated by more than the results of a single measure of likely 
expertise.  This required at least five-points of separation.  On the other hand, this 
degree of separation meant that Group B contained eight participants who undertook a 
total of 30 legal-risk assessments.   Whether this gap could have been narrowed with a 
more refined scoring and weighting system is arguable.  Within the limitations of the 
system as conceived it was ostensibly as narrow as the underlying assumptions would 
permit.  Another study along similar lines may be able to revisit and refine both the 
relevant assumptions and related scoring and weighting methodologies. 
Another concern was that the breadth of the Group B category resulted in it containing 
most of the expert and journeyman participants while leaving Group A to consist 
mostly of masters and Group C mostly apprentices.  Subsequent analysis would 
therefore have been between more distantly related legal specialists which could 
introduce material comparative discontinuities.  This could explain why in Chart 6.2 
there was a substantial gap between apprentices and journeymen on the one hand and 
experts and masters on the other in terms of time spent engaging in synthesis.  
However, Chart 6.1 supports the counter-argument that there was a clear progressive 
difference in terms of time spent retrieving information from long-term memory and 
that on this measure journeymen and experts were indistinguishable, which suggested a 
contiguous alignment.    
Considerable thought was given to the use of a second assessor to confirm the 
categorisation of particular behaviours and the identification of certain cognitive tasks.  
There was clear precedent for using such confirmation, but this has usually been 
because it is demanded by the rigour of a particular kind of scientifically-grounded 
analysis or was simply a researcher’s default position.  The choice of not using a 
second assessor for this thesis was supported by both practical and theoretical 
precedent, which seemed more applicable to the present study for the reasons stated in 
Chapter 5.  The trade-off was a need to provide more detailed descriptions of the 
assessment process rather than rely on a simple statement of inter-rater agreement. 
Moving forward from the present map-like, exploratory approach of cognitive analysis 
to more focused research projects investigating a smaller number of more discretely-
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defined variables, the balance of considerations is likely to fall towards the use multiple 
assessors to provide the assurances expected of such projects. 
The inherent inefficiency of the chosen investigatory approach also needs mentioning.  
While the results and findings described in this thesis have been presented 
systematically, the process by which they were selected was iterative and at times 
circuitous.  There were numerous attempts over many months to investigate different 
aspects of participants’ transcripts using a variety of qualitative and quantitative 
analytical techniques.  Some of these looked promising at first, but the end results were 
either not compelling or overly-complicated.  Others were dependent on too many 
assumptions.  Had the presented approach been selected initially, many of these dead-
end investigations and prolonged iterations would have been avoided.  Fortunately, it 
was the researcher alone who experienced this excessive exertion (since all interviews 
were completed and transcribed at an early stage study participants were spared this 
extra work) and, in any event, these processes were ultimately viewed as crucial, if not 
defining, aspects of the chosen approach.   
Lastly, it may have been more useful to have asked participants to assign a percentage 
estimate to the likelihood that a particular merger transaction would be cleared by the 
relevant competition authority.  While it was still possible to identify how those 
participants who provided conclusive opinions viewed the likely outcome of cases, this 
involved a binary distinction rather than a graduated scale of degree.  Moreover, those 
participants who gave inconclusive assessments may have been able to give a 
percentage figure, albeit a heavily qualified one.  This could have facilitated a more 
detailed analysis of assessment accuracy.  Nevertheless, it would still have been 
necessary to understand the reasoning behind any such percentage estimates to 
determine the extent to which they were logically-based and compelling, rather than 
simply the result of guesswork. 
The main downside to requiring a percentage estimate of the likely outcome of a case is 
that it could have obscured or masked an otherwise inconclusive assessment.  If all 
participants strove to provide a conclusive assessment in terms of a percentage 
estimate, it would likely have been more difficult to determine which of their 
assessments were in fact inconclusive.  This could have been a significant hindrance to 
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identifying inconclusive assessments, which were found to be more prevalent amongst 
apprentice and journeyman-level participants than higher-level participants.   
C  Future Research 
Using methodologies and previous research from the field of cognitive psychology, this 
thesis outlined a number of qualitative and quantitative methods for determining the 
expertise levels of legal specialists.  As the first study of its kind, it requires 
confirmation through replication of its results and findings.  If that occurs, then the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter may become foundational to further research 
in a range of other areas, including: the cognitive development of legal expertise; the 
formal accreditation of legal specialists; assessments by consumers of legal services; 
the development of legal talent within law firms; and legal education, particularly at 
intermediate and advanced levels.  
1  Replication and Reproduction of Results 
Detailed descriptions of the methodologies used in this thesis were provided in Chapter 
3 to enable and encourage the reproduction of this study.  Not only were the testing and 
analytical techniques (and technologies) described and explained at length, the actual 
test-case materials and website used to guide the test process have been preserved on-
line.
634
  Given that these particular cases could be quickly forgotten amongst the 
general population of Australian and New Zealand competition law specialists, it may 
be feasible to use the same cases to attempt the direct reproduction of the results and 
findings described here. 
Alternatively, or in addition to any such future studies, research could be undertaken 
along similar lines in other areas of law.  In this respect, the qualitative and quantitative 
data generated in the present study are not specific only to competition law expertise.  
Moreover, the test techniques, technologies and even the test website used in this study 
could be easily adapted for investigations in other specialist legal fields. 
A summary of the methodological approach behind this thesis and links to the relevant 
test materials and test website were provided in Part F of Chapter 3. 
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2  Cognitive Development of Legal Expertise  
The focus of this thesis was on readily identifiable and measurable differences between 
how different levels of legal experts think when assessing legal risk in the same 
information-limited and time-constrained contexts.  This resulted in data that were 
intentionally generalizable and which were derived from analytical approaches chosen 
for their ready applicability and statistical significance.  Given limits on the length of 
discussion in this thesis, priority was given to more broadly applicable measures over 
the detailed analysis of individual protocols.
635
 
This presents an opportunity for further research at this next level of analysis, which in 
turn could lead to a better understanding of the cognitive stages or steps through which 
legal expertise develops as individuals progress from apprentice to journeyman, and 
then to expert and master.  Assuming that further studies are able to confirm the 
findings of the present study, researchers seeking to study cognitive development 
within this process can use the results presented here to identify and categorise future 
participants in such studies. 
The discussion in Part D of the previous chapter presented a contextual analysis of how 
the concepts and theories relating to System 1 and System 2 thinking could provide 
opportunities for further investigation into why study participants with different levels 
of expertise thought as they did.  This is one area of opportunity for further studies of 
the cognitive development of legal expertise.  The results of that analysis were useful 
both contextually for this study and as a starting point for different kinds of cognitive 
analysis.   
The contribution of this thesis to such further research could be substantial insofar as it 
provides a workable basis for ranking different levels of legal specialists.  Prior to the 
present study, researchers relied on a number of critical assumptions, some of which 
may now be considered questionable.  These studies have also most commonly 
compared novices and assumed experts, which has precluded more fine-grained 
analyses at the higher-end of the legal expertise spectrum. 
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assumptions. 
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As previously noted, the methodology for ranking participants in this study involved 
detailed protocol analysis.  This increased the risk that further detailed protocol analysis 
when comparing different levels of experts would result in double-counting the same 
cognitive attributes.  For this reason, a broader and less detailed (but ultimately more 
purposeful) approach was adopted for this study's back-end analysis.  Future 
researchers can avoid these issues by starting with the behavioural traits and cognitive 
indicators identified in this thesis to rank their participants, after which they will have 
greater freedom to examine and compare their detailed protocols. 
3  Formal Accreditation of Legal Specialists  
Chay selected the higher-level participants in his study based on their having passed the 
Queensland Law Society’s family-law specialist accreditation process.636  Like many 
specialist legal accreditation schemes around the world, the Queensland Law Society 
requires that in addition to successfully completing set tasks, such as mock client-
interviews, prospective applicants must have a minimum number of years’ experience 
in the relevant area of law (at least 5 years in the case of Chay’s experts) and be 
‘recognised by her or his peers as a competent family law practitioner.’637  The Law 
Society of England and Wales states with respect to its specialist accreditation scheme, 
‘The expertise of scheme members in a given area of law has been verified and their 
accomplishment is recognised by the Law Society.’638  Similarly, the State Bar of 
California states that its certified specialists:  
Have taken and passed a written examination in their specialty field, demonstrated a 
high level of experience in the speciality field [a minimum 25% of their time for each 
the previous 5 years], fulfilled ongoing education requirements and been favourably 
evaluated by other attorneys familiar with their work.
639
 
These accreditation and certification schemes do not utilise a cognitive-based 
methodology for testing applicants, nor do they rank them according to their apparent 
levels of specialist legal expertise.   They also typically focus only on broad legal 
specialities rather than subspecialties, and primarily only on consumer-related practice 
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areas rather than corporate law.  Of interest in this particular context are the data from 
the previous chapter which can be used to assist with the ranking of legal specialists 
under existing accreditation schemes.  
Chart 7.1 below makes use of the quantitative data reflected in Column 3 of Table 6.1 
in the previous chapter.  That column, which lists cognitive indicators for each of the 
above levels of expertise, reveals different ratios of synthesis time and identifying time 
for each of these expert levels.  While based on sample averages, the linear trend line in 
this chart has explanatory power and is statistically significant.
640
   
CHART 7.1 – Ratio of Average Synthesis Time to Average Identifying Time641  
 
This chart combines the information presented in charts 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6 (as 
summarised in Column 3 of Table 6.1).  The result is a ranking of expertise based 
solely on time spent synthesising and identifying issues when assessing legal risk in an 
information-limited and time-constrained context.  With further work, this chart could 
be augmented by the additional information identified in this thesis regarding different 
types of assessment behaviour (ease of reasoning, certainty of assessment, assessment 
accuracy and depth of analysis as discussed in Chapter 5) and with reference to 
verbalisation rates while engaging in different cognitive tasks.   
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Future research could assess the extent to which these data ratios and additional 
behavioural information could be used as a basis for – or at least assist in – formally 
accrediting legal specialists according to their levels of sub-domain expertise. 
4  Assessments by Consumers of Legal Services 
According to a 2013 survey of 968 in-house legal counsel, the most common reason 
given for selecting a particular law firm or legal advisor was their expertise in a specific 
field of law.
642
   This finding is consistent with the previously mentioned schemes of 
specialist accreditation, by which lawyers seek to gain ‘brand advantage through 
establishing themselves as a specialist expert in a given area of law.’643  Apart from 
such accreditation (which is of limited relevance for larger corporate clients), users of 
legal services have little to rely on when assessing legal specialists and nothing that 
provides a cognitive-based ranking of individual lawyers’ according to their levels of 
specialist legal expertise. 
Whether or not a standardised testing methodology using cognitive data is developed 
by law societies or other formal accreditation bodies, some larger users of legal 
services could develop their own proprietary methodology to rank individual lawyers 
using information like that shown in Table 6.1 and Chart 7.1.  Such a methodology 
could also incorporate accreditation information and data provided by publications such 
as Who’s Who Legal, Chambers and Partners and The Legal 500 as discussed in 
Chapter 4.  However, as previously noted these publications do not provide quantitative 
rankings as such, and nor do they provide information on apprentice and journeyman-
level legal specialists. 
These are issues that future researchers could consider, potentially with the support of 
legal consumers and interested law firms. 
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5  Development of Legal Talent Within Law Firms 
Mentoring, coaching and improvements in feedback for mid-level lawyers are all 
subjects that exercise the minds of law firm management.
644
  While the motivations 
behind initiatives in these areas can be complex, a central challenge is how to assess 
and develop the talent of legal staff, particularly those at the mid to senior-levels who 
have already mastered the rules of legal reasoning and generic skills taught in law 
schools.  By engaging them in a discussion about the cognitive skills and behaviours 
discussed in this thesis, it may be possible to identify new strategies for increasing 
individual lawyer’s expertise in novel and effective ways. 
As an input into a cognitive apprenticeship model, an understanding of the results and 
findings of this study could assist focus and guide training programs as well as inform 
individual development plans for legal specialists at various levels.  During the 
interviews conducted for this study, there was considerable interest in this area amongst 
both partner and non-partner level participants.  Indeed, without a degree of fascination 
with and belief in the usefulness of this type of research, it is doubtful that the number 
of participants who volunteered for this study would have been as large as it was.  
Further research into how to develop the findings of this thesis to better equip those 
with senior management responsibility within law firms would ostensibly be a welcome 
and worthwhile pursuit. 
6  Legal Education 
Law schools have traditionally focused on teaching students to think like lawyers, but 
not on preparing legal specialists to think like experts.  Using the methodologies and 
findings from this thesis, law schools can review current post-graduate programs which 
focus on a specialist field of law and target mid to senior-level lawyers.
645
  This thesis 
has shown that levels of expertise vary materially even amongst experienced legal 
specialists, and that this variation is evident in legal risk-assessment behaviours and 
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cognitive performance on tasks such as identifying issues and engaging in synthesis in 
information-limited and time-constrained contexts. 
The testing methods used in this study were demonstrated to be effective in eliciting 
verbal data relevant to how participants approached the assessment of issues in the test 
cases.  Moreover, these tests could not have been gamed or pre-empted by participants 
in the way that some forms of assessment at law schools can be undermined by students 
who, for instance, engage third-parties to complete their assignments or cheat the 
system in other ways.
646
  Even if an interviewee knows that reduced identifying time 
and increased synthesis time generally reflects a higher level of expertise, without the 
ability to actually identify relevant issues quickly and synthesise them effectively, this 
information is of little help.  In addition, this method of testing enables the pinpointing 
of specific areas of cognitive difficulty that may not be evident using traditional 
examination techniques.   
In terms of essay writing, Palasota has shown how think-aloud problem solving can be 
adapted to understand the thinking processes of students, although verbalising while 
writing an essay involves different considerations from those noted in this thesis.
647
  
Colon-Navarro
648
 and Chay
649
 have also demonstrated that verbal data can be elicited 
during the review of video-recorded interview sessions.  Further uses of think-aloud 
verbalisations in law school settings have been suggested by Senger.
650
 
These represent other areas of research that could be undertaken by both legal scholars 
and researchers outside the legal academy such as other educators and cognitive 
psychologists.   Insofar as such research focuses on higher-level legal specialists, this 
thesis offers new methodological guidance and previously unavailable comparative 
data.  
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D  Conclusion 
Each of the 20 volunteers who participated in this study had at least five years’ 
experience as a competition law specialist.  Together they generated over 70,000 words 
of think-aloud verbalisations.  These verbalisations reflected the cognitive processes of 
participants as they engaged in the assessment of legal risk in merger clearance cases 
that were at the time being considered by either the ACCC or CC.  The selection of 
these volunteers and these cases (and the rules for disqualifying cases when a 
participant had direct prior knowledge of a test-case transaction) ensured that no 
participant had a knowledge advantage in terms of the relevant laws and procedures, of 
the factual details of particular transactions, or of the outcome of the ACCC or CC’s 
deliberations, which were the central focus of the legal-risk assessment task. 
Through the application of previous research findings concerning the cognitive abilities 
of experts, participants were ranked and their assessments divided into the categories of 
apprentice, journeyman, expert and master-level according to Hoffman’s Scheme.  This 
progressive domain-specific scheme of expertise development was chosen over the 
knowledge-based categorisations of expertise used by researchers such as Patel and 
Groen, whose analytical framework has been the predominant influence in the design 
of previous empirical studies of legal thinking skills.   
The exploratory nature of the analysis of verbal protocols undertaken in this study was 
a further point of departure from previous research in this area in a methodological 
sense, although there was firm precedent for this approach in the work of Baddely and 
other scholars.  The results of this exploration were both qualitative and quantitative, 
enabling for the first time a listing of readily identifiable and measurable differences 
between different levels of legal experts – differences that were unrelated to variations 
in technical legal knowledge.  This record of observed differences opens up 
opportunities for further research in a number of different areas, as well as the 
possibility to confirm the findings presented here through the recreation of the test 
procedures and methodological choices described in detail in the preceding chapters. 
Ultimately, it is hoped that these contributions to existing scholarship on how lawyers 
think will enhance our effectiveness as lawyers and law teachers, and lead to 
opportunities for more targeted research into the cognitive skills of legal experts both 
within and beyond the legal academy.  
277 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
A  Articles/Books/Reports 
Aaronson, Mark Neal, ‘We Ask You to Consider:  Learning About Practical Judgment 
in Lawyering’ (1997-1998) 4 Clinical Law Review 251 
Ackerman, Phillip L, ‘Nonsense, Common Sense and Science of Expert Performance: 
Talent and Individual Differences’ (2013) 45 Intelligence 6 
Acritas, Winning and Losing Business: Clients’ Candid Views on Why They Hire and 
Fire Their Law Firms (Acritas, September 2013) 
Alexander, Larry, Demystifying Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Alexander, P A, ‘Can We Get There From Here?’ (2003) 32 Educational Researcher 3 
Amsel, Eric, Rosanna Langer and Lynn Loutzehiser, ‘Do Lawyers Reason Differently 
From Psychologists? A Comparative Design for Studying Expertise’ in R Sternberg 
and P Frensch (eds), Complex Problem Solving: Principles and Mechanisms (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1991) 
Amsterdam, Anthony G, ‘Clinical Legal Education – A 21st Century Perspective’ 
(1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 612  
Ardelt, Monika, ‘Wisdom as Expert Knowledge Systerm:  A Critical Review of a 
Contemporary Operationalization of an Ancient Concept’ (2004) 47 Human 
Development 257 
Arocha, Jose F and Vimla L Patel, ‘Novice Diagnostic Reasoning in Medicine:  
Accounting for Evidence’ (1995) 4(4) The Journal of the Learning Sciences 355 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Informal Merger Review Process 
Guidelines (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, September 2013) 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Brambles Industries Limited – 
Completed Acquisition of CEVA Limited’s Pallecon Business (Reference 50545), 
Market Inquiries Letter, 19 March 2013 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Ruralco Holdings Limited – 
Proposed Acquisition of Elders Rural Services Limited (Reference 50978), Market 
Inquiries Letter, 19 March 2013 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Toll Holdings Limited – Proposed 
Acquisition of Linfox Trans-Bass Business (Reference 50982), Market Inquiries Letter, 
22 March 2013 
278 
 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Rocla Pty Ltd – Proposed 
Acquisition of Beresford Concrete Products Pty Ltd (Reference 51157), Market 
Inquiries Letter, 23 April 2013 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC To Not Oppose Ruralco’s 
Proposed Acquisition of Elders Rural Services, Media Release, 30 May 2013 
Bachmann, T and M Oit, ‘Stroop-like Interference in Chess Players’ Imagery: An 
Unexplored Possibility to be Revealed by the Adapted Moving-Spot Task’ (1992) 54 
Psychological Research 27 
Baddeley, A, ‘Short-Term and Working Memory,’ in E Tulving and F Craik (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Memory (Oxford University Press, 2000) 77 
Baddely, A, ‘Is Working Memory Still Working?’ (2002) 7(2) European Psychologist 
85 
Baddeley, A, ‘Working Memory:  Theories, Models, and Controversies’ (2012) 63 
Annual Review of Psychology 1 
Baltes, P B and U M Staudinger, ‘Wisdom:  A Metaheuristic (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate 
Mind and Virtue Toward Excellence’ (2000) 55 American Psychologist 122 
Baltes, P B, U M Staudinger, A Maercker and J Smith, ‘People Nominated as Wise:  A 
Comparative Study of Wisdom-Related Knowledge’ (1995) 10(2) Psychology and 
Aging 155 
Baxt, R, ‘The Australian Concept of Market – How It Came To Be,’ in M Richardson 
and P Williams (eds), The Law and The Market (The Federation Press, 1995) 10 
Beaton-Wells, Caron, Proof of Antitrust Markets in Australia (The Federation Press, 
2003) 
Bedard, J, ‘Expertise and Its Relation to Audit Decision Quality’ (1991) 8 
Contemporary Accounting Research 198 
Bilalic, Merim, Peter McLeod and Fernand Gobet, ‘Specialization Effect and Its 
Influence on Memory and Problem Solving in Expert Chess Players’ (2009) 33 
Cognitive Science 1117 
Blasi, Gary L, ‘What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory’ (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313 
Blasi, Gary L, ‘Teaching/Lawyering as an Intellectual Project’ (1996) 14 Journal of 
Professional Legal Education 65 
Bonner, Sarah M and Jerome V D’Agostino, ‘A Substantive Analysis of Responses to 
Items from the Multistate Bar Examination’ (2012) 25 Applied Measurement in 
Education 1 
279 
 
Bonneville-Roussy, A, G L Lavigne and R J Vallerand, ‘When Passion Leads to 
Excellence:  The Case of Musicians’ (2011) 39 Psychology of Music 123 
Borst, Gregoire, Elaine Niven and Robert H Logie, ‘Visual Mental Image Generation 
Does Not Overlap With Visual Short-Term Memory:  A Dual-Task Interference Study’ 
(2012) 40 Memory & Cognition 360 
Boshuizen, Henny P A and Henk G Schmidt, ‘On the Role of Biomedical Knowledge 
in Clinical Reasoning by Experts, Intermediates and Novices’ (1992) 16(2) Cognitive 
Science 153 
Braten, Ivar and Helge I Stromso, ‘A Longitudinal Think-Aloud Study of Spontaneous 
Strategic Processing During the Reading of Multiple Expository Texts’ (2003) 16 
Reading and Writing: An Interdisciplinary Journal 195 
Brooks, David, The Social Animal:  The Hidden Sources of Love, Character and 
Achievement (Random House, 2012) 
Brown, A and J Day, ‘Macro Rules for Summarizing Strategies:  The Development of 
Expertise’ (1983) 22 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 1 
Brozek, Bartosz and Jerzy Stelmach, Methods of Legal Reasoning (Law and 
Philosophy Library, 2006) 
Brunt, M, ‘“Market Definition” Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices 
Litigation’ (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 
Bryan, W L and N Harter, ‘Studies on the Telegraphic Language:  The Acquisition of a 
Hierarchy of Habits’ (1899) 6 Psychological Review 345  
Bryden, David P, ‘What Do Law Students Learn?  A Pilot Study’ (1984) 34 Journal of 
Legal Education 479 
Butterworth, J Scott and Edmund H Reppert, ‘Auscultatory Acumen in the General 
Medical Population’ (1960) 174(1) JAMA 114 
Cacciabue, P C and E Hollnagel, ‘Simulation of Cognition: Applications,’ in J M Hoc, 
P C Cacciabue and E Hollnagel, Expertise and Technology: Cognition and Human-
Computer Cooperation (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995) 55 
Camp, Elisabeth, ‘Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor’ (2006) 1(2) 
Philosophy Compass 154 
Chadderton, Sam, ‘Time for Competition Law to “Get Real,” Says Incoming CAT 
Chairman,’ The Lawyer, 11 January 2013 
Chaiken, S and Y Trope (eds), Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (Guilford 
Press, 1999) 
280 
 
Charles River Associates, Benchmarking the Supply of Legal Services by City Law 
Firms, report prepared for the UK Legal Services Board (Charles River Associates, 
2011) 
Charness, N, ‘The Impact of Chess Research on Cognitive Science’ (1992) 54 
Psychological Research 4 
Charness, N, M Tuffiash and T Jastrzembski, ‘Motivation, Emotion, and Expert Skill 
Acquisition,’ in D Dai and RJ Sternberg (eds), Motivation, Emotion and Cognition: 
Integrative Perspectives (Erlbaum, 2004) 299 
Chase, W G and H A Simon, ‘Perception in Chess’ (1973) 4 Cognitive Psychology 55 
Chase, W G and H A Simon, ‘The Mind’s Eye in Chess,’ in WG Chase (ed), Visual 
Information Processing (Academic Press, 1973) 215 
Chay, Allan James, Lawyer Problem Solving: An Investigation of the Knowledge Used 
in Solving Practical Legal Problems (PhD Thesis, Griffith University, 2006) 
Chi, M T H, ‘Knowledge Structure and Memory Development,’ in R Siegler (ed) 
Children’s Thinking:  What Develops? (Erlbaum, 1978) 73 
Chi, M T H, P Feltovitch and R Glaser, ‘Categorization and Representation of Physics 
Problems by Experts and Novices’ (1981) 5 Cognitive Science 121 
Chi M T H, R Glaser and E Rees, ‘Expertise in Problem Solving,’ in R Sternberg (ed) 
Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence (Vol. 1) (Erlbaum, 1982) 7 
Chi, Michelene T H, ‘Theoretical Perspectives, Methodological Approaches, and 
Trends in the Study of Expertise,’ in Y Li and G Kaiser (eds) Expertise in Mathematics 
Instruction (Springer, 2011) 17 
Chi, Michelene T H, ‘Laboratory Methods for Assessing Experts’ and Novices’ 
Knowledge,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R 
Hoffman, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 167 
Chi, M T H, ‘Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics,’ in K Anders 
Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman, The Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
21  
Christensen, Leah, ‘The Psychology Behind Case Briefing: A Powerful Cognitive 
Schema’ (2006) 29(1) Campbell Law Review 5 
Christensen, Leah M, ‘Legal Reading and Success in Law School:  An Empirical 
Study’ (2006-2007) 30 Seattle University Law Review 603 
281 
 
Christensen, Leah M, ‘The Paradox of Legal Expertise:  A Study of Experts and 
Novices Reading the Law’ (2008) Brigham Young University Education and Law 
Journal 53 
Clarke, Julie, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers (PhD Thesis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2010) 
Colon-Navarro, Fernando, ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer:  Expert-Novice Differences in 
Simulated Client Interviews’ (1997) 21 The Journal of the Legal Profession 107 
Colvin, Geoffrey, Talent is Overrated:  What Really Separates World-Class 
Performers from Everybody Else (Portfolio Trade, 2010) 
Commerce Commission, Determination:  Bertelsmann SE & Co KGaA and Pearson 
plc [2013] NZCC 6 (Wellington, 19 March 2013) 
Commerce Commission, Determination:  Bligh Finance Limited and Hire Equipment 
Group Limited [2013] NZCC 2 (Wellington, 21 February 2013) 
Commerce Commission, Statement of Preliminary Issues: Hirepool / Hirequip  
(Wellington, 22 October 2012) 
Commerce Commission, Statement of Preliminary Issues: Penguin / Random House 
(Wellington, 11 January 2013) 
Commerce Commission, Statement of Preliminary Issues: Perry Metal Protection 
Limited / CSP Coating Systems (Wellington, 25 January 2013) 
Coyle, Daniel, The Talent Code:  Greatness Isn’t Born.  It’s Grown.  Here’s How 
(Bantam, 2009) 
Crandall, Beth, Gary Klein and Robert R Hoffman, Working Minds:  A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Cognitive Task Analysis (The MIT Press, 2006) 
Crombag, H F M,  J L De Wijkerslooth and E H Van Tuyl Van Serooskerken, ‘On 
Solving Legal Problems’ (1975-1976) 27 Journal of Legal Education 168 
Cutler, Anne, Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (John Wiley & Sons, 2005) 
Dancey, C and J Reidy, Statistics Without Maths for Psychology: Using SPSS for 
Windows (Prentice Hall, 2004) 
Dane, Erik Ian, Does Experience Matter?  Examining the Relationship Between 
Experience and Dynamic Decision-Making Effectiveness Among Professionals (PhD 
Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007) 
Dane, Erik, Kevin W Rockmann and Michael G Pratt, ‘When Should I Trust My Gut?  
Linking Domain Expertise to Intuitive Decision-Making Effectiveness’ (2012) 119 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 187 
282 
 
Dawes, R M, ‘A Case Study of Graduate Admissions:  Application of Three Principles 
of Human Decision Making’ (1971) 26 American Psychologist 180 
Deegan, Dorothy H, ‘Exploring Individual Differences Among Novices Reading in a 
Specific Domain:  The Case of Law’ (1995) 30(2) Reading Research Quarterly 154 
Deffner, G, Think Aloud: An Investigation of the Validity of a Data Collection 
Procedure (PhD Thesis, University of Hamburg, 1983) 
Deffner, G, Think Aloud – An Investigation of the Validity of a Data Collection 
Procedure (Peter Lang, 1984) 
de Groot, A, Thought and Choice in Chess (Mouton, 1965) 
Dijkstra, K A, J van der Pligt, G A van Kleef and J H Kerstholt, ‘Deliberation Versus 
Intuition: Global Versus Local Processing in Judgment and Choice’ (2012) 48 Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology 1156 
Djkstra, Koen A, Joop van der Pligt and Gerben A van Kleef, ‘Deliberation Versus 
Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making’ 
(2013) 26 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 285 
Dreyfus, H L and S E Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine:  The Power of Human Intuition 
and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (The Free Press, 1986) 
Duckworth, A L, T A Kirby, E Tsukayama, H Berstein, and K A Ericsson, ‘Deliberate 
Practice Spells Success:  Why Grittier Competitors Triumph at the National Spelling 
Bee’ (2012) 2 Social Psychology and Personality Science 174 
Dudley, Robert J, Think Like a Lawyer:  How to Get What You Want by Using 
Advocacy Skills (Nelson-Hall, 1980) 
Duncker, K, ‘A Qualitative (Experimental and Theoretical) Study of Productive 
Thinking (Solving Comprehensible Problems)’ (1926) 33 Pedagogical Seminary 642 
Duncker, K, On Problem Solving (Greenwood Press, 1972 (L S Lees Trans.)) (Original 
work published 1945)  
Durkin, H E, ‘Trial and Error, Gradual Analysis and Sudden Reorganization:  An 
Experimental Study of Problem Solving’ (1937) Archives of Psychology 210 
Eells, Tracy D, Kenneth G Lombart, Edward M Kendjelic, L Carolyn Turner and 
Cynthia P Lucas, ‘The Quality of Psychotherapy Case Formulations:  A Comparison of 
Expert, Experienced, and Novice Cognitive-Behavioral and Psychodynamic Therapists’ 
(2005) 73(4) Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 579 
Elhauge, E and D Geradin, Global Antitrust Law & Economics (Foundation Press, 
2007) 
283 
 
Elhauge, Einer, ‘How Should Competition Law Be Taught?’ (2008) 4(1) Competition 
Policy International 267 
Elo, A E, ‘Age Changes in Master Chess Performance’ (1965) 20 Journal of 
Gerontology 289 
Elo, A E, The Rating of Chessplayers, Past and Present (Arco Chess, 2
nd
 ed, 1986) 
Elstein, Arthur S, ‘Naturalistic Decision Making and Clinical Judgment’ (2001) 14(5) 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 363 
Epstein, S, ‘Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic Unconcious’ (1994) 49 
American Psychologist 709 
Ericsson, K Anders, ‘Deliberate Practice and the Acquisition and Maintenance of 
Expert Performance in Medicine and Related Domains’ (2004) 79(10) Academic 
Medicine S70 
Ericsson, Anders K and Herbert Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data 
(The MIT Press, 1984/93) 
Ericsson, K Anders, ‘An Introduction to Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance:  Its Development, Organization and Content’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil 
Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of 
Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 3 
Ericsson, K Anders, ‘Protocol Analysis and Expert Thought:  Concurrent 
Verbalizations of Thinking during Experts’ Performance on Representative Tasks’ in K 
Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 223 
Ericsson, K Anders, ‘The Influence of Experience and Deliberate Practice on the 
Development of Superior Performance,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J 
Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 683 
Ericsson, K Anders, ‘The Scientific Study of Expert Levels of Performance:  General 
Implications for Optimal Learning and Creativity’ (1998) 9(1) High Ability Studies 75 
Ericsson, K A, R T Krampe and C Tesch-Romer, ‘The Role of Deliberate Practice in 
the Acquisition of Expert Performance’ (1993) 100 Psychological Review 363 
Ericsson, K A and A C Lehman, ‘Expert and Exceptional Performance:  Evidence on 
Maximal Adaptations on Task Constraints’ (1996) 47 Annual Review of Psychology 
273 
Evans, Vyvyan, ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ (2012) 3 WIREs Cognitive Science 129 
284 
 
Farrar, John, Legal Reasoning (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 
Fels, Allan, Sharon Henrick and Martyn Taylor, ‘Australia,’ in Maher Dabbah and Paul 
Lasok (eds) Merger Control Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 78 
Feltovich, P J, P E Johnson, J M Moller and D B Swanson, ‘LCS: The Role and 
Development of Medical Knowledge in Diagnostic Expertise,’ in William J Clancey 
and Edward H Shortliff (eds), Readings in Medical Artificial Intelligence: The First 
Decade (Addison-Wesley, 1984)  
Feltovich, P J and H S Barrows, ‘Issues of Generality in Medical Problem Solving,’ in 
HG Schmidt and ML de Volder (eds) Tutorials in Problem-Based Learning (Van 
Gorcum, 1984) 128 
Feltovich, Paul J, Michael J Prietula and K Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from 
Psychological Perspectives,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J Feltovich and 
Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 41 
Fernandes, Ronald and Herbert A Simon, ‘A Study of How Individuals Solve Complex 
and Ill-Structured Problems’ (1999) 32 Policy Sciences 225 
Fortescue, Michael, Neural Network Model of Lexical Organization (Continuum 
International Publishing, 2009) 
Fortescue, Michael, ‘Similitude: A Conceptual Category’ (2010) 42(2) Acta Linguistica 
Hafniensia 117 
Fox, Mark C, K Anders Ericsson and Ryan Best, ‘Do Procedures for Verbal Reporting 
of Thinking Have to Be Reactive? A Meta-Analysis and Recommendations for Best 
Reporting Methods,’ (2011) 137(2) Psychological Bulletin 316 
Freeman, J, ‘If You Can’t Measure It – It doesn’t Exist’ (2007) 18 High Ability Studies 
65 
Galton, F, Hereditary Genius (Macmillan, 1869) 
Gantt, Larry O, ‘Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind’ (2006-2007) 29 Campbell Law Review 413 
Gardner, H, ‘Expert Performance: Its Structure and Acquisition’ (1995) 50 American 
Psychologist 802 
Garicano, Luis and Thomas N Hubbard, ‘Managerial Leverage is Limited by the Extent 
of the Market:  Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Lawyer’s Human 
Capital’ (2007) 50(1) Journal of Law and Economics 1 
285 
 
Garicano, Luis and Thomas N Hubbard, ‘Specialization, Firms, and Markets:  The 
Division of Labor within and between Law Firms’ (2008) 25(2) The Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 339 
Garner, Bryan A, ‘Although IRAC Works for Exams, Avoid It in Practice’ (2004-2005) 
33 Student Lawyer 10 
Gigerenzer, G and H Brighton, ‘Homo Heuristicus:  Why Biased Minds Make Better 
Inferences’ (2009) 1 Topics in Cognitive Science 107 
Gilbert, D T, ‘Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the Social 
Inference Process’ in J Uleman and J A Bargh (eds), Unintended Thought (Prentice-
Hall, 1989) 189 
Gilbert, D T, ‘Inferential Correction’ in T Gilovich, D Griffin and D Kahneman (eds) 
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 167 
Gilhooly, K J, P McGeorge, J Hunter, J M Rawles, I K Kirby, C Green and V Wynn, 
‘Biomedical Knowledge in Diagnostic Thinking:  The Case of Electrocardiagram 
(ECG) Interpretation’ (1997) 9 European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 199 
Gladwell, Malcolm, Outliers: The Story of Success (Little, Brown and Company, 2008) 
Glaser, Robert, ‘Education and Thinking:  The Role of Knowledge’ (1984) 39 
American Psychologist 93 
Glockner, Andreas and Irena D Ebert, ‘Legal Intuition and Expertise,’ in Marta Sinclair 
(ed), Handbook of Intuition Research (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011) 157 
Gobet, Fernand and Neil Charness,’Expertise in Chess,’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil 
Charness, Paul J Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of 
Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 523 
Goor, A and R E Sommerfeld, ‘A Comparison of Problem-Solving Processes of 
Creative and Non-Creative Students’ (1975) 67 Journal of Educational Psychology 495 
Gordon, Leslie A, Legal Wranglers: Law Firms Add Coaches to their Staffs, ABA 
Journal, May 2014 
Grant, Kenneth A, ‘Tacit Knowledge Revisited – We Can Still Learn from Polanyi’ 
(2007) 5(2) The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management 173 
Greaves, C E, H Zacher, B McKenna and D Rooney, ‘Wisdom and Narcissism as 
Predictors of Transformational Leadership’ (2014) 35(4) Leadership & Organization 
Development Journal 335 
Groen, C J and Vimla L Patel, ‘Medical Problem-Solving:  Some Questionable 
Assumptions’ 1985) 19(2) Medical Education 95 
286 
 
Hambrick, David Z, Frederick L Oswald, Erik M Altmann, Elizabeth J Meinz, Fernand 
Gobet and Guillermo Campitelli, ‘Deliberate Practice: Is That All It Takes To Become 
An Expert?’ (2013) 45 Intelligence 34 
Hammond, K R, Judgment Under Stress (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
Hayes, J R, The Complete Problem Solver (Franklin Institute Press, 1981) 
Henderson, Bethany Rubin, ‘Asking the Lost Question:  What is the Purpose of Law 
School?’ (2003) 53(1) Journal of Legal Education 48 
Henderson, William D, Supercharging Lawyer Development Through Feedback, 
NALP Bulletin, June 2014 
Hinds, P J, ‘The Curse of Expertise:  The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods 
on Prediction of Novice Performance’ (1999) 5 Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Applied 205 
Hoffman, R R, ‘The Problem of Extracting the Knowledge of Experts from the 
Perspective of Experimental Psychology’ (1987) 8 AI Magazine 53 
Hoffman, Robert R, ‘How Can Expertise be Defined? Implications of Research from 
Cognitive Psychology’ in Robin Williams, Wendy Faulkner and James Fleck (eds), 
Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives (Macmillan Press Limited, 1998) 81 
Hoffman R R, J W Coffey and K M Ford, A Case Study in the Research Paradigm of 
Human-Centered Computing: Local Expertise in Weather Forecasting (National 
Technology Alliance, 2000) 
Hoffman, R R, G Trafton and P Roebber, Minding the Weather:  How Expert 
Forecasters Think (MIT Press, 2005) 
Hoffman, Robert R, Paul Ward, Paul J Feltovich, Lia DiBello, Stephen M Fiore and 
Dee H Andrew, Accelerated Expertise: Training for High Proficiency in a Complex 
World (Psychology Press, 2014) 
Hogarth, R M, Educating Intuition (University of Chicago Press, 2001) 
International Competition Network, ICN Investigative Techniques Handbook for 
Merger Review (International Competition Network, June 2005) 
International Competition Network, ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis 
(International Competition Network, 2008) 
Ippolito, Richard A, ‘The Sorting Function:  Evidence from Law School’ (2001) 51 
Journal of Legal Education 533 
Jacoby, L L, ‘A Process Dissociation Framework: Separating Automatic from 
Intentional Uses of Memory (1991) 30 Journal of Memory and Language 513 
287 
 
Jacoby, L L, ‘Dissociating Automatic and Consciously Controlled Effects of 
Study/Test Compatibility’ (1996) 35 Journal of Memory and Language 32 
James, Nickolas, Clair Hughes and Clare Cappa, ‘Conceptualising, Developing and 
Assessing Critical Thinking in Law’ (2010) 15(3) Teaching in Higher Education 285 
James, Nick, Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of Laws): Thinking Skills (Threshold 
Learning Outcome 3) (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2011) 
James, Nickolas John, ‘Professional Mentoring Programs for Law Students’ (2011) 30 
University of Tasmania Law Review 90 
James, Nick, ‘Logical, Critical and Creative: Teaching ‘Thinking Skills’ to Law 
Students’ (2012) 12(1) QUT Law & Justice 66 
Jenkins, J J, ‘Educating for Applications’ in R R Hoffman and D S Palermo (eds), 
Cognition and the Symbolic Processes:  Applied and Ecological Perspectives 
(Erlbaum, 1983) 335 
Johnson, E S ‘An Information Processing Model of One Kind of Problem Solving’ 
(1964) 4 Psychological Monographs 78 
Johnson, P E, ‘The Expert Mind: A New Challenge for the Information Scientist,’ in 
TMA Bemelmans (ed), Beyond Productivity: Information Systems Development for 
Organization Effectiveness (North Holland Publishing, 1984) 367 
Johnson, E J, ‘Expertise and Decision Under Uncertainty:  Performance and Process,’ 
in MTH Chi, R Glaser and MJ Farr (eds) The Nature of Expertise (Erlbaum, 1988) 209 
Justice Gault, ‘A Judicial Perspective on Competition Litigation,’ in R Adhar (ed), 
Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand (Law Book Co., 1991) 96 
Kahn, Larry, Think Like a Lawyer:  Negotiating a New Car Purchase (Amazon Digital 
Services, 2012) 
Kahneman, D and A Tversky, ‘On the Study of Statistical Intuition’ in D Kahneman, P 
Slovic and A Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982) 493  
Kahneman, D and S Frederick, ‘Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in 
Intuitive Judgment’ in T Gilovich, D Griffin and D Kahneman (eds), Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 49 
Kahneman, Daniel, ‘A Perspective on Judgment and Choice:  Mapping Bounded 
Rationality’ (2003) 58(9) American Psychologist 697 
Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) 
288 
 
Kallaugher, J, ‘Review of Elhauge & Geradin’s Global Competition Law and 
Economics’ (2007) 3(2) Competition Policy International 241 
Kaufman, S B, ‘Investigating the Role of Domain General Mechanisms in the 
Acquisition of Domain Specific Expertise’ (2007) 18 High Ability Studies 71 
Kedia, Soma, ‘Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Towards a New 
Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing’ (2009-2010) 87 University of Detroit Mercy Law 
Review 147 
Kermarrec, Gilles and Cyril Bossard, ‘Defensive Soccer Players’ Decision Making: A 
Naturalistic Study’ (2014) 8(2) Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 
187 
Keyzer, Patrick, Legal Problem Solving – A Guide for Law Students (LexisNexis, 
2002) 
Kift, Sally, Mark Israel and Rachael Field, Learning and Teaching Academic Standards 
Project:  Bachelor of Laws Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Statement, 
December 2010 (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2010) 
King, L and N Tuckwell, Stimulated Recall Memory (The Western Australian Institute 
for Educational Research, 1983) 
Klein, G A, ‘A Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision 
Making,’ in G A Klein, J Orasanu, R Calderwood and C E Zsambok (eds), Decision-
Making in Action:  Models and Methods (Ablex, 1993) 138 
Klein, G, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (MIT Press, 1998) 
Klein, D E, H A Klein and G Klein, ‘Macrognition: Linking Cognitive Psychology and 
Cognitive Ergonomics,’ in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Human 
Interactions with Complex Systems (University of Illinois, 2000) 173 
Klein, G, Intuition at Work: Why Developing Your Gut Instincts Will Make You Better 
at What You Do (Doubleday, 2003) 
Klein, Gary, Karol G Ross, Brian M Moon, Devorah E Klein, Robert R Hoffman and 
Erik Hoffnagel, ‘Macrognition’ (2003) 3 Human-Centered Computing 81 
Klein, Gary, ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (2008) 50(3) Human Factors 456 
Klein, Gary, Seeing What Others Don’t: The Remarkable Ways We Gain Insights 
(Public Affairs, 2013) 
Klinger, E, ‘Utterances to Evaluate Steps and Control Attention Distinguish Operant 
from Respondent Thought While Thinking Out Loud’ (1974) 4 Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society 44 
289 
 
Krieger, Stefan H, ‘Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem 
Solving’ (2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 149 
Krieger, Stefan H, ‘The Development of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law Students:  An 
Empirical Study’ (2006) 56(3) Journal of Legal Education 332 
Lakatos, I, Proofs and Reputations (Cambridge University Press, 1976) 
Larkin, J H, J McDermott, D P Simon and H A Simon, ‘Models of Competence in 
Solving Physics Problems’ (1980) 4 Cognitive Science 317 
Lawrence, Jeanette A, ‘Expertise on the Bench:  Modeling Magistrate’s Judicial 
Decision-Making’ in Michelene T H Chi, Robert Glaser and Marshall J Farr (eds), The 
Nature of Expertise (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988) 
Leahey, Erin and Laura A Hunter, ‘Lawyer’s Lines of Work:  Specialization’s Role in 
the Income Determination Process’ (2012) 90(4) Social Forces 1101 
Le Brun, Marlene and Richard Johnstone, The Quiet (R)Evolution: Improving Student 
Learning in Law (Law Book Co, 1995) 
Lemaire, P and R S Siegler, ‘Four Aspects of Strategic Change: Contributions to 
Children’s Learning of Multiplication’ (1995) 124 Journal of Experimental Psychology 
83 
Lesgold, A, H Rubinson, P Feltovich, R Glaser, D Klopfer and Y Wang, ‘Expertise in a 
Complex Skill: Diagnosing X-ray Pictures,’ in Michelene T H Chi, Robert Glaser and 
Marshall J Farr (eds), The Nature of Expertise (Erlbaum, 1988) 311 
Levelt, Willem J M, Ardi Roelofs and Antje s Meyer, ‘A Theory of Lexical Access in 
Speech Production’ (1999) 22 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 
Levitin, Daniel J, This is Your Brain on Music:  The Science of a Human Obsession 
(Plume/Penguin, 2007) 
Lipshitz, Raanan, Gary Klein, Judith Orasanu and Eduardo Salas, ‘Tacking Stock of 
Naturalistic Decision Making’ (2001) 14(5) Journal of Behavioural Decision Making 
331 
Logie, R H, ‘Visuo-Spatial Processing in Working Memory’ (1986) 23A Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 229 
Lundeberg, Mary A, Studying Understanding in Legal Case Analysis (Reading, Self-
Control Training, Metacognition) (PhD Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1985) 
Lundeberg, Mary A, ‘Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension:  Studying 
Understanding in Legal Case Analysis’ (1987) 22(4) Reading Research Quarterly 407 
290 
 
Lundgren-Laine, Helja and Sanna Salantra, ‘Think-Aloud Technique and Protocol 
Analysis in Clinical Decision-Making Research’ (2010) 20(4) Qualitative Health 
Research 565 
Maister, David, Managing The Professional Service Firm (Free Press, 1997) 
Makri, Stephann, Ann Blandford and Anna L Cox, ‘This is What I am Doing and Why:  
Methodological Reflections on a Naturalistic Think-Aloud Study of Interactive 
Information Behaviour’ (2011) 47 Information Processing and Management 336 
Malterud, K, ‘Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines’ (2001) 
Lancet 483 
Marchant, Garry, John Robinson, Urton Anderson and Michael Schadewald, 
‘Analogical Transfer and Expertise in Legal Reasoning’ (1991) 48 Organizational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 272 
McKinney, Ruth Ann, Reading Like A Lawyer: Time-Saving Strategies for Reading 
Like an Expert (Carolina Academic Press, 2
nd 
ed, 2012) 
McNeilage, Amy, ‘Universities Investigate MyMaster Cheating,’ Sydney Morning 
Herald, 18 November 2014 
Metzler, Jeffery, ‘The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing’ (2002-2003) 60 
University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 501 
Meyer, Antje, Linda Wheeldon and Mark Smith, Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2005) 
Middleton, H E, The Role of Visual Mental Imagery in Solving Complex Problems in 
Design (PhD Thesis, Griffith University, 1998) 
Mitchell, John B, ‘Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty 
Considers the Implications for Legal Education’ (1989) 39 Journal of Legal Education 
275 
Montgomery, H and C M Allwood, ‘On the Subjective Representation of Statistical 
Problems’ (1978) 22 Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 107 
Morris, Clarence, How Lawyers Think (Harvard University Press, 1937) 
Moxely, Jerad H, K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness and Ralf T Krampe, ‘The Role of 
Intuition and Deliberative Thinking in Experts’ Superior Tactical Decision-Making’ 
(2012) 124 Cognition 72 
Myers, D G, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils (Yale University Press, 2002) 
Newell, Allen and Herbert A Simon, Human Problem Solving (Prentice Hall, 1972) 
291 
 
New Zealand Commerce Commission, Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines 
(Commerce Commission, July 2013) 
Nievelstein, Fleurie, Tamara van Gog, Henny P A Boshuizen and Frans J Prins, 
‘Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological Knowledge in the Legal 
Domain’ (2008) 20(6) European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 1043 
Nievelstein, Fleurie, Tamara van Gog, Henny P A Boshuizen and Frans J Prins, 
‘Effects of Conceptual Knowledge and Availability of Information Sources on Law 
Student’s Legal Reasoning’ (2010) 38 Instructional Science 23 
Nievelstein, Fleurie, Tamara van Gog, Gijs van Dijck and Henny P A Boshuizen, 
‘Instructional Support for Novice Law Students: Reducing Search Processes and 
Explaining Concepts in Cases’ (2011) 25 Applied Cognitive Psychology 408 
Nodine, C F, H L Kundel, S C Lauver and L C Toto, ‘Nature of Expertise in Searching 
Mammograms for Breast Masses’ (1996) 3 Academic Radiology 1000 
Nodine, Calvin F, Harold L Kundel, Claudia Mello-Thoms, Susan P Weinstein, Susan 
G Orel, Daniel C Sullivan and Emily F Conant, ‘How Experience and Training 
Influence Mammography Expertise’ (1999) 6(10)  Academic Radiology  575 
Norman, Geoffrey R, Donald Rosenthal, Lee R Brooks, Scott W Allen and Linda J 
Muzzin, ‘The Development of Expertise in Dermatology’ (1989) 125 Archives of 
Dermatology 1063 
Oates, Laurel Currie, ‘Beating the Odds: Reading Strategies of Law Students Admitted 
Through Alternative Admissions Programs’ (1997-1998) 83 Iowa Law Review 139 
Oates, Laurel Currie, ‘Leveling the Playing Field:  Helping Students Succeed by 
Helping Them Learn to Read as Expert Lawyers’ (2006) 80 St John’s Law Review 227 
Ohlsson, S, The Cognitive Seminar: Report No 6 – Competence and Strategy in 
Reasoning with Common Spatial Concepts (University of Stockholm, 1980) 
Okamoto, Karl S, ‘Teaching Transactional Lawyering’ (2009) 1 Drexel Law Review 69 
Oskamp, S, ‘Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments’ (1965) 29 Journal of 
Consulting Psychology 261 
Palasota, Anthony, ‘Expertise and the Law: Some Recent Findings from the Cognitive 
Sciences About Complex Human Information Processing’ (1990-1991) 16 Thurgood 
Marshall Law Review 599 
Pasupathi, M, U M Staudinger and P B Baltes, ‘Seeds of Wisdom:  Adolescent’s 
Knowledge and Judgment About Difficult Life Problems’ (2001) 37 Developmental 
Psychology 351  
292 
 
Patel, Vimla, G J Groen and C H Frederiksen, ‘Differences Between Medical Students 
and Doctors in Memory for Clinical Cases’ (1986) 20(1) Medical Education 3 
Patel, V L, G J Groen and J F Arocha, ‘Medical Expertise as a Function of Task 
Difficulty’ (1990) 18(4) Memory & Cognition 394 
Patel, Vimla L and Guy J Groen, ‘The General and Specific Nature of Medical 
Expertise: A Critical Look’ in K Anders Ericsson and Jacqui Smith (eds), Toward a 
General Theory of Expertise: Prospects and Limits (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
93 
Patel, V L and G J Groen, ‘Developmental Accounts of the Transition from Medical 
Student to Doctor:  Some Problems and Suggestions’ (1991) 25(6) Medical Education 
527 
Patel, V L and D R Kaufman, ‘Clinical Reasoning and Biomedical Knowledge:  
Implications for Teaching,’ in J Higgs and M Jones (eds) Clinical Reasoning in the 
Health Professions (Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, 1995) 117 
Pemberton, John De J, ‘National Law Student Conference: The Conference Report,’ 
(1948-49) 1 Journal of Legal Education 73 
Perkins, David N, ‘Reasoning as Imagination’ (1985) 16 Interchange 14 
Pfaff, Mark S, Gary L Klein, Jill L Drury, Sung Pil Moon, Yikun Liu and Steven O 
Entezari, ‘Supporting Complex Decision Making Through Option Awareness’ (2013) 
7(2) Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 155 
Pink, Daniel H, Drive:  The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us (Riverhead 
Books, 2011) 
Polanyi, Michael, The Tacit Dimension (Doubleday, 1966) 
Polanyi, Michael, The Tacit Dimension (Doubleday, 1973) 
Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(University of Chicago Press, 1974) 
Popper, K, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchison, 1959) 
Posner, Richard, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 2008) 
Raab, M and J G Johnson, ‘Expertise-Based Differences in Search and Option-
Generation Strategies’ (2007) 13 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 158 
Rapoport, Nancy B, ‘Is “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Really What We Want to Teach?’ 
(2002) 1 Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors 91 
Rodriguez, Sheila, 'Using Feedback Theory to Help Novice Legal Writers Develop 
Expertise' (2008-2009) 86 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 207 
293 
 
Romantz, David S and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental Skill 
(Carolina Academic Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 
Ross, Karol G, Jennifer L Shafer and Gary Klein, ‘Professional Judgments and 
“Naturalistic Decision Making,”’ in K Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J 
Feltovich and Robert R Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 403 
Round, D, ‘Market Definition – A Matter of Fact, Commercial Commonsense or 
Economic Principles?’ in A Bollard (ed), The Economics of the Commerce Act (New 
Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 1989) 20 
Saariluomo, P, ‘Apperception and Restructuring in Chess Players’ Problem Solving,’ in 
K Gilhooly, M T G Keane, R H Logie and G Erdos (eds), Lines of Thinking: 
Reflections of the Psychology of Thought (John Wiley & Sons, 1990)  
Sanson, Michelle, ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer’ (2006) International Bar Association 
Conference Newsletter 
Sanson, Michelle, Thalia Anthony and David Worswick, Connecting with Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2010) 
Sargent, S S, ‘Thinking Processes at Various Levels of Difficulty’ (1940) Archives of 
Psychology 249 
Scandura, J M, ‘Problem Solving in Schools and Beyond: Transitions from the Naïve to 
the Neophyte to the Master’ (1981) 16(3) Educational Psychologist 139 
Schauer, Frederick, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning 
(Harvard University Press, 2009, reprint 2012) 
Schmidt, H G, G R Norman and H P A Boshuizen, ‘A Cognitive Perspective on 
Medical Expertise: Theory and Implications’ (1990) 65(10) Academic Medicine 611 
Schmidt, H G and P A Boshuizen, ‘On Acquiring Expertise in Medicine’ (1993) 5 
Educational Psychology Review 205 
Schneider, W, ‘Training High Performance Skills: Fallacies and Guidelines’ (1985) 
27(3) Human Factors 285 
Schraagen, Jan Maarten, ‘How Experts Solve a Novel Problem in Experimental 
Design’ (1993) 17(2) Cognitive Science 285 
Schwalbe, Ulrich and Daniel Zimmer, Law and Economics in European Merger 
Control (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
Schweickert, R, A M Burton, N K Taylor, E N Corlett, N R Shadbolt and A P 
Hedgecock, ‘Comparing Knowledge Elicitation Techniques:  A Case Study’ (1987) 1 
Artificial Intelligence Review 245 
294 
 
Senger, Charles J, Learning Legal Reasoning in Law School:  The Differences Between 
First and Third Year Students (PhD Thesis, Michigan State University, 1989) 
Senger, Charles J, ‘Thinking Aloud Protocols: A Diagnostic Tool for Teaching Legal 
Problem Solving’ (1993) 10 Thomas M Cooley Law Review 367 
Shadbolt, N R and A M Burton, ‘Kowledge Elicitation Elicitation Techniques:  Some 
Experimental Results,’ in KL McGraw and CR Westphal, Readings in Knowledge 
Acquisition (Ellis Horwood,1990)  
Shenk, David, The Genius in All of Us:  Why Everything You’ve Been Told about 
Genetics, Talent and IQ is Wrong (Image Books, 2010) 
Sherr, Avrom, ‘The Value of Experience in Legal Competence’ (2000) 7(2) 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 95 
Simon, D P and H A Simon, ‘Individual Differences in Solving Physics Problems,’ in 
R Siegler (ed) Children’s Thinking:  What Develops? (Erlbaum, 1978) 325 
Simon, H A and W G Chase, ‘Skill in Chess’ (1973) 61 American Scientist 394  
Smith, C O, The Structure of Intellect Processes Analyses Systems: A Technique for the 
Investigation and Qualification of Problem Solving Processes (PhD Thesis, University 
of Houston, 1971) 
Smith, J and P B Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge:  Age/Cohort Differences in 
Response to Life-Planning Problems,’ (1990) 26 Developmental Psychology 494 
Smith, J, U M Staudinger and P B Baltes, ‘Occupational Settings Facilitating Wisdom-
Related Knowledge:  The Sample Case of Clinical Psychologists’ (1994) 62 Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 989 
Smith, R and J Walker, ‘Australian Trade Practices and the Emerging Role of 
“Commercial Reality” Versus Substitution in Market Definition’ (1997) 5 Competition 
& Consumer Law Journal 1 
Spence, Michael, ‘Job Market Signaling’ (1973) 87(3) The Quaterly Journal of 
Economics 355 
Stanovich, Keith E and Richard F West, ‘Individual Differences in Reasoning:  
Implications for the Rationality Debate?’ (2000) 23 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 645 
Stanovich, K E and R F West, ‘Individual Differences in Reasoning:  Implications for 
the Rationality Debate’ in T Gilovich, D Griffin and D Kahneman (eds), Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 421 
Staudinger, U M, J Smith and P B Baltes, ‘Wisdom-Related Knowledge in a Life 
Review Task:  Age Differences and the Role of Professional Specialization’ (1992) 7 
Psychology and Aging 271 
295 
 
Staudinger, Ursula M, Jacqui Smith and Paul B Baltes, Manual for the Assessment of 
Wisdom-Related Knowledge (Max Planck Institute for Human Development and 
Education, 1994) 
Sternberg, Robert J, ‘Words to the Wise About Wisdom:  A Commentary of Ardelt’s 
Crtique of Baltes’ (2004) 47 Human Development 286 
Sternberg, Robert J, ‘What Do We Know About Tacit Knowledge? Making the Tacit 
Become Explicit,’ in Robert J Sternberg and Joseph A Horvath (eds), Tacit Knowledge 
in Professional Practice: Researcher and Practitioner Perspectives (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1999) 
Sternberg, R J and P A Frensch, ‘On Being an Expert: A Cost Benefit Analysis,’ in R R 
Hoffman (ed), The Psychology of Expertise: Cognitive Research and Empirical AI 
(Springer Verlag, 1992) 191 
Stratman, James F, ‘Contract Disclaimers in ERISA Summary Plan Documents: A 
Deceptive Practice?’ (1988) 10 Industrial Relations Law Journal 350 
Stratman, James F, ‘The Emergence of Legal Composition as a Field of Inquiry:  
Evaluating the Prospects’ (1990) 60(2) Review of Educational Research 153 
Stratman, James F, ‘Adversarial and Scholarly Theories of the Appellate Court Brief:  
Implications for Appeal Court Judges and Their Staff Attorney’s as Audiences,’ in D 
Roen and G Kirsch (eds), A Sense of Audience in Written Communication (Sage, 1990) 
115 
Stratman, James F, ‘Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse in Real 
Time:  Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs’ (1994) 17 
Discourse Processes 1 
Stratman, James F, ‘When Law Students Read Cases: Exploring Relations Between 
Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection’ (2002) 34(1) Discourse 
Processses 57 
Stratman, James F, ‘How Legal Analysts Negotiate Indeterminacy of Meaning in 
Common Law Rules:  Toward a Synthesis of Linguistic and Cognitive Approaches to 
Investigation’ (2004) 24 Language & Communication 23 
Stromso, Helge I and Ivar Braten, ‘Norwegian Law Students’ Use of Multiple Sources 
While Reading Expository Texts’ (2002) 37(2) Reading Research Quarterly 208 
Susskind, Richard, The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information 
Technology (Oxford University Press, 1998) 
Susskind, Richard, The End of Lawyers?  Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 
296 
 
Susskind, Richard, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
Syed, Matthew, Bounce: Mozart, Federer, Picasso, Beckham and the Science of 
Success (Harper Perennial, 2011) 
Taleb, Nassim N, The Black Swan:  The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Penguin 
Books, 2007) 
Taleb, Nassim N, Antifragile:  How to Live in a World We Don’t Understand (Allen 
Lane, 2012) 
Topolinski, S and F Strack, ‘The Architecture of Intuition:  Fluency and Affect 
Determine Intuitive Judgments of Semantic and Visual Coherence and Judgments of 
Grammaticality in Artificial Grammar Learning’ (2009) 138 Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 39 
Tordesillas, R S and S Chaiken, ‘Thinking Too Much of Too Little?  The Effects of 
Introspection on the Decision-Making Process’ (1999) 25 Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 623 
Toulmin, S, The Philosophy of Science (Hutchison, 1953) 
Tversky, A and D Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ 
(1974) 185 Science 1124 
Tversky, A and D Kahneman, ‘Extensional vs Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction 
Fallacy in Probability Judgment’ (1983) 90 Psychological Review 293 
Tversky, A and D Kahneman, ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model’ (1991) 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1039 
Van der Maas, H L J and E-J Wagenmakers, ‘A Psychometric Analysis of Chess 
Expertise’ (2005) 118 American Journal of Psychology 29 
Vandevelde, Kenneth J, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 
(Westview Press, 1996) 
Van Someren, M W, Y F Barnard and J A C Sandberg, The Think Aloud Method: A 
Practical Guide to Modeling Cognitive Processes (Academic Press, 1994) 
Voss, James F, Telly R Greene, Timothy R Post and Barbara C Penner, ‘Problem-
Solving Skill in the Social Sciences,’ in Gordon H Bower (ed) The Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation (New York, 1983) 165 
Voss, J F, G Vesonder and H Spilich, ‘Test Generation and Recall by High-Knowledge 
and Low-Knowledge Individuals’ (1980) 19 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior 651 
297 
 
Wade, John, ‘Meet MIRAT: Legal Reasoning Fragmented into Learnable Chunks’ 
(1990-1991) 2 Legal Education Review 283 
Watson, J B, ‘Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?’ (1920) 11 
British Journal of Psychology 87 
Watson, J B, Behaviorism (The University of Chicago Press, 1930) 
Weinstein, Ian, ‘Lawyering in the State of Nature:  Instinct and Automaticity in Legal 
Problem Solving’ (1998-1999) 23 Vermont Law Review 1 
Whish, Richard and David Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 7
th
 
Edition 2012) 
Wilson, T D and J W Schooler, ‘Thinking Too Much:  Introspection Can Reduce the 
Quality of Preferences and Decisions (1991) 60 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 181 
Wilson, T D, S D Hodges and S J LaFleur, ‘Effects of Introspecting About Reasons:  
Inferring Attitudes from Accessible Thoughts’ (1995) 69 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 16 
Witteman, Cilia L M and John H L van den Bercken, ‘Intermediate Effects in 
Psychodiagnostic Classification’ (2007) 23(1) European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment 56 
Wojcik, Mark E, ‘Add an E to Your IRAC’ (2006-2007) 35 Student Lawyer 26 
Yang, Shu Ching, ‘Reconceptualizing Think-Aloud Methodology:  Refining the 
Encoding and Categorizing Techniques via Contextualized Perspectives’ (2003) 19 
Computers in Human Behavior 95 
 
B  Cases 
Bertelsman SE & Co. KGaA and Pearson plc (File Number 14007, 20 December 2012, 
Cleared 19 March 2013) Decision Number [2013] NZCC 6 
Bligh Finance Limited and Hire Equipment Group Limited (Hirepool/Hirequip) (File 
Number 13913, 16 October 2012, Cleared 21 February 2013) Decision Number [2013] 
NZCC 2 
Brambles Industries Limited – completed acquisition of CEVA Limited’s Pallecon 
business (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Informal Review 50545, 
Date Commenced 19 March 2013, Date Completed 24 May 2013) 
298 
 
Perry Metal Protection Limited/ CSP Coating Systems (24 December 2012, withdrawn 
24 May 2013), New Zealand Commerce Commission – Statement of Preliminary 
Issues, 25 January 2013. 
Re Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission [1990] FCA 473 
Re Queensland Co-Operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) ATPR 40-012 
Rocla Pty Ltd – proposed acquisition of Beresford Concrete Products Pty Ltd 
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Informal Review 51157, Date 
Commenced 23 April 2013, Date Completed 19 June 2013) 
Ruralco Holdings Limited – proposed acquisition of Elders Rural Services Limited 
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Informal Review 50798, Date 
Commenced 19 March 2013, Date Completed 30 May 2013) 
Toll Holdings Limited – proposed acquisition of Linfox Trans-Bass business 
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Informal Review 50982, Date 
Commenced 22 March 2013, Date Completed 30 May 2013) 
Trade Practices Commission v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 299 
 
C  Legislation 
Commerce Act 1986 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
Legal Profession Act 2004  
299 
 
APPENDIX A – PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Q1 For how many years have you been: 
 (a)  Working as a lawyer or economist (eg years post-admission or 
certification); and 
 (b)  Working as a specialist competition law professional? 
 
Q2 (a)  What kinds or types of competition law matters: 
 (i) do you mainly work on at present; and  
(ii) have you mainly worked on in the past? 
 (b)  Approximately what percentage of your billable time over the last 12 
months was spent on competition law matters? 
 
Q3 Have you ever worked in a competition authority? If so: 
 (a)  Which authority; 
 (b)  During which period(s); and 
 (c)  In which areas or divisions predominantly? 
 
Q4 (a)  Have you ever undertaken post-graduate studies in competition law or 
competition economics?  If so: 
 (i) what was the course of study; and  
(ii) when and where did you undertake it? 
 (b)  Have you ever been an instructor or lecturer in such a course?  If so, 
please provide brief details of where and when. 
 (c)  Have you written any instructional or reference material in this area?  If 
so, in what form? and 
 (d)  How much time, on average, would you spend each week reading 
reference materials like decided court cases, annotated legislation, or 
topical articles written by other lawyers or academics? 
 
Q5 How many merger-related matters were you involved in during: 
 (a)  The last 12 months; 
 (b)  The last five years; and 
 (c)  Your professional career to date? 
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APPENDIX B – TEST-CASE SUMMARIES 
 
A  Case A – Rocla/BCP 
This case concerned Rocla Pty Ltd’s proposed acquisition of Beresford Concrete 
Products Pty Ltd (‘BCP’).651  The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(‘ACCC’) identified the relevant industry in which to consider the competitive effects 
of the transaction as ‘construction.’  Public review of the case began on 23 April 2013 
and was completed 57 calendar days (or 27 review days
652
) later on 19 June 2013.   
Rocla, a business owned by a New Zealand conglomerate, supplied a wide range of 
concrete infrastructure products used for constructing storm-water drainage systems, 
sewers, bridges, earth retention works, steel corrugated pipeline products and railway 
sleepers.  Its customers included local government authorities, civil contractors and 
building developers.  At the time of its application for merger clearance, Rocla operated 
14 manufacturing and sales sites located in the Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales (‘NSW’), Queensland (‘QLD’), South Australia, Victoria and Western 
Australia.
653
 
The target company, BCP, was a manufacturer of precast concrete products which it 
supplied to customers in NSW and QLD.  These products were ‘used for a range of 
applications, including for drainage, sewers, service access, environmental applications, 
roads, building products, metal products and recreational construction projects.’654  
BCP’s customer base included large and small civil construction companies, as well as 
plumbers.  It had three manufacturing sites in NSW and QLD. 
The proposed acquisition was an asset sale consisting of the transfer of leases over 
BCP’s three manufacturing premises at Charmhaven, Moorebank and Yatala, and the 
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transfer of licence agreements, supply agreements, intellectual property, works in 
progress, outstanding orders, inventories and fixed assets. 
The ACCC decided not to oppose the transaction on the grounds that it would be 
unlikely to substantially lessen competition ‘in the QLD and NSW markets for the 
supply of box culverts … [or] drainage pits.’655  It also dismissed any potential 
competition concerns over so-called conglomerate effects whereby the merged entity 
might have the opportunity to ‘bundle or tie supply of box culverts and drainage pits 
(and/or other precast concrete products).’656  These conclusions were based on the 
continuing competitive constraints from major competitors, low barriers to entry and 
expansion, customer countervailing power, and the pre-existing potential of another 
competitor to bundle similar products which had not led to any market foreclosure 
issues. 
B  Case B – Toll/Linfox Trans-Bass 
This case concerned Toll Holdings Limited’s proposed acquisition of the Linfox Trans-
Bass business.
657
  The ACCC identified the relevant market in which to consider the 
competitive effects of the transaction as ‘freight forwarding.’  Public review of the case 
began on 22 March 2013 and was completed 69 calendar days (or 38 review days) later 
on 30 May 2013.   
Toll was described as ‘a global provider of integrated logistics, employing around 
45,000 people via a network of 1200 sites in 55 countries.’  The focus of the review, 
however, was on two aspects of Toll’s business.  First, Toll’s operation (via a joint 
venture with ANL Container Line) of a shipping service in the form of Bass Strait 
Shipping Services connecting the island state of Tasmania with mainland Australia.   
The cargo carried by this operation included ‘road trailers, industrial mobiles and heavy 
lifts, trucks, light commercial vehicles and cars.’  The second aspect was the 
company’s subsidiary, Toll Tasmania, which provided freight forwarding services 
between Tasmania and the Mainland, and which used the services of Toll ANL.   
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Linfox Trans-Bass was described as providing ‘logistics services across the Asia 
Pacific region.’  While not involved in providing any shipping service between 
Tasmania and mainland Australia, it did provide freight forwarding services between 
these places, operating both within Tasmania and between Tasmania and the Mainland 
centres of Melbourne and Sydney.  Its customers were described as including 
businesses in the Tasmanian ‘food and beverage industry, building industry and 
retailers.’  The kinds of products it forwarded included ‘glass containers, timber and 
steel, fresh produce and consumer goods.’ 
In its background description, the ACCC stated explicitly that both the acquirer and 
target in this transaction provided ‘freight forwarding services between Tasmania and 
mainland Australia.’  However, no revenue or industry figures were provided in the 
letter.  Nor was there any mention of other competitors that may have been operating in 
relevant markets. 
After assessing the likely competitive effects of the transaction in ‘the market for the 
supply of freight forwarding services between Tasmania and the mainland Australia’ 
and ‘the market for the supply of Bass Strait shipping services,’ the ACCC concluded 
there was no material competition concern in either market.
658
  This was because of the 
strength of remaining competitors post-merger, which the ACCC believed would not be 
materially adversely affected by the transaction proceeding.  In other words, the ACCC 
was satisfied that there would be sufficient competitive constraint on the merged entity 
to guard against price rises and reductions in service quality and availability. 
C  Case C – Brambles/Pallecon 
This case concerned Brambles Industries Limited’s completed acquisition of CEVA 
Limited’s Pallecon business.659  The ACCC identified the relevant industry in which to 
consider the competitive effects of the transaction as ‘bulk storage / transport products.’  
Public review of the case began on 19 March 2013 and was completed 66 calendar days 
(or 38 review days) later on 24 May 2013. 
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The acquirer and target in this case were given only a cursory description in the ACCC 
market inquiry letter.  Brambles was described as ‘a global provider of pallets, crates 
and containers using the CHEP and IFCO brands.’  Pallecon was described as ‘a 
leading provider of intermediate bulk container (IBC) solutions in Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand.  In Australia, Pallecon trades as CEVA Logistics and supplies IBCs 
using the brands Pallecon, Maxicon, Haztainers and CEVA bins.’  The area of primary 
overlap between these businesses as identified by the ACCC was ‘the supply of hire 
IBCs.’ 
The transaction itself had already been completed inasmuch as it ‘was part of an 
international acquisition in which Brambles and/or its related bodies corporate acquired 
all of the shares of Pallecon companies based in the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Australia.’   
The ACCC decided not to continue its investigation of this completed transaction on 
the basis that after identifying a ‘container market’ consisting of collapsible IBCs, rigid 
IBCs (both new and reconditioned), flexible IBCs, cardboard IBCs and drums (both 
new and reconditioned), there were many alternatives to the products supplied by the 
merger parties.
660
   In this context, the ACCC characterized the market as differentiated 
with ‘a large number of alternative suppliers offering a wide variety of substitutes’ 
which would remain post-merger. It also dismissed concerns that Bramble’s market 
power in the pallet segment of the industry might be used to leverage foreclosure in the 
market through bundling or tying strategies. 
D  Case D – Ruralco 
This case concerned Ruralco Holdings Limited’s proposed acquisition of Elders Rural 
Services Limited.
661
  The ACCC identified the relevant industry in which to consider 
the competitive effects of the transaction as ‘agricultural products.’  Public review of 
the case began on 19 March 2013 and was completed 72 calendar days (or 39 review 
days) later on 30 May 2013. 
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Ruralco, a publicly listed agribusiness company, was involved in the wholesaling, 
retailing and provision of ‘expertise and services in rural merchandise, livestock 
agency, fertilizer, seed, wool, real estate, soft commodity risk management, grain 
marketing services, water solutions and water broking, finance and insurance.’  It had 
97 rural merchandise stores and was a wholesale supplier to 299 independent rural 
merchandise outlets.  For the previous reporting period, its annual sales revenue was 
AUD1.136 billion with a net profit of tax of AUD13.8 million. 
Elders was also a publicly listed company, but the target business was just one of its 
three operating divisions, the one concerned with rural services.  This business 
involved the retailing of agri-products, the provision of livestock agency services, wool 
broking and rural real-estate services.  Unlike Ruralco, Elders did not provide any 
wholesale services to independent agri-products retailers.  It owned 213 rural 
merchandise stores and had annual sales of AUD1.3 billion with a net profit of 
AUD29.5 million. 
The ACCC’s assessment – which concluded with a decision not to oppose any aspect 
of the transaction – considered local retail markets, state-based livestock markets, 
regional wool-broking markets, the market for the supply of water broking and trading 
services, and state-based real estate agency markets.
662
  In relation to the overlap of 
rural merchandise stores in local towns, the ACCC identified significant competitive 
constraints in the form of alternative suppliers in neighbouring towns and regions, and 
found that independent retailers would still have viable sources of wholesale supplies 
effectively constraining the merged entity from raising prices or diminishing services.   
It was similarly considered that there would continue to exist strong competitors in the 
markets for livestock services, wool broking services, water broking and trading 
services, and real estate agency services. 
E  Cases E, F and G – Perry Metal, Penguin and Hirepool 
The fifth, sixth and seventh test cases in this study were clearance applications under 
consideration by the New Zealand Commerce Commission (‘CC’).  Unlike the 
Australian informal clearance process that operated in the first four test cases, the CC’s 
assessment was part of a formal statutory process under section 66 of the Commerce 
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Act 1986.  In all relevant substantive aspects, however, the assessment task involved 
the same kind of legal and applied economic analysis.  
Case E concerned Perry Metal Protection Limited’s (‘PMP’) proposed acquisition of 
CSP Coating Systems (‘CSP’).663  The CC identified the relevant industry in which to 
consider the competitive effects of the transaction as ‘galvanising.’  There was no final 
determination in this case, however, as PMP’s application for clearance, which was 
lodged by PMP on 24 December 2012, was withdrawn on 24 May 2013.
664
 
The proposal, which was set out in the CC’s Statement of Preliminary Issues dated 25 
January 2013, was that ‘PMP would acquire the Auckland and Christchurch 
galvanizing businesses carried on by CSP … [while at the same time undertaking] to 
divest assets in the South Island.’665  The galvanizing process at the core of these 
businesses was ‘hot-dip galvanizing [a process which] protects steel from corrosion by 
immersing the steel in molten zinc creating a protective coating layer.’666 
The merger parties had argued that the CC should focus first on a North Island market 
where PMP operated four galvanizing plants in Auckland, Hamilton, Tauranga and 
Wellington, but where CSP – a division of Fletcher Steel – appears to have had only 
one plant, in Auckland.  They then identified a South Island market, where the parties 
‘each own one of the only two galvanizing plants in the South Island,’ both in 
Christchurch.
667
  PMP’s offer to divest assets in the South Island was ostensibly made 
to address any concerns the Commission may have had in this second market. 
Case F concerned an application by Bertelsmann SE & Co (‘Bertelsmann’) and Pearson 
plc (‘Pearson’) for clearance of a jointly-owned company to be called Penguin Random 
House, which would acquire the retail book publishing businesses of Random House 
and Penguin (which companies were at the time independently owned by Bertelsmann 
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and Pearson, respectively).
668
  This was part of a global transaction, the Australian 
aspects of which were cleared by the ACCC on 8 March 2013.
669
  The CC published its 
decision on 19 March 2013.
670
 
In deciding to clear the transaction, the CC considered likely competitive effects in the 
areas of trade book publishing, the supply of trade book distribution services and the 
supply of books to retailers.
671
  The CC concluded that the merged entity would be 
effectively constrained by existing competition from other publishers, that the merger 
would have a negligible effect in terms of increasing the market power of the parties in 
the trade book distribution services market, and that other suppliers and the 
countervailing power of purchasers would continue to be a constraint in the market for 
the supply of books. 
Case G concerned Bligh Finance Limited’s proposed acquisition of Hire Equipment 
Group Limited (‘Hire Equip’), which provided general construction, building and DIY 
equipment hire services.
672
  Bligh Finance already owned the Hirepool rental business 
which essentially provided the same kinds of services.  Hirepool operated 46 branches 
and Hirequip operated 36 branches, all throughout New Zealand. 
In deciding to clear this transaction, the CC concluded that ‘the merged entity would be 
constrained in each sub-regional market by the presence of existing competitors, low 
barriers to entry and/or the countervailing power of large customers.’673  This 
assessment was based on the view that the main area of overlap between the merger 
parties was in the hire of building construction and maintenance equipment. 
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APPENDIX C – TIME AND TASK ANALYSIS: EXAMPLE TRANSCRIPT 
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TIME AND TASK ANALYSIS 
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00:00 
00:10 
Okay, Brambles.  Another market-inquiry letter … Pallecon and Brambles - 
sounds like it's going to be with pallets 
16 
(96) 
●   
00:10 
00:20 
and I'm reading through … Yes, it's an acquisition by Brambles, which is a large, 
very large company … The [other] company I've never heard of … Pallecon 
25 
(150) 
●   
00:20 
00:30 
I'm interested in find out what it is … Provides intermediate bulk container 
solutions.  I don't actually know what that is … and I've never heard of any of 
those 
28 
(168) 
●   
00:30 
00:40 
Brands … The overlap is identified as being "hiring," so we're in a market where 
a particular storage, type of storage mechanism is 
22 
(132) 
●   
00:40 
00:50 
Hired … which I know is what Brambles does … They've already completed as 
part of an international acquisition … and so 
19 
(114) 
●   
00:50 
01:00 
the Commission is looking at it after the facts to see if it has any issues … and I'm 
just looking at the dates … it's actually several months after the fact, which is 
interesting … 
33 
(198) 
●   
01:00 
01:10 
Probably suggests that they've had a complaint because otherwise it wouldn't 
have done anything about it after so long.  They would have known about it 
before then 
27 
(162) 
 ●  
01:10 
01:20 
probably in some way … and [the] usual blurb which I don't need to look at … 
and this one's Davy [David Jones, the signatory to the letter] … and then I'm 
going to Attachment A 
26 
(156) 
●   
01:20 
01:30 
Don't know who I am [in response to question 1 which asks parties to describe 
their business] … It's asking me a very general question about whether my 
business competes with anything that either of Brambles 
23 
(138) 
●   
01:30 
01:40 
or Pallecon does for IBCs … what type of thing I produce, whether it's for sale or 
hire … so a very general question about who's involved in the market 
28 
(168) 
●   
01:40 
01:50 
if we're a customer, it's asking what we acquire … doesn't sound like it's 
particularly directed to anything … it's asking a very general question about 
24 
(144) 
●   
01:50 
02:00 
the nature of competition between the two companies, which have already 
merged … and switching and so on, which we're not necessarily 
21 
(126) 
●   
02:00 
02:10 
going to know about other than for ourselves if we're a customer … "Please 
identify the competitors ..." [question 5] … So doesn't sound like it's been driven 
by a submission from the merger 
29 
(174) 
●   
02:10 
02:20 
Entities … it's been driven by a complaint or some information, but it's all 
questions of a very general nature … Product areas, it's asking about 
24 
(144) 
 ●  
02:20 
02:30 
what the products that the entities provide, what they're substitutable with … 
So it indicates the Commission doesn't know a lot about what it's talking about 
25 
(150) 
 ●  
02:30 
02:40 
It's asking in various, various different ways … and it's asking about switching 
between hiring and buying 
16 
(96) 
●   
02:40 
02:50 
the product … so it's asking really, in essence, whether there's a constraint from 
a customer to be able to buy something as opposed to being able to hire it 
29 
(174) 
●   
02:50 
03:00 
which would act as a constraint on the merged entity … it's asking a very general 
question about barriers to entry for someone to come in and commence hiring 
30 
(180) 
●   
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these things 
03:00 
03:10 
countervailing power [question 9], it's a stupid question to ask if you're asking it 
of a customer or competitor, really … it's something you can't get a lot of 
information 
27 
(162) 
●   
03:10 
03:20 
about from the market … it's been written by a graduate … imports, I don't 
understand why imports would be relevant 
19 
(114) 
 ●  
03:20 
03:30 
if you're considering hiring, because I can't imagine that imports - that there are 
people overseas who are hiring things like this into Australia, 
23 
(138) 
 ●  
03:30 
03:40 
so that's probably a question related to whether or not sales are a constraint 
rather than imports.  Doesn't seem to be a very sensible question … And other 
more general ... So 
30 
(180) 
 ●  
03:40 
03:50 
how much is this transaction in danger? … Not at all … They're questions of a 
very general nature … They look like they're designed to assuage some 
complainant … They're being asked 
29 
(174) 
  ● 
03:50 
04:00 
some time after the fact about an international merger … The Commission 
probably doesn't have a lot to say about … It has in its usual fashion asserted 
section 
27 
(162) 
  ● 
04:00 
04:10 
50 jurisdiction as opposed to section 50 capital 'A' jurisdiction, which is what it 
really has in respect of mergers which don't involve an acquisition of shares in 
28 
(168) 
  ● 
04:10 
04:20 
an Australian company … and this sounds like it's a, an international transaction 
… That creates another whole level of protection for the entities, because the 
Commission actually can't do 
28 
(168) 
  ● 
04:20 
04:30 
that much about it if it falls under section 50 capital 'A' … so I would be advising 
the parties in half an hour that they really don't have anything to worry about, 
subject to finding out some more information 
39 
(234) 
  ● 
 
 
